

E Pluribus Unum (1st century AD)
https://www.culina-vetus.de/2026/07/05/e-pluribus-unum-feeding-the-revolution-xxix/
The Roman army was probably the most terrifying instrument of power the ancient world had seen, and the reign of Augustus saw it rise to its greatest height. It had triumphed from the Euphrates to the Atlantic, from the Rhine to the Sahara, adding territories and subjugating tribes and kingdoms. But in 14 CE, the legions on the Rhine, led by the widely admired young commander Germanicus, went on strike.
The Roman historian Tacitus has left us a moving and detailed account of events, though as a member of the senatorial aristocracy, he hated everything the mutineers stood for. Still, he records their complaints and the way they presented them, men crowding around their commander, showing off scars, toothless gums, grey hair, shouting of abuses, demanding redress and calling for Germanicus to take up their cause by leading them to Rome. When he protested he would rather fall on his sword than betray his loyalty to his adoptive father, one of the mutineers cut short the melodrama of Roman oratory by offering the general his own weapon with the words “Take this, it’s sharper.”
This is the kind of no-nonsense wit that Roman writers always appreciated in men of action, and this turning point is also what most historians focus on: The moment Germanicus declined to rekindle the civil wars of the Republic. Depending on your views of Rome, this can be a blessing or a tragedy, but it is important to keep in mind that it was not what the event was about for its protagonists. The legionaries on the Rhine did not set out to join in the historic struggle between Republic and Empire. They were mad as hell and not going to take it any more.
Their complaints were straightforward. Many of their centurions were tyrants who punished the men brutally and extorted cash with threats of degrading and dangerous duties. Their pay was inadequate even without this drain, their duties arduous, and many older rankers had been kept in the service well past the time they had been promised their honourable discharges. They felt betrayed and exploited.
With all due caution about believing anything ancient writers tell us, much of this is probably true. The backdrop to this is what we call the Roman Republic turning into the Empire, though again we must state that nobody at the time knew that was happening. The Roman Republic continued to exist, and Augustus, its de facto sole ruler, never declared himself emperor because there was no such thing yet. As far as the legions knew, they were still the Roman army of proud tradition, the force that had conquered most of the known world, fought interminable civil wars, and now served their commander just like their predecessors had served Caesar and Pompey, Marius and Sulla, Lucullus and Crassus. And that was a major headache to Augustus.
When Augustus made himself ruler of Rome, his victory ended a series of brutal civil wars in which ultra-wealthy members of the upper class vied for political power. The institutions of the Republic were ill-suited to deal with politicians who controlled enormous wealth gained by war and legions loyal to them far more than they were to a distant, often ungrateful Rome. For two generations, huge armies had been raised to fight massively destructive campaigns across the Mediterranean. The last round had led the Roman world to the brink of utter exhaustion. Augustus’ legitimacy depended on his promise that this would never happen again.
At the same time, his actual power depended on control of armed men. This was difficult because there was no such thing as ‘the Roman army’ institutionally. Technically, Roman officials were empowered to raise troops as needed, with all citizens obligated to serve for the duration of the campaign. This may have served well when Rome was a city state surrounded by other Italian powers, but it had long become a fiction. Troops were always needed, and generals maintained their armies out of their own pocket, relying on tribute or plunder for their pay. These permanent legions developed identities and traditions, shaping new recruits in their image, and in so doing, they became the standing army Rome never had. But the system had depended on war to sustain itself. Augustus now faced the prospect of managing the thirty-odd legions he had inherited in times of peace.
Part of the solution was keeping the army busy. Republican oligarchs had boosted their careers and fortunes by leading wars of conquest, and Augustus continued in that vein, adding more territory to Rome’s direct control than any other conqueror. However, there were two problems with this. The first was that he was not much of a general, so any successful campaign would produce a victorious commander who might challenge him. The second was that Rome was running out of good targets.
By 14 CE, Rome had been in control of the urbanised states of the Mediterranean for decades or centuries. The legions on the Rhine looked back on a generation of warfare against decentralised, tribal societies. Loot was sparse, the climate increasingly inhospitable, and the fighting dangerous. Just a few years earlier, Quintilius Varus had lost three legions to an ambush of insurgent local auxiliaries in Germany. Conquest, which had fed the Roman economy for centuries, increasingly was no longer profitable.
At the same time, Augustus’ legitimacy in the interior of the Empire depended on the promise of peace and prosperity, though this peace only applied to the core areas. War was fine as long as it happened far way, to someone else, and the victory messages kept coming in, but people were not keen on having to pay for it, much less take an active part. Several times in his reign, Augustus had to resort to force to recruit enough Roman citizens for the legions, and each time represented a threat to his status as guardian of peace.
When we look at life in the Roman legions, it is understandable not very many people were eager to volunteer. Discipline was famously harsh, service physically demanding, and creature comforts few. Legionaries were expected to carry their entire equipment on their backs in long marches and sleep in tents, building defensible camps every night on the road and field fortifications wherever they stayed for longer. It was an image the Roman elites embraced eagerly: Romans were a tough people, used to hard labour and able to withstand privation. Harshness, even cruelty, against themselves and others were part of their national character. Stories abound of how commanders and emperors shared the simple life of soldiers in the field, sleeping in tents on the ground and grinding grain rations to bake their own unleavened bread. Vespasian, a general turned emperor, famously rejected a candidate for a command position because of the perfume he was wearing. A real soldier, he opined, should smell of garlic.
It is less certain what the soldiers themselves thought of this. On the one hand, there was a sense of pride in their achievement. On the other, we know the troops appreciated comforts and luxuries. Caesar gifted his men decorated armour and allowed luxury goods. One of the most common tropes in Roman history writing is that armies posted in cities ‘go soft’ and need to be reconditioned by iron-fisted leaders who often kill some of them in the process. Clearly, this was a concern to the leadership.
Food was a symbolically charged arena where this tension could be fought out. That is why we need to read accounts of what Roman soldiers ate with great caution. We know that troops received rations of unprocessed grain, and a famous skill and daily task of the soldier was to turn this into a simple flatbread baked in the embers of the fire, the panis militaris. So much for the stereotype. There is little doubt Roman soldiers could subsist solely on these loaves. In reality, both literary sources and archeology suggest they would rather not. Very likely their daily diet in garrisons was similar to that of most civilians, mainly consisting of bread or porridge, with legumes, dairy, eggs, fish and meat added. One dish that even traditionalists would not have objected to was a garlic cheese paste called moretum. It is one of my favourites that I have written about before, and the recipe comes from a poem celebrating exactly the kind of plain rural life Roman writers loved to prise from afar:
(…) He then the garden entered, first when there
With fingers having lightly dug the earth
Away, he garlic roots with fibres thick,
And four of them doth pull; he after that
Desires the parsley’s graceful foliage,
And stiffness-causing rue,’ and, trembling on
Their slender thread, the coriander seeds,
And when he has collected these he comes
And sits him down beside the cheerful fire
And loudly for the mortar asks his wench.
Then singly each o’ th’ garlic heads be strips
From knotty body, and of outer coats
Deprives them, these rejected doth he throw
Away and strews at random on the ground.
The bulb preserved from th’ plant in water doth
He rinse, and throw it into th’ hollow stone.
On these he sprinkles grains of salt, and cheese
Is added, hard from taking up the salt.
Th’ aforesaid herbs he now doth introduce
And with his left hand ‘neath his hairy groin
Supports his garment;’ with his right he first
The reeking garlic with the pestle breaks,
Then everything he equally doth rub
I’ th’ mingled juice. His hand in circles move:
Till by degrees they one by one do lose
Their proper powers, and out of many comes
A single colour, not entirely green
Because the milky fragments this forbid,
Nor showing white as from the milk because
That colour’s altered by so many herbs.
The vapour keen doth oft assail the man’s
Uncovered nostrils, and with face and nose
Retracted doth he curse his early meal;
With back of hand his weeping eyes he oft
Doth wipe, and raging, heaps reviling on
The undeserving smoke. The work advanced:
No longer full of jottings as before,
But steadily the pestle circles smooth
Described. Some drops of olive oil he now
Instils, and pours upon its strength besides
A little of his scanty vinegar,
And mixes once again his handiwork,
And mixed withdraws it: then with fingers twain
Round all the mortar doth he go at last
And into one coherent ball doth bring
The diff’rent portions, that it may the name
And likeness of a finished salad fit. (…)
This translation is not mine – I am OK with Latin, but not to the extent classical metre comes easy to me. The poem is very traditional, artfully crafted, and it includes the phrase e pluribus unum to describe cheese, garlic, and green herbs coming together into a cohesive whole, in case you were wondering where that comes from. Practically, it describes what is going on fairly well once you strip out the flowery language: Garlic, cheese, olive oil, parsley, rue, coriander, and salt are worked into a paste that is eaten with the kind of ash-baked bread Roman soldiers also supposedly ate. The mix is strong enough to provoke tears from its smell, so the proportion of garlic is liable to be large. Grinding bowls in which such a moretum could have been prepared are often found in Roman contexts, including military camps. This kind of addition to the grain ration would no doubt have been welcome, not least for the poor guys who, we recall, had no more teeth.
Which raises the question why there were toothless legionaries on the Rhine in 14 CE. The simple answer is: they just were that old. Roman soldiers in the late Republic were enlisted for a campaign and had no legal expectation of any reward at the end, but traditionally the generals had taken care of their men by distributing the spoils of war. Often, soldiers received land taken from the defeated party in the latest Civil War. The problem was, Augustus had promised everyone they were not going to have those any more – repeatedly, in writing, on stone. But he still had soldiers to look after.
It had not been unknown for legions of Republican warlords to mutiny, but it happened with specific units in specific situations. Group identity referred to their legion and their general. At this point, decades into the pretense that the guy running everything in the Roman Republic was not actually a monarch, this was changing, though. There was a sense of being a soldier of Rome not as a temporary stage, but as a thing that defined your life. Augustus had promised the men retirement benefits after a set number of years – usually 20 – though in reality, poor recruitment numbers and continuous warfare ensured they were kept long beyond those limits. What this system meant from the perspective of a recruit, though, was that there was no longer any competition in the job market and no way of being a soldier briefly. There was now one army run by one commander, and joining up meant spending your entire working life there.
What Augustus and his family had not really reckoned with was that this new army would be able to express its own desires. For one thing, it was huge. “Thirty legions” became the shorthand way of expressing the power of the emperor, and though exact numbers are notoriously hard to come by, we can estimate that once the attendant navy and non-Roman auxiliary troops were factored in, there were around 300,000 of them. A group this big exerted its own gravity, moulding institutions and practices around itself. In 14 CE, things had more or less coalesced into a pattern of expectations, and they had been betrayed. The troops were justifiably angry.
It should probably be said that seeing the legions purely as victims of an exploitative upper class is reductive, to put it mildly. They were the business end of a brutally oppressive extractive state, willing to kill for it and often enough happy to loot, enslave captives, bully civilians, and extort money. But it is actually very common for exploitative systems to betray their servants. In the Roman world, powerful people generally kept promises to their inferiors if and when they felt like it. The people of Rome had occasionally countered this by rioting, though with elections mattering less and less as Augustus usurped all real power, this was no longer a valid strategy. Now, the soldiers – as a social class, distinct from civilians which was in itself a completely novel idea – had discovered they could enforce honesty on the ruling class.
What followed the uprising was a tense, emotional set of negotiations that solidified a new state of affairs. Germanicus insisted on one non-negotiable point: The army did not get to start a civil war, no matter how profitable. In other respects, he conceded a shocking amount. Centurions the soldiers identified as corrupt and abusive were executed and opportunities for extortion reduced. The pay and retirement bonuses the troops had been promised were actually provided reliably. Soldiers would from now on enjoy the particular patronage of the ruler, their abuses of civilians tolerated to a degree, and their pay and maintenance would be the first priority of the Roman state.
History books often focus on the political genius of Augustus and the way he created the Empire from the ashes of the Republic. They do not really focus enough on the actions of common people shaping this process. Rome’s destiny, for good and ill, was set on its path when tens of thousands of soldiers parked at the arse end of Germania stood up to make it unmistakeably clear they would not tolerate being treated the way they were. History is often made in moments like this.