
The expected reward of voting blue
https://www.desmos.com/calculator/lnm6kehhey
Variables:
y: How much you value your own life (in lives).
x: The minimum % of blue voters that is probable.
n: The total population
R: The count of possible vote outcomes/n
Assume a uniform distribution of all possible votes. If you think the blue vote will be between 25% and 75%, we are assuming all outcomes in that range are equally probable.
Is a tie possible?
If you think a tie is impossible, or rather that 50% is not within the range of possible blue vote outcomes, then the problem is simple.
Either this means blue is guaranteed to succeed, in which case it doesn't matter how you vote, or blue is guaranteed to fail in which case vote red.
For the rest of this, however, we will be dealing with the third case where a tie (excluding you) is possible.
The probability that you are the tiebreaker.
There is only 1/n % chance out of all possible votes that you will be the tiebreaker, assuming that a tie is possible.
So the probability that you will be the tiebreaker is 1/n/R
The probability that you will die if you vote blue
You will die whenever less than half the population votes blue.
Since x is the lower bound of possible blue voting percentages, this means there are 50% - x chances for you to die.
>Let's say the lower bound is 25%
50% - 25% is 25%. So we have a range with a space of 25% representing possible vote outcomes where a blue vote means death.
Note that this range does not include exactly 50%. If it did then we would need to add 1/n to make the range inclusive.
And since we still have R different possible votes the probability you will die is (50% - x)/R
Rewards
If you are the tiebreaker, voting blue gives you a reward of n/2 lives, half the population.
This happens 1/n/R times, so the expected reward from being a tiebreaker is 1/2/R = 1/2R
Meanwhile the cost for voting blue when less than half the population votes blue is your own life, valued as y lives.
So the expected cost of voting blue is y*(50% - x)/R
When is blue better?
Blue is better when the expected reward for voting blue is greater than the expected cost.
y*(50% - x)/R < 1/2R
Multiply both sides by R (a positive number)
y*(50% - x) < 1/2
Divide both sides by (50% - x)
y < 1/(2*(50% - x))
y < 1/(1 - 2x)
This so whenever you value your life less than 1/(1-2x) lives you should vote blue.
Alternatively we can solve for x to see how much you would need to value your before you would vote red.
1-2x<1/y
-2x < 1/y -1
x> (1 - 1/y)/2
https://www.desmos.com/calculator/lnm6kehhey
| y: How much you value your own life | x (minimum blue %) such that voting blue has a better reward than voting red |
|---|---|
| 1 life | 0% |
| 2 lives | 25% |
| 3 lives | 33% |
| 5 lives | 40% |
| 8 lives | 43.75% |
| 15 lives | 46.47% |
| 25 lives | 48% |
| 50 lives | 49% |
| 100 lives | 49.5% |
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The key assumption here is that there is a uniform distribution of probability from x to at least 50%.
A normal distribution would likely do a better job estimating, or some other distribution, but since we are essentially guesstimating to begin with a uniform has the advantage of being easy to visualize.
If you want a quick way to set your parameters, think of what you expect the value to be, and then give a value between 0% and 100% for how certain you are that this will be the value. Then subtract (1-your certainty) from your expected value and set that as the lower bar.
Another key assumption is that y can be represented by a number. People presumably will be more or less willing to die to save y number of people depending on circumstances. A person might be wholly unwilling to die to save 5 people by donating all their organs, but might be very willing to risk a 20% chance of death to protect 1 person from an attack.
The best way to address this is to simply think of y in context of this particular vote. Maybe imagine that you are voting for another person who you don't know, who has communicated explicitly to you that you should make whichever choice you prefer without particular deference to their interests. Then compare that to how you would feel if it was your own life on the line.
Lastly people don't value the lives of others uniformly. A parent might be unwilling to die to save 100 people, but be willing to die to save their child.