u/SaltAndChart

I reconstructed one STS incident where two similar-size VLCCs parted after they were already all fast alongside.

The easy explanation is a 30-knot squall… but that alone should not be enough to separate two properly managed VLCCs during STS.

The issue is what was happening to the whole system after cargo transfer started… draft, freeboard, mooring lead, fender load, anchor cable response and cargo hose geometry.

Full analysis:
https://thedeepdraft.com/2026/07/06/similar-size-vlcc-sts-the-risk-after-all-fast/

Image Credit - Torm Shipping

I am sharing this older article again because it ended up creating more discussion than I expected when I first wrote it.

A seafarer later shared it on the maritime forum, and the debate there was useful. Some points were fair. Some were not. But it did show that the words we use on the bridge during pilotage still mean different things to different people.

Command. Conn. Conduct. Control. Advice.

These are small words until the ship is close to traffic, tugs, a berth, a bend, or shallow water.

I am not posting this here to restart a fight between Masters and pilots... but because the subject is still worth discussing calmly.

Full article:
https://thedeepdraft.com/2025/09/18/command-vs-conn-why-the-masters-authority-is-never-shared/

Discussion question:

During pilotage, what wording have you seen that actually helps the bridge team understand authority clearly, and what wording creates confusion?

Short visual from the latest DeepDraft article.

The shadow fleet is usually discussed through ships, flags, sanctions, AIS gaps and insurance.

But there is a crew-risk side to it too. The trade may be planned ashore, while the exposure often lands on the bridge.

Full article:
https://thedeepdraft.com/2026/06/22/the-shadow-fleets-human-firewall/

Question:
Where should the line be drawn between a Master’s onboard responsibility and the commercial risk created ashore?

I wrote this after looking at recent sanctions enforcement cases involving shadow-fleet tankers.

The usual discussion is about old ships, weak flags, AIS gaps, doubtful insurance and opaque ownership. But once enforcement arrives, the person physically exposed is often the Master onboard.

He controls navigation, records, AIS conduct, VDR preservation and lawful orders. He does not control the oil sale price, banking route, ownership chain, flag history or sanctions screening done ashore.

Full article:
https://thedeepdraft.com/2026/06/22/the-shadow-fleets-human-firewall/

Discussion question:
Where should the line be drawn between a Master’s shipboard accountability and the commercial/legal risk created ashore?

A signed waiver might protect the office, but it does not do much for the seafarer once the ship is already in trouble.

This is the part of “high-risk” jobs that rarely gets discussed properly.

I wrote the longer breakdown here -

https://thedeepdraft.com/2026/06/15/settebello-was-not-sacrifice-it-was-a-recruitment-failure/

Three Indian seafarers died on MT Settebello after a U.S. strike off Oman.

That is the headline. But the harder shipping question starts before the strike.

Who cleared them into that voyage?
What risk was disclosed?
What insurance protection was confirmed?
And did they have any real right to refuse?

Marivex, Settebello, and Jalveer were not isolated names in a bad week. Together, they show a crew-risk layer now sitting inside Gulf operations. Sanctions exposure, war-risk routing, manning availability, recruitment approval, and seafarer consent are no longer separate files.

The Master may inherit the voyage, but the risk is built ashore.

Owners, managers, recruiters, insurers, charterers, flags, and regulators shape the operating reality long before the vessel reaches the firing line.

“Engineering spaces” may sound clinical in a military statement but a merchant tanker, it means a manned engine room.

Settebello was not sacrifice. It was a recruitment failure.

Full Analysis - https://thedeepdraft.com/2026/06/15/settebello-was-not-sacrifice-it-was-a-recruitment-failure/

A vessel delayed near Hormuz may look stationary on AIS but operationally, the ship is not standing still.

Warm Gulf water, idle time, hull fouling, propeller roughness, and possible sea-chest restriction can all start building before the vessel resumes passage.

The effect may not show immediately. It may appear later as speed loss, higher fuel consumption, cooling-water issues, or performance disputes under the charter party.

Operational question for those who have dealt with prolonged anchorage or waiting periods - after a long Gulf delay, should underwater condition checks become part of departure readiness before normal performance expectations resume?

I covered the full analysis here:

https://thedeepdraft.com/2026/06/08/the-barnacle-problem-waiting-behind-hormuz/

Full Analysis on - https://thedeepdraft.com/2026/06/08/the-barnacle-problem-waiting-behind-hormuz/

A lot of attention is going into whether ships delayed around Hormuz can move once the risk picture improves. Fair enough.... but there is another problem sitting below the waterline.

Prolonged anchorage in warm Gulf water can turn normal biofouling into heavy growth on the hull, propeller, sea chest, rudder gaps, and other niche areas. The ship may be fully crewed, classed, insured, and ready on paper, while her underwater condition has changed.

Operationally, this matters because fouling is not only a fuel-consumption issue. A fouled hull increases resistance. A fouled propeller may give poorer thrust response for the same RPM. A restricted sea chest can affect cooling-water flow, strainers, generator cooling, main-engine margin, and the ability to safely build up load. So this is not just “dirty hull”. Once thrust response and cooling margin are affected, the bridge and engine room both have a problem.

From a Master Mariner’s view, Hormuznacles should be treated as degradation until proven otherwise. Before a vessel resumes normal passage, the onboard team should be watching RPM versus speed, slip, vibration, sea suction condition, strainer loading, cooling-water temperatures, and any abnormal machinery response.

The commercial argument can come later through noon reports, diver or ROV evidence, fuel records, and charter-party claims. First, the ship needs to prove she can still perform safely.

https://thedeepdraft.com/2026/06/08/the-barnacle-problem-waiting-behind-hormuz/

https://thedeepdraft.com/2026/06/01/msc-111-2028-imo-compliance-shift/