Representationalism is the view that concepts are mental pictures that may or may not correspond to reality. This doesn't seem to be the theory that Catholic Philosophy uses, so I was wondering if we have any arguments against it.
Mackie's error theory states that though moral discourse aims to describe objective moral facts, such claims are false. How can we argue against this?
The Frege-Geach problem states that moral propositions seem to have a truth-conditional relationship such that normative statements like "if you value H you should do A" have a modus ponens validity which seems to undermine non-cognitivist anti-realist positions. However, I've heard an objection that ethical language is ultimately dependent on or derivative from epistemic normativity and thus doesn't actually track truth in the real world.
Recently, I keep hearing people say that the God of classical theism is some sort of weird, non-personal, cold, "alien" being. So I'm wondering if we could somehow deduce that God is personal from classical theism?
Recently, when I was browsing Substack, I stumbled upon a Mathematical Platonist that claims apophatic definitions of God are too vague. He claims that the definition of God in classical theism is compatible with the view that everything is grounded in mathematical structures if we identify God with the ensemble of all mathematical objects. He made a list quickly outlining how classical theism and Mathematical Platonism are similar. I'll copy it here.
* Is not a person
* Is infinite
* Is simple (in the sense of no free parameters, for instance)
* Is beyond human understanding
* Is a necessary being
* Grounds all of existence
* The physical world is inside God (for panentheists; not quite your view where there is an overlap but neither is wholly inside the other)
* Is perfect (to the extent that such a claim is meaningful at all, which I doubt)
At the end, he asserts that you would need positive claims to differentiate classical theism from Mathematical Platonism, such as the claim that God is the source of morality, or claims that Jesus (or whoever) is special in some God-related way. I'm wondering, do you agree with this person that the definition of God from classical theism is similar to Mathematical Platonism? How would you differentiate your view from his? And what do you think about Mathematical Platonism in general?
Can a Catholic adopt Phenomenal Conservatism? If not, what are some arguments against it.
It appears that doing virtuous acts gives us pleasure. Indeed, it appears that morally correct acts give us more long-lasting, "better" pleasure. Long-term goals also give us more pleasure than short-term ones. So, it seems that you CAN practice hedonism and live a "virtuous" life.
Could this "work"? How do we argue against this?
A few months ago I got this Panasync Pro P50i. Unfortunately, when I tested it with Pikmin 2, it looked way too dim. I tried messing with the settings a bit, but it didn't really work well. I was wondering if there was some kind of different fix for this?
I am struggling with the "Nazis knocking on the door" hypothetical against virtue ethics, which I think we're all familiar with. Virtue ethicists commonly respond by showing how you can deceive the Nazis without necessarily lying. However, it seems like we could modify the hypothetical to undermine this response. We could say, for example, that the Nazi is somehow aware that you're a virtue ethicist, or maybe the Nazi would only accept straight, dry answers like "Yes" or "No". Now, you might object that these scenarios aren't the most realistic, which might be fair, but I don't think the general idea of not being able to deceive the Nazi is impossible. So, in this scenario, it looks like the only way out for the virtue ethicist is to tell the truth and let the Jews be taken away, which seems immoral and unintuitive. I'd like to see if there are any other ways to resolve this hypothetical from a virtue ethics perspective.
Lately, I've been looking at various Eastern Orthodox arguments against the papacy and the Catholic Church, and to be honest, they seem pretty hard to refute. So, I was wondering if there were any specific philosophical arguments defending the papacy. I think Aquinas had some, if I remember correctly. Any thoughts or answers are appreciated, as I am having a bit of a tough time with my faith.
It is often claimed that hedonism is unlivable because things we think hedonists would do to gain pleasure, like excessive sex, food, drinks, and such, cannot be held as the ultimate goals of our lives. However, these aren't the only things that give us happiness and pleasure. Take Maslow's hierarchy of needs. Sure, physiological needs and security are obviously on there; however, things like self-actualization, morality, etc., are also present, and they also provide pleasure. It could be even argued that the steps at the top of the hierarchy provide fuller happiness, and they also seem much more noble and suited to becoming our ultimate goals.
So, could this type of hedonism "work"? Is this even hedonism at all? Also, I am not advocating for hedonism or whatever this viewpoint is. I am a Catholic, and I just wanted to get some clarification.
In the book "I Have No Mouth and I Must Scream", 5 humans are being tortured for eternity by the supercomputer AM. One of the humans decides to kill all of the other survivors, effectively sparing them of infinite suffering.
My question is, would you consider that an act of mercy?
Catholic morality, to my understanding, would state that killing someone like that would still be morally wrong. Yet, it seems that many people would consider that mercy, and I mean, the suffering of the other humans DID stop.
So, do you think that what the survivor did was morally correct? If you do not think it was an act of mercy, how would you argue it?
I'd like to know some arguments against consequentialism and in favor of natural law and virtue ethics.
Recently, while I was browsing Reddit, I stumbled upon this essay that, based on an eternalist theory of time, critiques Ed Feser's formulations of the famous 5 Ways. For now, I'd like to focus on the objection that eternalism and the Aristotelian powers view of causality are incompatible.
The essay first argues that if eternalism and divine conservation are both true, they necessarily imply a 4-dimensionalistic theory of persistence. It argues this as follows:
> So, assuming eternalism and endurantism, let’s go with the possibility that the selfsame entity A is being directly concurrently actualized by the purely actual actulizer at three different times t1, t2 and t3 by “existing wholly” at each of these times (endurantism), without having temporal parts. It is being concurrently caused directly since it is the second member of a hierarchical causal series. As A is a three-dimensional, it occupies a four-dimensional region by being exactly located at several instantaneous regions making up that region.
> If God concurs an entity's existence over multiple times from his beginningless and endless eternity, Then each cannot be considered the same object under eternalism. For example, if God actualized A at t1 and a similar but non-identical G also at t1. We would consider them separate objects, as God cannot actulize two distinct wholly present objects at t1 from his eternity while being considered the same object. But this could also be applied if he was actualizing A at t1 and A at t3. God would be actualizing two separate wholly present entities from eternity. So we can't consider that entity A at t1 is really the same A at t3 rather then a distinct but similar entity, so entity A at t1 does not survive other then an instant, instead of being located at several instantaneous regions, it is an instantaneous object. Thus A wholly present at t1 does not persist as it only exists for an instant. Then how we say that A persists? I see two possibilities: first, an perdurantist account where it is a whole composed of the different temporal parts), or second, an exdurantist account where it is a set of numerically distinct entities (the distinct temporal counterparts). Both of these are encompass what is called Four-dimensionalism.
So, basically, when God, from eternity, is actualizing object A at times t1 and t3, He is actualizing two different, distinct, but similar objects that don't survive other than an instant. This (rather obviously) means that objects do not persist, so endurantism is out of the question. This leaves out only four-dimensional theories of persistence.
Next, the author argues that four-dimensionalism and the powers ontology conflict with each other and cannot be reasonably held together. He does this by reasoning that, since powers have dynamic processes as their manifestation, they pretty clearly aren't compatible with static four-dimensional theories of persistence.
> Traditionally, powers theorists take the power or disposition of being water-soluble to essentially involve an ability to cause (together with the properties of water) the bearer to dissolve in water (the characteristic manifestation effect). But if the manifestation type in question involves some kind of change, as dissolving arguably does, the relevant power must, if it is to be a power of the kind in question, be an ability to cause this kind of change in the subject. I am not claiming that the power of being water-soluble must involve (or “point at”) the subject being completely dissolved. For the present purpose, I only want to propound the weaker claim that water-solubility must at least involve the subject undergoing some kind of change – i.e., that the power can cause (together with water) the subject to become, roughly put, at least partly dissolved. How much change is needed (e.g. the number of broken bonds, the distance the freed molecules must have travelled) for the subject to become at least partly dissolved may be a vague matter; but whatever happens at an instant is not enough to realize or constitute the subject even partly dissolving. Since the process of partly dissolving in water is a prolonged event where the subject (sugar) is undergoing change, which requires duration, and under four dimensionalism, an instant (a moment of time) has none.
> Considering Mumford's sugar cube: if the sugar cube is to be water-soluble at t1, and to be manifesting this power at t1, it has to have a power (potency) to change at t1, a power (to become partly dissolved) which is moreover actually manifested at t1. But if t1 is an instant (and not a long interval of time), nothing could realize this manifestation at t1. Since change requires duration; and a moment of time, under four-dimensionalism, has none. Hence, to be water-soluble at t1 in the power sense, the sugar cube must have an inherent ability that essentially involves over a temporal sequence. Merely having a power that “tends” towards a simultaneous effect is not enough. So, in order for the sugar-cube to actively dissolve in water, the sugar cube must have, at t1, a power (potency) with the aid of water to become partly dissolved over an interval of time that extends beyond t1. Since again, change requires duration, and under a four-dimensional account of persistence, an instant has none.
> This would make sense, since powers are understood as giving rise to processes, In Groff’s words, processes are ‘irreducibly active displays of dispositional properties’. Mumford seems to be on board with this analysis. He also analyses powers as giving rise to dynamic processes that are not analysable in terms of sequences of static parts. In Mumford’s view, processes that are the exercise of a certain individual’s powers are ‘continuous and constant’ in the sense that every proper part of a change process undergoes change itself and can hence not be reduced to static parts. For the power theorist, processes can be understood as a prolonged event that may encompass numerous changes to its constituent particulars and have no motionless parts.
> That powers may have processes as their manifestations is not itself problematic for a powers ontology under a four-dimensional account of persistence, but it quickly becomes so if we conceive of those same processes as essentially dynamic; that is, if we understand those processes as flowing continuous events that are constantly in act and undergoing seamless change. If the manifestations of powers are dynamic and continuous in this way, then they will be incompatible for the perdurantist’s and exdurantist's unchanging static temporal parts or stages. This is due to the fact that in perdurantism and exdurantism, the world consists of a mere succession of static events, so change and processes would be merely seen as the succession of these static events. This contradicts the view that processes have no motionless parts and are the continuous manifestation of change. As non-reductive dynamism sees change as continuous, in the sense that it does not break down into changeless parts.
> For Groff, the issue with respect to whether or not one is a passivist or an anti-passivist centers on the ‘bringing about’: how is the phenomenon in question being conceptualized? Does ‘bringing about’ involve real, non-metaphorical activity or does it not? By ‘bringing about’, i would assume that Groff means processes. Since powers bring about effects and processes are the manifestations of these powers. If processes are reduced to sequences of events as they would in a four-dimensional world and if they are the manifestations of powers, while activity is the exercise of a power. Then activity would be reduced to a sequence of events. So, activity is merely a metaphor and not actually real activity. Just like in her flipbook analogy mentioned earlier, activity would look like something other than a sequence of static “stills,” but it really isn’t. Rather, everything is static. This is identical to the so called static, passivist picture of the world.
Continuing, the author considers an objection from Neil. E Williams, which would be that the incompatibility between four-dimensionalism account of persistence and the powers ontology arises from an alleged mismatch between the duration of temporal parts and the time it takes a power to be manifested. Williams rejects this because, at least in the case of Worm theory, there is no reason to think that the time it takes for a single-link manifestation to arise is any longer than the duration of any temporal part. He thinks this objection might be plausible; however, he uses an argument from Timothy Miller to argue that God's continuous creation is inconsistent with Worm theory.
> Here, ill have a summary of Miller's argument as i understand it.Initially, Worm theory seems to comport well with the doctrine of continuous creation. Indeed, it seems to offer a quite simple and straightforward way of understanding the doctrine – to say that God is continuously creating me is simply to say that at each moment God creates the temporal part of me that exists at that moment. But worm theorists need to explain why a bunch of distinct temporal parts should be regarded as composing a further persisting individual or worm, and the most plausible accounts worm theorists have offered all require some kind of causal relation(s) between temporal parts. So the earlier temporal parts will have to causally contribute to one (or both) of the following: (a) the existence of the later temporal parts, and/or (b) at least some of the properties possessed by the later parts. Call the former version existence-causal worm theory and the latter version property-causal worm theory.
> Unfortunately, existence-causal version of worm theory is flatly inconsistent with continuous creation. Since God is the total and exclusive cause of the existence of everything at every moment, then nothing else is in on the act. Thus, since continuous creationists deny that earlier stages cause the existence of later stages, it seems that the property-causal version of worm theory is their only option. Nevertheless, this approach faces a further difficulty that is not easily overcome: namely, that of explaining how causal interactions between temporal parts are possible at all. If God conserves (creates) x at t1 and x at t2, then it is paradoxical, to say the least, to insist that earlier temporal stages make causal contributions to the existence/properties of later stages when those later stages would not even exist unless they were immediately created by God. If God has to step in at later moments to create them, then it is hard to see how anything other than God can contribute to the existence or properties these later stages possess. So x’s earlier stages cannot be the cause of the properties of x’s of later stages.
> This inference depends crucially upon the assumption that God cannot will that some contingent individual exist without willing that it exist with determinate properties. If God created a temporal part of a lamp at t3 with the property of being bent, God must create it with a determinate property – i.e. God must cause it to be either bent or non-bent. Moreover, in the case of creation in the narrow sense (i.e. of bringing about the existence of a new entity ex nihilo), it seems obvious that it must be God who causes the individual to possess the properties it has. After all, if t3 is the first moment of the bent lamp existence, then there was no opportunity prior to t3 for any earlier temporal part to act upon the bent lamp and cause it to possess the properties it has at t3 of being bent.
> To add upon this, let's assume the plausibly of hierarchical causal series and hypothesize that y causes x which exists at t4 to possess different accidental properties. Since we are assuming exdurantism and a hierarchical causal series, y itself would be a counterpart that would only exist at the moment that the counterpart x exists at, which is at t4. Due to the fact that in exdurantism and four-dimensionalism in general, none of these individual temporal stages is changing itself. The counter part y at t4 would not be able to cause a change in the counterpart x accidental properties at t4. Also, any contribution the counterpart y at t4 could of made would only be in the accidental properties of later counterparts of x. Since in a four-dimensional account of persistence, change is a succession of temporal parts/stages with different properties, but these are not the same counterpart x at t4. Because of this, it wouldn't be the counterpart x that counterpart y would of caused to possess different accidental properties at t4. So secondary causes cannot contribute to the accidental properties that things possess.
> It seems that continuous creation will be incompatible with any plausible version of worm theory – existence-causal or property causal worm theory. Then the only way one can retain the notion that anything persists is by accepting a exdurantist/stage theorist account of persistence. By saying that x persists (i.e. exist for longer than an instant) indirectly via having temporal counterparts that exist at other times. But in stage theory, exduring objects do not survive, as the different stages are different objects. At best, an exduring object “continues” in some way, but the momentary stages are no more identical than are links in a chain. Since in exdurantism, where persisting objects are composed as wholly present counterpart stages. A stage would be an instantaneous temporal part. So exdurantism entails that things persist only with instantaneous temporal parts. Thus, Williams proposal would not save processes.
Obviously, these objections only work if eternalism is true. However, the essay does provide some arguments for the idea that Thomism entails eternalism, but I'd rather not discuss them right now, because this post is already long enough. I recommend you read the whole essay yourself for more arguments and context.
Also, I am aware this essay was already discussed here before. The objections brought against it were unsatisfactory in my opinion, so I'd like to restart the discussion and hopefully get better answers.
So, after all that, my question to this forum should be pretty obvious. What can we do to answer these objections, aside from rejecting eternalism? Could we make the powers ontology work with an eternalist theory of time? Any answers and thoughts will be much appreciated.