This marks the first time Chinese-built military aircraft have flown on US soil since J-8II's "peace pearl" program in 1990, and the first time such aircraft have flown directly over an active US carrier.
(Source: Episode 149 of Yankee, Shilao, Ayi's livestream "羊羔特工队"; All images are sourced by me, which may not fully represent the opinions of the original hosts)
NSFW, Comrade!
It is well known that long-range air patrols can become quite boring for two-man fighter jet crews. As such, on aircraft like Su-30 and J-16, PLAAF pilots often bring tablets on board to browse some “learning materials”. And the more advanced J-16's rear-seat displays can also project and distribute information more effectively than those of other aircraft.
The latest and greatest J-20S takes it one step further, as the two pilots can directly upload files onto their large-area displays (LAD) to watch. But despite all the luxurious amenities the J-20S offers, some pilots may find one feature quite disturbing: screen sharing. In essence, what you watch on your display, such as career transfer policies and other “combat-unrelated materials”, could be accessed by your flight commander in real time. For this reason, it is not uncommon for junior pilots to be reprimanded on the ground. And certainly, the addition of a firmware-flashing feature may come in handy, so these pilots can leave no trace behind when their colleagues enter the cockpit later.
The front seat cockpit of J-16
Family Model in High Demand
Across national boundaries, the opportunity to fly a 5th-generation stealth jet is often a dream-come-true moment for senior air force officers approaching the maximum age for flight duties. Among them is the current USAF Chief of Staff, Kenneth S. Wilsbach, who has flown the F-22 Raptor after completing a full simulator and flight training.
But for PLAAF senior officers with experience flying the J-10A, J-11, Su-27, or Su-30 before, the service entry of the J-20S allows them to fly stealth jets in the rear seat without all the training hurdles. Of course, they are still required to undergo a health check, but it is often more forgiving due to J-20S’ advanced life-support systems compared to those on older jets. Their safety is further guaranteed by the fact that the pilots flying on such occasions are always experienced flight commanders themselves.
Even for generals who recently passed the age limit, they may still be granted permission to fly. After all, the legendary PLAAF General and Korean War veteran, Lin Hu, made his last flight on the Su-30 in Russia at the age of 70, so there is no reason his successors cannot follow such a legacy. In the future, personnel from AVIC who made significant contributions may also have a chance to experience an “incentive flight” in the J-20S, but until the long queue of elderly officers is cleared, they still have to wait a while.
Source: CheckSix Models
If imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, then China’s embrace of stealth aircraft technology is a compliment to American ingenuity.
Both awed by — and apprehensive about — U.S. stealth capabilities, China has invested heavily in developing stealth aircraft, as well as anti-stealth air defenses.
But China has learned the wrong lessons from America’s stealth program, according to U.S. Air Force analysis released this month. China is convinced that advanced technology is the foundation of U.S. stealth capabilities.
But in reality, the key to American success has been treating stealth as just one component of integrated aerial warfare, the report said.
China’s “assessments of U.S. stealth often diverge from technical reality and operational practice,” said Maj. Derek Ecklebe, a U.S. Air Force officer and a fellow at the Air Force’s China Aerospace Studies Institute.
The reality is that the U.S. treats stealth “as a multifaceted capability that integrates technology with operational tactics to maintain air superiority,” he said. “Stealth technology, while expensive, complex, and important, is only part of the equation.”
China is responding to U.S. stealth warfare with a mixture of fear and confidence.
“Chinese views of stealth as an asymmetric yet counterable U.S. advantage have driven a bifurcated strategy: robust investments in layered air defenses and a rapid program to field domestically developed [low observability] aircraft,” Ecklebe said.
Ironically, the U.S. military and intelligence agencies are often depicted as being fixated on technology at the expense of strategy and tactics. But in Ecklebe’s view, it is China that is overemphasizing tech.
Because Chinese experts believe that technology is at the heart of American stealth warfare, then it follows that the best defense against stealth is also technological. Thus, China has poured resources into developing anti-stealth sensors.
Chinese media and military journals suggest that better sensors, such as low-frequency radar, are the best countermeasure against stealth.
“These sources treat stealth as a technical problem to solve with new detection tools,” Ecklebe said. “They present low-frequency radars, passive sensors, and terahertz sensors as potential solutions that could soon counter U.S. advantages.”
But these stealth-busting technologies are either unproven or have limitations, such as accuracy, filtering out clutter or vulnerability to electronic warfare.
“In practice, these systems face significant physical and operational constraints,” said Ecklebe.
Nonetheless, Chinese air defenses should not be underestimated, even against stealth aircraft like the F-35 and B-2.
“What makes China’s defenses formidable is not any single radar or missile, but rather their integration into a unified IADS [integrated air defense system],” Ecklebe warned. “The PLA [People’s Liberation Army] has prioritized multi-domain integrated operations, pulling data from low-frequency early-warning systems, passive detectors, and even satellites into shared command centers at the corps level.^(”)
This same enchantment with technology applies to China’s own stealth aircraft.
China’s J-35 — which looks remarkably like the U.S. F-35 — “replicates features of the U.S. F-35 platform but prioritizes hardware metrics over U.S.-style software-defined adaptability coupled with [tactics, techniques and procedures] modernization,” said Ecklebe.
Ecklebe suggests that China’s perceptions of U.S. stealth aircraft — and their vulnerabilities — may be influenced by problems with Chinese stealth planes, which suffer from issues, such as unreliable engines.
“Mirror-imaging may further contribute to these distortions, as PLA planners project domestic constraints, such as WS-10 and AL-31F engine reliability and modernization issues that limit J-10 and J-20 sortie rates, onto U.S. systems,” he said.
One question is whether Chinese misconceptions of U.S. stealth could increase the chance of war. If Chinese leaders are convinced that better sensors can neutralize American stealth airpower, then they may feel more emboldened to invade Taiwan.
“Chinese strategists appear to view stealth not as an insurmountable barrier but as a factor that can be managed through overwhelming volume and integrated networks, leading to a deterrence posture that emphasizes rapid, decisive action to limit U.S. involvement,” Ecklebe said.
By Michael Peck
