u/4x4ing

Today is the 60th Anniversary of the Battle of Long Tan.

An important battle to remember.

For the sacrifice of the soldiers from D Coy and 1 APC Sqn.

From all of the lessons learnt, here are a couple that I learnt from interviewing Dave Sabben and Harry Smith.

1. Mobilisation can be done well. Great instructors, with strong experience and the facilities can provide hard training that forges civilians into very capable soldiers.

2. Train hard, fight easy. Harry Smith pushed D Coy harder than the other companies. At first it was resented, and then the Coy started to realise that they were better. They needed that esprit de corps during the battle.

3. Artillery. Good shooting goes without saying. On time and on target. But what really makes a difference is artillery logistics. A WO2 with Korea experience increased the number of rounds on position because he knew how hard it is to resupply bulk ammunition. He knew the lads would need it if they got into trouble. The 105s ended up firing over 3,000 rounds.

4. Force Design. A number was agreed on for how many soldiers were to deploy to Vietnam. It was calculated quickly and without a lot of thought. The Government wouldn't allow even a temporary increase. That limited what could be done and how hard everyone had to work. And what was available to respond on that day.

5. We TEWT for attack and defence at 3:1 ratios. The enemy doesn't.

Lest we forget.

Today is the 60th Anniversary of the Battle of Long Tan.

An important battle to remember.

For the sacrifice of the soldiers from D Coy and 1 APC Sqn.

For all of the lessons learnt. Here are a couple that I learnt from interviewing Dave Sabben and Harry Smith.

1. Mobilisation can be done well. Great instructors, with strong experience and the facilities can provide hard training that forges civilians into very capable soldiers.

2. Train hard, fight easy. Harry Smith pushed D Coy harder than the other companies. At first it was resented, and then the Coy started to realise that they were better. They needed that esprit de corps during the battle.

3. Artillery. Good shooting goes without saying. On time and on target. But what really makes a difference is artillery logistics. A WO2 with Korea experience increased the number of rounds on position because he knew how hard it is to resupply bulk ammunition. He knew the lads would need it if they got into trouble. The 105s ended up firing over 3,000 rounds.

4. Force Design. A number was agreed on for how many soldiers were to deploy to Vietnam. It is calculated quickly and without a lot of thought. The Government wouldn't allow even a temporary increase. That limited what could be done and how hard everyone had to work. And what was available to respond on that day.

5. We TEWT for attack and defence at 3:1 ratios. The enemy doesn't.

Here are a series of interviews with Dave Sabben and Harry Smith that I was very privileged to do a few years ago. Well worth the listen. https://theprinciplesofwar.com/category/long-tan/

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