u/Krahang01

Panpsychist arguments for consciousness are certainly parsimonious, but how robust are they when pitted against updated cosmological theories?

A fine-tuned single universe works for thinkers like Goff. Penrose’s Conformal Cyclic Cosmology, might work, because information from prior aeons influences subsequent ones through conformal geometry.

In the Many World’s Interpretation (MWI) cosmology has a branching structure and inflationary multiverse. In MWI specifically: is the universal wavefunction the cosmopsychist’s locus of experience? Or does each branch constitute a separate whole?

Something like Russellian Monism with weak emergence might hold up, even with Tegmark’s mathematical universe, but as cosmological theories get more precise and accurate, will most Panpsychist theories get invalidated (or confirmed)?

As far as we know, particles below a certain threshold have no experience of death like we do as a unified subject with consciousness. An atom behaves the same if it‘s part of a living being or a dead one.

I’m not convinced by IIT, but I do wonder if the framework would be stronger if it started measuring phi from what I’d call the autopoietic threshold (this is a fancy word for self producing which makes me feel smart using), the point where a physical system first maintains itself against dissolution, and death becomes a real event rather than just a metaphor. That seems to me that it would be a more rigorous system than just starting at zero. It might even help IIT avoid certain panpsychist implications.

How would this play out? Instead of asking “how much integrated information does this system have?” you’d first ask “is this system maintaining itself against dissolution?” There is the staring point to measure phi.

I have not read anything in the literature about this, but i think it would make IIT a bit more robust, even if it has to lean into the autopoietic angle.