这何止是多啊 台湾总人口2300多万 但是脆用户竟然有9486万 再也别说台湾少子化了 隐形人口可多着呢

感觉中国就是一个没那么坏也没那么好的国家

我这个帖子是写来回复上面这个帖子的

鉴于本sub应该有不少天龙人和红色权贵在视奸，我先声明，这个帖子就不是写给你们看的

你们作为权贵天龙人也没必要用宏大叙事和生活便利来据理力争

众所周知，中国的特权阶级无论在哪个国家都能过得很好，因为特权阶级本身就是规则的制定者，或者有足够的资源去搞定关系，或者凭借身份就能够在目前的合法渠道内成功维权

但是，对家里不是特权阶级的中产小留来说，评价国内和国外到底哪边更适合生活，最重要的标准不是国家强盛程度和GDP，也不是工资、房价、教育、医疗或者美食，而是一个更现实的问题

就是当你作为一个普通老百姓遭遇不公、利益受损的时候，你能不能通过现有的合法渠道成功维权

因为对于没有背景、没有关系、没有政治权力的中产阶级来说，真正决定生活质量的，不是顺风顺水的时候，而是倒霉的时候

比如租房押金被房东乱扣、公司拖欠工资、商家欺诈、买到烂尾楼、政府部门行政失误、学校乱收费、保险拒赔、合同违约、甚至在路上被有背景的人撞了等等等等这一系列狗屁倒灶的事情

这些事情其实在任何国家都可能发生，因为没有哪个社会可以做到零纠纷。

真正拉开差距的是，当事情发生以后，有没有一套普通人也能走得通的维权机制。

这几年发生的事让我意识到，国内中产真正的困境，不是权益受到侵害，而是在维权过程中面临巨大的成本和压力。

比如我最近在李老师那里看到的这几个案例

第一个案例

“浙金中心”爆雷后，受害投资人在浙江省政府外和平聚集要求兑付。

然而政府非但没有追责金融诈骗责任方，反而以“聚众扰乱公共场所秩序罪”刑事拘留了维权代表。

其中一名受害者是大学老师、在读博士，目前已被关押在看守所超半年并起诉至法院，她八十岁的外婆在维权群里血泪控诉求助无门。

第二个案例

一家北京咖啡馆被央企下属房东提前解约。

在没有任何沟通的情况下，房东委托的商管公司凌晨撬锁、砸毁店门、把店内所有物品打包装车拖走。

店主报警，对方诬陷店主不付租金，警方当作“商业纠纷”不予立案

店主将店内监控视频发到小红书申冤，相关内容迅速被平台限流封杀。

第三个案例

北京有一位37 岁的电子工程师，在连续加班 140 天后过劳猝死。

丧事还没办完，公司就迅速撤销其权限、办理离职、封存/擦除电脑日志，甚至称“出事当天没开机”。

因无法获取工作记录，相关部门直接下发《不予认定工伤决定书》，家属只能一边B站申冤，一边准备行政复议材料，想通过法律途径继续维权。

第四个案例

某公司离职员工在李老师的996 ICU的表格里填上了前公司“每晚 10:30 下班、周六默认加班”的真实情况。

信息发布不到 12 小时，警察直接上门将他刑事拘留，罪名是“寻衅滋事”。

我特意选取这几个案例，因为这几个案例的当事人都不是底层，都是按部就班考学工作、家有薄资的城市中产

这几个案例的当事人在没有遭遇不公的时候，也是能享受中国的人口红利的，每天点点外卖、逛逛街、刷刷剧，生活也是非常舒服的

但是当他们真正遇上事的时候，突然发现自己没有任何可以合理维权的合法渠道

我看了这些案例，看了李老师帖子底下的评论，也找不到任何一个能帮当事人解决问题的有效方法

在社交平台上发帖会被屏蔽封号限流，需要靠运气才能闹大引起舆情，找相关部门会被踢皮球，走司法程序周期长且成本高昂，甚至稍微声量大一点就可能成为被“维稳”的对象。

我换位思考了一下，如果我遇上了跟他们一样的事，我能想到的办法也就是去抖音举身份证申冤，然后翻墙把申冤视频投稿给李老师

只要没有人脉、没有特权、没有关系，在规则不透明的世界里，普通人就是最容易被牺牲的弱势群体。

本sub很多小留平时讨论国外生活，最喜欢比较的是工资、教育、房价、医疗、消费水平

这些不是说不重要，但我觉得，它们更多决定的是生活的上限。

而一个普通人的维权能力，决定的是生活的下限。

因为有权有势的红色权贵家庭毕竟是极少数，甚至连习仲勋和薄一波这样的中共元老家庭都会想方设法地把子孙后代送到国外去

大部分体制内高官也是人走茶凉，甚至连张又侠这样的勋贵受到清算时都是全程黑箱，一张蓝底白字通报就能立刻落马，根本没有公开公正的审判程序

工资收入影响的是生活水平，而能否依法维权，影响的是一个普通人最基本的安全感和尊严。

在国内这样一个没有法治公平和言论自由的环境里，家里有点小钱而没有政治权力的中产小留，在国内能取得的所谓高薪和体面，可以说都脆弱得不堪一击

In the 21st century, Taiwan is one of the world’s most developed economies. Its per capita income ranks among the highest globally, while its systems of healthcare, pensions, housing, and other forms of social welfare are also highly advanced.

Taiwan also takes pride in its high degree of freedom and democracy. It has shown considerable inclusiveness and care toward minority groups such as Indigenous peoples and LGBT communities, providing them with ample public visibility and opportunities to make their voices heard. Taiwan has also promoted efforts to restore the reputations of the victims of the February 28 Incident (二二八事件) and their families, provide compensation, and preserve historical memory. The Democratic Progressive Party (民主進步黨) government, along with some Taiwanese, has even commemorated and paid tribute to Taiwanese who served in the Japanese military during World War II, including some who were once classified as war criminals.

At first glance, Taiwan appears to be a prosperous society that safeguards civil rights, allows all social groups to speak freely and receive public attention, and embraces humanity, diversity, and inclusiveness.
Yet this is not the whole picture of Taiwan. For a long time, certain groups have been excluded from mainstream Taiwanese society. They have not fully shared in Taiwan’s prosperity and democracy, nor have their individual rights been adequately and comprehensively protected. Their voices have been deprived or weakened, and their circumstances remain largely unknown both within Taiwan and to the international community.

Among them, migrant workers (Yi gong, 移工) , Mainland Chinese spouses (“Lu pei,” 陆配), and Republic of China military veterans (“Rong min,” 荣民) are the three principal groups that have suffered severe injustice, endured extremely difficult lives, lacked a meaningful public voice, and remained on the margins of society. The issue of migrant workers—that is, foreign laborers—has already received attention from some Taiwanese media and is not the focus of this article. Instead, this article concentrates on the hardships and marginalization experienced by the veterans and Mainland Chinese spouses.

Republic of China military veterans officially designated as “Rongmin” refer to retired officers and soldiers of the Republic of China Armed Forces. However, in the narrower and more common public usage, “Rongmin” or “old Rongmin” primarily refers to veterans of the Republic of China Armed Forces who relocated from mainland China to Taiwan (that is, “senior veterans”,资深荣民), rather than those who were born in Taiwan, enlisted there, and later retired (“Taiwan-born veterans”, 在台入伍荣民). In this narrower sense, these veterans generally experienced both the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War, bid farewell to their families and hometowns before relocating to Taiwan, and subsequently lived through the Cold War confrontation across the Taiwan Strait while also contributing to Taiwan’s development.

Had these Republic of China soldiers not defended Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu, secured victory in the Battle of Kinmen (金门战役), and withstood the fierce assaults of the Chinese Communist forces, the Republic of China, which still governs Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu today, along with Taiwan’s freedom, prosperity, and human rights achievements, might no longer exist. Some of these veterans were wounded in battle and suffered psychological trauma caused by war. Having come to Taiwan from mainland China, far from their hometowns, they also endured profound homesickness and the pain of displacement.

During the 1950s through the 1970s, these active-duty and retired Republic of China soldiers also participated in constructing much of Taiwan’s infrastructure, including roads, bridges, airports, and dams. They contributed to projects such as the famous Sun Yat-sen Freeway (中山高速) and Chiang Kai-shek International Airport (中正机场) (now Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport), as well as other projects included in the Ten Major Construction Projects, thereby laying the foundation for Taiwan’s economic takeoff.

These veterans survived repeated wartime dangers, endured the suffering of leaving their homes behind, persevered in combat and military preparedness, and defended Taiwan against occupation by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. In doing so, they not only spared the people of Taiwan from many of the hardships experienced by those in mainland China after 1949, especially during the Mao Zedong (毛泽东) era, but also participated in major infrastructure projects that helped transform Taiwan into one of the Four Asian Tigers, bringing an era of such widespread prosperity that money seemed to pile up around people’s feet. Their contributions and sacrifices were truly immense.

Yet the protection of their rights and the welfare they received throughout most of their lives fell far short of matching their sacrifices and contributions. During the rule of the Kuomintang (中国国民党) under Chiang Kai-shek (蒋介石) and Chiang Ching-kuo (蒋经国), not only did material shortages and military necessity force these still-serving soldiers to live under harsh conditions, but the authorities also deliberately restricted ordinary soldiers from marrying normally and integrating into Taiwanese society.

At the time, Chiang Kai-shek believed that a campaign to “retake the mainland” could be launched at any moment. He feared that if these Republic of China soldiers established families in Taiwan, married, and had children, their fighting spirit would diminish, their determination to retake the mainland would weaken, and they would no longer maintain the morale embodied in the slogan “Never Forget Ju” (“勿忘在莒”), a historical expression urging constant vigilance and determination to recover lost territory. Furthermore, the authorities hoped to maintain tighter control over military personnel in order to prevent unrest and preserve Taiwan’s stability.

As a result, the Republic of China government concentrated active-duty and retired soldiers who had relocated to Taiwan, together with their families, in military dependents’ villages (“Juancun,” 眷村), intentionally maintaining a certain degree of separation from broader Taiwanese society. The authorities also discouraged ordinary enlisted soldiers from marrying local Taiwanese women. Although military camps and these military dependents’ villages did provide certain welfare benefits and services, overall living conditions remained relatively harsh and far less prosperous and free than those enjoyed by ordinary Taiwanese civilians. In particular, restrictions on marriage and romantic relationships left many ordinary soldiers single for many years, deprived of the warmth of family life.

These veterans were permanently separated from their families on the mainland, yet were also unable to establish new families in Taiwan. The bitterness and suffering they endured cannot be fully conveyed by even the most eloquent language, nor can outsiders truly comprehend them. The price they paid and the sacrifices they made are likewise beyond the ability of words to describe completely.

Compared with senior Republic of China officers, who enjoyed favorable treatment during military service and generally entered the political and business elite after retirement, leading successful and comfortable lives, ordinary enlisted soldiers were instead reduced to mere instruments. Their human rights and dignity were ignored or even trampled upon. Those in power deprived them of many of their personal rights, freedoms, and opportunities to enjoy life, turning them into mere cogs in the machine on the front line of the Cold War, where they shed both blood and sweat.

They defended Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu for their country and, indeed, for the entire free world. They consolidated the presence and stability of the free bloc in the Asia-Pacific region, thereby allowing the people of Taiwan to enjoy decades of peace and prosperity. Yet they themselves were denied the simple joys and modest happiness of ordinary life, forced instead to spend their days in monotonous military readiness and guard duty while constantly facing the danger of enemy bombardment.

Until the 1980s and 1990s, as cross-strait relations eased, the threat of war receded, and Taiwan lifted martial law, ordinary active-duty and retired Republic of China military personnel were finally freed from the many restrictions on marriage, employment, and daily life, and were permitted to live freely. By that time, however, many Republic of China soldiers who had come from mainland China were already elderly. They had devoted the most energetic years of their youth and the middle years when they should have been building families and careers to the defense of their country. They generally lacked higher education, had accumulated little savings, and had spent decades isolated from civilian society outside the military, making it difficult for them to reintegrate into society, marry, raise families, or achieve economic success.

It is also worth noting that the relatives these elderly veterans had left behind in mainland China had themselves endured the Japanese invasion, the Chinese Civil War, and later the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries, the Great Famine, and the Cultural Revolution under Mao Zedong. Many of their family members had perished, while the survivors often lived in deep poverty. Their hometowns on the mainland simply lacked the material means to receive these veterans back for a peaceful return to their roots. Instead, it was often these relatively poor veterans in Taiwan who were able to bring money and gifts to their surviving relatives on the mainland.

Although some veterans were warmly received by local governments on the mainland in the name of attracting investment and promoting economic development, these were generally a small number of individuals with status and influential connections. Veterans who lacked social standing or political networks, who could not bring tangible benefits to local governments, and who were already very old received little enthusiasm from the mainland authorities. Moreover, the continued political separation and periodic tensions across the Taiwan Strait still hindered them from residing on the mainland for extended periods. For these veterans, returning to the mainland to “return to their roots” was neither realistic nor suitable.

In Taiwan, after martial law was lifted, the social standing of Republic of China soldiers—who had both defended the country and enforced martial law—declined to some extent. Many came to be viewed as accomplices or executioners of an authoritarian regime and were no longer respected, instead becoming frequent targets of criticism. Many native Taiwanese who had experienced the repression and killings associated with the February 28 Incident and related political crackdowns, even if they did not openly insult these soldiers, often harbored little goodwill toward them. Furthermore, these older veterans from mainland China, despite having lived in Taiwan for decades, were still regarded as “Waishengren” (“外省人,” people of mainland Chinese origin), separated by various social and cultural barriers from Taiwan’s “Benshengren” (“本省人,” native Taiwanese). Retired military personnel were also more vulnerable to discrimination.

After the lifting of martial law, these ordinary retired military personnel were officially recognized by the government as veterans under the “Rongmin” designation, receiving a certain degree of material security as well as the right to live freely. At the same time, however, because they entered civilian society too late in life, were already advanced in age, and faced various social and cultural divides with the native Taiwanese majority, they never received the respect and care they deserved. Their social circles remained limited, and upward social mobility was difficult. Their circumstances stood in stark contrast to those of former senior Republic of China officers, who had long since become deeply integrated into Taiwan’s political, business, and social elites.

These veterans had made enormous contributions to defending both mainland China and Taiwan, resisting foreign invasion and confronting totalitarian forces. They had survived gunfire on the battlefield and the shadows of the Cold War. For years they had stood firm in harsh frontline trenches, safeguarding Taiwan’s development and prosperity, while some also directly participated in major and arduous infrastructure projects. It can fairly be said that both the Kuomintang government and the Democratic Progressive Party government, as well as the people of Taiwan as a whole, owe a great debt to these ordinary former soldiers.

Yet neither the government nor Taiwanese society has provided them with compensation commensurate with their contributions. On the contrary, driven by their own narrow political positions and objectives, both the Kuomintang and the Democratic Progressive Party have treated ordinary Republic of China soldiers and these retired veterans as instruments—making use of them without treating them well. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s broader mainstream society and the majority of Taiwanese people appear to have forgotten or overlooked them.
During the post-martial law period when the Kuomintang remained in power, the senior veterans who had come from mainland China still received relatively greater care and assistance. Under Democratic Progressive Party administrations, however, veterans of mainland Chinese origin have generally been treated with indifference. Many have been forgotten by mainstream society, surviving only on limited pensions while spending their final years in loneliness and hardship. They have also been passively marginalized by Taiwan’s mainstream society: their former glory has been obscured, their contributions forgotten, their suffering ignored, and their appeals rejected.

As these elderly veterans from mainland China pass away one after another, it will not be long before they, like the comrades who died before them, cease to exist as living people capable of speaking for themselves, remaining only as fragments of history preserved in documents, photographs, and historical relics.
Another group that has been ignored, discriminated against, and forced to the margins of Taiwanese mainstream society is Mainland Chinese spouses. Mainland Chinese spouses are people born in mainland China who came to Taiwan after the 1980s and married Taiwanese residents holding Republic of China citizenship. The majority of them are women.

These women from mainland China met and married Republic of China citizens through relationships based on mutual affection. A significant proportion of their husbands were the veterans discussed earlier. Since both spouses originated from mainland China, shared emotional and practical needs, and were both somewhat distant from Taiwan’s mainstream society, they naturally relied on one another for mutual support. Of course, many Mainland Chinese spouses also married people from other professions and social backgrounds in Taiwan.

Mainland Chinese spouses have also participated extensively in labor across a wide range of industries in Taiwan, contributing to the island’s development and prosperity. Even those who became homemakers deserve, like many Taiwanese homemakers and indeed all Taiwanese people, the enjoyment of basic civil rights and freedoms. They should not be subjected to extraordinary scrutiny or unfair criticism.

Like participants in cross-border marriages in almost every other country and region in the world, Mainland Chinese spouses should have obtained full citizenship and enjoyed substantive civil rights. However, because of the unique cross-strait relationship, they have long been caught between the governments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, occupying an awkward legal status and unable to obtain Republic of China citizenship and the full rights of Taiwanese citizens in the same way as other foreign spouses.

After Lai Ching-te (赖清德), representing the more hardline pro-Taiwan independence faction within the Democratic Progressive Party, took office, his administration further intensified pressure on and persecution of Mainland Chinese spouses. Measures included deporting several Mainland Chinese spouses over remarks supporting “military reunification” (that is, reunification through military force), while often excusing similarly extreme rhetoric by supporters of the pro-DPP camp in the name of freedom of speech; removing some Mainland Chinese spouses from positions as local councilors or local government officials; and imposing additional restrictions and scrutiny on cross-strait marriages.

I have already discussed in detail the general circumstances and injustices faced by Mainland Chinese spouses in Taiwan in my article *Mainland Chinese Spouses Face Discrimination and Stigmatization Amid the Wave of Taiwanese Nativist Populism* (《台灣本土民粹浪潮下 陸配遭受歧視與污名化》), so I will not repeat those arguments here, offering only a brief summary.
Mainland Chinese spouses came to Taiwan through lawful means, married Republic of China citizens, worked in a wide variety of occupations, and made significant contributions to Taiwanese society. Morally, logically, and legally, they should enjoy full civil rights and lives free from discrimination. The overwhelming majority of them are also law-abiding, low-profile individuals who do not participate in politics. Even if a very small number engage in controversial speech or conduct, the law should simply deal with them in the same manner and to the same extent as it would with other Taiwanese citizens engaging in comparable behavior. They should not receive disproportionate punishment, nor should such cases be generalized to implicate other law-abiding Mainland Chinese spouses.

In reality, however, Mainland Chinese spouses have suffered widespread discrimination and stigmatization. Their work and daily lives are constrained in many ways, and they have been subjected to what resembles a witch hunt. The term “Mainland Chinese spouse” itself has gradually acquired derogatory connotations in Taiwan. At times, the Democratic Progressive Party and the broader pro-DPP camp instead refer to them as “Zhongpei” (“中配”), a term that likewise carries pejorative implications and serves to distance Taiwan from mainland China while excluding Mainland Chinese spouses. This is, of course, unjust and should not be the case.

In the narrower sense, both these veterans and Mainland Chinese spouses consist of people who came to Taiwan from mainland China and are viewed by Taiwanese nativists as “Waishengren” and “Chinese.” Yet both groups have put down roots in Taiwan, made substantial contributions to its peace, stability, economic prosperity, and social development, and form part of Taiwan’s diverse and inclusive society, deserving care and concern. Nevertheless, the Democratic Progressive Party government and some Taiwanese, driven by narrow political positions, extreme ideology, and ignoble motives, have deliberately sought to exclude both these veterans and Mainland Chinese spouses.

Numerous concrete examples illustrating the circumstances of these veterans and Mainland Chinese spouses have already been documented in the article *A Lifetime of Solitude, a Lifetime of Stigma: The Families of Veterans and Mainland Chinese Spouses Living Under the Shadow of* “*Forced Eviction*” (《半生孤影、一世污名：被「強制驅離」陰影籠罩的榮民陸配遺屬們》) by the writer and media commentator Shangguan Luan (上官乱).
For example, the article describes dozens of Mainland Chinese spouses, including Sister Huang and Sister Mi, living in the extremely dilapidated Fanglan Villa (方蘭山庄) and Zhongqin Villa (忠勤山庄). They struggle with poverty and illness, survive through extreme frugality, are subjected to bureaucratic mistreatment and pressure to leave, have their applications for medical subsidies rejected, and must endure lengthy waiting periods for public housing. Few media organizations, human rights institutions, or individuals are willing to speak up or defend the rights of these Mainland Chinese spouses. Instead, they are frequently targeted by stigmatizing rumors and malicious attacks. All of this is taking place in Taiwan, a society renowned for its highly developed media industry, civil rights organizations, and social welfare system.

Because both these veterans and Mainland Chinese spouses have already established their homes in Taiwan while lacking family property or social welfare support on the mainland, even those who wish to leave Taiwan and settle in mainland China generally find it impossible to do so. Some Mainland Chinese spouses have brought their veteran husbands back to their hometowns on the mainland, only to return to Taiwan because access to medical treatment and long-term care proved even more difficult there. (This stands in sharp contrast to the enthusiastic receptions given by some local governments eager to attract investment when certain veterans returned to visit relatives in the 1980s. Today, elderly and marginalized veterans and Mainland Chinese spouses attempting to return to the mainland receive little assistance, revealing the mainland authorities’ utilitarian approach toward these veterans.) Moving to a third country would likewise involve prohibitive costs as well as language and other barriers, making it an unrealistic option for people of such advanced age. Vast as the world may be, although both mainland China and Taiwan are lands where ethnic Chinese form the majority, neither offers a place where these veterans and Mainland Chinese spouses can live with dignity.

For further details about those Mainland Chinese spouses who married these veterans, readers may consult Shangguan Luan’s original article, and I will not elaborate further on the subject here.
In short, these veterans and Mainland Chinese spouses live in extremely difficult and sorrowful circumstances. Their standard of living is clearly below Taiwan’s average, and they rarely receive the beneficial exposure and sympathetic attention given to other minority groups, such as Indigenous peoples, LGBT communities, and non-Chinese nationals studying or working in Taiwan.

On the contrary, Mainland Chinese spouses are routinely attacked and stigmatized. Simply because they were born on the mainland, they are slandered as “Chinese spies” and subjected not only to online abuse but also to harassment and obstruction in real life. Veterans are likewise labeled “pro-Communist” because of their broader Chinese identity, even though these old soldiers once risked their lives courageously resisting Communist attacks, served loyally as soldiers of the Republic of China, and personally defended Taiwan’s freedom and democracy.

Strictly speaking, Taiwan is not entirely without human rights organizations, media outlets, or individuals who speak out for and assist Veterans from Mainland China and Mainland spouses. There are indeed some kind-hearted Taiwanese people who have offered them assistance and support. 

For example, when some Mainland spouses were deported to mainland China, certain human rights groups publicly voiced their support for them. However, such organizations and individuals are very few in number, have limited influence, and themselves occupy a relatively marginalized position, making their efforts little more than a drop in the bucket. The overwhelming majority of Taiwan’s mainstream media, human rights organizations, government agencies, and most Taiwanese people remain indifferent toward Veterans from Mainland China and Mainland spouses. 

Among them, Veterans from Mainland China receive at least a small degree of concern, whereas Mainland spouses often face strong hostility and exclusion.More specifically, higher-ranking veterans generally receive more generous benefits and greater care, while rank-and-file veterans tend to live in difficult and miserable circumstances, with little care or assistance.

Mainland Chinese spouses who are the wives or surviving family members of veterans consequently face double pressure, harm, injustice, and marginalization. Because veterans themselves live in difficult circumstances, their spouses and surviving family members naturally suffer as a result. At the same time, Mainland Chinese spouses are subjected to even greater stigmatization from many sectors of Taiwanese society.
External discrimination, prejudice, and other forms of injustice directed against veterans and Mainland Chinese spouses can also aggravate problems within their families and contribute to further tragedies. Some veterans who are very old, impoverished, and already deeply traumatized may also inflict physical and psychological harm on their Mainland Chinese wives, including forms of domestic violence that are difficult to speak about.

Ultimately, these sufferings and tragedies have been caused or intensified by the discrimination, indifference, and unfair treatment directed at veterans and Mainland Chinese spouses by both Taiwan’s authorities and wider society. Some Taiwanese nativists and supporters of the pro-DPP camp allege that Mainland Chinese spouses marry veterans in order to “seize their property and cause their deaths” or “deliberately make their husbands die early.” These claims are not only baseless rumors; those making them also show no genuine concern for the veterans and offer them no assistance. Instead, they take pleasure in others’ misfortune and use the issue as an opportunity to vent their hatred toward people of mainland Chinese origin.

The broader environment of cross-strait confrontation, together with the neglect and silence of the mainland Chinese authorities, mainland Chinese society, and Chinese communities around the world, has further aggravated the suffering and marginalization of veterans and Mainland Chinese spouses. The separate rule and confrontation of the two governments on either side of the Taiwan Strait, unresolved historical problems and present-day conflicts, the respective calculations of the authorities in Beijing and Taipei, and their various actions or failures to act have jointly created these two distinctive social groups and become both the causes and the background of their misfortune. Because veterans and Mainland Chinese spouses live in Taiwan, the Taiwanese authorities and all sectors of Taiwanese society clearly bear the more direct responsibility.
The bleak circumstances of veterans and Mainland Chinese spouses reflect both the narrow-mindedness and coldness of the Democratic Progressive Party authorities and some Taiwanese people, while also casting a shadow over Taiwan’s claims to freedom, democracy, diversity, and inclusiveness. Every veteran and Mainland Chinese spouse is a member of Taiwanese society, with individual contributions, value, and personal stories. They deserve the same respect, attention, and assistance as other Taiwanese people.

Since Taiwan’s current DPP-led government and wider society are willing to provide economic support, public visibility, organizational assistance, and other forms of help to Indigenous peoples, LGBT communities, elderly and disabled people requiring long-term care, victims of the February 28 Incident and the martial-law era, Taiwanese who served in the Japanese military, and many other minority groups, ensuring that these groups receive visibility and sympathetic concern, they should not exclude veterans and Mainland Chinese spouses. Still less should they turn these two groups into targets of criticism and exclusion.

Showing concern and offering assistance to some people while deliberately ignoring or even suppressing others, and allowing an outwardly beautiful and diverse society to exclude certain groups, is in some respects worse than treating everyone with equal coldness or living in a completely monotonous and uniformly dark society. It creates even greater inequality: the happiness of those who are cared for makes those who suffer feel even more unfortunate, while those who are abandoned and harmed become still more distressed and desperate. It also violates the basic requirements of universal values such as equality, humanity, and opposition to discrimination.

Moreover, when a society’s total resources are limited, the resources received by some groups that attract concern are, to some extent, resources denied to those who are neglected and abandoned. Certain groups, including Taiwanese who served in the Japanese military, receive public concern and relatively substantial resources, while Republic of China veterans and Mainland Chinese spouses are marginalized and deprived of resources they should rightfully receive. This is profoundly unfair.

The fear and anxiety felt by the Democratic Progressive Party, the pro-DPP camp, Taiwanese nativists, and many other Taiwanese people about a possible invasion by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, the loss of freedom and democracy, and future persecution are understandable. But these fears do not provide a legitimate reason to persecute, discriminate against, or marginalize innocent veterans and Mainland Chinese spouses from mainland China.

The overwhelming majority of veterans and Mainland Chinese spouses clearly neither support nor participate in Communist China’s invasion or infiltration of Taiwan. They simply wish to live peacefully and spend the rest of their lives in dignity after enduring so much suffering. Treating them as “Chinese spies,” “Trojan horses,” or “pro-Communist elements” is baseless and amounts to judging entire groups by a small number of cases. The Democratic Progressive Party and the pro-DPP camp also include prominent figures who have visited mainland China or made statements favorable toward it, as well as party members exposed as spies working for mainland China. Does that mean the Democratic Progressive Party itself is an “agent of the Chinese Communist Party” and every DPP member is a “Chinese spy”?

For these veterans and Mainland Chinese spouses, mainland China was the home of their birth. Most left their hometowns and crossed the Taiwan Strait for reasons beyond their control, struggling to survive in unfamiliar surroundings. These men and women were swept along by the tides of history and had little control over their own circumstances, while their individual fates rose and fell with the changes of the era. Their suffering is deeply distressing. The stories of veterans and Mainland Chinese spouses supporting and depending upon one another through hardship are especially moving.

As someone who supports the Republic of China, hopes for peace across the Taiwan Strait, and favors democratic unification between the two sides, I am particularly concerned about their lives and destinies. As someone who also lives in a marginalized position of a certain kind, I can especially understand and empathize with these veterans and Mainland Chinese spouses.

For many people from mainland China who retain a Chinese identity while also supporting freedom and democracy, the Republic of China veterans in Taiwan are heroes who once defended their homes and country, while Mainland Chinese spouses are compatriots connected by common ancestry. Their suffering should therefore not be ignored; instead, they deserve particular attention and support. The misfortunes endured by veterans and Mainland Chinese spouses over so many years are also a shared tragedy for every Chinese person and for Chinese communities worldwide.

Even those unable to provide practical assistance should at least speak out to express sympathy and solidarity. In the long term, the power of public voices and public opinion can also help improve the actual circumstances of veterans and Mainland Chinese spouses. Of course, most veterans from mainland China have already passed away, and the remaining elderly survivors are disappearing year by year. This is deeply saddening, and care for them should therefore be delayed no longer.

For Taiwanese people, veterans and Mainland Chinese spouses are also members of their society. The veterans were soldiers who defended freedom and democracy, while Mainland Chinese spouses are new residents who have brought Taiwan greater diversity, labor, and other benefits. Taiwanese society should treat these two groups with goodwill and sympathy rather than subjecting them to discrimination and humiliation rooted in narrow prejudice. Taiwan’s promotion of diversity, inclusiveness, and the idea that “the most beautiful thing in Taiwan is its people” should not remain superficial, nor should compassion be selective or assistance granted only for utilitarian reasons.

Taiwan’s government and official institutions bear an even clearer legal and moral responsibility to treat veterans and Mainland Chinese spouses properly through nondiscriminatory, responsible, proactive, and conscientious policies. They should address their legitimate demands, grant them the treatment owed to them as citizens and commensurate with their contributions, and allow these men and women, who have suffered for most of their lives, to live with dignity in their final years.

(The author of this article is Wang Qingmin(王庆民), a Chinese writer living in Europe and a researcher of international politics.)

王炳章先生曾经披露, 陈水扁收买一批披着"大陆民运"外衣的"中华民国台独化"政策的辩护士和推销员。让大陆民运人士签下"卖身契"。"卖身契"的实质内容就是同意"台独"。大陆民运因台湾因素的不当介入而受到了相当的破坏。

喜欢《海贼王》（航海王）的人都是台独」这一观点，在客观上缺乏事实依据与逻辑支持：
核心价值的普适性：该作品强调「追求自由」、「反抗压迫」、「伙伴羁绊」与「守护梦想」等核心价值。这些属于超越地域和政治立场的普适人类情感。
受众群体的多元性：《海贼王》在全球拥有数以亿计的粉丝，遍布中国大陆、台湾、港澳、日本以及欧美等地区。这群人包含了各种不同的政治观点与国家认同。
文化作品的娱乐本质：绝大多数观众观看动漫是为了娱乐、放松或寻找情感共鸣。这与其个人的政治主张、政党倾向或两岸关系立场并无实质因果关系

2025年4月1日，知名作家、中华民国台湾前文化部长龙应台女士，在纽约时报发表文章《台湾的时间不多了（The Clock is Ticking for Taiwan）》，表达了对美国抛弃乌克兰后可能再抛弃台湾的强烈担忧，对民进党当局激进台独、对抗中国的立场政策做了批评，也回顾了马英九时期两岸和平稳定的关系、陆台人民密切的往来，呼吁台湾与大陆再次和解，避免战争。

   笔者对于龙女士的看法和主张，是颇有同感、很是认同的，也对两岸关系及其未来走向，有些自己的见解要说。

   最近几年，中国大陆和台湾的关系，可谓每况愈下。例如自从2022年8月时任美国众议院议长的佩洛西访问台湾以来，中国解放军就频繁在台湾海峡及周边进行军事演习。中国官方对赖清德等台独人士的批评也越发激烈，并祭出多种制裁措施。

   而台湾方面，即便较为温和的独派蔡英文执政时期，就已积极与中国大陆“脱钩”，与美日加强关系。而赖清德执政后则迅速强化台独路线，宣称“中国是境外敌对势力”，强化日台友好以争取外援，并打击国民党和民众党等较亲大陆的势力。主张台独、敌视中国的势力已成为台湾多数和主流。
  
   两岸官方剑拔弩张，民间敌对情绪也在累积。在互联网上，大陆人与台湾人的骂战天天都在发生，都有对于对方非人化的贬损，同文同种的人民，成为两个相互视若寇仇的对立族群。近日台湾政府和绿营民粹分子驱逐支持武统的“陆配”，也反映了冲突已蔓延至线下。

   这样的状况，是令人担忧的，也并不是许多年里一直如此的。龙应台女士提到的马英九执政时两岸友好热络的关系，就以事实证明陆台并非天生敌对。相反，两岸有着颇为深厚的交流合作基础，只要有契机、双方表现诚意、求同存异，就能转化为实实在在的友谊与和平。
   
   而双方友好合作的基础，正是两岸人民同文同种（台湾绝大多数人祖籍大陆、语言文字相同（仅有繁简字体之分）、对“中华民族”身份的认可，以及陆台人民对“中华民国”的好感、“一中各表”的默契，而形成的两岸同一共同体。而“中华民国”正是这一共同体和两岸纽带的关键。

虽然如今中国大陆的国号和法统是“中华人民共和国”，但对于“中华民国”的历史存在及其功绩，并没有彻底否定。在毛泽东时代，蒋介石的国民党被视为死敌，残酷迫害与民国党政军有关的人士，但仍尊奉中华民国国父孙中山先生为“革命先行者”。

   改革开放后，大陆官方对国民党的正面评价增加不少，虽仍然强调中共击败腐败堕落的国民党、建立新中国“是历史和人民的必然选择”的基本观点，但对民国政府及国民党（及其前身同盟会）推翻封建帝制、北伐“打倒列强除军阀”统一中国、1927-1937“黄金十年”建设、抗日战争国军浴血奋战等功劳，都做出一定程度的肯定。而民间对中华民国的好感更多一些。在世纪初至2010年代，中国大陆还掀起“民国热”，对民国历史、社会风尚、文化教育的宣传和追捧达到高峰。

   虽然在“中国共产党是历史和人民的选择、唯一正确道路”叙事等影响下，对于中华民国的肯定仍然是有限的、宣传仍受压的，但即便如此中华民国的历史、政治理念、知名人物也得到相当多来自大陆官方与民间的肯定，可见“中华民国”在大陆的正面形象。

  而台湾方面，自1945年以来都是“中华民国”国家实际统治的一部分。两蒋时期国民党实行威权统治，制造了一些镇压和杀戮，但也有有限民主自由，并有力促进了台湾的经济发展、提高了台湾人民生活水平，有功于台湾各族群人民。虽然自1990年代，台湾本土主义和台独势力日益强大，其代表力量民进党于2000年执政，但坚持自己是“中国人”、认同中华民族身份的，长期（2020年左右之前）都在半数以上。只是他们多数不认可“中华人民共和国”而认可“中华民国”。那时即便一些倾向台独的人士，也并不激烈排斥“中华民国”及“中国人”身份，而是既认同民国又认同台湾。

  于是，大陆和台湾达成的“两岸一中，一中各表”的“九二共识”，以及大陆官方与民间对“中华民国”及国民政府、国民党、国军的部分认可，让两岸有了可以和平共处、友好往来的“最大公约数”。

   正是暨此“最大公约数”，才有了2005年国民党主席连战访问大陆、与中共总书记胡锦涛的“胡连会”，实现历史性破冰和解。而2008-2016年马英九执政八年，两岸在经济、文化、学术等方面的密切交流、从官方到民间的互信和友好氛围，极大加强了两岸关系，也助推了大陆“民国热”、大陆人对“中华民国”的更多认识和更大好感。而海峡两岸、大陆人与台湾人能实现这样的和平友好、热络交流，关键即在于双方官方和多数民众对“中华民国”有着默契与共识，大家认可同属一个中国、是一家人，相互之间芥蒂减少而信任增加，对于对方作为同胞关爱，就顺理成章的“两岸一家亲”了。

   而之后两岸关系的恶化，则很大程度源于双方对“中华民国”由曾经的较为肯定，到变得更多否定，所制造和加剧的两岸割裂。民进党籍的台湾领导人蔡英文和赖清德，都更强调“台湾（国家）”、“台湾人”的身份认同和立场，而淡化“中华民国”色彩。虽然蔡赖等人也偶有肯定中华民国法统与历史的言论，但往往只是官样文章，他们涉及台湾独立的言行更频繁和真情流露。

   而且台湾民进党政府及绿营人士不仅从统治所属和政治立场上“去中国化”，更在文化、教育、宣传、日常生活中全面和深层的“去中国化”，如修改课纲删减中国历史、大幅增加东亚史和台湾本土史等，将台湾人和中国人（大陆人）明确和严厉的加以区分隔离，去除中华文化的影响和传承性，突出“台湾民族”及“台湾文化/价值观”。这就让台湾人从基本身份认同和心理上就疏远大陆、敌视中国，对两岸关系、台湾与大陆的连结性产生了难以逆转的破坏。

   而中国大陆在最近十年也减少了对中华民国时期的正面宣传，如反映国军抗战的多部影片（如《八佰》、《援军明日到达》等）的拍摄和上映计划一波三折、多次延迟。大陆政治体制也更加保守化，少了开明多了垄断，支持中华民国或对民国有好感人士并无参政可能，也没有通过媒体和文艺表达的空间。

   双方对“中华民国”共识的远离，让两岸少了共同认同的历史、合作交流的桥梁、“一家亲”的载体，剩下的只有“中华人民共和国是中国唯一合法政权/对外代表”、“武统台湾”和“台湾独立”、“中国是境外敌对势力”这样截然对立的立场及必然发生的冲突。（虽然也有中华民国前总统马英九先生等人致力捍卫中华民国法统、宣讲中华民国功绩、努力维系两岸交流、致力于民主统一的人士及其努力，但杯水车薪，两岸整体关系显然是日益疏离和敌对的）

   而龙应台在纽约时报的文章，所怀念的正是两岸认同“中华民国”历史贡献、对分歧能够求同存异、台海风平浪静、人民友好合作、互补互助互利、共同繁荣的岁月，并在今日两岸相互仇视、战争一触即发状态下，对两岸再次共同认可同属中华民族、不要同胞相残的真挚呼唤和强烈愿望。而实现这一愿望的关键，正是两岸重新对“中华民国”历史贡献、孙中山先生及其同仁“三民主义”理念、国共两党合作与两岸人民协力实现民族复兴，能够达成共识、相互认可、积极宣传和实践。
  
   虽然在如今两岸政治状况都较为不良、双方剑拔弩张的状态下，想实现这样的共识与和解并不容易，但事在人为。

   今年是中国人民抗日战争胜利80周年，正是两岸共同纪念、缓和关系的契机。笔者并不指望强烈本土主义立场的赖清德政府愿意纪念抗战和宣讲民国法统，也对中国大陆软化对台立场、中共包容不同政治派别不抱希望。

   但台湾和大陆各界有识之士，无论出于对国家民族的情感，还是保持和平繁荣的现实需要，都应追溯历史上中国人民的苦难与辉煌，对中华民国的功绩积极认可，让两岸人民明白对方是血脉相连的同胞，即便政治制度和历史记忆有所差别，也应求大同、存小异，不重演历史上内战悲剧、不再发生战祸、不再生灵涂炭，台海和平得到保障，两岸合作互助，共谋人民福祉。

我们是占据世界七分之一人口的民族，我们有着上下五千年的文明历史。我们的北方边境理应到达北冰洋，东南方通往太平洋的道路也应该是畅通无阻的。与我们接壤的邻国理应是我们的内藩属国，与我们内藩属国接壤的国家理应是我们的外藩属国。我们不应该被困在小小的东亚！我们的民众不应该生活困苦！我们的子弟不应该遭受不平等待遇！我们不是满洲人，我们不应该被称作清长虫，我们不应该被拉起咪咪眼挑衅。我们需要获得应有的尊严。他们不应该让我们想起自西元1644年中国被满洲侵略灭亡后被奴役三百年的屈辱历史，我们漢人再也不想回到那三百年的血泪历史中。如果那一天来临，军国主义会找到自它诞生以来最强大的肉体和最坚韧的意志。我们要向他们复仇。