u/Pale-Detective-7440

🎤 Britt Calls Out Michael Gottlieb’s “Press Tour” Claims — 0:00–1:19

• Britt criticizes Blake Lively’s attorney, Michael Gottlieb, for publicly framing the settlement as a victory despite not litigating the claims to trial.
• Britt mocks his statements minimizing the relevance of Taylor Swift in the case.
• Britt argues the alleged attempt to serve a subpoena at Travis Kelce’s property became a distraction narrative used to shift media attention away from the underlying claims.
• Process servers typically act independently from clients themselves.

📄 Britt Says the Court Order Contradicted Gottlieb — 1:19–2:13

• Britt points to a court order denying Blake Lively’s request for a protective order related to Taylor Swift communications.
• The judge noted that Lively herself identified Swift as someone with potential knowledge regarding workplace discussions on the set of It Ends With Us.
• She emphasizes that Swift was allegedly included on witness disclosures, contradicting Gottlieb’s public claim that Swift had “nothing to do” with the case.

⚖️ Lawyers, Public Trust, and Duty of Candor — 2:28–3:55

• Britt says her frustration stems partly from being a lawyer and believing public trust in attorneys is already very low.
• Lawyers and online commentators have a responsibility to accurately describe court proceedings and judicial rulings.
• According to Britt, misrepresenting court orders to large audiences damages public understanding of how the legal system works.
• Britt frames the issue as bigger than celebrity drama, and it reflects broader concerns about honesty, transparency, and public confidence in the courts.

🧠🤭🧨 Notactuallygolden - “It’s Already Privileged”: Litigation Privilege May End §47.1 "Me Too" Law Debate

⚖️ Why 47.1 May Not Apply Here — 0:00–1:17

• LGA says she revisited Judge Liman’s June 9 order dismissing the Wayfarer defendants’ claims to better understand the nuance of California Civil Code 47.1.
• She explains that before 47.1 existed, statements made in lawsuits, depositions, administrative hearings, and other legal proceedings were already protected by existing litigation privileges.
• According to LGA, 47.1 created an expanded privilege for sexual harassment communications made outside those traditional legal contexts.

🗣️ Example — 1:17–2:44

• LGA says the law appears designed to protect someone who publicly speaks about alleged sexual harassment outside court or media reporting protections.
• She uses the example of someone standing in a town square saying they were sexually harassed or assaulted.
• In that scenario, 47.1 would shield the speaker from defamation liability if they were later sued.
• The statute’s fee-shifting and treble damages provisions, she explains, appear aimed at compensating people harmed by retaliatory defamation lawsuits.

📰 Why Lively’s Situation May Be Different — 2:44–4:08

• LGA notes that Blake Lively’s statements were made to the New York Times and in legal pleadings.
• Judge Liman already found those communications protected under the fair reporting privilege and litigation privilege.
• LGA highlights a key line from the June 9 order: the court specifically stated it had not ruled on whether Lively’s statements were privileged under 47.1.
• Because the judge did not dismiss the claims on 47.1 grounds, LGA says he could conclude Lively was not the “prevailing defendant” under that statute.

📚 The Legislature’s Intended Scope — 4:08–5:34

• Lively’s counsel would likely argue her statements still fall within 47.1’s language.
• However, the statute may have been intended to fill a gap for communications that otherwise lacked legal protection.
• Since Lively’s statements were already protected by existing privileges, LGA questions whether Blake Lively fits the type of speaker the legislature intended to protect under 47.1.

⚖️ Existing Privileges May Already Cover Lively’s Claims — 0:00–1:44

• NAG argues that Judge Liman may not need the 47.1 privilege for sexual harassment allegations made in court filings.
• Those statements may already be protected by litigation privilege.
• Judge Liman had already found that litigation privilege, along with fair report privilege, blocked Wayfarer from suing over the CRD complaint and New York Times reporting.

🧩 47.1 May Only Matter Outside Court — 1:52–2:53

• NAG suggests 47.1 may be most relevant when sexual harassment claims are made outside the legal system.
• If statements are made in lawsuits, the existing litigation privilege may already apply.
• She notes the law was based on a situation involving public statements to the legislature and media, not claims filed in court.

🤔 The Simplest Argument — 2:53–3:32

• With LGA’s input, NAG considers whether Judge Liman could simply say he already found the statements privileged.
• He may not need to decide whether 47.1 also applies.
• The key point: the statements are already privileged under other legal doctrines.

💸 Fee-Shifting and “Stacking” Privileges — 3:39–4:00

• NAG questions whether fee-shifting or damages should apply if 47.1 is only a “third privilege” layered on top of existing ones.
• Whether courts should allow multiple privileges to pile onto the same filing.
• This may be the strongest and simplest argument.

🗣️🎙️Notactuallygolden and Little Girl Attorney - A Long-Awaited Kevin Fritz Interview After Months Covering the Lively-Baldoni Case

🤝 Finally Sitting Down With Kevin Fritz (0:00–0:47)

• LGA and NAG finally had the opportunity to properly interview Kevin Fritz after briefly meeting him during the January dispositive motions hearing in New York.
• The interview allowed LGA and NAG to ask more in-depth inside baseball questions about the litigation and legal strategy.
• Listeners will likely find many of Fritz’s answers and insights genuinely interesting once the episode releases over the weekend.

⚖️ Privilege Still Exists Even After Settlement (0:47–1:18)

• LGA explains that although the case may be resolved, attorney-client privilege still survives.
• Because of that, there were certain questions they intentionally could not ask Kevin Fritz.
• Privilege remains in place regardless of whether there are non-disclosure agreements tied to the settlement.

👏 Kevin Fritz Recognized the Lawyers Behind the Scenes (1:18–2:29)

• One of the biggest things that stood out to LGA was how Kevin Fritz repeatedly credited associates and behind-the-scenes lawyers at his firm.
• Many of those attorneys worked extensively on the case without receiving public recognition.
• Fritz went out of his way to mention several lawyers by name and acknowledge their contributions.
• LGA says this impressed her deeply because partners often receive the public credit while associates do much of the day-to-day litigation work.
• Kevin's willingness to share recognition is a sign of strong character and leadership.

🌟 Kevin Fritz Represents the Best of Litigation (2:29–3:25)

• LGA describes Kevin as the type of litigator who gives litigators a good name.
• LGA also thanks NAG for inviting her onto the podcast and reflects on how the lawsuit unexpectedly created new friendships and professional connections between creators and lawyers following the case.

🗣️🎙️Little Girl Attorney + Notactuallygolden - Interview with Kevin Fritz Offers Rare Behind-the-Scenes Insight Into the Lively-Baldoni Litigation

🎙️ NAG Announces Major Interview with Kevin Fritz Alongside Little Girl Attorney (0:00–1:37)

• NAG and Little Girl Attorney are officially interviewing Kevin Fritz together for an upcoming podcast episode.
• They have been planning the interview for a while and intentionally wanted to co-host it because both have followed the case closely together.
• The interview will cover:
  • What happened in the case
  • Legal issues and strategies
  • Behind-the-scenes insights
  • Some lighter and more fun questions as well
• NAG will try to release the episode over the weekend instead of waiting until the usual Tuesday upload schedule.

📚 Why Blake Lively’s Massive §47.1 Filing in Texas May Legally Mean Nothing (0:00–2:17)

• Blake Lively attached nearly 300 pages of legislative history to her §47.1 motion in the Texas case.
• NAG explains that legislative history includes committee votes, sponsor statements, amendments, advocacy materials, and policy discussions created while a bill becomes law.
• The filing gives insight into the origins and intended purpose of California Civil Code §47.1.
• The judge likely cannot even consider most of those materials unless the statute is first found to be ambiguous by the judge.

🗣️ The Real Origin of California’s §47.1 Law (2:17–3:33)

• California already had anti-SLAPP and pro-speech protections before §47.1 existed.
• NAG says the statute was created after a California lobbyist accused a state assembly member of assault publicly and was later sued for defamation.
• Courts protected statements made to the government, but not necessarily statements made to the press.
• §47.1 was designed to expand protections so alleged victims could speak publicly about sexual misconduct without automatically facing defamation liability.

🛡️ §47.1 Was Intentionally Designed as a Pro-Speech Statute (3:33–5:28)

• The legislative materials repeatedly describe §47.1 as an extension of California’s anti-SLAPP framework.
• The law’s purpose was to encourage people to come forward and discourage retaliatory lawsuits.
• Support for the bill came from advocacy groups and anti-SLAPP organizations, while the formal legislative history showed virtually no recorded opposition.
• NAG also highlights that one major argument in the current litigation is whether §47.1 is procedural in nature and therefore potentially inapplicable in federal court.

🏛️ How the Legislature Quietly Broadened the Statute (5:28–7:12)

• NAG points out that earlier versions of the bill protected only formal “complaints” made by “complainants.”
• During the legislative process, lawmakers intentionally broadened the wording to cover any “individual” discussing an “incident.”
• This expansion allowed the statute to apply even when no formal complaint was filed.
• NAG says this change was specifically meant to protect people speaking publicly to the media about alleged misconduct.

⚠️ Why Judges Usually Cannot Use Legislative History (7:12–9:51)

• Legislative history only becomes relevant if a judge concludes the statute is ambiguous and cannot reasonably be interpreted from its text alone.
• NAG argues that neither side in the litigation has formally claimed §47.1 is ambiguous.
• That means the judge may ultimately be limited to analyzing the statutory language itself and whatever case law exists — which, in this situation, is almost none.
• NAG concludes that while the legislative history may help explain the political intent behind the law, it may carry little legal weight unless the court first finds ambiguity in the statute.

⬇️ Relevant Content:

🧮💰🫩 Notactuallygolden - Fee Shifting, Not Punishment: Why a 47.1 Fee Award Could Open Blake Lively’s Billing Records

🥊🙏🫰🏻 Little Girl Attorney - Judge Liman Appears Ready to Resolve the 47.1 Motion Without More Briefing

👺👹🚨💀 Notactuallygolden - The Real Problem With §47.1: Why California’s Untested §47.1 Law Is So Complicated and Why §47.1 Was Always Separate From the Main Trial

🤺🫯🥊 Little Girl Attorney - The Legal Chaos Around §47.1: Blake Lively’s Lawsuit Is Officially Dismissed, But the §47.1 Battle Is Just Beginning

🧠👀🐉 Little Girl Attorney - California §47.1 Explained: Why Lively’s Attorney Fees Fight Isn’t Going Away (Yet) and Is Still Hanging Over the Case

🧠Little Girl Attorney - Wayfarer Opposes Lively’s §47.1 Fees Motion — Malice Standard, Connection and a Chaotic Law

🔥 Notactuallygolden - Wayfarer’s §47.1 Opposition Goes All In — Framing Lively’s Claims as Malicious, Risky, and Constitutionally Flawed

🧠 Lawyeredup1 - Lively v. Wayfarer Studios LLC Section 47.1 Motion: Serious Issues

⁉️💥🤯💣 Notactuallygolden - A Last-Ditch Attempt: Breaks Down the Explosive Settlement Dispute and The 47.1 Carve-Out Is Crazy

🧠Notactuallygolden - Redacted 47.1 Motion Emerges — A Mysterious Declaration, But Likely Just Background Noise

🧐 Little Girl Attorney - Lively’s 47.1 Reply Brief: One Word Only - Confusing

Judge Liman’s One-Line Order May Actually Be a Good Sign (00:00–00:59)

• Judge Lewis J. Liman declining additional briefing is likely a positive development
• LGA Interprets the order as a sign the judge believes he already has enough legal briefing to rule on the §47.1 issue
• Suggests the judge is not interested in arguments based on:
  • the post-settlement joint statement
  • later stipulations
  • or events that happened after September 2025 when briefing closed

🧠 Don’t Overread the Judge’s Wording (00:59–01:36)

• LGA cautions against overanalyzing phrases in the judge’s order
• People often project meaning onto minimal judicial language that may not actually exist
• Notes the wording could mean many things, including:
  • possible future evidentiary proceedings
  • procedural housekeeping
  • or simply the judge’s writing style

⚖️ Option 1: Evidentiary Hearing on Malice & Damages (01:36–02:19)

• One possible route: Judge Liman orders an evidentiary hearing
• LGA says this could require testimony about:
  • whether the communications were made “without malice”
  • whether the underlying defamation suit was malicious
  • and whether punitive or treble damages are justified under California law
• Emphasizes that punitive-style relief requires evidence, not just allegations

🚪 Why the Judge May Want an “Off-Ramp” (02:19–03:05)

• LGA questions why the judge would voluntarily create precedent on a brand-new statute like California Civil Code §47.1
• Since both parties waived appeal rights, the judge has a rare opportunity to resolve the matter quietly without creating broader appellate consequences
• LGA Suggests Judge Liman may prefer an “off-ramp” that avoids deeper constitutional or procedural rulings

💰 The Middle-Ground Outcome: Limited Attorney’s Fees (03:05–03:45)

• LGA outlines a possible compromise ruling:
  • grant reasonable attorney’s fees and costs only
  • deny punitive and treble damages
  • avoid a major evidentiary battle
• If that happens, Blake Lively’s legal team would need to submit invoices and billing records showing:
  • hours worked
  • rates charged
  • and what work specifically related to the dismissed defamation claims

🧾 The Court Still Controls What Is “Reasonable” (03:45–04:16)

• LGA stresses attorney’s fees are not automatic or unlimited
• Even if fees are awarded, the judge can sharply reduce the requested amount
• Gives an example:
  • if counsel sought millions, the judge could instead determine a reasonable motion-to-dismiss fee was closer to $50k–$100k

⏳ No Trial Date Means No Immediate Pressure (04:16–05:00)

• Because the case settled, there is no looming trial deadline forcing a fast ruling
• LGA says Judge Liman could take:
  • weeks
  • or even months to decide the motion
• However, the continued filings and public controversy may motivate the court to resolve the issue sooner

📚 §47.1 Is a Fee-Shifting Statute — Not Automatic Punishment (05:00–06:25)

• LGA pushes back on claims online that §47.1 automatically entitles Blake Lively to massive damages
• LGA Explains the statute is fundamentally a fee-shifting mechanism
• To recover damages, Lively would still need to prove:
  • malice
  • actual harm
  • and entitlement under the law
• Judge Liman retains discretion to reject or reduce many categories of requested relief

🔚 Final Take: The Judge Wants This Finished (06:25–End)

• LGA’s overall conclusion:
  • Judge Liman declining more briefing is probably a sign he wants to move toward a resolution
  • not reopen the entire litigation fight

Why Lively Should Lose on the § 47.1 Motion

1. Extraterritoriality

California Civil Code § 47.1(a) provides as follows: A communication made by an individual, without malice, regarding an incident of sexual assault, harassment, or discrimination is privileged under Section 47.

Subsection(b) provides as follows: "A prevailing defendant in any defamation action brought against that defendant for making a communication that is privileged under this section shall be entitled to their reasonable attorney’s fees and costs for successfully defending themselves in the litigation, plus treble damages for any harm caused to them by the defamation action against them, in addition to punitive damages available under Section 3294 or any other relief otherwise permitted by law."

It is on the basis of subsection(b) that Lively filed her motion seeking attorney's fees, costs, damages, treble damages and punitive damages.

In order to prevail, Lively must first establish that she made the "communication" described in § 47.1(a). No communication, no recovery. So, what is that communication? Luckily, the California defined that communication in subsection(d). Here's the excerpt:

"For the purposes of this section, “communication” means factual information related to an incident of sexual assault, harassment, or discrimination experienced by the individual making the communication, including, but not limited to, any of the following:
"(1) An act of sexual assault.

(2) An act of sexual harassment, as described in Section 51.9.

(3) An act of workplace harassment or discrimination, failure to prevent an act of workplace harassment or discrimination, aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling, or coercing an act of workplace harassment or discrimination, or an act of retaliation against a person for reporting or opposing workplace harassment or discrimination, as described in subdivision (a), (h), (i), (j), or (k) of Section 12940 of the Government Code.

(4) An act of harassment or discrimination, or an act of retaliation against a person for reporting harassment or discrimination, by the owner of a housing accommodation, as described in Section 12955 of the Government Code.

(5) An act of sexual harassment, as defined in Section 212.5 and 66262.5 of the Education Code.

(6) An act of harassment or discrimination, or an act of retaliation against a person for reporting harassment or discrimination, based on any of the protected classes enumerated in Section 220, 221.51, and 66270 of the Education Code.

(7) An act of cyber sexual bullying, as defined in Section 48900 of the Education Code."

In reviewing the text of § 47.1(d)(reproduced above), you'll readily notice citations to California law with respect to the wrongful conduct that was being communicated. The inescapable conclusion from this excerpt is that, with the exception of sexual assault, the communication has to be about or based on alleged violations of California law.

Lively's allegation of sexual harassment and discrimination involved conduct that occurred in New Jersey (and possibly, NY) where the movie was filmed. These alleged acts did not involve violations of California law. Thus, Lively's communications regarding these acts do not meet the definition of communication in § 47.1(d). Again, no communication means no recovery.

The question is: in enacting § 47.1(d), did California intend to include communication about acts occurring beyond California borders? The language of the statute did not clearly indicate that communication about conduct outside California was covered. As the US Supreme Court stated, “when a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 109, 115 (2013).

Similarly, in Ward v. United Airlines, Inc., 9 Cal. 5th 732, 264 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 466 P.3d 309, 325 (2020), the California Supreme court noted California's "presumption against extraterritoriality—that is, a presumptionthat state law is intended to apply only within state borders." (emphasis added). This is merely a presumption. The Court added that: "Of course, legislatures can, and do, regulate beyond their territorial borders in appropriate circumstances."
However, here comes the most crucial language on this issue: "But courts ordinarily will not give extraterritorial effect to legislative enactments absent an affirmative indication that such was the Legislature's intent."

With respect to Section 47.1 and specifically, subsection 47.1(d) (dealing with communication), there is no affirmative legislative indication that the California legislature intended that the communication regarding matters occurring outside of California is covered by section 47.1(d). Lively has the burden of proof in this motion because she is the movant. She has not pointed to any affirmative legislative indication that section 47.1 should apply extraterritorially. Nor has she cited any caselaw that applied section 47.1 extraterritorially. In my opinion, this issue of extraterritoriality is enough to easily defeat Lively's motion.

I understand that Lively could also be alleging that she made a communication regarding her California CRD complaint. However, under section 47.1(d), communication about the filing of a complaint is not one of the types of communication listed. Section 47.1(d) lists communication about substantive conduct (such as sexual harassment) that occurred in violation of California laws. Also, communication section 47.1(d) means "factual information related to an incident of sexual assault" that occurred in violation of California laws. Filing a CRD complaint in California for acts that occurred in New Jersey, does not elevate the CRD complaint to a factual communication about conduct occurring in violation of California law.

2. The Language of Section 47.1(b). As mentioned earlier, this is the basis of Lively's motion. A careful examination of this subsection raises in important issues for Lively. Subsection (b) says that "A prevailing defendant in any defamation action brought against that defendant for making a communication that is privileged..." Emphasis added. This subsection does not allow the prevailing defendant in any defamation action to sue and recover. It only allows the prevailing defendant to sue and recover if the defamation action was brought as a result of the defendant making privileged communication. As such, we must examine Wayfarer's defamation action against Lively.

One of the important things to note about Wayfarer's lawsuit against Lively is that it alleged 7 causes of action, but only one cause of action alleged defamation. As such, only the defamation count (2nd Cause of Action) is relevant for Sec 47.1 consideration.

Additionally, the defamation cause of action included allegations against Lively, Ryan Reynolds, Sloane, and Vision PR, Inc. This means that Lively cannot recover (under Section 47.1) for the defamation allegations against Ryan Reynolds, Sloane, and Vision. She can only recover with respect to the defamation allegation against her on which she prevailed.

The central allegation in the defamation complaint is as follows:
"Defendants made one or more statements to persons other than Plaintiffs, including without limitation to the New York Times, to the effect that Plaintiffs engaged in, permitted, and/or failed to prevent sexually inappropriate conduct toward Lively and others, and that Plaintiffs retaliated against Lively and others for reporting the alleged sexual misconduct including by propagating false and misleading narratives about Lively for the purpose of damaging her image and reputation."

To properly assess this defamation allegation, we must remember that section 47.1 references privileged communication under Section 47. Thus, the question is whether communication with the NYT is deemed privileged communication under Section 47. The short answer is that it is not. Therefore, how can Lively recover for winning a defamation case based on non-privileged communication with NYT? Imho, she cannot recover. NYT apparently obtained a copy of the confidential CRD Complaint as well as other items not included in the complaint. Based on all these, NYT published their article.

Wayfarer's defamation action did not allege that Lively defamed them by filing a CRD complaint. They did not allege that Lively defamed them by making an employment complaint in New Jersey (protected activity) or for filing a complaint with the California Civil Rights Department (privileged and protected activity). Because the defamation case was not based on Lively's protected activities, prevailing in the defamation action does not entitle Lively to recovery under Section 47.1.

Why Lively Should Lose on the § 47.1 Motion

1. Extraterritoriality

California Civil Code § 47.1(a) provides as follows: A communication made by an individual, without malice, regarding an incident of sexual assault, harassment, or discrimination is privileged under Section 47.

Subsection(b) provides as follows: "A prevailing defendant in any defamation action brought against that defendant for making a communication that is privileged under this section shall be entitled to their reasonable attorney’s fees and costs for successfully defending themselves in the litigation, plus treble damages for any harm caused to them by the defamation action against them, in addition to punitive damages available under Section 3294 or any other relief otherwise permitted by law."

It is on the basis of subsection(b) that Lively filed her motion seeking attorney's fees, costs, damages, treble damages and punitive damages.

In order to prevail, Lively must first establish that she made the "communication" described in § 47.1(a). No communication, no recovery. So, what is that communication? Luckily, the California defined that communication in subsection(d). Here's the excerpt:

"For the purposes of this section, “communication” means factual information related to an incident of sexual assault, harassment, or discrimination experienced by the individual making the communication, including, but not limited to, any of the following:
"(1) An act of sexual assault.

(2) An act of sexual harassment, as described in Section 51.9.

(3) An act of workplace harassment or discrimination, failure to prevent an act of workplace harassment or discrimination, aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling, or coercing an act of workplace harassment or discrimination, or an act of retaliation against a person for reporting or opposing workplace harassment or discrimination, as described in subdivision (a), (h), (i), (j), or (k) of Section 12940 of the Government Code.

(4) An act of harassment or discrimination, or an act of retaliation against a person for reporting harassment or discrimination, by the owner of a housing accommodation, as described in Section 12955 of the Government Code.

(5) An act of sexual harassment, as defined in Section 212.5 and 66262.5 of the Education Code.

(6) An act of harassment or discrimination, or an act of retaliation against a person for reporting harassment or discrimination, based on any of the protected classes enumerated in Section 220, 221.51, and 66270 of the Education Code.

(7) An act of cyber sexual bullying, as defined in Section 48900 of the Education Code."

In reviewing the text of § 47.1(d)(reproduced above), you'll readily notice citations to California law with respect to the wrongful conduct that was being communicated. The inescapable conclusion from this excerpt is that, with the exception of sexual assault, the communication has to be about or based on alleged violations of California law.

Lively's allegation of sexual harassment and discrimination involved conduct that occurred in New Jersey (and possibly, NY) where the movie was filmed. These alleged acts did not involve violations of California law. Thus, Lively's communications regarding these acts do not meet the definition of communication in § 47.1(d). Again, no communication means no recovery.

The question is: in enacting § 47.1(d), did California intend to include communication about acts occurring beyond California borders? The language of the statute did not clearly indicate that communication about conduct outside California was covered. As the US Supreme Court stated, “when a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 109, 115 (2013).

Similarly, in Ward v. United Airlines, Inc., 9 Cal. 5th 732, 264 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 466 P.3d 309, 325 (2020), the California Supreme court noted California's "presumption against extraterritoriality—that is, a presumption that state law is intended to apply only within state borders." (emphasis added). This is merely a presumption. The Court added that: "Of course, legislatures can, and do, regulate beyond their territorial borders in appropriate circumstances."
However, here comes the most crucial language on this issue: "But courts ordinarily will not give extraterritorial effect to legislative enactments absent an affirmative indication that such was the Legislature's intent."

With respect to Section 47.1 and specifically, subsection 47.1(d) (dealing with communication), there is no affirmative legislative indication that the California legislature intended that the communication regarding matters occurring outside of California is covered by section 47.1(d). Lively has the burden of proof in this motion because she is the movant. She has not pointed to any affirmative legislative indication that section 47.1 should apply extraterritorially. Nor has she cited any caselaw that applied section 47.1 extraterritorially. In my opinion, this issue of extraterritoriality is enough to easily defeat Lively's motion.

I understand that Lively could also be alleging that she made a communication regarding her California CRD complaint. However, under section 47.1(d), communication about the filing of a complaint is not one of the types of communication listed. Section 47.1(d) lists communication about substantive conduct (such as sexual harassment) that occurred in violation of California laws. Also, communication section 47.1(d) means "factual information related to an incident of sexual assault" that occurred in violation of California laws. Filing a CRD complaint in California for acts that occurred in New Jersey, does not elevate the CRD complaint to a factual communication about conduct occurring in violation of California law.

2. The Language of Section 47.1(b). As mentioned earlier, this is the basis of Lively's motion. A careful examination of this subsection raises in important issues for Lively. Subsection (b) says that "A prevailing defendant in any defamation action brought against that defendant for making a communication that is privileged..." Emphasis added. This subsection does not allow the prevailing defendant in any defamation action to sue and recover. It only allows the prevailing defendant to sue and recover if the defamation action was brought as a result of the defendant making privileged communication. As such, we must examine Wayfarer's defamation action against Lively.

One of the important things to note about Wayfarer's lawsuit against Lively is that it alleged 7 causes of action, but only one cause of action alleged defamation. As such, only the defamation count (2nd Cause of Action) is relevant for Sec 47.1 consideration.

Additionally, the defamation cause of action included allegations against Lively, Ryan Reynolds, Sloane, and Vision PR, Inc. This means that Lively cannot recover (under Section 47.1) for the defamation allegations against Ryan Reynolds, Sloane, and Vision. She can only recover with respect to the defamation allegation against her on which she prevailed.

The central allegation in the defamation complaint is as follows:
"Defendants made one or more statements to persons other than Plaintiffs, including without limitation to the New York Times, to the effect that Plaintiffs engaged in, permitted, and/or failed to prevent sexually inappropriate conduct toward Lively and others, and that Plaintiffs retaliated against Lively and others for reporting the alleged sexual misconduct including by propagating false and misleading narratives about Lively for the purpose of damaging her image and reputation."

To properly assess this defamation allegation, we must remember that section 47.1 references privileged communication under Section 47. Thus, the question is whether communication with the NYT is deemed privileged communication under Section 47. The short answer is that it is not. Therefore, how can Lively recover for winning a defamation case based on non-privileged communication with NYT? Imho, she cannot recover. NYT apparently obtained a copy of the confidential CRD Complaint as well as other items not included in the complaint. Based on all these, NYT published their article.

Wayfarer's defamation action did not allege that Lively defamed them by filing a CRD complaint. They did not allege that Lively defamed them by making an employment complaint in New Jersey (protected activity) or for filing a complaint with the California Civil Rights Department (privileged and protected activity). Because the defamation case was not based on Lively's protected activities, prevailing in the defamation action does not entitle Lively to recovery under Section 47.1.

⬇️ Relevant Content:

🥊 Blake Lively files Motion for Attorney Fees and Punitive Damages under CA Civil Code section 47.1

👺👹🚨💀 Notactuallygolden - The Real Problem With §47.1: Why California’s Untested §47.1 Law Is So Complicated and Why §47.1 Was Always Separate From the Main Trial

🧮💰🫩 Notactuallygolden - Fee Shifting, Not Punishment: Why a 47.1 Fee Award Could Open Blake Lively’s Billing Records

🤺🫯🥊 Little Girl Attorney - The Legal Chaos Around §47.1: Blake Lively’s Lawsuit Is Officially Dismissed, But the §47.1 Battle Is Just Beginning

🧠👀🐉 Little Girl Attorney - California §47.1 Explained: Why Lively’s Attorney Fees Fight Isn’t Going Away (Yet) and Is Still Hanging Over the Case

🧠Little Girl Attorney - Wayfarer Opposes Lively’s §47.1 Fees Motion — Malice Standard, Connection and a Chaotic Law

🔥 Notactuallygolden - Wayfarer’s §47.1 Opposition Goes All In — Framing Lively’s Claims as Malicious, Risky, and Constitutionally Flawed

🧠 Lawyeredup1 - Lively v. Wayfarer Studios LLC Section 47.1 Motion: Serious Issues

⁉️💥🤯💣 Notactuallygolden - A Last-Ditch Attempt: Breaks Down the Explosive Settlement Dispute and The 47.1 Carve-Out Is Crazy

🧠Notactuallygolden - Redacted 47.1 Motion Emerges — A Mysterious Declaration, But Likely Just Background Noise

🧐 Little Girl Attorney - Lively’s 47.1 Reply Brief: One Word Only - Confusing

⚖️ Constitutional Analysis (00:00–00:53)

• Vague or unclear statutes often raise constitutional concerns because people must know what conduct is allowed and what conduct is prohibited
• §47.1 creates those questions because the fact pattern and procedural history are so unusual

🧠 Think Ten Steps Ahead, Not Two (00:53–01:26)

• NAG agrees with Little Girl Attorney’s breakdown on attorney’s fees but adds a strategy point
• In litigation, you cannot only think about the immediate result—you have to think many moves ahead
• Even if Lively’s best outcome is attorney’s fees for the motion to dismiss, that comes with consequences

💸 Attorney’s Fees Are Not Sanctions (01:26–02:01)

• NAG emphasizes that fee-shifting is not the same thing as sanctions
• If Lively is awarded fees, it does not mean Wayfarer or its lawyers were punished by the court
• It simply means the court shifts some legal costs from the prevailing party to the losing party under the statute

📄 Fee Requests Open the Billing Records (02:01–03:32)

• To recover attorney’s fees, Lively’s team would have to submit billing records showing what work was done, by whom, and at what hourly rate
• Privileged legal advice can be redacted, but the court and opposing side still get to review the time entries
• Wayfarer can then challenge whether the fees were reasonable, excessive, duplicative, or unrelated to the defamation claim

⚖️ Reasonable Fees vs. Actual Fees (03:32–04:31)

• NAG explains that a party does not automatically recover whatever they paid their lawyers
• The court only awards a reasonable fee, and the opposing party can argue that the requested amount is inflated
• Practicing attorneys may even submit declarations explaining what a reasonable fee should be for that type of work

🔍 Why This Could Backfire Strategically (04:31–05:40)

• Even if Wayfarer had to pay some fees, the process could reveal how much Lively spent and how many lawyers worked on the motion
• NAG suggests Lively may not want that level of billing detail made public
• So the “win” of getting fees could come with the downside of exposing litigation spending and strategy logistics

🧾 Best-Case Scenario for Lively (05:40–06:03)

• NAG says Lively’s best realistic shot may be recovering fees tied narrowly to the motion to dismiss the defamation claim
• But even that would not equal punishment or vindication
• It would only mean the statute shifted the cost of that specific work

🧠 Final Take: Look Beyond the Obvious (06:03–End)

• NAG encourages viewers to keep thinking several steps beyond the immediate ruling
• Legal strategy often depends on hidden consequences that appear later
• Even a partial fee award could trigger a new fight over invoices, rates, reasonableness, and public exposure of billing records

⬇️ Relevant Content:

🥊 Blake Lively files Motion for Attorney Fees and Punitive Damages under CA Civil Code section 47.1

👺👹🚨💀 Notactuallygolden - The Real Problem With §47.1: Why California’s Untested §47.1 Law Is So Complicated and Why §47.1 Was Always Separate From the Main Trial

🤺🫯🥊 Little Girl Attorney - The Legal Chaos Around §47.1: Blake Lively’s Lawsuit Is Officially Dismissed, But the §47.1 Battle Is Just Beginning

🧠👀🐉 Little Girl Attorney - California §47.1 Explained: Why Lively’s Attorney Fees Fight Isn’t Going Away (Yet) and Is Still Hanging Over the Case

🧠Little Girl Attorney - Wayfarer Opposes Lively’s §47.1 Fees Motion — Malice Standard, Connection and a Chaotic Law

🔥 Notactuallygolden - Wayfarer’s §47.1 Opposition Goes All In — Framing Lively’s Claims as Malicious, Risky, and Constitutionally Flawed

🧠 Lawyeredup1 - Lively v. Wayfarer Studios LLC Section 47.1 Motion: Serious Issues

⁉️💥🤯💣 Notactuallygolden - A Last-Ditch Attempt: Breaks Down the Explosive Settlement Dispute and The 47.1 Carve-Out Is Crazy

🧠Notactuallygolden - Redacted 47.1 Motion Emerges — A Mysterious Declaration, But Likely Just Background Noise

🧐 Little Girl Attorney - Lively’s 47.1 Reply Brief: One Word Only - Confusing

⚖️ NAG Breaks Down California’s Uncharted §47.1 Law (00:00–01:03)

• Nobody truly knows how California Code §47.1 works yet because:
  • It has never been fully tested in court.
  • There is no controlling precedent interpreting it.
• Everything lawyers are doing right now is essentially:
  • statutory construction,
  • interpretation,
  • and educated guesswork.
• She explains this is a good example of how statutes are often written in a confusing, layered way that lawyers must decode section by section.

📜 Section A: Protected Communications & Privilege (01:03–02:03)

• NAG explains that the first core part of §47.1 creates a protected category of speech.
• The statute says:
  • certain communications made without malice about harassment or discrimination allegations become “privileged.”
• Meaning:
  • those communications are shielded from liability and lawsuits.
• Key legal concepts buried inside the statute:
  • “communication”
  • “malice”
  • “regarding”
  • “reasonable basis”
• Central takeaway:
  • The law is designed to immunize certain harassment-related complaints from defamation liability.

🧩 Why Section C Matters More Than People Realize (02:03–03:52)

• NAG says the real explanatory language is buried in Section C, not the opening section.
• Section C clarifies:
  • a person does not need to formally file with the CRD or EEOC for protections to apply.
• Instead:
  • If they had a reasonable basis to complain,
  • The communication may still qualify as privileged speech.
• She frames this as:
  • The statute defines what kinds of speech get protected status.
• NAG emphasizes:
  • statutes rarely cleanly separate “rights” and “defenses.”
  • Lawyers must infer how sections interact with each other.

⚙️ Section B: Enforcement & Monetary Consequences (03:52–05:11)

• NAG explains that Section B functions as the enforcement mechanism.
• Once a communication is deemed privileged:
  • A person sued for defamation over that communication may recover damages.
• This includes:
  • attorneys’ fees
  • costs
  • and potentially treble damages.
• Important distinction:
  • The statute itself doesn’t create the speech
  • It creates consequences for suing over protected speech.

🏛️ Why §47.1 Was Always Going to Survive Trial (05:11–06:59)

• NAG explains what the Wayfarer defendants mean when they say:
  • the §47.1 issue would have existed no matter what happened at trial.
• Why?
  • Because Blake Lively already prevailed on the dismissal of the defamation claims against her.
• That dismissal happened separately from:
  • her retaliation claims,
  • contract claims,
  • or FEHA claims.
• So regardless of whether she later won or lost trial:
  • she would still remain a “prevailing defendant” on the defamation portion.

⚠️ The Settlement Created New Problems for §47.1 (07:01–08:11)

• NAG says the settlement complicates enforcement because:
  • major unresolved factual issues were never decided by a jury.
• Key unresolved questions include:
  • Did Lively have a “reasonable basis” for her complaints?
  • Were her communications made “without malice”?
• Those issues were potentially going to be litigated at trial.
• But because the case settled:
  • there is now no factual verdict resolving them.

💰 Damages Are Another Major Weak Spot (08:11–09:12)

• NAG highlights another complication:
  • §47.1 allows damages tied specifically to harm caused by the defamation lawsuit itself.
• But:
  • no factual record cleanly separates:
    • harm caused by the alleged smear campaign,
    • harm caused by media coverage,
    • harm caused specifically by the defamation filing.
• Trial might have sorted that out through evidence and expert testimony.
• By settling:
  • Lively gave up the opportunity to fully establish those distinctions before a jury.

🧠 Final Take: Why Lawyers Think §47.1 Is Such a Stretch (09:12–End)

• NAG concludes that:
  • yes, Lively clearly prevailed on the defamation dismissal,
  • and that issue was always going to trigger §47.1 arguments.
• But the real difficulty is enforcement.
• Many of the factual findings needed to maximize or prove §47.1 remedies:
  • were never adjudicated because the case settled before trial.
• Final takeaway:
  • §47.1 may provide a path forward,
  • but because the statute is legally untested and so many factual issues remain unresolved,
  • Everyone is still operating in uncertain territory.

⬇️ Relevant Content:

🤬🤮🥊 TheTownPodcast - A Sit-Down With Blake Lively’s Lead Litigator: Michael Gottlieb Defends Blake Lively’s Settlement Strategy: “The §47.1 Claim Is the Win”

🧠 Lawyeredup1 - Lively v. Wayfarer Studios LLC Section 47.1 Motion: Serious Issues

⁉️💥🤯💣 Notactuallygolden - A Last-Ditch Attempt: Breaks Down the Explosive Settlement Dispute and The 47.1 Carve-Out Is Crazy

🔥🧨🌋 Notactuallygolden - This Is Completely Unethical: Blake Lively Team Lost All Credibility After Settlement Spin, and This Is Why People Hate Lawyers

🤮🖕🏻🔥💥 Little Girl Attorney - SLAMS Blake Lively’s “Resounding Victory” Spin: This Is Manipulative Legal PR

🧨 Committothebritt - Blake’s continued lies

🤥🔥🧨 Attorney Stara - BLASTS Blake Liely’s “Resounding Victory” Statement: That’s Not What the Settlement Says

🧨🔥 Justin Baldoni's Lawyer REACTS to Blake Lively's Pursuit for a Payout After 'Shocking' Settlement

⚖️ Settlement “Victory” or Legal Spin? (00:00–01:39)

• LGA reacts to Michael Gottlieb’s interview on The Town podcast and challenges his legal framing of the settlement as a “win” for Blake Lively.
• Main criticism: the §47.1 issue was never some new post-settlement opportunity — it has existed and been filed since Lively first moved to dismiss Wayfarer’s defamation claims.🫠
• Gottlieb is reframing an old motion to make the settlement sound strategically triumphant when the §47.1 motion had already been fully briefed since September.
• Core point:
  • If §47.1 was always the real goal, why continue litigating for months afterward instead of settling earlier?

📚 What §47.1 Actually Is (01:39–02:58)

• LGA explains that California Code of Civil Procedure §47.1 is tied to defending against allegedly retaliatory defamation lawsuits.
• According to LGA:
  • It is not really an “affirmative claim” in the same way Lively’s retaliation and contract claims were.
  • It arose only because Wayfarer sued Lively for defamation after she filed her allegations.
• Important distinction:
  • Lively’s lawsuit and the §47.1 proceeding are procedurally separate issues.
  • One concerns her claims against Wayfarer.
  • The other concerns whether Wayfarer’s defamation suit triggered liability under §47.1.

🧩 The Settlement Didn’t Change Anything (02:58–04:17)

• LGA argues Wayfarer would still have been litigating §47.1 even if the case had gone to trial and defendants had fully won.
• Therefore:
  • The settlement did not “unlock” the §47.1 issue.
  • That fight was already happening regardless of the outcome of the trial.
  • Wayfarer is now in essentially the same procedural legal position they would have been after a trial verdict — except without the cost and risk of trial.

💸 Plaintiffs Usually Don’t Walk Away for Free (04:17–05:30)

• LGA stresses that when plaintiffs settle cases, they are voluntarily dismissing their claims.
  • Lively dismissed her remaining claims before trial.
  • Reports indicate no settlement money exchanged hands.
• From LGA's perspective:
  • Walking away from claims without compensation is highly unusual for a plaintiff.
  • The practical “win” may simply be avoiding trial, public testimony, expense, and litigation risk.

🗣️ Joint Statement & “Admissions” Debate (05:30–06:17)

• LGA pushes back on claims that the parties’ joint settlement statement acts as an admission supporting §47.1 liability.

📉 “They Oversold This Motion” (06:17–07:41)

• LGA speculates that Lively’s legal team may have overestimated the strength or impact of §47.1 early in the litigation.
• LGA notes:
  • There is almost no meaningful precedent interpreting the statute.
  • No established roadmap exists for how courts should award damages under it.

⚖️ Final Assessment: “Legally, This Isn’t a Win” (07:41–End)

• LGA’s overall conclusion:
  • Most of Lively’s claims were either dismissed or voluntarily abandoned.
  • Wayfarer spent enormous amounts of money defending the case.
  • Both sides likely wanted the financial bleeding to stop.
• LGA acknowledges:
  • Emotionally or strategically, each side may internally view the outcome as a win.
  • But legally speaking, LGA does not see the settlement as the sweeping victory Lively’s side is portraying.
• Final takeaway:
  • In LGA’s view, the settlement reflects mutual exhaustion and litigation cost avoidance more than courtroom triumph.

Section 47.1 Motion: Serious Issues

1. Can the Judge Even Decide this Motion?
The Lively Action and the Wayfarer Action were dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. This rule is a self-executing rule and as such, the judge's signature was not even needed.

The interesting thing is that, with this dismissal, Judge Liman no longer has jurisdiction over the Lively Action and the Wayfarer Action. If any party violates the settlement agreement, Judge Liman doesn't even have jurisdiction to adjudicate the alleged violation. The aggrieved party has to file a breach of contract action to enforce the agreement.

If the Section 47.1 Motion is a part of the Lively Action, an argument could be made that Judge Liman no longer has jurisdiction to adjudicate this motion. If the motion is not a part of the Lively Action, what legal basis does Judge Liman have to adjudicate the state law action? A federal district court only has the jurisdiction and power authorized by the Constitution or statute.

I think this matter may implicate the Supreme Court case of Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 145 S. Ct. 41 (2025). In that case, a unanimous SCOTUS held that if a plaintiff amends her complaint to delete the federal-law claims that enabled the removal of the case to federal court, leaving only state-law claims behind, the federal court loses jurisdiction over the state claims.

In the present case, Lively's section 47.1 Motion is a state law claim. The only reason it was even before Judge Liman was the fact that the Lively Action was before the judge. Now that the Lively Action has been dismissed, I don't see the basis for the exercise of federal jurisdiction over the state law motion.

I understand the concept of ancillary jurisdiction by federal courts, but I don't think that this motion fits the parameters for the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction. The dismissal didn't require the judge's signature or approval. The judge did not explicitly retain jurisdiction over the motion when he signed the stipulation. The law governing Sec 47.1 issues is different from the law governing the dismissed actions. Also, although the stipulation of dismissal mentioned the Section 47.1 motion, as a general legal principle, parties cannot (by agreement) confer federal jurisdiction on a federal court that lacks jurisdiction.

2. Conflict Between Section 47 and Section 47.1
Under Sec 47.1, Lively can maintain an action if she is the prevailing defendant in a defamation case arising out of her protected activity. So, in a nutshell, Wayfarer's defamation case was the reason for Lively's Sec 47.1 motion. However, Sec 47 suggests that Wayfarer's defamation action is a privileged, and is, therefore, not actionable. Section 47 covered communication made in "any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding authorized by law ..." If Wayfarer's defamation case is privileged under Sec 47, then there is a direct conflict between Sec 47 and Sec 47.1.

So, how do we resolve this conflict? Lively will argue that Sec 47.1 is an exception to the general prohibition in Sec 47. This sounds reasonable. However, a review of another part of the statute would lead to a different conclusion.

Ordinarily, in California, when you file a complaint against an official or employing agency alleging misconduct, criminal conduct, or incompetence, etc. you are protected under Sec 47 because that complaint is privileged. You cannot be sued or held liable for that complaint. However, in Sec 47.5, the California legislature made an exception to this general rule when the complaint relates to police officers. Sec 47.5 says as follows: "Notwithstanding Section 47, a peace officer may bring an action for defamation against an individual who has filed a complaint with that officer’s employing agency alleging misconduct, criminal conduct, or incompetence, if that complaint is false, the complaint was made with knowledge that it was false and that it was made with spite, hatred, or ill will."

Notice the use of the preface, "Notwithstanding Section 47". The significance of 47.5 to the Lively Motion is that it shows that when the legislature wanted to carve out an exception to Sec 47, it did so explicitly. However, in enacting Sec 47.1 (on which Lively's motion was based), the legislature never said that it was exempted from the general privilege rule set forth in Sec 47.

Conclusion: I know this is a very long post, but sound legal principles make it doubtful that Lively can prevail in her Section 47.1 motion.

⬇️ Relevant Content:

⁉️💥🤯💣 Notactuallygolden - A Last-Ditch Attempt: Breaks Down the Explosive Settlement Dispute and The 47.1 Carve-Out Is Crazy

🔥🧨🌋 Notactuallygolden - This Is Completely Unethical: Blake Lively Team Lost All Credibility After Settlement Spin, and This Is Why People Hate Lawyers

🤮🖕🏻🔥💥 Little Girl Attorney - SLAMS Blake Lively’s “Resounding Victory” Spin: This Is Manipulative Legal PR

🧨 Committothebritt - Blake’s continued lies

🤥🔥🧨 Attorney Stara - BLASTS Blake Liely’s “Resounding Victory” Statement: That’s Not What the Settlement Says

🧨🔥 Justin Baldoni's Lawyer REACTS to Blake Lively's Pursuit for a Payout After 'Shocking' Settlement

⚖️ Attorney Stara Says the Post-Settlement Statement Crossed a Line (00:02–00:49)

• Attorney Stara explains she intentionally avoided heavily commenting on the case because employment law is not her specialty
• However, she says the latest public statement from Blake Lively’s attorneys pushed her to speak out
• After watching commentary from NAG, she says she shares the same reaction: the statement felt misleading and ethically uncomfortable

🧩 What Specifically Bothered Her About the Statement? (00:49–01:37)

• Stara focuses on the language claiming that by settling and waiving appeal rights, Justin Baldoni and the other defendants now face personal liability for “abusing the legal system”
• This is not what the settlement actually established
• The remaining issue regarding fees or sanctions was separately preserved and still unresolved, not automatically decided by the settlement itself

📜 The Joint Statement Is Being Reframed After the Fact (01:37–02:18)

• Stara criticizes the attempt to reinterpret the joint settlement statement as proof that the defendants admitted Lively did not fabricate harassment or retaliation claims
• Many of Lively’s claims — including harassment-related claims — had already been dismissed earlier in the litigation
• The settlement did not legally determine whether the allegations were true or fabricated

⚖️ Criminal Law Analogy: “Would Anyone Call That a Victory?” (02:26–03:48)

• To explain why the public messaging feels dishonest to her, Stara compares it to a criminal plea deal
• Hypothetical:
  • a defendant faces life in prison
  • accepts a five-year plea deal because both sides see risks at trial
• She argues it would sound absurd for the defense lawyer to then publicly call that outcome a “resounding victory” while implying the prosecution admitted the conduct was not serious
• Settlements are compromises, not declarations of total vindication

💰 “How Is This a Resounding Victory?” (03:54–04:38)

• Stara notes that many legal commentators believe the settlement likely did not include a financial payout to Lively
• Stara questions how relinquishing claims after most major claims were dismissed can realistically be framed as a sweeping legal triumph
• Especially because the retaliation claims that remained were the claims she ultimately chose not to present to a jury

🔥 Final Reaction: “It Doesn’t Feel Honest” (04:38–End)

• The public spin surrounding the settlement does not match what actually occurred procedurally in the litigation
• Final takeaway: the messaging feels more like strategic PR than an honest reflection of the legal outcome

⬇️ Relevant Content:

⁉️💥🤯💣 Notactuallygolden - A Last-Ditch Attempt: Breaks Down the Explosive Settlement Dispute and The 47.1 Carve-Out Is Crazy

🔥🧨🌋 Notactuallygolden - This Is Completely Unethical: Blake Lively Team Lost All Credibility After Settlement Spin, and This Is Why People Hate Lawyers

🤮🖕🏻🔥💥 Little Girl Attorney - SLAMS Blake Lively’s “Resounding Victory” Spin: This Is Manipulative Legal PR

🧨 Committothebritt - Blake’s continued lies

🤥🔥🧨 Attorney Stara - BLASTS Blake Liely’s “Resounding Victory” Statement: That’s Not What the Settlement Says

🧨🔥 Justin Baldoni's Lawyer REACTS to Blake Lively's Pursuit for a Payout After 'Shocking' Settlement

⚖️ The Settlement Statement “Manipulative” (00:00–01:02)

• The public statement from Blake Lively’s attorneys was crafted to make readers believe the defendants effectively admitted wrongdoing by settling
• The wording implies that by waiving appeal rights, the defendants somehow became liable for alleged abuse of the legal system
• That interpretation is legally misleading because both sides waived appeals as part of the settlement structure

🧩 The 47.1 Motion Was Separate From the Settlement (01:02–01:38)

• LGA emphasizes that the pending California §47.1 issue was specifically carved out and preserved separately by the parties
• Settling the remaining claims does not automatically establish liability under the still-pending 47.1 proceedings
• The settlement and the separate statutory dispute are legally distinct issues

📉 Lively Walked Away From Her Remaining Claims (01:38–02:28)

• LGA notes that the claims still heading to trial were Blake Lively’s retaliation-related claims, particularly the alleged online smear campaign theory
• She voluntarily chose to settle those claims rather than present them to a jury
• Blake Lively contrasts this with prior public messaging that framed the retaliation claim as the “real” focus of the case after the harassment claims were dismissed

📝 The Joint Statement Is Now Being Reinterpreted (03:02–04:04)

• LGA criticizes Lively’s attorneys for now using the jointly negotiated settlement statement as if it were an admission by the defendants
• Specifically, Blake Lively's PR statement suggests that the statement proves the defendants abandoned the position that Lively fabricated harassment and retaliation claims
• The original statement was compromise language negotiated by both sides, not a confession of wrongdoing

🎯 Why LGA Thinks the Messaging Matters Legally (04:11–05:05)

• LGA says the public framing appears strategically tied to the pending §47.1 dispute
• LGA explains that malice is a key element in that issue, and Lively’s side appears to be reinforcing the narrative that her allegations were made in good faith
• Blake Lively's public messaging is being used not only for PR purposes, but also to indirectly support ongoing legal arguments

💰 “Resounding Victory” Without a Trial or Payment? (05:05–06:14)

• LGA says it is normal for both sides to publicly characterize settlements positively
• However, calling this outcome a “resounding victory” is difficult to reconcile with the fact that:
  • Lively dropped her remaining claims
  • waived appeal rights
  • and reportedly received no financial payout
• Blake Lively was close to finally presenting those retaliation claims before a jury but ultimately chose not to proceed

🔄 “The Goalposts Keep Moving” (06:14–07:32)

• LGA argues the public narrative around the lawsuit has repeatedly shifted:
  • first centered on workplace harassment
  • then retaliation and online smear campaigns
  • and now allegedly focuses on broader issues about being sued for reporting misconduct
• LGA criticizes what she sees as changing justifications for the litigation after major claims were dismissed

🔥 Final Frustration With the Case (07:32–End)

• LGA pushes back strongly on the phrase abusing the legal system, arguing the litigation itself has become excessively drawn out and contradictory
• Blake Lively was never silenced because she fully pursued her claims publicly and in court