r/nelsonsnavy

In 1759, during the seven years war, Pitt's strategy of hoovering up French colonies whilst France was preoccupied fighting on the continent had brought Britain a string of victories, including the successful capture of Guadeloupe and Canada. In response to this, Louis XV intended to orchestrate a killer blow, and tasked his secretary of state for foreign affairs, Étienne François de Choiseul, with planning an invasion of Britain itself.

A brilliant man, the plan he concocted was arguably even more ridiculous than Napoleon's fateful plans of 1805, calling for simultaneous landings in England and Scotland, with a multitude of landing forces and fleets. The whole operation had the British quaking, but France still faced its age old problem - that of having part of their fleet based in Toulon and part in Brest. Just as Napoleon demanded of Villeneuve, Choiseul ordered Admiral of the Mediterranean fleet, Jean-François, Comte de La Clue to escape Toulon and rendezvous with the fleet in Brest.

La Clue took some convincing, and even longer getting out of port, but seeing his opposite number not on station (Boscawen was regrouping in Gibraltar after a storm) he made sail on the 5th. He planned to creep along the north African coast, before crowding sail and slipping through the strait of Gibraltar at night, and his plan almost worked. Boscawen and many of his senior captains were at dinner ashore on the night of the 17th, but the French were spotted by a frigate keeping watch over the straight.

The battle of Lagos was won due to one great feat of seamanship and one embarrassing one.

The great feat was the British fleet's achievement of getting 15 ships of the line, moored in a difficult harbour at night, with sails still unbent, and crews and officers onshore, out to sea in the middle of the night in just three hours.

The embarrassing one, was made by the French. Fearing his pursuers would catch up with his slower vessels, La Clue changed his plan on that same night, and signalled to change their rendezvous from Cadiz to Cape St Vincent. 5 of his ships of the line, and three frigates, never saw this signal and continued on to Cadiz. To add calamity to error, come morning La Clue waited for what he believed were his missing ships, only on counting the 15 sail following him, to discover that they weren't his missing rear guard, but the entire fleet of his enemy.

The battle of Lagos was thus, a running battle as Boscawen’s fleet chased a vastly inferior foe. The first day was characterised by a rear guard stand by Captain de Sabran Gramont in the Centaure (74), who fought 5 royal navy ships before striking, whilst Boscawen's attempt to fight a personal duel with La Clue’s L’Ocean (80) actually resulted in him being beaten off. However, the British continued chasing the French through the night (in which two more of La Clue's ships of the line slinked off) before the two fleets reached Lagos on the 19th. Seeing all was lost, La Clue ran two of his ships aground, where they were later burnt, whilst the other two were taken as prizes by Boscawen (in clear breach of Portuguese neutrality) after they attempted to moor at Lagos.

The battle became one of the great victories of the year 1759, and in some ways outstrips Quiberon bay for importance, given the numerical superiority it guaranteed Britain in the channel. As the Duke of Newcastle confessed after the battle ‘I own I was afraid of invasion until now.’ 

Needless to say, Choiseuls’s planned invasion of Britain never occurred. 

The siege of Cartagena was a de decisive battle between the spanish and the british forces during the War of Jenkins' Ear. Against all odds, and thanks to Lezo's military tactical genius, the spanish garrison, supported by some indigenous archers and a handful of ships, was able to repeal the assault of largest british fleet ever assembled at that time, inflicting huge casaulties and damages to the british and assuring the spanish victory in the conflict and the end of british hopes of taking over the Spanish Main.

The final naval battle of the first Anglo-Dutch war, saw a fleet of 130 ships under General-at-sea George Monck (later Lord Albermarle) defeat a Dutch fleet of 125 ships under Maarten Tromp.

Tromp led the attack in an attempt to break a devastating blockade of the Dutch coast, and had neatly managed to free a squadron led by Witte de With, blockaded at the Texel, 2 days prior. Monck launched his attack on the morning of the 10th (31st July OS), which as per his recent tactical restructure called for three squadrons all fighting in line. 

The Dutch broke the English lines almost immediately and a melee ensued by which the two fleets passed through each other 4 times. Throughout the first Anglo-Dutch war the Dutch had found their ships lacking for sheer firepower, and so it was again: the particularly calm conditions allowing the English to make use of their heavy guns (The Brederode (54) was the only Dutch ship with more than 50 guns - whilst the English had 14 with more than her and 50 that could throw a heavier broadside). On top of this, throughout the war the Dutch administration had repeatedly left crews unpaid and supplied them with insufficient gun powder, leading to a motivation crisis that certain officers had chosen to remedy with brutality. Given these conditions it’s not a stretch to believe the French minister at the Hague’s declaration that ‘the English fought with spirit and order, our people with neither.’

The majority of the fighting was over by 1pm, by which time the Dutch had lost 14 ships sunk or captured and the English only two, but the biggest loss was that of Admiral Tromp himself, who was shot early in the conflict (his flag captain kept his flag flying to try and keep up morale). Although the English were back off the Dutch coast in two weeks, the formal blockade was never renewed, however, the loss of Tromp led directly to the end of the war: the new Grand Pensionary of Holland, Johan De Witt, moving quickly to secure peace with England and prevent a revival of the pro-Stuart Orangists.