Image 1 — LNK Leads to DARTHVADER Stealer via LOLBins and AutoIt.
Image 2 — LNK Leads to DARTHVADER Stealer via LOLBins and AutoIt.
▲ 20 r/ANYRUN+2 crossposts

LNK Leads to DARTHVADER Stealer via LOLBins and AutoIt.

A malicious LNK disguised as a PDF launches a multi-stage chain with cmd.exe, LOLBins, AutoIt, and PowerShell, leading to stealer deployment and persistence. The risk is post-click compromise.

Observed behavior: hidden command execution with disabled output, curl.exe downloads, PowerShell ExecutionPolicy Bypass, mutex creation, and persistence setup.

cmd.exe /V:ON enables delayed environment variable expansion, while /D disables execution of AutoRun commands. Fewer artifacts make the chain harder to trace and can delay containment.

See the execution chain and collect IOCs to speed up detection & response: https://app.any.run/tasks/81e896a9-849b-491f-8dc4-edd51fed632b/

u/ANYRUN-team — 21 days ago
▲ 11 r/Malware+1 crossposts

Banana RAT Evolves

Full report is available at https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/banana-rat-evolution-analysis/

The exposed server at 198[.]245[.]53[.]26 gave a rare opportunity to compare two related Banana RAT branches through live infrastructure, sandbox telemetry, and recovered payloads. The older branch used ETW-themed paths, static Microsoft-looking names, and a typo-based pseudo-Microsoft C2 identity. The newer branch kept the same staging concept but moved to randomized install identifiers, better-structured SYSTEM persistence, and a WebSocket channel built around a hashed testewin.com subdomain.

IoC:

u/rifteyy_ — 28 days ago

Harvard is compromised... again

https://preview.redd.it/rvflwy7wznbh1.png?width=861&format=png&auto=webp&s=21bb7a6cb47369fa6fcd71a77d2bb17de2ed35e6

https://preview.redd.it/weu33saxznbh1.png?width=1682&format=png&auto=webp&s=f58f67aea868d585f3992109c735d7562f0714e4

It wasn't that too long ago when I wrote here about Harvard being compromised - https://www.reddit.com/r/cybersecurity/comments/1tkncvz/harvard_and_140_other_legitimate_websites/

This time it redirects to a hazel-palm-cliff[.]pages[.]dev/help/?35151776230997 that eventually leads to a site that wants you to enable notifications with extensive tracking in the URL query.

This time with Russian notes:

// Целевой URL для редиректа -> // Target URL for redirect

// Выполняем редирект на целевой URL -> // Perform a redirect to the target URL

// Альтернативный вариант (сохраняет историю браузера): -> // Alternative option (preserves browser history):

Whole redirect in action at https://app.any.run/tasks/893eef05-f43d-4de0-a10e-1f3a76270304

By searching the campaign name hotejmain on threat intelligence tools (ANY.RUN TI, Shodan, Censys), you can find more compromised websites that are relevant to this redirection campaign, such examples are:

  • dmspharma[.]com
  • ttm-medical-logistics[.]de
  • arxis[.]eu
  • baufoerderung[.]de
  • bmservice[.]nl
  • hodgsonphysio[.]co[.]uk

Few of the URL's that would love you to enable browser notifications:

  • hxxps://vexaluno[.]vexaluno[.]shop/?utm_medium=9eb2bcdc89976429bc64127056a4a9d5d3a2b57a&utm_campaign=HotejMain&1=11005&cid=11005-14814-20260416103042b28c
  • hxxps://tavqeril[.]tavqeril[.]shop/?utm_medium=9eb2bcdc89976429bc64127056a4a9d5d3a2b57a&utm_campaign=HotejMain&1=346&cid=346-0-202604132346259ceb368bd0
  • hxxps://zelmoriax[.]zelmoriax[.]shop/?utm_medium=9eb2bcdc89976429bc64127056a4a9d5d3a2b57a&utm_campaign=HotejMain&1=346&cid=346-0-20260421171506e809e6cfee
  • hxxps://kavontrix[.]kavontrix[.]shop/?utm_medium=9eb2bcdc89976429bc64127056a4a9d5d3a2b57a&utm_campaign=HotejMain&1=346&cid=346-0-20260425212701a89df87b23
  • hxxps://pelnoriva[.]pelnoriva[.]shop/?utm_medium=9eb2bcdc89976429bc64127056a4a9d5d3a2b57a&utm_campaign=HotejMain&1=346&cid=346-0-20260501111413de4ce9f9e4
  • hxxps://talvexoni[.]talvexoni[.]shop/?utm_medium=9eb2bcdc89976429bc64127056a4a9d5d3a2b57a&utm_campaign=HotejMain&1=346&cid=346-0-20260509135905390a114882
  • hxxps://tavronixe[.]tavronixe[.]shop/?utm_medium=9eb2bcdc89976429bc64127056a4a9d5d3a2b57a&utm_campaign=HotejMain&1=346&cid=346-0-20260512211922ef6f36eb47
  • hxxps://nra5toveli[.]nra5toveli[.]cfd/?utm_medium=9eb2bcdc89976429bc64127056a4a9d5d3a2b57a&utm_campaign=HotejMain&1=11569&cid=11569-15854-20260609190219c50e
reddit.com
u/rifteyy_ — 1 month ago

Harvard is compromised... again

It wasn't that too long ago when I wrote here about Harvard being compromised - https://www.reddit.com/r/cybersecurity/comments/1tkncvz/harvard_and_140_other_legitimate_websites/

This time it redirects to a hazel-palm-cliff[.]pages[.]dev/help/?35151776230997 that eventually leads to a site that wants you to enable notifications with extensive tracking in the URL query.

This time with Russian notes:

// Целевой URL для редиректа -> // Target URL for redirect

// Выполняем редирект на целевой URL -> // Perform a redirect to the target URL

// Альтернативный вариант (сохраняет историю браузера): -> // Alternative option (preserves browser history):

Images are available on my X post if you are interested -> https://x.com/rifteyy/status/2074214854303654264 and whole redirect in action at https://app.any.run/tasks/893eef05-f43d-4de0-a10e-1f3a76270304

By searching the campaign name hotejmain on threat intelligence tools (ANY.RUN TI, Shodan, Censys), you can find more compromised websites that are relevant to this redirection campaign, such examples are:

  • dmspharma[.]com
  • ttm-medical-logistics[.]de
  • arxis[.]eu
  • baufoerderung[.]de
  • bmservice[.]nl
  • hodgsonphysio[.]co[.]uk

Few of the URL's that would love you to enable browser notifications:

  • hxxps://vexaluno[.]vexaluno[.]shop/?utm_medium=9eb2bcdc89976429bc64127056a4a9d5d3a2b57a&utm_campaign=HotejMain&1=11005&cid=11005-14814-20260416103042b28c
  • hxxps://tavqeril[.]tavqeril[.]shop/?utm_medium=9eb2bcdc89976429bc64127056a4a9d5d3a2b57a&utm_campaign=HotejMain&1=346&cid=346-0-202604132346259ceb368bd0
  • hxxps://zelmoriax[.]zelmoriax[.]shop/?utm_medium=9eb2bcdc89976429bc64127056a4a9d5d3a2b57a&utm_campaign=HotejMain&1=346&cid=346-0-20260421171506e809e6cfee
  • hxxps://kavontrix[.]kavontrix[.]shop/?utm_medium=9eb2bcdc89976429bc64127056a4a9d5d3a2b57a&utm_campaign=HotejMain&1=346&cid=346-0-20260425212701a89df87b23
  • hxxps://pelnoriva[.]pelnoriva[.]shop/?utm_medium=9eb2bcdc89976429bc64127056a4a9d5d3a2b57a&utm_campaign=HotejMain&1=346&cid=346-0-20260501111413de4ce9f9e4
  • hxxps://talvexoni[.]talvexoni[.]shop/?utm_medium=9eb2bcdc89976429bc64127056a4a9d5d3a2b57a&utm_campaign=HotejMain&1=346&cid=346-0-20260509135905390a114882
  • hxxps://tavronixe[.]tavronixe[.]shop/?utm_medium=9eb2bcdc89976429bc64127056a4a9d5d3a2b57a&utm_campaign=HotejMain&1=346&cid=346-0-20260512211922ef6f36eb47
  • hxxps://nra5toveli[.]nra5toveli[.]cfd/?utm_medium=9eb2bcdc89976429bc64127056a4a9d5d3a2b57a&utm_campaign=HotejMain&1=11569&cid=11569-15854-20260609190219c50e
reddit.com
u/rifteyy_ — 1 month ago
▲ 29 r/threatintel+2 crossposts

Remus Stealer - 64bit evolution of Lumma

Remus Stealer is a rapidly evolving Malware-as-a-Service infostealer that emerged in 2026.

Remus also shifted from Lumma's 32-bit architecture and traditional resolvers to 64-bit with EtherHiding and enhanced anti-analysis (e.g., sandbox DLL checks, PST honeypot detection).

  • It utilizes EtherHiding, storing C2 addresses in Ethereum smart contracts to avoid takedowns.
  • The malware steals credentials, browser cookies, authentication tokens, and cryptocurrency wallet data.
  • Session theft is one of Remus's most dangerous capabilities because it can bypass MFA by stealing active session cookies directly from browser memory.
  • The malware shows strong technical similarities to Lumma Stealer and may represent its evolutionary successor.
  • Financial services, healthcare, government, technology firms, and MSPs are particularly attractive targets.
  • Common infection vectors include phishing, fake software downloads, malvertising, and fake CAPTCHA campaigns, as well as SEO poisoning and fake GitHub projects to trick tech-savvy users.

See whole ANY.RUN execution chain at https://app.any.run/tasks/ae43628b-9d56-4c43-abac-fae7266c749f/

Check out whole malware analysis report at https://any.run/malware-trends/remus/

u/rifteyy_ — 9 days ago
▲ 492 r/Malware+3 crossposts

Harvard and 140 other legitimate websites compromised

Harvard and ~140 other compromised legitimate sites are now spreading ClickFix malware.

hxxps://hir.harvard.edu/israel-and-international-football-a-breaking-point/
hxxps://hir.harvard.edu/a-better-way-forward-an-interview-with-paul-ryan/

Both contain a remote load script in it's HTML that reverses it's C2 sj.ssc/ipa/orp.eralfduolccitats to original form and then displays the ClickFix box from it.

C2: hxxps://staticcloudflare.pro

AnyRun identifies the loading pattern well:

Sandbox detonation of one of the ClickFix payloads:

Original post and more discovered compromised URL's: https://x.com/rifteyy/status/2057842147630411877

u/rifteyy_ — 3 months ago
▲ 190 r/jdownloader+2 crossposts

Proper JDownloader malware remediation

According to https://www.reddit.com/r/jdownloader/comments/1t6goqe/is_the_website_hacked/, the JDownloader site delivered malware on 20:12 - 07.05.2026 GMT+2.

u/Takia_Gecko did a very well technical analysis in this comment so I would like to focus on the proper steps to remediate this infection.

Execution chain:

To clarify, the installer was replaced with a malicious signature-less version that delivered the official JDownloader and exactly 8 minutes after the initial setup start, it decrypted and executed the malicious payload that consisted of installing the Python interpreter, PyArmor runtime for code obfuscation and then starting a Python remote access malware.

When the malware is executed, Windows Defender is fully disabled, Windows Updates are also disabled and a root certificate is installed

I have also discovered several strings that may indicate manipulating with:

  • Manual malware removal software such as FRST
  • Antivirus scanners such as HitmanPro, Kaspersky Virus Removal Tool
  • Antivirus software such as Avira, Avast, Windows Defender

Remote access malware (RAT):

  • You can remove the visible signs of this infection, but due to the nature of this type of malware, no one can guarantee the trustworthiness of your computer. A backdoor or RAT gives the attacker complete access to your system, allowing them to steal data, install additional malware, or monitor your activity.
  • This means that at some point the attacker was able to interact with your PC (see your desktop, view files, open programs) just like you are able to do so. For this reason, we do not recommend manual malware removal, because the malware could be embedded deeper in the system or able to manipulate with the removal process and making it ineffective.
  • If your computer was used for online banking, has credit card information or other sensitive data, using a non-infected computer/device you should immediately change all account information (including those used for banking, email, eBay, PayPal, online forums, etc). Consider these accounts already compromised.
  • I suggest you read and follow this guide on how to properly change your passwords after a stealer infection: https://rifteyy.org/report/the-ultimate-guide-to-infostealers - specifically the section "How to properly secure my accounts"

Proper steps to take now:

If you have executed the file, you can not guarantee a 100% clean system because of the malware's natures and because of how many changes it had already done on execution (disabling antivirus, manipulating with antivirus scanners, disabling Windows Updates, installing a root certificate) so please follow one of these steps to ensure your device is clean from the malware:

u/rifteyy_ — 3 months ago
▲ 92 r/Malware+3 crossposts

JDownloader is compromised!

JDownloader is compromised!

  • The replaced malicious executable contains the official and benign JDownloader in resources along with an XOR encrypted blob also available in resources
  • The encrypted blob after 8 minutes of waiting to prevent sandbox noise is decrypted and executed, the next stage contains also several XOR encrypted resources and the official Python installer
  • After decrypting resources, they contain PyArmor encrypted file and PyArmor runtime
  • Delivers sophisticated Python remote access malware

See AnyRun execution chain along with the 8 minute wait before the payload starts: https://app.any.run/tasks/e0cecc2d-5571-49fe-a549-cc7d1b8b5908

IOC's:

  • Initial delivered installer -> 5a6636ce490789d7f26aaa86e50bd65c7330f8e6a7c32418740c1d009fb12ef3
  • Stage 2 payload -> 77a60b5c443f011dc67ace877f5b2ad7773501f3d82481db7f4a5238cf895f80
  • PyArmor encrypted blob: 5fdbee7aa7ba6a5026855a35a9fe075967341017d3cb932e736a12dd00ed590a
  • hxxps://parkspringshotel[.]com/m/Lu6aeloo.php (most likely another compromised URL)
  • hxxpx://auraguest[.]lk/m/douV2quu.php (most likely another compromised URL)
u/rifteyy_ — 3 months ago
▲ 8 r/Malware+1 crossposts

Another post to raise awareness of ClickFix and job hunting social engineering attempts to infect you with malware;

  1. comes initially from threat actors sharing a link to for example Teams, Zoom or Google Meet
  2. after opening the link, user is greeted with a prompt to fix a connection issue by copying and executing a command
  3. the attacker collects credentials, browser sessions, and system-stored secrets, including macOS Keychain data and sends to a Telegram exfiltration channel

Full report: https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/lazarus-macos-malware-mach-o-man/

Communication with a threat actor sharing a malicious link leading to ClickFix

reddit.com
u/rifteyy_ — 4 months ago