r/redteamsec

GitHub has a serious fake engagement problem and I wanted to see how visible it actually is through the public API, its worse than I thought after I went down that rabbit hole...
▲ 238 r/redteamsec+16 crossposts

GitHub has a serious fake engagement problem and I wanted to see how visible it actually is through the public API, its worse than I thought after I went down that rabbit hole...

Turns out: very visible. Yesterday's scan found 185 out of 185 engagers on a single repo were bots. Not 90%. Not "mostly suspicious". Every single one. The repo had zero legitimate stars.

What I built

phantomstars is a Python tool that runs daily via GitHub Actions (free, no servers):

  1. Scrapes GitHub Trending and searches for repos created in the last 7 days with sudden star spikes
  2. Pulls star and fork events from the last 24 hours per repo
  3. Bulk-fetches every engager's profile via the GraphQL API (account creation date, follower counts, repo history)
  4. Scores each account on a weighted model: account age (35%), profile completeness (30%), repo patterns (25%), activity history (10%)
  5. Detects coordinated campaigns using timestamp clustering and union-find: groups of 4+ suspicious accounts that engaged within a 3-hour window
  6. Files an issue directly on the targeted repo so the maintainer knows what's happening

Campaign IDs are deterministic SHA-256 fingerprints of the sorted member set, so the same group of bots gets the same ID across runs. You can track a farm across multiple days even as individual accounts get suspended.

What the pattern actually looks like

It's remarkably consistent. A fake engagement campaign in the raw data:

  • 40-200 accounts, all created within the same 1-2 week window
  • Zero original repositories, or only forks they never touched
  • No bio, no location, no followers, no following
  • All of them starring the same repo within a 90-minute window
  • The target repo usually has a name implying it's a tool, hack, executor, or generator

Today's scan: 53 active campaigns across 3,560 accounts profiled. 798 classified as likely_fake. The repos being targeted are mostly low-quality AI tools and "executor" software that needs manufactured credibility fast.

Notifying the affected repo

When a repo hits a 40%+ fake engagement ratio or a campaign is detected, phantomstars opens an issue on that repo with the full suspect table: account logins, creation dates, composite scores, campaign membership. The maintainer sees it in their own issue tracker without having to find this project first.

Worth noting: a lot of these repos have issues disabled, which is a red flag on its own. Those get skipped silently.

Why I built this

Stars are how developers decide what to evaluate, what to depend on, what to recommend. When that signal is bought, it affects real decisions downstream. This started as curiosity about how measurable the problem was. The answer was more measurable than I expected.

It's part of broader research into AI slop distribution at JS Labs: https://labs.jamessawyer.co.uk/ai-slop-intelligence-dashboards/

The fake engagement problem and the AI content quality problem are really the same problem. Fake stars are the distribution layer that gets garbage in front of real users.

All open source. The data is append-only JSONL committed back to the repo after every run, queryable with jq.

Repo: https://github.com/tg12/phantomstars

Findings are probabilistic, false positives exist, the README explains the full scoring model. If your account shows up and you're a real person, there's a false positive process.

Questions welcome on the detection approach, GraphQL batching, or campaign ID stability.

github.com
u/SyntaxOfTheDamned — 11 hours ago
▲ 27 r/redteamsec+6 crossposts

Open-source CLI for red-teaming LLM agents before they touch tools and memory

Sharing RedThread, an open-source CLI for AI red-team campaigns:

https://github.com/matheusht/redthread

The angle is AI agents as an attack surface. Prompt injection gets more interesting once the model can call tools, delegate to workers, write memory, retry failed actions, or propose guardrail changes.

RedThread is built for staging/internal targets. It runs LLM red-team campaigns, records traces, scores failures, and can replay exploit and benign cases before treating a defense as evidence.

Current pieces:

  • PAIR, TAP, Crescendo, and GS-MCTS attack flows
  • JudgeAgent/rubric scoring
  • replay-backed defense proposals
  • telemetry/drift signals
  • agentic checks for tool poisoning, confused deputy paths, canary propagation, and budget amplification

It is not a magic prompt shield and not broad production enforcement.

Looking for people who test agent workflows and can suggest realistic failure cases or target adapters.

▲ 34 r/redteamsec+15 crossposts

48 saatlik HASBLCTF'26 CTF yarışması

Öncelikle bu konunun bir reklam olmadığını, sadece liseli gençler olarak düzenlediğimiz bu etkinliğin daha fazla kişiye duyurulması amacıyla paylaşıldığını belirtmek isterim.

Kısaca: Biz 4 kişi HASBL CTF adında Jeopardy formatında olacak bir CTF düzenliyoruz, katılım linki en aşağıda mevcuttur.

Peki CTF nedir? CTF yani; Capture The Flag (Bayrağı Yakala), siber güvenlik alanında farklı kategorilerdeki becerilerimizi test etmek ve geliştirmek amacı güden bir yarışma formatıdır. Amacımız kategoriye göre verilen sorudaki açığı bularak cevaba (flag'e) erişmektir:

Kendimizden bahsetmem gerekirse biz sosyal bilimler lisesinde 11. sınıf öğrencisi olan 4 kişiyiz ve birçok CTF'e katıldıktan sonra; "Neden soru yazmayı da denemiyoruz?" dedik ve kendi CTF yarışmamızı yapmak istedik. Elimizden gelenin en iyisini yaparak bir şeyler yaptık işte...

Etkinlik detaylarına geçmek gerekirse:

Kategoriler:​

  • Web: Açtığınız Instance'da zafiyet bulup flag'e ulaşmak.
  • OSINT (Açık Kaynaklı Bilgi/İstihbarat): Soruda verilen foto/video, sosyal medya hesap adı vb. ortamlarda kanıt inceleme ve analiz ederek flag'e ulaşmak.
  • Cryptography (Kriptografi): Şifre kırma diyebiliriz basitçe. Kod ve/veya verinin mantığını çözerek şifrelenmiş flag'i okunabilir hale getirerek flag'e ulaşmak.
  • Reverse/Reverse Engineering (Tersine Mühendislik): Derlenmiş bir yazılımı yada makine kodunun bazı programları kullanarak nasıl çalıştığını çözüp okunabilir hale getirme ve flag'e ulaşmak.
  • Pwn (Zaafiyet/Sömürü): Hedef olarak verilen sistemin güvenlik açıklarını bularak sisteme sızıp yetki yükseltme ve flag'e ulaşmak.
  • Forensic (Adli Bilişim): Dijital kanıtların (log, disk görüntüsü, wireshark vb.) inceleyerek flag'e ulaşmak.

Kategorilerin tanımını yaparken ben bile kötü bir şey yapıyormuş hissiyatına kapıldım ama emin olun öyle bir şey yapmıyoruz kesinlikle 

Tarih:​

  • 29 - 30 - 31 Mayıs tarihlerinde 48 saat sürecek.

Platform:​

  • CTFd altyapısı üzerinden kendi sunucularımızda (Google Cloud) gerçekleşecek.
  • CTF Time üzerinden de yarışma duyurusu yaptık ama kabul bekliyoruz, CTF'lerde önemli olduğu için kabul aldığında eklerim buraya.

Kurallar: Kurallar sitemizde yer almakta ama kısaca önemli birkaç kurala değineyim.​

  • Takımlar en az 1, en fazla 4 kişilik olabilir.
  • Flag paylaşımı yapmak yasak.
  • Yarışma boyunca write-up yayınlamak yasak.
  • Yarışma sürecinde yarışmacıların birbirine saygılı olması ve sportmen olması önem arz etmekte.

Kayıt ve Daha fazla bilgi için:​

  • Kayıt ve daha fazla bilgi için sitemizi bağlantı kımından ziyaret edebilirsiniz.
  • Yarışma sürecince kayıtlar açık olacak ve belirli bir şart olmaksızın isteyen herkes katılabilecek.
  • Ödüller daha belli değil (TBA) maalesef..
  • Lise düzeyinde kısıtlı süre ve bütçede hazırladığımız bu etkinlikte hata olacaktır ama bunları düzeltmeye ve kendimizi geliştirmeye özen gösteriyoruz.
  • Sitede ve yarışma genelinde bir öneriniz, sorunuz olursa; bunları duymakta, cevaplamakta ve geliştirmekten memnuniyet duyarız.

Şimdiden ilgi gösteren herkese ve CuteTopia Sub'ına bu konuyu açamama izin verdiği için teşekkür ederim.

hasblctf.tech
u/Rav3nnd — 2 days ago
▲ 18 r/redteamsec+4 crossposts

SeekYou, unified host intelligence across 15 sources

SeekYou – unified host intelligence across 15 sources, runs free on Cloudflare.
- Built a tool that takes any IP, domain, or ASN and queries 15 sources in parallel: open ports, CVEs, BGP, RDAP, cert history, passive DNS, 5 threat feeds, exposed buckets, Wayback snapshots — all in one report.
- 4-layer parallel execution (total time ≈ slowest source, not sum of all).
- KV caching per source, circuit breakers, per-IP rate limiting.
- Typed diff engine — get alerted when ports open, CVEs appear, or certs expire on monitored hosts.
- Runs entirely on Cloudflare free tier (~5k lookups/day).
Source: https://github.com/Teycir/SeekYou (https://github.com/Teycir/SeekYou)

u/tcoder7 — 2 days ago
▲ 8 r/redteamsec+1 crossposts

Attacking Cloud Service Providers (ACSP) - An interactive textbook on control-plane intrusion and breaking cross-tenant isolation

Attacking Cloud Service Providers (ACSP) is an interactive textbook on control-plane intrusion and breaking cross-tenant isolation, built from 275 real-world cloud service provider(CSP) vulnerabilities.

This book is about hacking the cloud provider itself — breaking into the control plane, defeating cross-tenant isolation, and exploiting provider-side services and trust boundaries. It is not a guide to pentesting a single customer's cloud account. The target is the provider; the prize is everyone else's tenant. If your mental model of "cloud security" is misconfigured S3 buckets, this book will rebuild it.

senyuuri.github.io
u/senyuuri — 3 days ago
▲ 6 r/redteamsec+1 crossposts

OtterCookie: the JavaScript RAT that turned developer compromise into live surveillance

OtterCookie is not “BeaverTail but again.”

That is the part I think matters.

BeaverTail mostly grabbed saved stuff from a developer machine.

OtterCookie keeps watching the machine after that: Socket.IO / Engine.IO, live victim rosters, clipboard, keystrokes, screenshots, browser data, wallet artifacts, dev secrets.

Less “dump the box once.” More “sit on the box while the dev keeps working.”

The annoying detection problem:

developer workstations are already garbage fires.

Node tooling, random high ports, local services, package installs, Vercel/npm traffic, Socket.IO noise. A lot of this looks dumb but normal.

So where is the line?

What would make you look at outbound Socket.IO / Engine.IO from a dev workstation and say: yeah, this is not normal Node nonsense anymore?

No creds / victim names / live paths / exploit steps in the write-up.

redasgard.com
u/_redasgard — 5 days ago

CRTO 2026 retrospective on what's changed since I first bought it in 2020

Just thought I'd share. Bought CRTO in 2020, sat the exam in 2021 but had to abandon it for personal reasons, and came back to it five years later. The course was almost unrecognisable, with different C2 options, different lab platform, different exam format.

Wrote up the full retrospective on the blog, including the bits I found most interesting (the tradecraft full-circle back to raw LDAP queries, the 2025 exam redesign, what the gap actually feels like coming back).

payloadforge.io
u/blahmemeblah — 6 days ago

Doing customer discovery for a pentesting tool — looking for 20-min interviews with practitioners

I'm building a pentesting platform and I want to talk to real practitioners before I overengineer the wrong things.

I'm looking for:

  • In-house red teamers / security engineers
  • Pentest consultants (solo or at a firm)
  • Bug bounty hunters

20-minute call, no pitch, no recording without permission. I'll share a summary of aggregate findings with anyone who participates.

DM me if you're interested. Happy to answer questions about what I'm building in return.

I've also attached a poll that I've created to gain better insights :)

linkedin.com
u/Miserable_Object2021 — 9 days ago
▲ 26 r/redteamsec+1 crossposts

I've just open-sourced Cascavel, a modular Red Team Intelligence Engine written in Python 3.10+. I built this because I was tired of chaining 10 different fragmented scripts together during engagements. Cascavel unifies recon, scanning, and exploitation into a single, highly extensible CLI framework.

Core Capabilities:

  • 85 Security Plugins: Covering 14 attack categories (XSS Polyglots, SSRF via IMDSv2, JWT Key Confusion, HTTP/2 Desync, GraphQL Introspection, Docker/K8s exposure, etc.).
  • 30+ Native Recon Integrations: Hooks directly into Nmap, Subfinder, Amass, Katana, Nuclei, and Shodan.
  • Cinematic Terminal UX: Built with Rich. It includes progress bars, an ANSI escape sanitizer (anti-terminal-injection), and graceful SIGINT/SIGTERM handling so you don't lose scan data if you kill the process.
  • Reporting: Auto-generates reports in PDF, Markdown, and JSON mapping findings by severity.

https://cascavel.pages.dev

The codebase is CI/CD hardened (Bandit, CodeQL, Semgrep). I’d love for the Red Team community to test it out, review the code, and let me know what attack vectors or plugins I should add next.

u/Ok-Presentation1619 — 12 days ago