u/bigwang123

‘We have gone from grand proclamations of “unconditional surrender” and telling the Iranian people “the hour of (their) liberation is at hand” to now sheepishly looking for any agreement, including one that does not liberate the Iranian people, does nothing to diminish Iranian support for its proxies, likely will not not end the Iranian ballistic missile program, may not secure the remaining highly enriched uranium, and at best, reopens the strait to a condition less advantageous for the U.S. and international community than status quo ante. 

The president is now dealing with the realities of neither explaining to the American people why the war was necessary and what its goals were, nor focusing on those goals himself. The former has created a domestic reaction that pressures the president to make a hasty deal. The latter means he may be willing to give away the farm to secure that deal. 

Regardless of the timing of or forethought put into the conflict, America is currently engaged in a war, and it is better for us, our allies, and the world as a whole that it is resolved with an American victory rather than the perception of an Iranian one. As of yet, the means Trump thought would be adequate to bring about this victory have proven insufficient, and he should adjust accordingly—generally speaking, this would likely require a long-term imposition of the mutually painful blockade or an escalation of combat operations, potentially including ground-based options. However, escalation or resumption of combat operations may now be complicated by the president’s attestation to Congress that the war has “terminated”—his short-term cute trick to skirt the War Powers Act potentially hindering his options over the longer term. 

Either one of these requires him to do two things he has, as of yet, been unwilling or unable to do—explain to the American people the sacrifices and difficulty to come, and why those sacrifices are worth it, and demonstrate to the Iranian regime that he is willing to endure them.’

Recent attempts at implementing internet restrictions in Russia have caused many, including some who were previously apolitical, to criticize the government

A look at how Russian civil society and private enterprise has evolved to support the Russian army in Ukraine. While these efforts may be small in comparison to both the traditional pillars of the Russian military industrial base and Ukrainian private defense enterprises, the People's VPK provides a look into how a bottom up effort has emerged in the authoritarian Russian political system.

The attacks conducted by JNIM (alongside the FLA) against the Malian state in April 2026 highlight the growing power of jihadist groups in the Sahel. Therefore, Western policymakers are faced with the imperative of changing its regional approach. The author argues that in order to achieve long term security, the West must focus on addressing the governance issues that plague the region, rather than continuing a security first approach.

Despite mutual mistrust (to put it mildly) between Israel and Syria, there is one area where their interests intersect: the disarmament and disruption of Hezbollah. Hezbollah routinely launches rockets at Israeli settlements, and integrated itself closely with the hated (and now deposed) Assad regime. While efforts to enhance cooperation between the two governments has stalled, the author argues that the United States can play the role of mediator, clearing up red lines and facilitating indirect coordination.

CSIS provides an estimate of American munitions stocks

“If inventories are so depleted, how can the analysis conclude that the United States has enough munitions for this war? The answer lies in the dramatic drop in usage from the early days of the war. For ground attacks, the less expensive and more plentiful munitions of Figure 1 have largely replaced the long-range munitions (TLAMs, JASSMs, and PrSMs). Air and missile defense expenditures came down because Iran’s drone and missile attacks were way down after the first few days. Whereas Iran fired more than 2,000 drones and 500 ballistic missiles in the first four days, launches were down, respectively, by 83 and 90 percent after a week.

The diminished munitions stockpiles have created a near-term risk. A war against a capable peer competitor like China will consume munitions at greater rates than in this war. Prewar inventories were already insufficient; the levels today will constrain U.S. operations should a future conflict arise.

President Trump has accepted this munitions risk—alongside other tradeoffs like the diversion of forces from the Western Pacific. The theory here appears to be that it is important to decisively win the current war you are in, rather than to hold back and preserve capability for a future war that may never happen. Once Operation Epic Fury ends, the naval assets sent* *to the Middle East will return to the Pacific. Munitions inventories will start to recover, but restoring depleted stockpiles and then achieving the desired inventory levels will take many years.”