u/InitiativeGlobal2616

There are eight billion individuals in the world. All are sentient (I presume). I am one of them. I have my ‘me.’

There is currently only one ‘me’ in the world. My ‘me’ is my phenomenal first-person perspective of the world, for want of a better phrase. It is what looks out through my body's eyes. It is the owner of all my brain's internal stimuli. It is the kernel of what makes up my consciousness. And it's one of a kind.

I presume the same holds true for you. There is only one ‘you.’

If you agree, then the question becomes: do you think it is impossible for another ‘you’ to coexist, or merely improbable? If you lean toward impossibility, what do you think guarantees that two individuals cannot share your ‘you’? Is it biology? Quantum mechanics? Spatial location? Something else?

If you lean toward improbability, then presumably you think that with a large enough sample (far beyond eight billion) a second ‘you’ might eventually appear. If that were to happen, what do you imagine it would be like? What would it mean for two individuals to share the same ‘you’?

Some contend that if you copy a brain perfectly, consciousness will automatically emerge from the copied brain. I would agree with that. That's doesn't puzzle me.

What puzzles me (and puzzled others, like Derek Parfit) is whether the copied consciousness is the same as the original consciousness. Will the copy have the same phenomenal first-person perspective as the original or will it have a new consciousness of its own? In other words, will an identical physical copy of me be 'me' or will it be someone else?

My intuition tells me that the copy will not have the same consciousness as the original. I can't prove it but it seems like a reasonable position. I simply can't picture two people sharing one consciousness.

But that raises the following question. If the two copies are identical down to their last particle (and firing patterns), yet their phenomenal first-person perspectives differ, then where did that difference come from? The implication is that it didn't come from the brains themselves (since they're identical). So, it must have come from something external to the brains.

Different phenomenal first-person perspectives may literally have something to do with different vantage points. It might have something to do with the fact that the original and the copy occupy different locations in space and in time. If so, consciousness may not be an intrinsic property of the brain but rather an indexical property (of the universe?). That's where my reasoning leads me. And I'm not implying anything spiritual.

Does this way of thinking about consciousness resonate with anyone?

I have spent many hours listening to talks on consciousness and have read countless papers and books on the subject. Most of what I have encountered has been frustratingly vague. The word "conscious" is often used simply to mean "not unconscious”, especially in medical papers. And when it is used to mean "sentient," I rarely hear anyone discuss specifics. What I am looking for, if not a solid, well-rounded explanation, is at least a coherent framework for consciousness. So far, on that front, we are batting zero, imo. 

What follows is an outline of a framework I have in mind. But I must first introduce the reader to the idea of a phenomenal first-person perspective property (a PFPP). And for that I will resort to a famous whimsical metaphor.

Introduction

Imagine the Cheshire Cat from Alice's Adventures in Wonderland. If you recall the scene, you’ll remember that the cat appears, then slowly vanishes, part by part, until finally only its wide, mischievous grin remains, lingering in the air long after the rest of the creature has gone. That smile, floating there, detached from any body, that’s how I picture a phenomenal first-person perspective property.

A PFPP is not your thoughts, your memories, your name, or the story of your life. Those are the fur, the stripes, the twitching tail of the cat. They can change. They can fade. They can be lost or forgotten. But the PFPP is the smile. It is the barest, most minimal fact that there is someone to whom all of this is happening. It is the raw ‘me’ that remains when everything else is stripped away. No biography. No personality. Just the simple, irreducible property of being a perspective, a ‘from here, now,’ a point from which the world is witnessed.

Just as the Cheshire Cat's smile floats free of the cat, so the PFPP floats free of the specific contents of your mind. It is not what you see, but that there is a you doing the seeing. It is not the story of your life, but the fact that the story has a reader. And like that lingering grin, it is both utterly insubstantial and absolutely real to the one who possesses it.

With that introduction, here’s the outline. The assumptions I list below strike me as not only intuitive but also entirely reasonable.

Assumption #1

Each person’s brain carries a single phenomenal first-person perspective property (PFPP).

Assumption #2

For any sensation to be experienced consciously (sentiently) whether it’s a stimulus, a thought, or a memory, it must be presented to the PFPP. Otherwise, it is not a conscious experience. That’s what it means to have consciousness, to be sentient. When my finger touches a table, that touch is felt because it has an owner. I have subjective experience of that touch because in my brain that stimulus reaches my PFPP.

Assumption #3

Each person’s PFPP is implicitly guaranteed to be unique from everyone else's. It is never shared and never duplicated. I have never possessed someone else's PFPP, and no one has ever possessed mine. I simply cannot have the same PFPP as anyone else. Ever. This is guaranteed. It’s practically sacrosanct. And it’s a ‘feature’ of consciousness that theories fail to address.

Assumption #4

In theory, it is possible for two brains to be physically identical, all the way down to the quantum level. Such an occurrence is extremely unlikely. But the point is that it is possible. I can even envisage these brains immersed in identical environmental simulations. Even so, their PFPPs will not be identical, per assumption #3.

Hypothesis #1

If two brains can be physically identical and yet their PFPPs are guaranteed to be unique, where does this guarantee come from? What in our world can ensure unique PFPPs? Spacetime offers one possible answer. Any two objects, even those that are physically identical, are guaranteed to be unique with respect to spacetime. They occupy different locations or follow different worldlines. And no two distinct worldlines are ever identical. The geometry of spacetime guarantees it.

Assumption #5.

Certain regions of the brain distinguish the internal world from the external world. They tell the difference between actions initiated by the body and those imposed by the environment. This is what it means to establish a self. These brain centers continuously compare self-initiated movements with proprioceptive feedback. When discrepancies arise, they signal a possible external, non-self-influence. Working together with the vestibular system, the brain orients the body relative to the gravitational vertical. That vertical serves as a reference point for a stable, stationary self.

Hypothesis #2

In addition to a gravitational vertical reference, perhaps the brain can also reference something deeper and more fundamental, something on a smaller scale. Perhaps the brain possesses some as yet unknown ability to reference a worldline. And perhaps each unique worldline carries, as an intrinsic property, a unique PFPP. If so, then the brain can establish a stable reference to a PFPP.

Summary

This idea (perspectival anchoring) is obviously highly speculative, and it certainly raises many questions. For example, a worldline is not a physical object. It is a concept. How could a brain tap into that? Furthermore, there is an enormous difference in scale between the biology of the brain and the geometry of spacetime. How might a brain possibly connect to spacetime, tether itself to a worldline, or anchor itself to this mysterious PFPP? I don’t have answers to these. But the idea provides a more rational framework for consciousness than any others I've come across. And it addresses the often-ignored observation (assumption) that my ‘me’ (my PFPP) is guaranteed to be unique. It also addresses why my 'me' persists (I am still me every time I wake up). These are some of the features that any complete theory of consciousness should address, imo. 

We are still virtually clueless about consciousness. We can’t properly define it. We can’t test its presence. So, any and every hair-brained idea should remain "on the table."