"Conservationists once asked: what is a bird without a tree to nest in?

This year, we may well wonder the grim inverse – what is a tree without a bird to nest in it? I can tell you. A tree without a bird is a miserable thing – and in a broader ecological sense, a tree without a bird could be in trouble.

In Australia, birds act in many roles that mammals or insects might fill elsewhere, from pollinating flowers to spreading seeds to keeping trees free of sap-sucking insects.

Bird flu doesn’t just threaten birds and mammals – it could well affect entire ecosystems."

Penny Olsen Honorary Professor in Ecology and Evolution, Australian National University

Complete article: https://theconversation.com/from-the-coasts-to-the-plains-bird-flu-could-threaten-not-just-birds-but-their-homes-289709

https://theconversation.com/is-bird-flu-infecting-humans-how-would-we-know-289489

Really shocked and worried by the misinformation in today's article and Facebook post by The Conversation.

It states,

"So far in 2026, no humans in Australia have been diagnosed with the currently circulating strain. And evidence from overseas indicates that in the rare situation this would occur, illness would generally be mild."

It links to an article looking at bovine-to-human cases of the 2.3.4.4b clade.

I've written an email to the editorial team requesting a correction:

"Hi,

You need to immediately take down or revise today's article and Facebook post "Is bird flu infecting humans? How would we know?"

I cannot believe The Conversation would publish something saying that the "illness would generally be mild."

The only time that the 2.3.4.4b clade is "usually mild" is when it is spread from cow to human.

When 2.3.4.4b is spread from bird to human, it is still extremely dangerous.

[Globally] There are 6 confirmed cases of the 2.3.4.4b clade which spread bird-to-human, of which 2 were fatal, 1 was severe, and only 3 were "mild".

This is more in line with what we know about H5N1 in general which is that when it spreads from bird to human, the case fatality rate is around 53%.

The reason for this difference is that birds carry much higher viral loads than cows. Exposure often involves aerosolised faeces, carcass handling, or contaminated environments. The virus in birds is fully adapted to avian tissue, which can cause catastrophic inflammation when it hits human lungs. Cow infections, by contrast, involve mammalian‑adapted virus, which may reduce severity in humans, including changes in PB2 and other replication genes.

I've followed the Conversation for a long time as a source of news on viruses of concern, and this enormously damages your standing if you are going to become another propaganda machine for the government whenever they want to reduce panic.

Soon, as the disease spreads, thousands of Australians will be exposed to H5N1 infected birds including vets, volunteer workers and poultry farmers. Spreading the complete misinformation that the virus is "usually mild" puts all of those people at risk. It also greatly increases the risk of a human-to-human mutation because it encourages people to be less precautious about going near sick birds.

I am horrified and disgusted with today's cherry picking (of completely irrelevant data), and gross public health misinformation."

Here's hoping they correct it asap but it shows a concerning sign that we may be starting to see the beginning of the propaganda machine around H5N1 in Australia now. I'd bet money that the Australian government would do anything to protect poultry industry profits. And if that means making everyone think the virus is safe for humans, they'd do it.

Diario Sao Paulo Google translation 8-8-26 >>

The Department of Agriculture and Supply confirmed an isolated case of highly pathogenic avian influenza in a whistling duck (or irerê) in Ibirapuera Park, with no impact on poultry production.

The São Paulo Department of Agriculture and Supply confirmed, this Friday (August 7th), a new case of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HAAI) in a wild bird in Ibirapuera Park, located in the southern part of the city of São Paulo.

The infected bird is a whistling duck (Dendrocygna viduata), a type of duck found in tropical Africa, the Antilles, and South America. The case was classified as isolated, with no connection to commercial farms or food production.

The confirmation was made by the Federal Agricultural Defense Laboratory, following the Agricultural Defense's work in isolating the bird, conducting clinical examinations, and collecting samples. The institution emphasizes that, since it is a case involving a wild bird, there are no embargoes on meat and egg exports.

The state government assures that there is no impact on poultry production and that the consumption of poultry meat and eggs remains safe. The sanitary status of São Paulo and Brazil before the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOH) has not been altered.

The Department of Agriculture emphasizes that health surveillance continues to monitor wild birds in parks and reserves, especially during migration periods. Biosecurity measures are already in place on rural properties to prevent the spread of the virus.

Experts recommend that the public avoid direct contact with sick or dead birds and contact health authorities if they suspect anything. Transmission to humans is considered low, but vigilance is essential to prevent mutations.

This is the second case of avian influenza in wild birds in the state in 2026, according to the department. The first case was recorded in another region, also without commercial impact.

The City of São Paulo, through the Municipal Secretariat for Green Areas and the Environment, informed that the park remains open to the public, but monitoring teams have been reinforced to track the situation of the local birds.

Mongabay 8-6-26 >>

• In June, a bird flu outbreak at Kathmandu’s Central Zoo killed at least 65 animals from more than 20 species, exposing flaws in Nepal’s disease surveillance.
• The outbreak has raised concerns that similar outbreaks could go undetected in national parks, where wildlife is not routinely monitored.
• Experts warn that shared feeding sites, including Nepal’s renowned “vulture restaurants”, and the reliance of wild carnivores on domestic poultry could create pathways for influenza viruses to spread between birds and mammals.
• Despite the outbreak and recommendations from the zoo’s own investigation committee for contingency plans, stronger biosecurity and rapid reporting, Nepal’s wildlife and livestock authorities say they have no plans for park-specific surveillance or response programs.

KATHMANDU — In the village of Pithauli, on the edge of Nepal’s Chitwan National Park, a safe feeding site for critically endangered vultures has long been hailed as a success story by conservationists.

For visitors, the feeding site, also known as a “vulture restaurant”, provides a rare photo op for tourists: As white-rumped vultures (Gyps bengalensis) and slender-billed vultures (Gyps tenuirostris) feed on carcasses laid out by locals, greater one-horned rhinos, jackals, wild boars and crows watch and, sometimes, participate.

For ornithologist Rajendra Suwal, however, this ensemble is an eyesore, he told Mongabay, “If an infected bird comes to the site, the disease could spread to other birds or even animals.”.

Suwal’s concern stems from a recent outbreak of bird flu or avian influenza in the country’s capital. An outbreak that started in mid-June at Kathmandu’s Central Zoo is believed to have cost the lives of at least 65 animals and birds across more than 20 species. The dead included barn owls, Himalayan griffons, greylag geese, jungle cats, leopard cats, a sarus crane and two common leopards.

An investigation by the National Trust for Nature Conservation (NTNC), which manages the zoo, says the origin of the outbreak could likely be traced to two sources: Among birds, it likely started through feral crows roosting in open-topped aviary enclosures, while for carnivores, it spread through chicken meat fed to them by the zoo.

Notably, the zoo’s six tigers (Panthera tigris) were unaffected. A member of NTNC’s investigation committee told Mongabay that this is not necessarily because one species is more resistant. “Tigers at the zoo are fed roughly 5-7 kilograms of buffalo meat each per day, not chicken, so they were never on the same exposure pathway as the infected carnivores,” said the committee member, who asked not to be named as they weren’t authorized to talk to the media.

In national parks, however, carnivores often share common diets. There are also no enclosures to inspect, no feeding records to audit and no vet team to notice the first death, ornithologist Suwal said. Central Zoo lost many animals before it could contain the outbreak, but a park may not know it has an outbreak at all, he added.

Two viruses and a delayed response

A copy of the NTNC’s investigation report, obtained by Mongabay through a right-to-information request, shows two influenza viruses potentially circulating at the zoo during the outbreak.

Birds tested positive for H5 strain of the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI). Jungle cats, leopard cats and the zoo’s two common leopards all tested positive for the “low pathogenic” H9, believed to cause mild or no symptom in birds. NTNC’s committee attributed the carnivore deaths, including the leopards, to the outbreak.

The central vet lab’s report to NTNC, reviewed by Mongabay, flagged the H9 finding, “Although H9 LPAI [low pathogenic avian influenza] generally causes mild disease in birds … detection of this strain in wild felids is of concern”.

Umesh Dahal, Director General at the Department of Livestock Services, confirmed the distinction to Mongabay: “We found H5 and H9 in birds. However, the mammals died due to H9, which is an influenza virus that we do not classify as bird flu.”  No park-specific surveillance was needed, he added.

Asked about the lab’s own “of concern” language, he said existing regulations were sufficient.

The investigation committee’s report said the zoo administration knew of bird deaths and bird flu suspicion from June 13, but didn’t notify headquarters until July 19 — five days after the lab confirmed the outbreak. It’s the first known case in Nepal where influenza has hit both zoo birds and mammals. The zoo outbreak occurred amid a wider H5N1 wave that spread to 11 districts after starting March and led to the culling of hundreds of thousands of poultry nationwide, according to Department of Livestock Services data.

One more threat for common leopards

The health of common leopards is a particular concern in Nepal. A 2024 study suggests canine distemper virus, a serious and contagious disease, already circulates among Nepal’s wild population, potentially causing deaths. Canine distemper antibodies have also been reported in tigers.

The death of the two leopards at the zoo attributed to H9 presents a case for the susceptibility of wild leopard populations to the viral strain. Leopards across Nepal regularly prey on domestic poultry, providing H9 with a plausible route from farms into the wild population.

A 2025 DNA study of leopard scat in forests around the Kathmandu Valley found chicken made up nearly a fifth of the leopard diet by frequency. Other studies also point the same way: In the mid-hills (also known as the “lesser Himalaya”) livestock accounted for more of leopards’ dietary biomass than wild ungulates did.

Wild leopards have so far not been tested for influenza, but a wild leopard preying on an infected farm bird would face a comparable exposure route to the leopards in Central Zoo without a keeper to notice any sickness, a member of the NTNC investigation committee told Mongabay.

A leopard in the Central Zoo. Leopards across Nepal regularly prey on domestic poultry, providing H9 with a plausible route from farms into the wild population. Image by Petr Meissner via Flickr (CC BY 2.0).

The vulture restaurant question

Nepal’s vulture restaurants were born after the livestock painkiller diclofenac poisoned vultures that fed on treated carcasses, triggering collapses in populations.

Nepal banned veterinary diclofenac in 2006 and opened the first “restaurant” that year at Pithauli, Nawalpur. There are now more than half a dozen nationwide. The sites are also close to the feedings grounds of crows, vultures, rhinos, jackals and wild boars, creating a contact risk analogous to the zoo’s but with no veterinary oversight.

Ornithologist Suwal said he questions how often carcasses are provided at some sites: Wild vultures feed once and go 10–12 days before eating again, so three or four feedings a week may let pat hogens accumulate. Ornithologist Hem Sagar Baral, one of the pioneers of the vulture restaurant model, went further: If bird flu risk is confirmed, feeding at the restaurants should stop.

Ankit Bilash Joshi from the NGO Bird Conservation Nepal, which supports a vulture feeding site in nearby Kawasoti, said active sites rotate every 20–30 days and are disinfected regularly

Two years ago, three vultures showed signs of illness, Joshi said. Two birds tested positive for  positive for disease antibodies ,suggesting the infection wasn’t transmissible to humans, he said.

Team leader at the Pithauli site, Dhan Bahadur Chaudhary said restaurant staff are more vigilant since the zoo outbreak, no birds there have shown symptoms and no antibody testing is planned.

Vultures from surrounding areas, some of which are tagged, feed on a carcass provided at a vulture restaurant in southern Nepal. Image by Abhaya Raj Joshi for Mongabay.

No plan for national parks

Nepal’s Bird Flu Control Regulations 2019 contain provisions for an inter-departmental coordinating committee that would require sample collection from bird habitats when an outbreak is suspected.

But Buddhi Sagar Paudel, Director General at the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation, said there’s no park-specific program, “We consider the situation to be under control, so we have not prepared any separate plan.” Director General at the Department of Livestock Services Dahal said he backs that position.

Writing about the zoo, NTNC’s committee reached the opposite conclusion and recommended an urgent contingency plan, biosecurity guidelines and a transparent, 24-hour reporting system.

“It is unfortunate that even when all should come together to face a pandemic, treating it lightly by not informing the higher authority in time leads to a situation where risk reduction becomes impossible,” the committee said.

“We need active monitoring not just sample collection when something is already dead,” ornithologist Suwal added.

At Pithauli, restaurant team leader Chaudhary is watching his staff, monitoring his birds and waiting. So far, nothing has raised the alarm, but winter will bring migratory species and, with them, new variables. “We are being careful,” he said.