r/hot_stocks

Summary
Respectfully, I think there’s an important distinction that gets lost when people share the famous “$410M/share” Yahoo Finance chart for GPUS (formerly DPW).

The chart does highlight years of reverse splits and dilution, but the $410M/share figure is not the actual historical trading price.

Here’s the original post on X, and something I’ve shared on Reddit.

https://x.com/notweirdal37144/status/2073451047536763007?s=46

Yahoo Finance displays a split-adjusted historical price. GPUS has undergone a cumulative 210,000,000:1 reverse split (20 × 40 × 300 × 25 × 35), meaning:
210,000,000 pre-split shares = 1 current share
Yahoo multiplies historical prices by that cumulative factor so the chart remains continuous. That’s why the early prices appear in the hundreds of millions of dollars per share.
This doesn’t mean investors literally paid $410 million per share, nor does it mean shareholders “lost $410 million per share.”

That said, it doesn’t change the fact that long-term shareholders experienced significant dilution and multiple reverse splits. Those are real and well documented.
As a hypothetical example:

Someone trying to offset a $10,000 loss
Buying approximately 11,628 shares today at $0.14 would invest about $1,628.

If GPUS reached $1.00/share, that position would be worth approximately $11,628, which would offset a $10,000 loss on a separate investment.

I’m not trying to defend or criticize management here—only to separate the mathematics of split-adjusted charts from the actual economic impact on shareholders.

If anyone has historical unadjusted price data from 2018, I’d be interested in comparing it with the adjusted chart to better illustrate the difference.

I’ve create a graph here.

https://x.com/mrperezmarc/status/2073776956672208918?s=46

This is not financial advice. Please do your own due diligence.

I was thinking NBIS, Asts or RKLB.

Stewards, Inc $SWRD is setting it's eyes on uplisting to Nasdaq. https://x.com/i/status/2071544578927128938 Keep your eyes on this company, great value and upside. This can move and run as it has many times before in the past, previously known as $FAVO, Favo Captial. This is a premium discount sitting at under $3.00 right now as well. As always, do your DD, and you too shall feel this is a company with BIG potential and a must add.

Wendy’s (WEN) has recently become one of the meme-stock names on WallStreetBets, but I think the more interesting point is that WEN is not just a squeeze trade. As a standalone investment, I find it much more compelling than GME was before its original short squeeze.

Funny side note: I tried posting a version of this on WallStreetBets, but apparently it was too boring.

1. Asset-light franchise model

Wendy’s is primarily a franchised business, with roughly 94% of restaurants operated by franchisees. That means the parent company earns recurring royalty and marketing-fund income while avoiding much of the store-level operating risk.

That shows up in the economics: in fiscal 2025, Wendy’s generated about $2.2 billion of revenue, $344.5 million of operating cash flow and $205.4 million of free cash flow, with gross margin of 63.6% and operating margin of 15.8%. This is not a speculative concept stock; it is a capital-light royalty stream attached to a real consumer brand.

2. The valuation looks genuinely depressed

Before the recent meme-stock move, WEN was trading around $6.07, close to a multi-decade low. At that level, the stock was roughly around 7x earnings and about 7x EBITDA on an enterprise-value basis, depending on how you treat net debt and forward estimates.

That is a major discount to large franchised QSR peers such as McDonald’s, Yum Brands and Restaurant Brands International, which typically trade at much higher EBITDA multiples.

The key question is not whether Wendy’s is as good as McDonald’s. It clearly is not. The question is whether it deserves to trade at such a large discount if the new management team can merely stabilize the business. From this starting point, even a modest improvement could create meaningful re-rating potential.

3. High cash yield while you wait

The annual dividend is $0.56 per share, which represented roughly a 9% forward yield near the recent lows.

That yield should not be treated as risk-free. If the turnaround disappoints, the dividend could come under pressure. But management has stated a target payout ratio of 50–60% of adjusted earnings, so the dividend is currently an important part of the thesis: investors are being paid to wait while the turnaround plays out.

4. Turnaround team with relevant experience

CEO Bob Wright and newly appointed CFO Steve Cirulis previously worked together at Potbelly, where the turnaround led to a very large increase in the share price. That does not guarantee success at Wendy’s, but it does give the current management team some credibility.

Their plan, Project Fresh, focuses on brand revitalization, operational execution, system optimization and capital allocation.

There is at least some early evidence that management-controlled stores are responding better: in Q3 2025, company-operated comparable sales outperformed the overall system by about 4 percentage points. That matters because company-operated restaurants are where management has the most direct control over execution.

5. International growth is still intact

The US business is the main problem, but international growth remains a positive part of the story. International systemwide sales grew 8.6%, with growth across all regions, and Wendy’s has committed development pipelines including Italy, Armenia and Romania.

Because most new units are franchised, successful international growth should convert into royalty income without requiring heavy capital investment from Wendy’s itself.

6. Activist and asset optionality

Trian still owns a meaningful stake in Wendy’s, and Nelson Peltz has a long history with the company. Wendy’s also has a real-estate segment that owns property, which could create monetization or strategic optionality over time.

I would not make this the base case, but it adds another layer of potential upside if the board or large shareholders push for more aggressive value creation.

7. The separate meme-stock / short-interest setup

This part should be kept separate from the fundamental thesis.

Short interest has been reported around 30–37% of the float, depending on the source, and recent retail buying has been far above normal levels. That is the kind of setup that can create violent near-term moves.

But this is a trading catalyst, not an investment thesis. It can add or destroy a lot of value in days, and it says very little about whether Wendy’s is a good long-term investment.

My view

The cleanest version of the thesis is this:

Wendy’s is a real, asset-light, cash-generative franchise business trading at a distressed valuation, with a high dividend yield, a credible turnaround team, international growth optionality and a potentially explosive positioning setup.

The risks are obvious: US same-store sales remain weak, the brand has lost relevance versus stronger QSR peers, the dividend may not be sustainable if earnings deteriorate, and meme-stock volatility can cut both ways.

I think the risk/reward is attractive. I am treating the short squeeze potential as a bonus, not the core reason to own the stock.

I have a position in WEN.

GRPN is my biggest holding. I think they are pulling off one of the best business turnarounds we have seen in the past decade and the market is dead asleep on it. Am I regarded? Read and decide for yourself.

My bull case has three legs: a platform with massive room to improve (top line), an operation with massive room to streamline (bottom line), and a stock under extraordinary short pressure (the squeeze fuel). Each one wins on its own. Together they're stupid.

**Basic facts**

\- Groupon returned to growth in 2025: global billings of $1.67B, up 7%, and free cash flow positive for the second straight year. Q1 2026 was a soft patch (revenue flat, billings down 1%, units down 5%), but that quarter predates both the restructuring and the platform rollout in its core market. That matters, hold the thought.
\- 16.2 million people actually buy on Groupon every year (active customers, real billings, not site visitors), up 5% year over year.
\- But each of those customers only buys about twice a year. Annualized units run around 32 to 35 million against 16.2 million customers, so roughly 2 purchases per customer per year, and that frequency is currently falling, not rising. That is the single biggest lever in this entire thesis, and I'll explain why in a second.
\- Roughly 1,700 employees plus several hundred contractors. They just cut up to 400 roles (employees and contractors), which the company itself frames as about 15% of global headcount, as the first wave of a multi-tranche AI efficiency program called Project Foundry. First targets are customer service and HR. IT, finance, and marketing come later.

Leg 1: The platform (the top-line lever)

Do yourself a favor and pull up groupon.com right now. Outdated? Yes. Kind of ugly? Yes. User friendly? No. Recommendation algorithm? Terrible. So ask yourself why 16.2 million people still buy from it every single year.

The answer is a genuinely strong brand moat and an unmatched scale of local offerings. That keeps Groupon on top despite a product nobody has loved in years.

Here is the opportunity. Groupon's core user is older, lower to middle income, and deeply discount savvy. But younger lower to middle income people are struggling financially at levels we have not seen in a long time, and they are every bit as discount savvy as their parents are. The only thing missing is that Groupon lacks the flavor and the user experience of the discount apps young people actually use. Management knows this, and fixing the UI/UX and the recommendation engine is now the number one platform priority. A better product means a bigger addressable demographic (more users) and more purchases per user (higher frequency). Frequency is the one that really matters, because incremental purchases fall almost straight to the bottom line.

And this is not hypothetical. The new consumer platform is already live internationally, and in Q1 2026 International Local Revenue grew 19% (excluding Giftcloud) on the back of it. North America, the bigger and more important market, has barely started migrating (about half of NA iOS users as of Q4 2025). So the platform catalyst is already proven in one market and is only now rolling into the larger one. That is the cleanest tell you will get that this works.

On top of the operating story there is a one-time windfall coming. Groupon owns roughly a 2.3% stake in SumUp, a European payments company reportedly preparing an IPO that could value it around $10B to $15B. At that range the stake is worth somewhere in the low to mid hundreds of millions gross, though lockups mean not all of it turns into cash on day one. Even a conservative realization is well above the roughly $75M the stake is carried at on the books, so it is almost pure upside the market is not pricing. Whenever it lands, it further fortifies a stabilizing balance sheet and hands management more ammo.

Leg 2: Operations (the bottom-line lever)

Groupon's headcount has always been bloated, and this is the leg where they finally fix it for good.

Project Foundry is the next chapter, and AI is the tool. The plan is to embed AI agents into the core of every function, and then take headcount out as those agents absorb the work. Crucially, this is not a one-time slash. It is being run in tranches.

Wave one is the up to 400 roles already announced (about 15% of global headcount), with the majority done by the end of Q3 2026 and the rest extending into Q4 where local labor laws require consultation periods. The first functions on the block are customer service and HR, the most automatable layers, and they are leaning on contractors here, which is why the restructuring charge is small (only $7M to $13M, almost all severance) relative to the savings. That alone is guided to generate $20M to $25M in annualized payroll savings.

Wave two and beyond is the part the market is not paying for yet. Management has explicitly said it is evaluating further material cost-reduction and automation actions under Project Foundry, with those expected to run through the end of 2027. That is where the remaining merchant rep layer, IT, finance, and marketing come into play, the bigger and more expensive SG&A functions. Wave one is the cheap, contractor-heavy proof of concept. The real margin unlock is the employee-side automation still ahead.

And this is not a company swinging the axe blindly to juice one quarter. They are reinvesting up to half of the savings back into marketing, AI infrastructure, and talent density, so this is a reallocation from low-value manual labor into the growth engine, not pure cost-cutting. They have also done exactly this kind of painful headcount reduction before. A decade ago, before they built the self-serve merchant portal, they needed reps to service basically their entire merchant base, and they cut that down massively. This is a management team that knows how to take a company leaner and come out better for it.

The result already shows in guidance. Management raised full-year 2026 adjusted EBITDA guidance to $75M to $80M on the back of these actions, and full-year free cash flow is guided to at least $60M. On a roughly $625M market cap, that is around a 10% free cash flow yield on guidance, for a company the market has basically left for dead.

Leg 3: The stock (the squeeze fuel)

This is where it gets fun.

\- Short interest is extreme. Depending on the source it runs roughly 50% to 60% of float (Quiver had it at 61% in May), among the highest of any US listed stock, with around 11 days to cover. And that is the polite version. A large block of shares is locked up with Pale Fire Capital (the CEO's firm, now the controlling shareholder) and other insiders, so against the shares that can actually be borrowed and traded, effective short interest is dramatically higher, plausibly near or above 100%. That is a powder keg.
\- The board authorized up to $300M in buybacks and is actually executing: $21.3M in Q1, another $10.1M in April alone, with about $215M still left. That remaining authorization by itself is roughly a third of the entire market cap. Every share they retire shrinks an already tiny tradeable float, straight into the teeth of that short interest.
\- Add the eventual SumUp cash and you have a fortified balance sheet with real optionality: more buybacks, more platform investment, or worst case more strategic investments.

The obvious bear arguments, addressed

\- “Negative equity, it's basically insolvent." No. The equity deficit is an accounting artifact of the buybacks (treasury stock) and convertible note math, not an operating problem. They hold $225.5M in cash against roughly $290M of converts, generate positive free cash flow, and have the SumUp asset sitting on top. The 2023 going-concern scare is dead and buried.
\- “Units are falling."True right now, and that is exactly the point. Frequency is depressed because the product is dated. The entire platform thesis is about reversing that, and the international numbers say it is already reversing where the new product has actually shipped.
\- “It's not dirt cheap anymore." At roughly 7.5x EBITDA it is not a cigar butt. But it is nowhere near priced for a successful AI-native turnaround plus a SumUp windfall plus a short squeeze.

Alignment

The CEO runs Pale Fire Capital, the controlling shareholder, owns about 3% directly, and insiders have been net buyers (over $1M in the last year). They formed a board-level AI committee in March 2026. The people steering this have their own money in the seat right next to yours.

Bottom line

Improving product (more users, more frequency) plus AI-driven cost cuts (fatter margins) plus a $300M buyback chewing through a tiny float that is shorted into the ground plus a SumUp cash windfall. Three independent ways to win, on a stock the market has written off. I'm long, it's my biggest position, and I'm not trimming.

Not financial advice.

I’ve been looking for small caps where the market is pricing in very little success despite multiple catalysts lining up.
I think Orchestra BioMed ($OBIO) fits that description well and feel like Reddit is not talking about it for some odd reason.
Current price is around $4.1.
Current market cap is only ~240 M.

Why I think the market is sleeping on it:

This isn’t another biotech hoping someone notices their technology.
Medtronic licensed AVIM, is running the pivotal BACKBEAT trial, and already has a royalty agreement in place if the therapy reaches commercialization.
That’s a huge de-risking event compared with most companies at this valuation.

The FDA keeps moving things forward
Two Breakthrough Device Designations.
The FDA also reduced the pivotal trial from roughly 500 patients to 316.
Those aren’t guarantees of success, but they’re meaningful regulatory milestones.

Massive market
Hypertension affects more than 1.3 billion people globally.
Millions of those patients already receive pacemakers.
AVIM uses existing pacemakers to reduce blood pressure, meaning the commercial opportunity is significantly larger than a company with a $240M valuation would suggest.

The catalyst is close
The pivotal BACKBEAT trial is expected to complete enrollment in the coming weeks.
After that, the market’s focus shifts almost entirely toward the pivotal data expected in early 2027.
Historically, the biggest moves in biotech and medtech often occur before the data release as investors begin positioning for the catalyst.

No immediate financing overhang
Another thing I like:
The company expects to have enough cash to fund operations through the end of 2027.
That means they’re funded well beyond the expected data readout, reducing the need for near-term dilution.

Valuation
Current market cap:
~$240M
Sell-side analysts already have pre-data price targets around $11–15, despite still applying development risk.
If BACKBEAT delivers strong pivotal data and AVIM proves commercially viable, I think the market will need to revalue the company substantially.
The bull-case valuation is $40–60+ per share if the trial is successful, commercialization progresses as expected, and investors begin pricing in the long-term opportunity. That’s an optimistic scenario rather than a prediction, but it’s why I find the setup compelling. Also, this valuation only accounts for the Backbeat trial and not the other studies being under taken with other medical device giants like Terumo.

I wonder if anyone knows more/is invested? There is a huge shift towards healthcare atm that could be potential gains.

Not financial advice, and I’m not claiming a squeeze is guaranteed. I’ve been following Beyond Meat closely, and I think several developments are worth putting together in one informational post.

The technical and short-positioning setup
BYND’s cost to borrow is currently being displayed around 67% on Fintel, although borrow fees can change quickly and differ between brokers.
That is notable because it is higher than some of the borrow-fee readings reported during the active portion of BYND’s October run. A high CTB does not automatically cause a squeeze, but it increases the carrying cost for short sellers and can become more meaningful when combined with:

Extremely elevated short positioning
Limited or fluctuating share availability
High options activity
A heavily compressed stock price
Fibonacci retracement levels lining up with other technical support and resistance zones
Some platforms are showing figures as high as 303% in certain short-related calculations. Investors should verify exactly what that percentage represents because short interest, short volume and short-float calculations are not interchangeable. The officially reported share count is already extremely high, regardless of which float methodology is used.
This creates squeeze potential, including the possibility of gamma-related pressure if call buying becomes concentrated near important strikes. It does not guarantee that one will occur; sustained buying volume and movement through the options chain would still be required.

Similar stock price, but potentially more underlying value
BYND is trading around territory it visited before, but the business itself is beginning to look different.
The company’s restructuring plan has focused heavily on two things:
Reducing cash burn and unnecessary operating expenses
Shifting toward products and channels capable of producing better margins

In Q1 2026, Beyond Meat reported its lowest quarterly cash usage in more than two years, approximately $11.8 million. Its net loss also narrowed to $28.5 million from $61.1 million in the same quarter last year.
Revenue is still declining, so the turnaround is far from complete. However, the improvement in expenses, inventory management and cash consumption suggests management is making measurable progress on the part of the business it can control.

Beyond Immerse could change how the market views the company
Beyond Meat is no longer positioning itself solely as a frozen-burger company. It is expanding into daily-consumption plant-protein products, beginning with Beyond Immerse.
Beyond Immerse combines:
10 or 20 grams of plant protein
Fiber
Electrolytes
Antioxidants
Vitamin C
A lighter, ready-to-drink format
Beyond says it is the first ready-to-drink protein beverage to receive Clean Label Project Certification. The drinks are available in Peach Mango, Orange Tangerine and Lemon Lime.
Unlike a frozen burger that someone might purchase occasionally, a functional drink can potentially become a repeat or even daily purchase. That creates a very different consumer opportunity.
The New York launch is being handled through Big Geyser, which provides access to more than 26,000 grocery, convenience, drug, club, food-service and mass-merchandise outlets across the region.
Big Geyser has distributed major beverage brands such as Celsius, Poppi and Vitaminwater. That does not mean Beyond Immerse will automatically repeat their success, but it gives the product an experienced distribution partner and meaningful shelf access from the beginning.
The company has also brought in New York Knicks player Josh Hart as an ambassador for the drink. Its social-media marketing on Instagram and Threads has become much more active and appears focused on fitness, recovery and clean nutrition rather than only meat alternatives.

Expansion into California and additional regions would be an important catalyst to monitor.

Clean Label Certification directly addresses an old bearish narrative
One of the biggest arguments used against plant-based meat was that the products were “ultra-processed” or unhealthy.
Beyond Meat has reformulated several products using simpler ingredients, including avocado oil, and now has more than 20 Clean Label Project Certified products.
It is the first company in the plant-based meat category to receive that certification. The certification involves third-party testing for contaminants and other potentially harmful substances.
That does not settle every debate about nutrition, but it gives Beyond Meat objective third-party evidence with which to respond to one of the strongest narratives that damaged the brand.
The bearish media campaign around plant-based meat was also not entirely organic. Beef and livestock industry organizations have spent significant money promoting competing narratives and criticism of plant-based alternatives. Investors can debate the merits of either side, but it is worth understanding the commercial interests behind the messaging.

Better inventory discipline
Another historical problem was producing and shipping too much inventory before demand was properly established, particularly in distant international markets such as China.
Beyond Meat has since exited its China operations, consolidated production and emphasized smaller-scale testing before committing to broader launches. Its test-kitchen approach allows it to measure consumer demand before investing in mass production and distribution.
That can reduce:
Product waste
Freight expenses
Inventory write-downs
Cash tied up in unsuccessful launches
The recent cash-burn improvement occurred before Beyond Immerse had contributed a full quarter of commercial sales.

More products could be coming
Beyond has indicated that its broader strategy involves expanding from meat alternatives into a wider plant-protein platform.
Potential products and categories investors are watching include:
Protein bars and portable snacks
Beyond Steak Filet
Additional protein beverages
Milk or dairy-alternative products
Other higher-margin, repeat-purchase formats
Some of these remain developmental or have not received firm nationwide launch dates, so they should be viewed as possible catalysts rather than guaranteed revenue.
The company has also explored government and military-related food opportunities. Until a contract is announced, that should be treated as an opportunity under consideration—not an awarded deal.

The core meat products are improving too
Beyond Meat has continued reformulating its burgers with simpler ingredients and avocado oil while maintaining its focus on taste.
The company has repeatedly promoted strong results in blind taste comparisons. Taste matters because healthier ingredients alone will not drive repeat purchases if consumers do not enjoy the product.
Potential test-kitchen launches, including products such as steak filets, could further expand the company beyond the burger category.

The valuation question
BYND reached an all-time high near $240 in 2019, even though it was not profitable at the time.
That does not mean it will return there, and today’s share count, debt load and business conditions are substantially different. Comparing only the stock prices without adjusting for dilution would be misleading.
However, it does demonstrate how dramatically the market once valued Beyond Meat’s brand and growth potential. The more relevant question today is what the company could be worth if it can:
Stabilize revenue
Continue reducing cash burn
Improve gross margins
Build repeat demand for Beyond Immerse
Expand distribution beyond New York
Launch additional higher-margin products
Eventually establish a credible path toward sustainable profitability
The next two earnings reports, beginning with the expected August report, should provide important evidence. The key metrics I’m watching are cash usage, gross margin, operating expenses, beverage distribution, repeat purchases and management’s revenue outlook.

Bottom line
The bullish case is no longer based only on “plant-based burgers becoming popular.”
It is now a combination of:
Very high short positioning
Elevated borrowing costs
Possible options-driven squeeze mechanics
Improving cash management
Clean Label Project Certification
New daily-consumption products
Big Geyser distribution
Athlete-led marketing
Potential geographic expansion
A growing pipeline of higher-margin products
There are still serious risks: falling revenue, debt, dilution, execution risk and the possibility that new products fail to gain repeat customers.
But at the current valuation, I believe BYND deserves more attention than it is receiving. The short setup may attract traders, while the restructuring and product expansion could give longer-term investors something more substantial to monitor.

I've been running a multi-agent pipeline that generates LONG-BUY equity signals, and I finally have enough of a track record to look at it honestly. The methodology turned out to be more interesting than the headline number.

The setup
- 66 LONG-BUY signals generated between Apr 23 and May 24, 2026
- Each measured from its own entry date to today's close (Jun 26) — every position has held 1+ month
- Equal-weight, paper-traded, public data. Positions still open: this is unrealized, mark-to-market.

Raw results
- Avg return: +4.75%
- Win rate (positive): 63.6% (42/66)
- Median: +5.15% · Best: MU +56% · Worst: PLTR −18%

Raw return means nothing without a benchmark — and that's where it got interesting.

Benchmarking done right
The naive way is to compare against the index from day one of the set. That's wrong: a signal opened on May 24 shouldn't be measured against an index window starting April 23. So I measured each signal against the benchmark over *its own* holding window and aggregated the 66 differentials.

vs SPY (cap-weighted)
- Avg alpha: +6.24pp · Beat rate: 65.2% (43/66)
- Over these exact windows SPY actually *fell* −1.49%, dragged by mega-cap tech.

vs RSP (equal-weight S&P 500)
- Avg alpha: +1.46pp · Beat rate: 57.6% (38/66)
- Over the same windows RSP *rose* +3.29%.

The honest read
The +6pp vs SPY looks great, but it's mostly **sector allocation, not stock selection** — the pipeline avoided the mega-cap tech that sank cap-weighted SPY. Against equal-weight (the fairer comparison, since the book is itself equal-weight), the edge shrinks to ~+1.5pp and a 58% beat rate. Real, but modest, and on a single regime.

Caveats I'm not hiding
- Unrealized / mark-to-market, positions still open — moves daily
- Single ~6-week regime
- Equal-weight, paper-traded, no costs/slippage
- Duplicate tickers counted as independent signals
- n=66 is small

Question for the room: for a long-only equal-weight signal set, would you benchmark against RSP, SPY, or a sector-neutral construction? The choice swings the conclusion from "strong" to "marginal," and I'd rather get the methodology right than flatter the result.

(The signals come from an AI pipeline I built — prospect-ai.moisesprat.dev. Happy to get into the architecture in the comments.)

Full signal list (sorted by alpha vs SPY, best → worst)
**Full signal list** (sorted by alpha vs SPY, best → worst)

*Prices marked-to-market Jun 26, 2026. Benchmarks measured over each signal's own holding window.*