r/eBPF

▲ 30 r/eBPF+1 crossposts

Netbump is a new Rust tool (no AI involved) using Aya to work with EBPF.

It is intended to be used by end-user to limit a group of targets which can be a started program or an already running program, a socket or a cgroup (v2). User can add/delete/update/list his own rules.

netbump is the client, buiding request to be sent over a Unix socket to the server. netbumpd is the server handling client request and some events from internal EBPF programs and netlink connections.

Netbump EBPF programs are used to track targets and to mark network packets. Bandwidth limitation is done by the kernel itself.

u/gonbalf — 3 days ago
▲ 14 r/eBPF

LID / Linux Is Dying

Hello again, I’m azqzazq1, a cybersecurity researcher.

My previous research, SunnyDayBPF, was recently featured by Ollie Whitehouse, CTO at the UK NCSC, in the Cyber Defence Analysis weekly summary.

Now I’m working on a new low-level Linux security research idea and I’d really like to hear opinions from people interested in eBPF, LSMs, AppArmor, and Linux hardening.

While spending more time with BPF internals, I noticed an interesting trust-boundary problem.

At a high level, the LSM framework prevents one LSM from simply overriding another LSM’s deny decision. However, eBPF tracing mechanisms can operate outside that LSM decision flow. This creates an interesting gap when combined with pathname-based MAC enforcement.

The research explores whether pre-LSM pathname manipulation through eBPF can cause AppArmor to evaluate a different path than the one originally requested by the user process.

In other words:

Can the security decision remain technically “valid” while the observed enforcement target is shifted before the LSM check?

I’m currently calling this research:

LID — Linux Integrity Drift

The focus is not “turning off AppArmor”, but understanding how kernel tracing, pathname-based access control, and security enforcement assumptions can drift from each other under specific conditions.

I’d love to hear thoughts from people working on Linux security, eBPF, AppArmor, LSM internals, or runtime detection.

Security assumptions killing all the ecosystem.

reddit.com
u/secsecseec — 5 days ago
▲ 3 r/eBPF

UDP packets drop reason in BPF

Hello,

I am a writing BPF program to monitor network packet drops, the reason why they are dropping, connections etc. Using tracepoint/skb/kfree_skb and kprobe/udp_sendmsg for monitoring UDP connections and drop reasons. However, the program doesn't show the reason such as DNS couldn't resolve or the reason code for this.

So the question is which kernel function or tracepoint I can use to get this information?

What my program displays right now while querying invalid website:

  {
    "type": "UDP",
    "pid": 519,
    "uid": 991,
    "comm": "systemd-resolve",
    "src": "10.0.2.15",
    "sport": 31956,
    "dst": "10.0.2.3",
    "dport": 53
  },
  {
    "type": "UDP",
    "pid": 519,
    "uid": 991,
    "comm": "systemd-resolve",
    "src": "10.0.2.15",
    "sport": 1763,
    "dst": "10.0.2.3",
    "dport": 53
  },
  {
    "type": "PKT_DROP",
    "pid": 4295,
    "uid": 0,
    "comm": "kworker/0:0",
    "src": "-",
    "sport": 0,
    "dst": "-",
    "dport": 56,
    "drop_reason": "OTHER"
  },
  {
    "type": "UDP",
    "pid": 2126,
    "uid": 115,
    "comm": "cups-browsed",
    "src": "127.0.0.1",
    "sport": 38575,
    "dst": "127.0.0.53",
    "dport": 53
  },

Thanks in advance! I'd appreciate any help or reading materials regarding this.

reddit.com
u/jamala2000 — 7 days ago
▲ 11 r/eBPF+1 crossposts

I built NanoPAM (Aegis-XDP): 629ns deterministic latency with eBPF/XDP + 5.1GHz isolated cores

Hey r/eBPF,

I recently open-sourced AI Agentic Nano Previlaged Access management (NanoPAM) (Aegis-XDP) — a transparent Layer-2 bridge that does port-level PAM + token-bucket rate limiting entirely in XDP.

We achieved:

• P50 = 629 ns

• P99 = 645 ns (<41 ns variance)

• 8,000× faster than traditional Netfilter/iptables

Full technical deep-dive (with architecture diagrams, benchmarks, and jitter graphs) is here:

https://medium.com/@reachshankarg/how-we-achieved-629ns-deterministic-latency-using-ebpf-xdp-and-5-1ghz-isolated-cores-90a15f3e81e1

GitHub repo (source + build instructions): https://github.com/reachshankarg-byte/NanoPAM

Would love feedback from the eBPF community — especially on the XDP fast path and CPU isolation approach. Thanks!

medium.com
u/Status-Pirate-1160 — 8 days ago
▲ 10 r/eBPF

Using eBPF for Linux endpoint telemetry in an open-source detection engine

Hi r/ebpf,

I’m working on Rustinel, an open-source endpoint detection project for Windows and Linux.

On the Linux side, the project uses eBPF to collect endpoint telemetry and feed a shared detection pipeline. Current Linux coverage focuses on:

- Process activity

- Network activity

- File activity

- DNS-related telemetry

The collected events are normalized into a shared model, then evaluated against Sigma rules, YARA rules and IOC indicators. Alerts are written as ECS-compatible NDJSON so they can be ingested into SIEM/log pipelines.

I’m very interested in feedback from people with more eBPF experience.

The project is written in Rust and is still evolving. Windows coverage is broader today, so the Linux/eBPF side is one of the areas where feedback would be especially useful.

github.com
u/bzh_Karib0u — 10 days ago
▲ 10 r/eBPF+5 crossposts

eBPF LSM runtime security agent for synchronous file/network denial — looking for technical feedback

I’m working on Aegis-BPF, an open-source Linux runtime security project built around eBPF LSM.

The goal is narrow: explore enforcement-first runtime security, where selected file and network operations can be denied before syscall completion, rather than only emitting post-event telemetry.

Current scope:

- BPF-LSM based file/network policy decisions

- cgroup-scoped policy

- OverlayFS/copy-up handling

- audit-mode fallback when enforcement is unavailable

- Prometheus metrics

- Kubernetes/Helm deployment path

I’m not claiming it is a production-ready replacement for Falco, Tetragon, or KubeArmor. I’m treating it as a focused enforcement model project and looking for criticism from people who understand eBPF, Linux security, or container runtime edge cases.

Main feedback I’m looking for:

- Are the hook choices reasonable?

- What enforcement edge cases am I probably missing?

- What would make the failure-mode model more trustworthy?

- What tests would you expect before taking this seriously?

- Are there obvious problems with cgroup-scoped policy or OverlayFS handling?

Repo:

https://github.com/ErenAri/Aegis-BPF

Technical criticism is more useful than general encouragement.

u/EreNN_42 — 13 days ago