u/simonperry955

Moral realism and moral subjectivity both arise naturally from the goals-methods model of morality (Perry, 2026).  In this model, moral principles are methods of achieving mutual fitness.  As such, they are goals in themselves, with sub-methods of achieving these goals.  

 

Moral realism

If I have moral goal GM, then it is true that I (morally) should do action X (that promotes GM).  The moral goal is mutual thriving, surviving and/or reproducing.  

 

Moral subjectivity

Moral principles come equipped with normative pressure, since each is a method of achieving mutual fitness, and there is evolved normative pressure to achieve fitness (thriving, surviving, reproducing).  

The moral agent can only act upon this normative pressure if they endorse the particular method, or domain of methods, for achieving mutual fitness.  I.e., if I do not think a principle is legitimate then I will reject it as illegitimate.  

In practice, the domain this applies to is patriarchy.  The goal of patriarchy is reproduction, which is mutual, but on men’s terms, at women’s expense, which is not compatible with fairness, equality, women’s autonomy, etc.  

 

Reasons why I might not endorse patriarchy:  

• It violates women’s autonomy, fairness, equality, etc.

 

 

Reasons why I might endorse patriarchy (as a man):  

• I don’t care about women’s rights.
• I get what I want (reproduction on my terms).
• My family endorsed patriarchy.  
• My culture endorses patriarchy.  
• I don’t know the biological reasons for patriarchy.
• I’ve never really thought about it.  
• I don’t know any different strategies for achieving the same ends (e.g., mate retention through attractiveness).

 

 

Reference

Perry, Simon (2026) – “Understanding morality and ethics”; https://orangebud.co.uk/web_book_2.html

What exactly is moral objectivity, why does it matter, does it even exist, and if so, in what form?  

 

Evolutionary ethics does without objectivity entirely, it does not rely on it for its model of morality, and seeks to explain only why people feel that morality is objective.  In this, objectivity is like any other feature of the moral landscape.  Evolutionary ethics is a descriptive model, that nevertheless can tell us what people do, and why, and why they feel they should or must act morally.  

It is unclear what moral realists are referring to, when they claim that morality is real, factual and objective.  It is also unclear how they can ever make such determinations accurately, when they do not have an adequate model of morality to interrogate.  This may be because they focus on the factual or objective nature of morality, instead of investigating the full, rounded nature of morality itself.  

 

Forms of objectivity in evolutionary ethics

 

• Group-wide similarity and standardness
• Folk perceptions of moral objectivity and relativity/culture-specific pluralism
• Conditional ought makes moral imperatives necessary and factual: to achieve moral goal G, you should do X action that promotes G.  
• Objective-feeling moral goals; patriarchal goals; religious goals; other moral domains.  Domains are morally correct according to themselves, but not necessarily to each other.

 

 

Michael Tomasello’s “group-wide” objectivity and moral realism

 

• A large cultural group is “a collaborative foraging group writ large” (Tomasello, 2016).  Moral objectivity or realism is one property of large-group morality.  This is for a number of reasons.  
• Collaborative partners take the perspectives of all their fellow partners, for coordination; in a large group, the perspective is “maximally general” as all group members can take the perspectives of all others.  
• Group-wide similarity of practical methods facilitates cooperation between strangers.  
• The moral voice of the group is authoritative because the group’s ways have enabled it to survive and flourish since time immemorial.  
• Religion may further fortify the moral realism of the group, as what the gods say must be real.
• Social norms and their enforcement are “three-way general” (Tomasello, 2016). 1) an enforcer assumes “representative authority” of the group and can in principle be any member of the group.  2) a target of enforcement can in principle be any member of the group.  Finally, 3) the standards or norms themselves apply to any member of the group.

 

 

Folk perceptions of moral objectivity

According to a study by Sarkissian, Park, Tien, Knobe, and Wright (2011), ordinary people take morality to be objective – true or false – when evaluating the actions of members of their own culture, but more relativistic when evaluating people's actions from other different cultures with different moral frameworks.  

 

The conditional ought is a factual ought

An ought is only possible if you have a goal.  Without a goal to achieve, an ought is meaningless.  I “ought” to do X – but why?  To what end?  What's the point?  

With a goal, then an action has meaning relative to that goal.  The action can promote the goal or threaten it.  

The human moral goal is “maximising benefits for all concerned” (according to the evolved moral domain that regulates achieving proximate mutual benefit).  Since we do have this goal, we (factually) should do actions that promote it.  

Where does the moral legitimacy of this goal come from?  From evolution.  The human race must, logically, have found this a necessary and worthy goal from day one, since we left the forest and hit the harsh environment of the savannah, where suddenly, humans needed each other to share and cooperate with.  

 

Instrumental and moral goals

Some people say, if morality is goals-based then it's just instrumental.  However, that depends on the goal.  If the goal is moral, then the action is in the service of morality.  

Similarly, patriarchal goals feel correct to people who believe in patriarchy; and patriarchy is a moral domain.  Religious goals feel correct to people who believe in God.  Religion forms a kind of moral domain as it is a system of joint self-regulation.  

References

Sarkissian, Hagop; John Park; David Tien; Jennifer Cole Wright; and Joshua Knobe (2011) – “Folk Moral Relativism”; Mind and Language; September 2011; https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263023574_Folk_Moral_Relativism

Tomasello, Michael (2016) - “A natural history of morality”; Harvard University Press

 

Morality looks factual and real. This point is not in dispute. Our moral convictions are not in doubt. If I say "murder is wrong", I mean it. If you say "murder is right", I will believe that you are mistaken.

Morality looks factual and real because it operates on a conditional ought. In the abortion debate, IF my primary goal is the welfare of the foetus, THEN I factually ought to be anti-abortion. Given that's my goal, my anti-abortion activism is factually necessary and required. The IF-THEN, goals-methods construction introduces facticity. The methods of achieving the goal are factually required, if you want to achieve the goal.

Moral judgements are factually right or wrong according to moral values. A moral value is a method of achieving mutual well being; the moral "good". As such, a moral value is a goal in itself. This goal, e.g., fairness, charity, etc., can be achieved measurably, objectively, factually better or worse. We can evaluate the fairness or charity of action X; we can judge X according to multiple relevant values.

Moral realists state that the appearance of realness is enough to say that morality IS real, because when we perceive the realness of things we know are real, like the blueness of the sky, they really are real. Unless there is a defeater. In this case, there is an epistemic defeater - an alternative explanation for the appearance of the objective realness of morality.

Why do you believe in moral realism? I hear a number of arguments, and to my mind, they're all shallow, simplistic, and weak. These are the arguments I hear:

• anything I "know" must be factually true.
• what about? the opposition. If moral realism isn't true, then anything goes.
• moral progress. Moral realism is true because the arc of history tends towards justice.

I think philosophers should be ashamed of themselves for putting so much faith in such simplistic, surface-level, weak arguments.

Why is moral realism not arbitary? As I understand it, it doesn't specify any actual moral content. It's content free. Therefore, arbitrary.

Evolutionary ethics is not arbitrary because historically and anthropologically, nobody ever justifies genocide, slavery, rape, child abuse etc. on moral grounds. (If they try, then nobody believes them.) There is a limited palette of evolved moral values that are used to justify actions. Religious morality is another kind of morality that sometimes allows terrible things.

Historically and anthropologically, what is seen as moral by real people is methods of achieving mutual fitness benefit or altruistic fitness benefit.

If you introduce the conditional ought (if I want mutual benefit, then...) then you can have:

• factual moral judgments: action A is factually correct according to value V.
• factual normativity: if you want to achieve goal G then you are factually required to X.

The implication of this is that people can pick and choose their values and the values' goals. E.g., I don't want to achieve the goal of dominating and controlling women (the goal of patriarchy - on the way to males' reproduction). So, the logical implication of this position is non-arbitrary subjectivism.

Moral progress can be equally well, or better, explained by the biological pressure towards achieving welfare.

Moral realists say, "I factually ought to X". The rest of us say, why? Who says? Etc.

However, factually: if my goal is G, then I factually ought to X.

This is a form of moral realism. I think that hidden in the discourse of moral realists who say, "my values are the correct ones", is the conditional ought. "My values are the correct ones" if I have goal G. That actually makes sense.

Moral realism is incoherent because it is unable to coherently account for competing moral viewpoints. We contrast two moral domains: patriarchy, and compassion/fairness/equality. These two moral domains are at odds with each other. According to patriarchy, it is correct for me to beat my wife because she looked at another man. A moral realist could say, wife-beating is objectively immoral because it violates a sapient being's bodily property rights and is therefore categorised as an immmoral act. Yet, what's to stop the patriarch responding, "yes, but women need to be controlled and dominated, and this trumps your bodily property rights".

The point is, "who says?" Why exactly is the "realist" right and the patriarch wrong? On the face of it, each one has an equal claim to moral correctness.

Subjectivism says, patriarchy is correct according to patriarchy. Compassion/fairness/equality are correct according to themselves. Which one is "really" correct? There is no "really". If I accept the normative pressure to be patriarchal as legitimate, then patriarchy is correct *for me*, and compassion/fairness/equality take second place. If I view patriarchy as illegitimate, it's because I prefer compassion/fairness/equality.

So, subjectivism is coherent because legitimacy and rightness are perspectival to the moral agent (individual or group), and in real life, everyone has their own perspective - that's a thing already.

The argument for moral realism should not be, "it's philosophically necessary". The argument should be, moral realism is true because of X, Y, Z factual and logical reasons.

The point is not so much the merits of utilitarianism vs. deontology. Rather, why do lay people think that a deontologically organised society will beat a utilitarian one for actual welfare maximisation?

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