u/Yakiniku1010

私の理解だと、CLPS 1.0の上限（ceiling）は$2.6Bから$4.2Bに引き上げられていて、つまり発注能力が追加で$1.6B分増えたってことだと思う。

最近発表されたCX-2のベース・アワード（約$188M）を差し引くと、それで残るのはだいたい$1.41B。

残りの 月基地（Moon Base）関連のデリバリー枠が11あるとして、もしNASAがそれを全部CS-8で発注することに決めたなら、単純平均だと1回のミッションあたり約$128Mくらいになる。

もちろん、これはあくまで上限ベースのざっくり計算であって、NASAの実際の予算計画そのものじゃない。CX-2のオプション価値も入れると、平均はもう少し$103M前後のミッションあたりに近づく。

それでも、拡大されたCLPS 1.0の上限の中にCS-8のタスクオーダーが複数入る余地はありそうで、1つか2つ、せいぜい3つだけ…って感じではないように思える。

それと、その11個残ってる枠のうちの1つは、まだ中型カーゴのデリバリーミッションにつながってる可能性もあるんだろうか、って気になってる。(Super NOVA)

もともとNASAはLTVの提供者を3社選ぶ予定だったけど、実際に選ばれたのは2社だけだった。だから、その変更のせいで空いた枠がまだ残ってるのかもしれない。あるいはNASAが、その機会を「小さめの月基地（Moon Base）向けペイロードのデリバリー」に振り替えた可能性もある。

これはあくまで私のざっくりした見立てで、残ってる月基地デリバリー枠について、他の人たちがどう考えてるのかぜひ聞いてみたい。

この画像を参考にして、月面基地の着陸ミッションを数えてみたんだよね。
これって、残りの11件のミッションはまだ未確定ってことになるの？
自分がここで何か見落としてないか確認しただけ。

* CLPS – 南極のサイト（合計**17）**

* 小型貨物（12？ 13**？）**
Griffin ミッション
IM-4

* 中型貨物（5？ 4**？）**
MK1
MK2 (VIPER)
LTV 1
LTV 2

* その他のサイト
IM-3
BG-2
BG-3
Draper（保留）

I originally wrote this in Japanese, but here is a shorter English version of my current thoughts on Intuitive Machines’ LTV situation.

Astrolab has its FLIP rover plan, and Lunar Outpost has been focused on rover development and lunar surface mobility.
That means both companies may be able to feed real lunar rover operation data back into their LTV designs.
IM, on the other hand, is very strong in landers, lunar delivery, communications, navigation, and operations, but it does not appear to have had the same near-term rover operation roadmap before LTV.

This may have mattered in Phase 1.

My impression is that IM’s original LTV concept was not just a rover.
It was a vertically integrated lunar mobility service: build the vehicle, deliver it with its own lander, connect it through its own communications/navigation network, and operate it as part of a broader lunar infrastructure business.

That is a very IM-like strategy.

However, the Phase 1 requirements may not have fully rewarded that vertical integration.
NASA may have prioritized faster, smaller, more directly testable mobility systems that could benefit from near-term rover experience.
If so, IM’s broader integrated vision may have looked less competitive at this stage.

Another point is the trailer concept.
IM’s Moon RACER was differentiated by the idea of towing cargo and supporting larger lunar logistics.
That could be very valuable for a future lunar base. But if Phase 1 focused more on the core LTV vehicle itself, without fully valuing the trailer/logistics concept, then IM may have lost one of its strongest differentiators.

So, is IM’s LTV strategy in trouble?

If Astrolab and Lunar Outpost successfully develop and operate their vehicles, they will gain valuable knowledge and credibility.
LTV is not just about building a good vehicle on Earth. It requires surviving lunar dust, low gravity, extreme temperatures, communication delays, autonomous/remote operations, lunar night survival, and power constraints.
Real lunar operation experience will matter a lot.

That said, I do not think IM has no chance.

The biggest future opportunity for IM may come if the key challenge of LTV turns out to be less about “vehicle design” and more about long-duration survival, power, thermal control, communications, navigation, and operations. In those areas, IM’s experience with landers, satellites, lunar communications, PNT, and surface operations could become very valuable.

If IM continues to gain knowledge through Nova-C, Nova-D, lunar communications, satellite systems, and possibly survive-the-night technologies, it may be able to bring those lessons back into a future LTV or lunar mobility proposal.

Another possible path is that IM may try again in a later phase with a more complete proposal: LTV + its own lander + communications + operations. In Phase 1, its lander roadmap may not have been ready enough to fully support that approach.
But if Nova-D or SuperNOVA, IM could revive the original vertical integration strategy.

There is also the possibility that IM eventually reduces or exits the LTV effort.
If LTV becomes too competitive, low-margin, or dominated by companies with earlier rover experience, it may be rational for IM to focus on higher-margin areas where it has stronger advantages: lunar delivery, communications, PNT, lunar data, OTV, defense, and broader space infrastructure.

That would not necessarily be a bad thing. It could simply be business discipline.

Finally, I think IM may still have opportunities outside NASA’s LTV program.
Other agencies or commercial lunar resource companies may eventually need robotic mobility, cargo movement, or surface operations.
IM’s ability to combine lander delivery, communications, and operations could still be attractive in non-NASA or international lunar mobility missions.

So my current view is:

IM lost an important round in LTV.
Its position in NASA’s early LTV program is weaker now.
But IM’s broader value as a lunar infrastructure company has not disappeared.

If IM returns to LTV, as a lunar infrastructure company offering mobility, delivery, communications, power resilience, and operations as one integrated system.

That is where IM may still have a differentiated path.

This is just my personal interpretation as a long-term IM follower, not investment advice.
I would be very interested to hear how others are reading the LTV situation.