u/Nouble01

青木氏曰く原油価格高騰や金利高の中でもアメリカはノートの内容が見られる事等より未来スーパーサイクルに入りつつあると述べた。

さて貴方は此の青木氏の意見に対して何の様な見解を示すだろうか？
___
ノート：
- 恐らくCPIが4%半ばに及ぶ
- 機械、電力、ガス、鉱工業生産、半導体、電子部品、此らにおいての設備投資が堅調さを示している、
- キチンの波として製造業における在庫-新規受注の関係性において改善や、受注改善もが見られる
- ジュグラーの波として、金融機関の貸し出し態度が改善している
- クズネッツの波として、サンベルト地域への人口流入がインフラ拡張とを喚起していて、こうしたイルすら拡張による基盤醸成により製造業にも中長期の設備投資を押し上げていくだろう
- コンドラチェフの波として、生成AI等による産業構造の根本的な技術革新が勃興してくる
- 此等の複数期間サイクルにおける好転期がいずれもが重なるこんにちはスーパーサイクルの開始時期を示唆している。

Mr. Aoki stated that, despite soaring oil prices and high interest rates, the contents of the following notes also indicate that the US is entering a supercycle.

Now, what is your opinion on this?

__
Notes:
- CPI will likely reach the mid-4% range.
- Capital investment in machinery, electricity, gas, mining and manufacturing, semiconductors, and electronic components is showing strength.
- As part of the Kitchin wave, improvements are being seen in the inventory-new order relationship in manufacturing, as well as improvements in orders.
- As part of the Juglar wave, lending attitudes of financial institutions are improving.
- As part of the Kuznets wave, population influx into the Sun Belt region is stimulating infrastructure expansion, and this expansion and resulting foundation building will boost medium- to long-term capital investment in manufacturing.
- As part of the Kondratiev wave, fundamental technological innovations in industrial structure, such as generative AI, are emerging.
- These periods of improvement in multiple time cycles all coincide, suggesting the start of a new supercycle.
___
Please note that replies to your posts may be in languages ​​other than English.

Social infrastructure, energy, and similar sectors represent areas where certain goods in the United States exist outside the bounds of competitive market pricing. The price levels of these goods directly and unavoidably burden citizens, leaving them no recourse. As outlined in the notes below, a degree of regulatory precedent already exists in adjacent sectors.
In light of this, we propose the following: building upon the transparency obligations described herein, and through the expansion of regulatory authority at either the federal or state level — encompassing the FTC, FERC, state Attorneys General, and state Public Utility Commissions — the upstream crude oil profit margin for extraction operators should be capped at a maximum net profit rate of 20% ±2%, inclusive of a risk premium (serving as a benchmark of approximately $85 per barrel). Gasoline retail prices should likewise be capped at $3.70 per gallon, inclusive of a comparable retail margin premium.
It should further be noted that addressing the current crude oil price surge through interest rate hikes would be profoundly unethical and an act of gross policy failure that ought to be categorically avoided.

Notes:
- Other quasi-public utility costs are subject to at least some form of price regulation, however limited:
　　Internet: Under regulatory frameworks in New York State and Connecticut
　　Note: Limited to low-income households
　　Electricity: Regulated in 32 of 50 states, approximately 64%
　　Natural Gas: State Public Utility Commissions (PUC)
　　Water: State Public Utility Commissions (PUC)
　　Railroad freight: Surface Transportation Board (STB) at the federal level; Note: partial scope only
　　Telephone: FCC and state-level regulation
- Breakeven costs for shale crude oil extraction operators:
　　Median: Below $70 per barrel
　　Weighted average: Mid-$60s per barrel
- Sustainable net profit margins by industry:
　　Software / SaaS: 15–30%
　　Pharmaceuticals: 15–25%
　　Finance / Insurance: 10–20%
　　Manufacturing (machinery / electronics): 5–10%
　　General retail: 2–5%
　　Food and beverage: 3–9%
　　Construction: 2–6%
　　Transportation / logistics: 2–5%
　　Grocery / food retail: 1–3%
- Typical net profit premiums among high-performing non-tech businesses:
　　Outstanding / high-yield: 15–25% or above
　　Strong / healthy: 8–15%
　　Average / acceptable: 3–8%
　　Thin margin / at risk: 1–3%
　　Pre-loss territory: Below 1%
- Projected retail gasoline prices by crude oil price level:
　　$70/bbl: $3.01/gal
　　$85/bbl: $3.65/gal
　　$105/bbl: $4.51/gal
- Market conditions in crude oil and gasoline:
　Oligopolistic conditions have become entrenched in the U.S. domestic oil market, and from the perspective of ordinary citizens, meaningful price competition is largely absent.
　Background: As a result of extensive merger and consolidation activity throughout the 1990s, the U.S. petroleum market came to be dominated by a small number of major players. The large-scale mergers exemplified by ExxonMobil and BP-Amoco led to a significant increase in market concentration, giving rise to a structure of mutual interdependence in which each firm closely monitors the pricing behavior of its rivals. Congressional reports have cited the existence of internal documents indicating that these companies were aware of their role as members of an oligopoly and were deliberately avoiding flooding the market in ways that would erode their collective profitability.
　At the retail level, price differentials between stations within the same local area typically range from a few cents to approximately 20 cents per gallon, leaving consumers with limited practical ability to make meaningful price-based choices. Given the low short-term price elasticity of gasoline demand and the absence of readily available substitutes, market participants on the supply side effectively function as price setters — a structure fundamentally at odds with that of a genuinely competitive market.
- Core argument:
　Based on the foregoing, we propose that the maximum net profit rate for goods and services operating in non-competitive, oligopolistic markets be capped at 20% ±2%, inclusive of a risk premium.
　For reference, the gasoline price equivalent of $85 per barrel of crude oil is $3.65 per gallon, derived using an empirically confirmed conversion coefficient of 0.04295. The proposed retail cap of $3.70 per gallon falls within the margin of error and reflects a considered allowance for minor fluctuations in retail margins.
- In the interest of ensuring transparency, operators shall be required to file advance notice of any price changes. Furthermore, where instances of deliberate net profit suppression are identified, the relevant line items shall be excluded from regulatory reporting.
- It is our understanding that interest rate increases are among the measures under consideration in response to the current surge in crude oil prices. However, this approach fundamentally misdiagnoses the problem.
　The true purpose of raising interest rates is to act as a form of public deterrent — analogous to a financial penalty — against businesses that exploit inflationary conditions to compress consumer purchasing power while extracting excessive profits. However, in the present situation, non-extraction businesses are not the perpetrators of such exploitation. On the contrary, they find themselves victims alongside ordinary citizens, effectively squeezed by the actions of crude oil producers.
　Any public policy that inflicts further hardship upon citizens and businesses who are already the injured parties is, by its very nature, unethical. An interest rate hike under these circumstances reflects a failure to grasp fundamental economic principles — it is, without qualification, a misguided and counterproductive measure that should be rejected outright.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
　Any public policy that inflicts further hardship upon citizens and businesses who are already the injured parties is, by its very nature, unethical. An interest rate hike under these circumstances reflects a failure to grasp fundamental economic principles — it is, without qualification, a misguided and counterproductive measure that should be rejected outright.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
- Please note that replies to this message may be in languages ​​other than English.

Social infrastructure, energy, and similar sectors represent areas where certain goods in the United States exist outside the bounds of competitive market pricing. The price levels of these goods directly and unavoidably burden citizens, leaving them no recourse. As outlined in the notes below, a degree of regulatory precedent already exists in adjacent sectors.
In light of this, we propose the following: building upon the transparency obligations described herein, and through the expansion of regulatory authority at either the federal or state level — encompassing the FTC, FERC, state Attorneys General, and state Public Utility Commissions — the upstream crude oil profit margin for extraction operators should be capped at a maximum net profit rate of 20% ±2%, inclusive of a risk premium (serving as a benchmark of approximately $85 per barrel). Gasoline retail prices should likewise be capped at $3.70 per gallon, inclusive of a comparable retail margin premium.
It should further be noted that addressing the current crude oil price surge through interest rate hikes would be profoundly unethical and an act of gross policy failure that ought to be categorically avoided.

Notes:
- Other quasi-public utility costs are subject to at least some form of price regulation, however limited:
　　Internet: Under regulatory frameworks in New York State and Connecticut
　　Note: Limited to low-income households
　　Electricity: Regulated in 32 of 50 states, approximately 64%
　　Natural Gas: State Public Utility Commissions (PUC)
　　Water: State Public Utility Commissions (PUC)
　　Railroad freight: Surface Transportation Board (STB) at the federal level; Note: partial scope only
　　Telephone: FCC and state-level regulation
- Breakeven costs for shale crude oil extraction operators:
　　Median: Below $70 per barrel
　　Weighted average: Mid-$60s per barrel
- Sustainable net profit margins by industry:
　　Software / SaaS: 15–30%
　　Pharmaceuticals: 15–25%
　　Finance / Insurance: 10–20%
　　Manufacturing (machinery / electronics): 5–10%
　　General retail: 2–5%
　　Food and beverage: 3–9%
　　Construction: 2–6%
　　Transportation / logistics: 2–5%
　　Grocery / food retail: 1–3%
- Typical net profit premiums among high-performing non-tech businesses:
　　Outstanding / high-yield: 15–25% or above
　　Strong / healthy: 8–15%
　　Average / acceptable: 3–8%
　　Thin margin / at risk: 1–3%
　　Pre-loss territory: Below 1%
- Projected retail gasoline prices by crude oil price level:
　　$70/bbl: $3.01/gal
　　$85/bbl: $3.65/gal
　　$105/bbl: $4.51/gal
- Market conditions in crude oil and gasoline:
　Oligopolistic conditions have become entrenched in the U.S. domestic oil market, and from the perspective of ordinary citizens, meaningful price competition is largely absent.
　Background: As a result of extensive merger and consolidation activity throughout the 1990s, the U.S. petroleum market came to be dominated by a small number of major players. The large-scale mergers exemplified by ExxonMobil and BP-Amoco led to a significant increase in market concentration, giving rise to a structure of mutual interdependence in which each firm closely monitors the pricing behavior of its rivals. Congressional reports have cited the existence of internal documents indicating that these companies were aware of their role as members of an oligopoly and were deliberately avoiding flooding the market in ways that would erode their collective profitability.
　At the retail level, price differentials between stations within the same local area typically range from a few cents to approximately 20 cents per gallon, leaving consumers with limited practical ability to make meaningful price-based choices. Given the low short-term price elasticity of gasoline demand and the absence of readily available substitutes, market participants on the supply side effectively function as price setters — a structure fundamentally at odds with that of a genuinely competitive market.
- Core argument:
　Based on the foregoing, we propose that the maximum net profit rate for goods and services operating in non-competitive, oligopolistic markets be capped at 20% ±2%, inclusive of a risk premium.
　For reference, the gasoline price equivalent of $85 per barrel of crude oil is $3.65 per gallon, derived using an empirically confirmed conversion coefficient of 0.04295. The proposed retail cap of $3.70 per gallon falls within the margin of error and reflects a considered allowance for minor fluctuations in retail margins.
- In the interest of ensuring transparency, operators shall be required to file advance notice of any price changes. Furthermore, where instances of deliberate net profit suppression are identified, the relevant line items shall be excluded from regulatory reporting.
- It is our understanding that interest rate increases are among the measures under consideration in response to the current surge in crude oil prices. However, this approach fundamentally misdiagnoses the problem.
　The true purpose of raising interest rates is to act as a form of public deterrent — analogous to a financial penalty — against businesses that exploit inflationary conditions to compress consumer purchasing power while extracting excessive profits. However, in the present situation, non-extraction businesses are not the perpetrators of such exploitation. On the contrary, they find themselves victims alongside ordinary citizens, effectively squeezed by the actions of crude oil producers.
　Any public policy that inflicts further hardship upon citizens and businesses who are already the injured parties is, by its very nature, unethical. An interest rate hike under these circumstances reflects a failure to grasp fundamental economic principles — it is, without qualification, a misguided and counterproductive measure that should be rejected outright.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
　Any public policy that inflicts further hardship upon citizens and businesses who are already the injured parties is, by its very nature, unethical. An interest rate hike under these circumstances reflects a failure to grasp fundamental economic principles — it is, without qualification, a misguided and counterproductive measure that should be rejected outright.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
- Please note that replies to this message may be in languages ​​other than English.

Social infrastructure, energy, and similar sectors represent areas where certain goods in the United States exist outside the bounds of competitive market pricing. The price levels of these goods directly and unavoidably burden citizens, leaving them no recourse. As outlined in the notes below, a degree of regulatory precedent already exists in adjacent sectors.
In light of this, we propose the following: building upon the transparency obligations described herein, and through the expansion of regulatory authority at either the federal or state level — encompassing the FTC, FERC, state Attorneys General, and state Public Utility Commissions — the upstream crude oil profit margin for extraction operators should be capped at a maximum net profit rate of 20% ±2%, inclusive of a risk premium (serving as a benchmark of approximately $85 per barrel). Gasoline retail prices should likewise be capped at $3.70 per gallon, inclusive of a comparable retail margin premium.
It should further be noted that addressing the current crude oil price surge through interest rate hikes would be profoundly unethical and an act of gross policy failure that ought to be categorically avoided.

Notes:
- Other quasi-public utility costs are subject to at least some form of price regulation, however limited:
　　Internet: Under regulatory frameworks in New York State and Connecticut
　　Note: Limited to low-income households
　　Electricity: Regulated in 32 of 50 states, approximately 64%
　　Natural Gas: State Public Utility Commissions (PUC)
　　Water: State Public Utility Commissions (PUC)
　　Railroad freight: Surface Transportation Board (STB) at the federal level; Note: partial scope only
　　Telephone: FCC and state-level regulation
- Breakeven costs for shale crude oil extraction operators:
　　Median: Below $70 per barrel
　　Weighted average: Mid-$60s per barrel
- Sustainable net profit margins by industry:
　　Software / SaaS: 15–30%
　　Pharmaceuticals: 15–25%
　　Finance / Insurance: 10–20%
　　Manufacturing (machinery / electronics): 5–10%
　　General retail: 2–5%
　　Food and beverage: 3–9%
　　Construction: 2–6%
　　Transportation / logistics: 2–5%
　　Grocery / food retail: 1–3%
- Typical net profit premiums among high-performing non-tech businesses:
　　Outstanding / high-yield: 15–25% or above
　　Strong / healthy: 8–15%
　　Average / acceptable: 3–8%
　　Thin margin / at risk: 1–3%
　　Pre-loss territory: Below 1%
- Projected retail gasoline prices by crude oil price level:
　　$70/bbl: $3.01/gal
　　$85/bbl: $3.65/gal
　　$105/bbl: $4.51/gal
- Market conditions in crude oil and gasoline:
　Oligopolistic conditions have become entrenched in the U.S. domestic oil market, and from the perspective of ordinary citizens, meaningful price competition is largely absent.
　Background: As a result of extensive merger and consolidation activity throughout the 1990s, the U.S. petroleum market came to be dominated by a small number of major players. The large-scale mergers exemplified by ExxonMobil and BP-Amoco led to a significant increase in market concentration, giving rise to a structure of mutual interdependence in which each firm closely monitors the pricing behavior of its rivals. Congressional reports have cited the existence of internal documents indicating that these companies were aware of their role as members of an oligopoly and were deliberately avoiding flooding the market in ways that would erode their collective profitability.
　At the retail level, price differentials between stations within the same local area typically range from a few cents to approximately 20 cents per gallon, leaving consumers with limited practical ability to make meaningful price-based choices. Given the low short-term price elasticity of gasoline demand and the absence of readily available substitutes, market participants on the supply side effectively function as price setters — a structure fundamentally at odds with that of a genuinely competitive market.
- Core argument:
　Based on the foregoing, we propose that the maximum net profit rate for goods and services operating in non-competitive, oligopolistic markets be capped at 20% ±2%, inclusive of a risk premium.
　For reference, the gasoline price equivalent of $85 per barrel of crude oil is $3.65 per gallon, derived using an empirically confirmed conversion coefficient of 0.04295. The proposed retail cap of $3.70 per gallon falls within the margin of error and reflects a considered allowance for minor fluctuations in retail margins.
- In the interest of ensuring transparency, operators shall be required to file advance notice of any price changes. Furthermore, where instances of deliberate net profit suppression are identified, the relevant line items shall be excluded from regulatory reporting.
- It is our understanding that interest rate increases are among the measures under consideration in response to the current surge in crude oil prices. However, this approach fundamentally misdiagnoses the problem.
　The true purpose of raising interest rates is to act as a form of public deterrent — analogous to a financial penalty — against businesses that exploit inflationary conditions to compress consumer purchasing power while extracting excessive profits. However, in the present situation, non-extraction businesses are not the perpetrators of such exploitation. On the contrary, they find themselves victims alongside ordinary citizens, effectively squeezed by the actions of crude oil producers.
　Any public policy that inflicts further hardship upon citizens and businesses who are already the injured parties is, by its very nature, unethical. An interest rate hike under these circumstances reflects a failure to grasp fundamental economic principles — it is, without qualification, a misguided and counterproductive measure that should be rejected outright.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
　Any public policy that inflicts further hardship upon citizens and businesses who are already the injured parties is, by its very nature, unethical. An interest rate hike under these circumstances reflects a failure to grasp fundamental economic principles — it is, without qualification, a misguided and counterproductive measure that should be rejected outright.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
- Please note that replies to this message may be in languages ​​other than English.

少し前の話ザ・ソースでメインを担当しているケイトランコリン女史はこう述べました。
》特定対象に躍起に張るのは相手が厄介な脅威だからだ。

さて、此処二週程同女史を含め此の番組ではトランプ氏へのペテンばかりのバッシングに躍起になり出しています。
以前同番組内で発表された何らかの支持率差は民主党２：共和党１と言った様に大差を博していると胸を張って豪語していました。然し此処数日の内に発表した現在民主党と共和党の支持率差は彼女ら自身発言として本当にかなり差が縮まってしまっていて、6ポイント差だとの事でしたが、此が如何同女史の発言に影響が影を落としているかは私では解りません。
又、トランプ氏第二期就任前も結果として実現不可能な事をあれや此やと画策して其はもう本当に躍起になってました。

重ねますが私では真意は分かりませんが、同女史が先に発言した内容、つまり彼女の脳内に常に横たわっているだろう上記の内容が彼女を見るたびに走馬灯の様に呼び起こされ続けています。

重要点ですので再度示します。
》特定対象に躍起に張るのは相手が厄介な脅威だからだ。
彼女曰くの通り、要するにトランプ氏の脅威感から目を離せないために彼女やCNNは躍起にならざるを得ない、だから彼女やCNNは語気を強め攻撃に出なければいられない、だからこその慌てふためき様なのでしょうか？

其とも、CNNの人気が実は公表値より実はとても低過ぎるため何らかの社内事情が極めて悪化しており内容が事実に即しているかや、又報道倫理をも一切気にする余裕が余にもなさすぎるために、致し方なく自社の延命行為として苛烈な見出しや内容を踊らせるイエローペーパー合戦を流さざるを得ない、倫理なんて延命の前では顧みれない、そういう事なのでしょうか？

となると、CNNは実は倒産する可能性が見えてくるのでしょうか？

https://www.facebook.com/share/18bHupuAAc/?mibextid=wwXIfr
Γ8÷2(2+2)
=8÷2(4)
=8÷8
=1

又は、
Γ8÷2(2+2)
=8÷(2×2+2×2)
=8÷(4+4)
=8÷(8)
=8÷8
=1

何故間違え得るのだろう？
電卓で検算しても1になるのに。

https://special.topics.smt.docomo.ne.jp/article/mainichi/nation/mainichi-20260513k0000m040071000c?utm\_source=dmenu\_top&utm\_medium=apppush&utm\_campaign=dmenu\_202605\_132001\_flashnews\_ios&ct=2
以前より検察による裁判係争事案への不服抗告は行政からの司法介入として危ぶまれてきました。
内密ではなく開かれた法廷の光の元のみで全てを審議べきだという理念からです。
又再審に要する期間が膨大化する事も今般問題視されています。
此を受け与党は検察による抗告規定の削除を根強く求めていましたが、如何やら国民を安心させ欺く策略たったのです。

最終段では政府による司法介入を本則に明文化してきました。
此は三権分立への反逆です。
真っ向倫理違反だと思うのですが何かご意見はありますか？

恐らくはこうして又もや日本帝国化が此の21世紀において今後更に進行していくと見るべきだ。

Note：
過去の策略事例、
①2013年：内閣法制局長官人事
内部昇格の慣例を破り、集団的自衛権行使の憲法解釈変更に前向きな外務省出身者を起用。 これにより安保法制への道を開いた。「慣例」という非公式な歯止めを人事で突破した最初の事例。
②2017年：最高裁判事任命
日本弁護士連合会が推薦するリストから起用するという慣例があった最高裁判事に、リスト外の人物を任命。 司法人事への介入を慣例破りという形で実行。
③2020年：黒川検事長定年延長
政府は黒川氏の定年延長は国家公務員法に基づく措置だと説明したが、直後から法曹界や野党で「違法」の声が上がった。 批判を受けると今度は検察庁法改正案として明文規定を新設し、「違法」のそしりも受けない 形に事後的に正当化しようとした

何考えたらこんなの通せるんだろ？
三権分立のなし崩し敵叩き壊しだよ。
馬鹿の集まりか？
又は計略なのか？
兎に角売名行為ウッハウハではなくて？

貴方は今回の翻訳機能の翻訳制度を何の様に評価しますか？

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「水筒（ステンレス製）」2026年4月24日
【詳細】https://www.u-np.jp/orion_bottle_recall/
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「玩具（打楽器）」2026年4月24日
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◆本田技研工業株式会社（法人番号：6010401027577）
　デンヨー株式会社（法人番号：4010001105371）
　株式会社小松製作所（法人番号：1010401010455）
　スーパー工業株式会社（法人番号：9120901009532）
「着脱式可搬バッテリー」2026年4月21日
【詳細】（本田技研工業株式会社）
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オンライン受付フォーム（24時間）
https://www.honda.co.jp/customer/?from=navi_header_www

◆ジミーチュウトウキョウ株式会社（法人番号：6010401060173）
「婦人靴」2026年4月16日
【詳細】https://www.jimmychoo.jp/ja/home
オンライン受付フォーム（24時間）https://www.jimmychoo.jp/ja/contact-us

ハンターウイルスが今回の種ではヒトカラ単の感染可能性があるとされているそうです。
ハンターウイルスは当時の新型コロナウイルスとはもちろん違う種です。
然し空気感染なら感染拡大する際の挙動は同じです。
又エピデミックが起きるのでしょうか？