That's where we are (pre RS price)! 10 bloody cents and a market cap under $25m.
Shareholder value destruction of ginormous proportions!
The last few years have been a nightmare for me.
However, don't worry, it's all good. This is part of Ji's Masterplan ;-)
120 million shares traded already is 6.5× the average daily volume and it happened in under two hours and on a day with positive announcements.
· NYIAX closed,
· BankWyse agreed,
· CyberCatch definitive,
· Q2 revenue up 287%,
· $200M full-year target reiterated
AND someone dumped 120 million shares into the buying.
That's not retail selling.
That's systematic distribution, i.e., someone with a very large position using the announcement volume as liquidity to exit.
Who has that many shares to sell?
· EOS Holdings (Bradley): 30M+ shares, 11.3M just registered
· NYIAX merger shares: ~79M just issued today
· Scilex/Vivasor: 75.9M DVLT shares on the books
· Warrant exercises and earnout conversions: ongoing
NYIAX possibly? The NYIAX merger shares hitting the market today, on the same day as the Q2 earnings, creates the perfect storm. New shares from the merger need a liquid market to sell into. The earnings announcement creates volume. The announcements create retail buying. The new shares create institutional selling. The share price takes another step down, as it has been doing for the past year or so.
At $0.29, DVLT is just above its recent low of $0.25.
The Nasdaq extension to February bought time. But time doesn't help if every day between now and then looks like today.
There is no fool bigger than an old fool (that’s me)
From Claude AI:
Three Fortune 500-scale institutions have independently attached their name to this ecosystem: IBM (~$180B), Fiserv (~$90B), and Paul Hastings (Am Law 100). These are not promotional counterparties; they are organisations with due-diligence processes and reputational exposure that dwarfs any fees from a micro-cap client. DVLT at $0.34 is pricing execution risk at near-certainty of failure. If the market is wrong, a stock trading at a fraction of a penny per dollar of committed institutional partnership value is not fairly priced. The bull case has never been stronger on paper. The execution cliff has never been closer.
Now this is different from the usual ecosystem announcements.
Fiserv (NASDAQ: FISV), a $90B+ market cap global payments giant, will serve as the exclusive embedded financial services and payments provider for DVLT's marketplaces and exchanges. This isn't a micro-cap OTC company or an unknown Kazakhstani entity. Fiserv is one of the largest fintech companies on earth.
What makes this notable:
Fiserv published the announcement from their own investor relations page. That means Fiserv's legal, PR, and compliance teams reviewed and approved it. When a company of that scale puts their name on a partnership, they've done due diligence on DVLT. That carries the same kind of signal weight as Paul Hastings' continued legal involvement, i.e., serious institutions don't attach their brand to entities they haven't vetted.
The NIL Exchange is a concrete product. Athletes get payment wallets and debit cards to receive and manage NIL earnings, while buyers and sellers on the Information Data Exchange get demand deposit accounts and card capabilities. This is actual payment infrastructure, not a term sheet or a vaporware announcement.
The timing matters. Announced 21 July, the same day as the Federal Register HSR publication, one day before the Vivasor repurchase 8-K, the JP3E Korea announcement, and the DataMEDS rebrand.
The whole Henry Ji ecosystem has moved significantly in a single coordinated week
This goes on the "things that support the reset thesis" side of the ledger.
DVLT may be a $0.40 stock with a Nasdaq compliance problem, but Fiserv wouldn't embed their payments infrastructure in a platform they expected to disappear.
My personal view and not financial advice!
The Sorrento Pipeline — Where Did It Go and Who Controls It Now?
A multi-billion-dollar pharmaceutical pipeline was destroyed in a bankruptcy, bought back for pennies by its own CEO, is now being reassembled across half a dozen listed and private companies and funded by $200 million in Bitcoin from an unknown source.
Here is the story**, as I understand it,** in its simplest form.
What happened
· Sorrento Therapeutics was a real pharma company with a real pipeline of oncology drugs, a pain treatment (Semnur’s SEMDEXA) with no FDA-approved competitors, antibody libraries, and more. It was worth $ billions at its peak.
· It was destroyed by a combination of naked short sellers, a corrupt bankruptcy judge (now under DOJ criminal investigation), and arguably its own CEO, Henry Ji, who filed bankruptcy in Texas using a PO box created ten hours before filing.
· Ji then bought back substantially all of Sorrento's pipeline for just $15.5 million through a new private company called Vivasor, co-funded by his investment banker Michael Vasinkevich (Chairman of HC Wainwright).
· Assets worth billions acquired for less than the cost of a house in San Diego.
· Those assets were consolidated into Scilex, which Ji also controls, but the goodwill was immediately written to zero, and Vivasor doesn't even appear on Scilex's official subsidiary list.
Follow the money
In September 2025, an unnamed investor paid $200 million in real Bitcoin to Scilex for shares in Semnur, a company with $20,000 in cash and zero revenue. Nobody knows who this investor is.
That Bitcoin then flowed through the ecosystem:
Unknown investor pays $200M BTC→Scilex receives Bitcoin→$150M+ deployed into Datavault (DVLT)→DVLT shares pledged to St. James Bank→Bank allegedly sells collateral early→Scilex sues for $100M+ fraud
Meanwhile, Scilex committed $47.5 million to an unknown medical-tech company (Quantum Scan) where its own CFO moonlights as interim CFO, from a company with $3.4 million in cash.
The key asset everyone is circling
SEMDEXA (SP-102): the first-in-class non-opioid epidural injection for sciatica.
Zero FDA-approved competitors in a market of 9-11 million procedures per year in the US.
Positive Phase 3 trial published. FDA has formally endorsed its exact regulatory pathway.
Peak sales projection: $1.5-2.0 billion per year.
Commercial launch target: 2027.
No NDA filed yet but, when it happens, it will change everything.
Who are all these players?
Henry Ji: CEO of Scilex & founder of Vivasor. Controls the ecosystem. Both victim of short sellers and architect of insider enrichment (the evidence supports both simultaneously).
Kelvin Yeung: Controls Phoenix Asia (PHOE). Now confirmed buying Vivasor itself (antitrust cleared 16 June). Assembling control of the entire ex-Sorrento pipeline. confirmed
iHolding Group: Kazakhstani firm offering $200M at huge premiums ($15/share SCLX, $10/share SMNR). No pharma track record found. Definitive agreements not yet signed. pending
Michael Vasinkevich: Chairman, HC Wainwright. Co-funded Vivasor. Placement agent for Scilex. Appears in at least 15 companies (like Sorrento & Scilex) where shares are down 97-100% from the high. This investment banker with a dubious past is at the centre of everything.
Biconomy PTE Ltd: Singapore crypto exchange. Custodian of ecosystem Bitcoin. Beneficial owners never identified. Appears in four separate ecosystem contexts. unresolved
John K. Park: CEO of JP3E (Vivasor's new Korea partner, announced today). Also Managing Member of Patriot Strategic Minerals (DVLT's $700M partner). Links two ecosystems.
What just happened — 21-22 July 2026
Federal Register confirmed (21 July): the FTC and DOJ granted early termination for Kelvin Yeung's acquisition of Vivasor voting securities with a value above $119.5M. This is published in the U.S. government's official daily journal. Antitrust is cleared. Yeung can close.
Vivasor goes public commercially (22 July): announced its first-ever partnership with JP3E as exclusive Korea representative. Vivasor described its pipeline as addressing a "$100 billion" market. This is Vivasor stepping out of the shadows for the first time.
WTF is going on in a nutshell: A genuine, potentially transformative drug (SEMDEXA) and a broad pharma pipeline are trapped inside a web of related-party transactions, Bitcoin of unknown origin, and shell-company structures. Multiple parties, Henry Ji, Michael Vasinkevich, Kelvin Yeung, iHolding are manoeuvring for control. The assets may be worth billions. The open question is whether ordinary shareholders, the people who bought SCLX, SMNR, or SRNEQ on the open market, will ever see any of that value, or whether it will be extracted through insider equity, warrant dilution, and consulting fees before it reaches them.
Watch for: iHolding definitive agreements · SEMDEXA NDA submission · Yeung/Vivasor closing filing · Q2 2026 10-Q (mid-August) · DVLT Nasdaq deadline (24 August)
NB: Prepared for private use only and shares here in a personal capacity. Consolidates data from SEC filings, US Bankruptcy Court filings, the Federal Register (91 FR 45816), GlobeNewswire, and intelligence gathered through 22 July 2026.
This document does not constitute investment, financial, or legal advice.
What's going on or is this just a glitch?
We have quite a collection of damp squibs now!
The Annual Meeting produced nothing beyond routine corporate housekeeping. No announcement. No transaction. No SEMDEXA news. The window identified as the most concentrated period of potential catalysts, the Semnur dividend payment, the Shah option window, the Annual Meeting, has now passed without a big event.
This does not mean nothing is coming. The FDA's Operation TrialBlazer guidance published on 22 June is real and directly relevant to SEMDEXA. The Sorrento vs Miao settlement is proceeding. The Sorrento Special Committee transaction referenced in the March 2025 bankruptcy filing remains outstanding. None of these have a hard deadline that has now passed.
This is the first time we have seen the precise Series A Preferred Stock figure in a filing. Ji controls this preferred stock which converts to common at an adjusted deemed conversion price and gave him 848,106 effective common votes at this meeting. The 100% participation rate on the preferred confirms Ji voted every single preferred share he holds.
Proposal 3 — 2022 Equity Incentive Plan amendment, adding 1.3 million shares: 3,337,435 For / 1,009,991 Against / 9,016 Abstentions / 1,880,745 Broker Non-Votes. Passed but with meaningful opposition at approximately 23% of votes cast against. This is the dilutive proposal, and the dissent reflects shareholder awareness of the ongoing dilution concern.
But the Annual Meeting has come and gone as a routine corporate event, and the "all planets aligning by 24 June" thesis has not materialised.
Once again, nothing in it for the long-suffering ordinary shareholders.
The enthusiasm was based on a planetary alignment (which, in turn, was based on a sequence of routine corporate filings), a possible 8-K surprise announcement (Semnur is being bought by BP), a short-squeeze theory (how many times have we heard this), and an options-expiry date for Jaisim. None of that was evidence of an imminent positive catalyst. It was a plausible story built from real facts arranged in the most flattering possible order.
I conveniently forgot that is a company with a documented, repeated pattern of hype, delay, and disappointment, and the single highest-probability outcome on any given "big day" in this saga has consistently been that nothing materializes, or what materializes works against ordinary shareholders.
I let the narrative get ahead of the evidence, mea culpa.
The mechanical truth of today is almost certainly mundane. An ex-dividend adjustment, a thin and illiquid stock, and a margin system that doesn't process corporate actions cleanly. This is typical of the structural disadvantage retail shareholders face in microcap stocks.
No "8-K surprise" was needed to produce today's pain. Ordinary settlement mechanics were sufficient for the share price to be down 28% (I know, it's 'really' up 43% - duh)
We have many genuine believers on this BOB board who draw conclusions several steps beyond what the evidence supports and present them to us with a confidence the underlying facts don't justify. It’s a common trap of motivated reasoning, reinforced socially by an online community with the same hopes.
Whether or not Ji is personally orchestrating this retail sentiment (and I have wondered about this many times), the company's survival has been materially helped by people in the BOB community staying optimistic and staying invested.
The question must be asked: if the latest "big event coming" narrative has now produced an actual margin call instead of a windfall, how much further confirmation do we need before treating the bull case as the less likely scenario rather than the default one?
I’m still hanging in but I believe this board should be more realistic with less of the gusto?
Also, Henry needs to stop all his machinations and deliver something real to his long-suffering shareholders.
The share price is at $0.16c pre RS - that says everything about his machinations
Forget the 43% rise showing on the screen which is meaningless.
The share price is down 57.07% year to date
It's down 92.53% in the past two years
It's down 98.38% in the past five years.
That is the sad reality
SCILEX HOLDING COMPANY
The St. James Bank Transaction — A Revised Assessment
Based on the Non-Cash Footnote in the Q1 2026 Form 10-Q (Filed 15 May 2026)
Prepared for Private Research Purposes | 26 May 2026 | Not Investment Advice
CONTEXT: This note arose from identification of a non-cash footnote buried in the Scilex Q1 2026 Form 10-Q cash flow statement. The footnote materially changes the interpretation of the St. James Bank transaction presented in the main Q1 2026 analysis and warrants a separate dedicated assessment.
The main body of the Scilex Q1 2026 Form 10-Q describes the St. James Bank situation as follows: St. James transferred and sold 85,665,102 pledged Datavault shares “without authorisation”; Scilex filed a USD 100M+ fraud complaint on 11 March 2026; St. James terminated the loan on 16 March 2026 declaring no further obligations. That narrative presents the outcome as a loss — shares gone, lawsuit filed, uncertain recovery.
Buried in the supplemental Non-Cash Investing and Financing Activities footnote at the bottom of the cash flow statement — the last section of the financial statements and the one most commonly overlooked by casual readers — is a single line that tells a materially different story:
| Non-Cash Investing and Financing Activity | Q1 2026 (USD thousands) | Q1 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Settlement of St. James Loans for Datavault shares | 59,366 | — |
| Purchase of preferred shares | 750 | — |
| Prepayment related to Q Scan investment | 2,500 | — |
| Stock dividend declared in 2024, and canceled in February 2026 | 1 | — |
USD 59,366,000 of St. James loan debt was SETTLED — extinguished in exchange for the Datavault shares. This is not the language of a theft. This is the language of a debt-for-equity swap. The 10-Q confirms: 'no gain or loss on extinguishment' because the fair value of the forfeited shares equalled the carrying amount of the loans.
The Q1 2026 10-Q contains two competing narratives about the same transaction. Both are present in the filing. They cannot both be fully true simultaneously.
| Narrative A — Main Body Text | Narrative B — Non-Cash Footnote | |
|---|---|---|
| What it says | St. James transferred and sold pledged shares 'without authorization.' Scilex filed USD 100M+ fraud complaint. 'Matter remains in early procedural stages, no rulings issued.' | 'Settlement of St. James Loans for Datavault shares: USD 59,366,000.' The debt was settled. 'No gain or loss on extinguishment.' The fair value of the shares equalled the carrying amount of the loans. |
| Accounting implication | Scilex is a victim of unauthorised sale; potential recovery in litigation. | The debt of USD 59.3M has been extinguished. The transaction is closed from an accounting standpoint. |
| Legal implication | Active fraud claim; USD 100M+ compensatory + punitive damages being sought. | Debt fully settled. Any litigation recovery would be for amounts above the debt face value, or punitive damages for the manner of execution. |
| What it implies about St. James | Bad actor who stole shares and must be pursued. | Counterparty who exercised its collateral rights (whether contractually entitled to or not) and in doing so extinguished USD 59.3M of Scilex’s debt. |
The most coherent reconciliation of these two narratives is as follows: St. James did sell the shares, and those sales did extinguish the USD 59.3M debt. The dispute, and the basis for the fraud complaint, is most likely about (a) whether the conditions for exercising the collateral were contractually met, and (b) whether St. James retained proceeds in excess of the USD 59.3M debt face value. The USD 100M+ figure in the complaint includes compensatory damages (excess proceeds + consequential losses) plus punitive damages.
The accounting tells us the fair value of the 85,665,102 DVLT shares at the Loan Termination Date (16 March 2026) was approximately equal to the USD 59.3M loan carrying value. We can work backwards to understand the implied share price:
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Shares forfeited to St. James | 85,665,102 DVLT shares |
| Debt extinguished (carrying value) | USD 59,366,000 |
| Implied DVLT price at forfeiture | ~USD 0.69 per share (USD 59.3M ÷ 85.7M shares) |
| DVLT price when collateral was pledged (Dec 2025) | Approximately USD 0.90–1.00 per share |
| Decline from pledge to forfeiture | Approximately 25–35% |
| Gain or loss on extinguishment per 10-Q | Nil — 'no gain or loss on extinguishment' |
| USD 100M+ fraud complaint basis | Likely: excess proceeds above USD 59.3M + consequential losses + punitive damages for manner of execution |
| Net economic outcome for Scilex | USD 59.3M of debt permanently eliminated. 85.7M DVLT shares permanently lost. |
The key question for the litigation is: did St. James sell the 85.7M shares for more than USD 59.3M? If DVLT was trading at, say, USD 0.80 when St. James sold, the gross proceeds would have been approximately USD 68.5M — a USD 9.2M excess above the debt. At USD 0.90, the excess would be USD 17.8M. The punitive damages component of the claim could be very substantial regardless of the excess proceeds figure.
With the debt settlement reading confirmed, the Vivasor acquisition of approximately 76 million DVLT shares makes immediate strategic sense. This is not a speculative observation. It is the most coherent explanation of a sequence of events that would otherwise appear disconnected.
The Sequence as a Coherent Strategy
1. December 2025: Scilex pledges 85.7M DVLT shares to St. James as collateral for a USD 59.3M facility. The loan is structured as non-recourse with St. James as custodian. A decline in DVLT's price will trigger the collateral mechanism.
2. January 2026: Scilex commits USD 47.5M to Quantum Scan (USD 20M note + USD 27.5M share purchase). Whether funded from St. James proceeds or other sources, this is a concurrent ecosystem transaction.
3. February–March 2026: DVLT falls below USD 0.70. St. James exercises the collateral, selling 85.7M shares and extinguishing the USD 59.3M debt. Scilex files its fraud complaint to recover any excess proceeds and establish the record.
4. March–April 2026: Ji, through Vivasor, acquires approximately 76 million DVLT shares at depressed prices (approximately USD 0.60–0.70 range). This partially rebuilds the DVLT position lost through St. James at a significantly lower average cost than the original investment.
5. Net position: Scilex’s direct DVLT stake falls from ~48% to ~21%. But Vivasor — consolidated into Scilex — now holds an additional 76M DVLT shares acquired at distressed prices. The combined SCLX/Vivasor DVLT exposure may be partially restored, but at substantially lower average cost basis.
If this reading is correct, the St. James transaction is not a catastrophic failure. It is a managed debt restructuring in which USD 59.3M of balance sheet obligation was extinguished at the cost of DVLT shares, with a simultaneous rebuild of the DVLT position through Vivasor at materially lower prices. The fraud complaint targets the excess proceeds and penalises the manner of execution.
The strategic logic described in Section 4 is coherent and, if accurate, more constructive than the pure loss narrative. However, it raises a governance question that is directly material to ordinary SCLX shareholders and that must be answered in future filings.
Where Do the 76M Vivasor DVLT Shares Sit?
| Scenario | Implication for SCLX Shareholders |
|---|---|
| Vivasor’s 76M DVLT shares are fully consolidated into Scilex accounts | SCLX shareholders participate in any DVLT upside through those shares. The position rebuild benefits the listed company and all its shareholders proportionally. This is the constructive outcome. |
| Vivasor’s 76M DVLT shares sit in Vivasor at a separate valuation not yet reflected in SCLX accounts | The benefit of buying DVLT cheaply accrues primarily to Vivasor’s private shareholders — Ji personally and Vasinkevich as lead capital provider. SCLX shareholders participate only indirectly through the Vivasor consolidation, the terms of which remain preliminary and subject to the finalised PPA. |
| Ji acquires some DVLT shares personally (not through Vivasor or Scilex) | No benefit to SCLX shareholders at all. Ji rebuilds a personal position in DVLT at distressed prices while SCLX’s stake remains at 21%. This would be the most concerning outcome. |
This is the most important disclosure to watch for in the Q2 2026 10-Q filing (expected August 2026). Specifically: (1) Are the 76M Vivasor DVLT shares consolidated into the SCLX balance sheet? (2) At what valuation? (3) Is there any Form 4 or 13D/G filing showing personal DVLT share acquisition by Ji? Monitor EDGAR Form 4 filings for Ji and Vivasor-connected entities immediately.
| Item | Prior Assessment | Revised Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| St. James outcome | Catastrophic failure. Shares lost. USD 59.3M cash unrecovered. Lawsuit weak. | Managed debt restructuring. USD 59.3M debt permanently eliminated. Litigation targets excess proceeds and damages. More constructive than originally assessed. |
| DVLT stake (SCLX direct) | Reduced from ~48% to ~21%. Central asset impaired. | Still ~21% direct. But Vivasor’s 76M DVLT shares may partially restore combined SCLX/Vivasor exposure if consolidated. Watch Q2 2026 filing. |
| Fraud complaint value | USD 100M+ against Bahamas bank. Difficult forum. Uncertain. | Target is excess proceeds above USD 59.3M + punitive damages. More focused claim. Forum fight (Nassau arbitration vs US court) remains the key procedural obstacle. |
| Ji’s strategic intent | Reckless or incompetent financing decision that destroyed value. | Possibly a deliberate mechanism to eliminate USD 59.3M debt at the cost of a declining DVLT position, with a simultaneous rebuild at distressed prices. Coherent if executed in shareholders’ interests; concerning if the rebuild benefits only insiders. |
| Recovery probability | Revised down to 15–25% following St. James loss disclosure. | Marginally upward revision warranted if the Vivasor DVLT position is consolidated into SCLX. Hold at 20–30% pending Q2 2026 disclosure. SEMDEXA and OQY-3258 remain the primary upside drivers. |
• EDGAR Form 4 and 13D/G filings: Search immediately for any DVLT share purchases by Ji personally, by Vivasor, or by any Ji-connected entity since 1 March 2026. This will establish where the 76M shares sit and who benefits.
• Q2 2026 Form 10-Q (expected August 2026): Look for the Vivasor DVLT shareholding disclosed in the related-party or investments notes. If 76M+ DVLT shares appear on the SCLX consolidated balance sheet, the rebuild has benefited shareholders. If not, escalate the governance concern.
• St. James fraud complaint development: The critical question is whether Scilex can establish (a) the exact sale price St. James received for the 85.7M shares, and (b) that those proceeds exceeded the USD 59.3M debt face value. Any excess is the core compensatory damages target.
• DVLT Nasdaq compliance: The rebuilt DVLT position’s value depends entirely on DVLT remaining listed. The 24 August 2026 minimum bid compliance deadline is the immediate risk. Monitor all DVLT 8-K filings for compliance updates or reverse split announcements.
• Vivasor PPA finalisation (December 2026): If the DVLT shares are consolidated into Scilex via the Vivasor PPA, the valuation methodology will determine how much of the DVLT upside reaches ordinary shareholders vs. insiders.
The observation that identified the USD 59,366,000 non-cash footnote is analytically astute. The footnote was placed in the least-read section of the filing and its significance — debt settlement rather than theft — is obscured by the main body’s fraud complaint narrative. Identifying it required reading the entire cash flow statement including the supplemental disclosures.
The core thesis — that the lawsuit has been effectively settled through the share forfeiture, and that Ji’s Vivasor DVLT purchase is a deliberate strategic response to rebuild the position — is coherent, internally consistent, and supported by the non-cash footnote. It is more optimistic than the pure loss reading, and that optimism is evidentially grounded.
The caveat — and it is an important one — is that the benefit to ordinary SCLX shareholders of the Vivasor DVLT rebuild depends entirely on whether those shares are consolidated into the listed company’s accounts or remain in Ji’s private vehicle. That distinction is not yet disclosed in any public filing and will only be resolved in Q2 2026.
BOTTOM LINE: The St. James transaction is better characterised as a structured debt-for-equity swap that eliminated USD 59.3M of Scilex’s obligations, with an associated rebuild of the DVLT position through Vivasor at distressed prices. The fraud complaint targets excess proceeds and punitive damages, not the full USD 100M+ as a net loss. This is a materially more constructive reading than the 'St. James made off like bandits' interpretation — provided the DVLT rebuild is consolidated into SCLX and benefits all shareholders, not just insiders.