u/Sejaa-Hvercraft-6672

Are quarterly access reviews pointless when managers approve everything in 10 minutes?

Pulled the numbers on our Q3 access reviews. One director approved 412 items in eleven minutes. Median time per item across all managers was four seconds.

I get why, nobody knows what a role like SAP_FI_ROLE_07 does, so they approve and move on. The reviews count as complete for audit, but people still have access from old jobs.

What would you change first if you were starting reviews from scratch?

reddit.com
u/Sejaa-Hvercraft-6672 — 13 days ago
▲ 2 r/iam

Common mistakes when you first let AI agents into your access request workflow

We’ve been running agents against our ITSM for about six months and I've made most of these already, so here they are.

- Letting agent requests land in a shared queue. Ours raised its own access request through the API and an approver cleared it in four minutes, because it looked like every other ticket that morning. Nobody felt like the decision was theirs. Fix was routing anything non-human to a named person.

- Assuming the approver can tell. They can't. The agent authenticates as a shared svc account, so the ticket says svc-ops and means nothing. We prefix the requester now and the ticket looks visibly odd, which slows people down.

- No ceiling on what a requester can ask for. Humans self-limit because asking for domain admin is embarrassing. An agent has no such instinct. We cap requests at whatever the agent's owner already holds.

- Treating approval as a control at all. It works for humans because we're slow and visible. Neither applies here.

The one that cost me most was the second one, and the fix took an afternoon. What have I missed?

reddit.com
u/Sejaa-Hvercraft-6672 — 16 days ago

How do you revoke an AI agent’s access at machine speed?

If an AI agent is compromised, connected to a malicious tool server, or begins operating outside its expected boundaries, containment cannot depend on manually locating every API key, cloud role, OAuth grant, and workflow credential.

A useful response path would disable the agent identity, block new credential issuance, revoke delegated authority, restrict access to particular tools or environments, and show which systems the agent could reach.

Does anyone have a central containment model for agent identities, or is this still fragmented across IAM, cloud consoles, CI/CD, SaaS administration, and agent orchestration tools?

reddit.com
u/Sejaa-Hvercraft-6672 — 23 days ago