r/Rojhelat

Eastern Kurdish (Hawrami) and Western Kurdish (Kirdki) are so incredibly archaic among New Western Iranic languages that they actually are more archaic than Middle Persian and Parthian WHEN it comes to the grammatical cases, genders and numbers.

Of course as languages of the Middle Iranic stage, both, MP and Parthian had so many lexemes, sound structures and grammatical features that are generally lost in New Iranic. Including EK and WK.

But the archaic subdialects of EK and WK have even to this day these certain features that MP and Parthian didn't have from the earliest time of their attestation on from a point after 2'000 years ago.

Since I am more familiar with EK than with WK I will focus on EK.

EK has three cases (subject, object, vocative), two numbers (singular, plural) and two genders (masculine, feminine). MP and Parthian had two cases, which only showed in a limited way, and no grammatical gender. For example, NK also has two genders and three cases but it does not mark the gender or number of the subject case while EWK does and NK's masculine vocative marker (-o) is an innovation. In EK everything is marked even the adjectives!!! Which is an O.G. Indo-European feature that still existed in Old Iranic (Awistan and Old Persian with seven cases (nominative, accusative, dative, genitive, locative, ablative/instrumental, vocative), three genders (masculine, feminine, neuter) and three numbers (singular, dual, plural)). Latin e.g. worked like that too and Russian e.g. still does. SCNK like New Persian does not do any of this.

English

EK

SK

CK

NK

MP

-----

(A) girl sees (a) boy

(A) boy sees (a) girl

Girls see boys

Boys see girls

.

Kināca kurrī wīno

Kurr kināce wīno

Kināce kurrān wīnān

Kurre kinācān wīnān

.

Düat kurr(a) dünet

Kurr düat(a) dünet

Düat kurr dünin

Kurr düat dünin

.

Kanīshk kurr dabīnet

Kurr kanīshk dabīnet

Kanīshkān kurrān dabīnin

Kurrān kanīshkān dabīnin

.

Kac kurī dibīna

Kur kace dibīna

Kac kurān dibīnin

Kur kacān dibīnin

.

Kanīzag pisar wīnad

Pis kanīzag wīnad

Kanīzag pisarān wīnand

Pisar kanīzagān wīnand

---

She is healthy

He is healthy

They (only female) are healthy

They (only male) are healthy

.

Āda washa (a)na

Ād wash an

Āde washe (a)ne

Āde washe (a)ne

.

Aw xwash a

Aw xwash a

Awān xwash in

Awān xwash in

.

Aw xosh a

Aw xosh a

Awān xosh in

Awān xosh in

.

Aw xwash a

Aw xwash a

Aw xwash in

Aw xwash in

.

Oy xwash ast

Oy xwash ast

Oy xwash and

Oy xwash and

-----

He sees her

She sees him

They see them

They see her

.

Ād āde wīno

Āda ādī wīno

Āda ādīshān wīno

Āde āde wīnān

.

Aw aw dünet

Aw aw dünet

Aw awān dünet

Awān aw dünin

.

Aw aw(ī) dabīnet

Aw aw(e) dabīnet

Aw awān dabīnet

Awān aw(e) dabīnin

.

Aw we dibīna

Aw wī dibīna

Aw wān dibīna

Aw wān dibīnin

.

Oy oy wīnad

Oy oy wīnad

Oy aweshān wīnand

Oy oy wīnand

----

Note: <oy> in Middle Persian is transcribed as such but might as well be <awe>

First, what exactly did the Kurds gain from all these wars and partnerships?

Over the past century, the Kurds have suffered tens of thousands of casualties in wars against terrorism, dictatorship, and the many campaigns launched against them by Saddam Hussein, Iran, Syria, and Turkey. Hundreds of thousands of Kurds have been killed, displaced, imprisoned, or wounded. But what did the Kurds ultimately receive in return? Did they gain freedom? Independence? The right to self-determination?

What kind of support did the Kurds actually receive? Were they given fighter jets, tanks, artillery systems, air defence systems, drones, or meaningful long-term guarantees? NOOOO. In most cases, support was limited to light weapons, ammunition, limited military coordination, and some financial assistance.

What did the Trump administration offer the Kurds during its first and second terms?

In 2017, when more than 90 percent of voters in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq supported independence in a referendum, the Kurdish leadership expected at least political understanding from its Western partners. Instead, Kurdish areas were attacked by Iraqi forces and Iranian-backed groups using American-made weapons, while the United States and the wider international community largely stood aside.

Then, in early 2018, the Trump administration effectively allowed the Turkish invasion of Afrin. Hundreds of thousands of Kurds were displaced from the region following the operation.

In 2019, after direct communication between President Trump and Erdoğan, Turkey launched another military operation against Serê Kaniyê and Grê Spî in Rojava (northeastern Syria). Large parts of the region came under Turkish control after the withdrawal of American protection from the area.

For years, Kurdish forces in Rojava served as the primary partner of the United States and the international coalition in the war against ISIS. Thousands of Kurdish fighters lost their lives in that struggle. Yet many Kurds believe that, once ISIS was territorially defeated, Western priorities changed and Kurdish concerns became secondary.

Today, after all these experiences, Kurdish groups in Rojhilat (Irani Kurdistan) are being accused of disappointing Washington because they refused to enter another dangerous conflict without guarantees regarding their future political status and protection.

But from the KURDISH PERSPECTIVE, this caution is understandable.

The Kurds are not mercenaries. Kurdish blood is not cheap, and the lives of Kurdish youth are not for sale. The Kurds are fighting for their freedom, dignity, and political rights, not to serve the temporary agendas of regional or international powers without any clear outcome for the Kurdish people themselves.

At the same time, the Kurds have repeatedly shown their willingness to cooperate in fighting terrorism, extremism, and instability in the Middle East. Kurdish forces played a central role in the defeat of ISIS and contributed greatly to regional security. But cooperation must be based on mutual respect, clarity, and long-term political understanding.

I do not know the accuracy of the recent claims regarding weapons allegedly sent to protesters inside Iran. If such operations truly existed, then the American side should clearly explain which group, force, or individuals received those weapons. A nation of tens of millions of people should not be collectively accused through vague and unverified statements.

The Kurds do not claim that the American people are enemies of the Kurdish people. Nor is this a rejection of international cooperation. Rather, many Kurds are expressing frustration with repeated political experiences in which Kurdish sacrifices were welcomed during conflict but forgotten once larger geopolitical priorities changed.

For this reason, Kurdish groups in Rojhelat are approaching the current situation with caution. The lessons of recent history remain very fresh, especially after the experiences of Iraqi Kurdistan and Rojava. Any future cooperation must involve clear guarantees, realistic political understandings, and serious consideration for the future and security of the Kurdish people themselves.