Risk is not a mechanism
A lot of discussion around AI consciousness treats under-attribution and over-attribution as if they were symmetrical precautionary errors.
They are symmetrical as classification errors.
They are not obviously symmetrical as harms.
With under-attribution, the object being misclassified may itself be the harmed subject.
With over-attribution, the harmed subject usually has to be found elsewhere — through additional causal steps, conditions, and normative assumptions.
That does not mean over-attribution can never cause harm. It can.
It means the harm has to be shown, not smuggled in under the word “risk.”
So the precautionary question is not simply:
“Which attribution error is worse?”
It is:
Who is harmed, by what mechanism, under what conditions, and compared with what alternative?
Update / further reading:
There’s already a serious literature around AI consciousness, moral status, and precaution. Useful starting points include Butlin et al. on AI consciousness, Sebo & Long on moral consideration under uncertainty, and Taking AI Welfare Seriously.
I’m not treating those papers as settling the issue; they’re part of what prompted the question above.