r/aisecurity

Anthropic shuts the EU out of its most advanced cyber AI model
▲ 323 r/aisecurity+2 crossposts

Anthropic shuts the EU out of its most advanced cyber AI model

Anthropic has reportedly restricted EU access to Claude Mythos, keeping it mostly available to select U.S. companies and government agencies.

European banks, software firms, and governments may now be unable to test their defenses against one of the most advanced AI cyber tools out there, which could deepen Europe’s dependence on U.S. tech and widen the cybersecurity gap.

Maybe this becomes an opportunity for Mistral and Lumo if things line up right.

https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/news/article/anthropic-shuts-the-eu-out-of-its-most-advanced-cyber-ai-model

u/x4rvi0n — 3 days ago

How are people keeping vibe coded apps from leaking company data?

I work at a mid sized B2B tech company and management is pushing pretty hard for AI adoption.....

As a result - employees are now allowed to vibe code small internal tools for their own workflows, and we also have a small dedicated AI engineering team building AI into actual business processes.

From security standpoint this is starting to feel very messy.

People can now build little apps with Lovable, Replit whatever else (like they can connect docs, paste customer data, upload spreadsheets, create internal dashboards, build wrappers around ChatGPT or Claude)...

At first we tried to frame this as “which AI tools are allowed”, but we understood that it is too narrow pretty quickly because the bigger issue is where company data moves once someone is already inside a browser session.

Classic DLP feels too far away in some of these cases. Same with normal web filtering. They can tell me someone visited ChatGPT or uploaded something somewhere, but I’m trying to understand what happened inside the actual browser session.

Was sensitive data pasted into a prompt. Was a file uploaded to Claude. Was an internal tool exposed publicly because someone forgot auth. Was an AI wrapper extension reading page content. Was this done from a managed laptop or some contractor/BYOD machine.

I also really do not want to force everyone into a new enterprise browser unless there is no other choice. I know Island/Talon type tools can give deep control, but for our culture and user base that feels like a big change management project.

I’m trying to understand the practical options for GenAI prompt-level DLP / session-level DLP without overbuilding this thing.

From what I see, CASB/SSE/web filtering gives broad visibility but may miss browser session detail. Browser extension security can make sense if we can enforce it through MDM, but that gets weaker for BYOD and contractor access.

The other bucket we are looking at is agentless SSE / web session security, where the control is more around the access/session path instead of forcing a new browser or heavy endpoint rollout.

Red Access is one we are looking at there, mostly because it seems closer to session level DLP / secure web access than a full browser replacement. I’m not assuming it solves everything. There is still identity/routing/session enforcement somewhere. But the idea of controlling the session without making everyone switch browsers is appealing.

For people who already dealt with this, what did you end up using for GenAI data exfiltration prevention?

Did session level DLP actually help, or did you end up back at browser extensions / enterprise browser / blocking tools?

reddit.com
u/southway_ — 5 days ago

How should AI coding agents be contained before tool calls execute?

AI coding agents are starting to do more than suggest code: they can run shell commands, read local files, call tools/MCP servers, and modify config using the user’s permissions.

From a security point of view, I’m trying to think through where containment should happen. The risky part seems to be unsafe action before the human notices, not just bad advice.

For people working with coding agents:

What actions would you block by default?

Examples I’m thinking about:

  • destructive shell commands
  • access to secrets or SSH keys
  • modifying security-sensitive config
  • network calls to unknown destinations
  • installing packages or running downloaded scripts
  • MCP/tool calls with broad permissions

Also curious:

What false positives would make this unusable?

Is local pre-execution enforcement the right layer, or should this be handled by sandboxing, identity/permissions, audit logs, rollback/snapshots, or something else?

reddit.com
u/Gary_AIAGENTLENS — 11 days ago
▲ 10 r/aisecurity+3 crossposts

Built my first 3 microlearning lectures - feedback welcome

I built three first microlearning lectures about Claude Code Basics. My target audience would be technical people which want to learn the basics before they use it

Getting started with MCPs

https://app.scibly.com/student/worksheets/cmowyggwd00000ajonr4zzb4p/editor?v=cmox03jr600000al9lzxl3w0w

Claude Code permission modes

https://app.scibly.com/en/student/worksheets/cmowi3e0400000ajlfo5ohpe8/editor?v=cmowi3e0s00010ajl9jd51apr

Claude Code sub-agents

https://app.scibly.com/en/student/worksheets/cmowha9ps00000ai82nkqn2sv/editor?v=cmowha9ql00010ai8gue3q4x9

I would appreciate all feedback and critique to improve them in the future so that learners can effectively use them 

u/chefkoch-24 — 12 days ago