r/WarCollege

Two examples from WW2:

• Pointe du Hoc - the US knew the guns had been moved but still pressed forward with the Ranger assault.
• Market Garden - the Allies had photo evidence that the Germans had moved heavy forces into the area.

Edit: This discussion is not limited to these examples, please add yours.

One proposal in Ukraine for military reforms was to staff close to 50% of infantry or assault units with foreign recruits. I assume the Russians are also looking into expanding the use of foreigners. Given given the level of attrition in a large-scale conventional war, is that even a viable plan? In previous wars where the belligerents turned to foreign manpower, what was their experience in dealing with attrition among their ranks?

By "choosing" I mean they had access to some form of spear/pike/sword/what have you but instead deliberately used something else?

Alternatives that come to mind are things like flails, scythes, hammers, axes, etc?

I believe some sort of one handed mace was relatively common for the specific group of knights who wore full plate and fought other knights in full plate, but even then I think that was a secondary weapon you might use after trying lance/sword?

And, of course, if anyone did equip units this way, why?

So, in short, Robert E. Lee’s affection for state, family, and property superseded his oath to the USA. I understand there are many who defend him still, but if this happened today, he’d be painted as a traitor. So I’m wondering why there are still so many in defense of him still. Also, this makes me wonder why so many influential people in the past didn’t see him as a traitor, like Eisenhower. I’m genuinely wondering, not trying to argue, just trying to learn.

"Catch 22" had satirical take on corruption and graft with "Milo Minderbinder M&M Enterprise" with his never ending schemes and trade relations from USAAF airbase in Italy, but in reality how bad corruption, graft, kickbacks, subpar quality, overcharging and other forms of profiting from war at the cost of US really was and what government and military command was fighting with illegal actions on their supply, production and handling contracts?

With all that sea of money being pumped into war, bases full of food, medical supplies, weapons and fuel in war torn countries and millions of men of all stripes (and some with less than stellar stance on what "Government Property" really means) and greedy companies at home front seems like a perfect recipe for "Strategic Transfer of Equipment to Alternative Location" (STEAL in short) happening all the time.

Even in 2026, there has arguably never been an army in history that advanced faster than the Germans in France in 1940 and in Russia in 1941. Even though the German army is often mocked for its poor logistics, they somehow still managed to get enough ammunition and fuel to their forward troops. How exactly did they do this?

It is said that Russia is starting to ramp up the deployment of the jet-powered Geran-3/4/5 which fly faster than the Geran-2/Shahed-136 which are more difficult to shoot down and may increase the demand for SAMs. When it comes to OWAs, mobile fire groups have been an important countermeasure against them. But if they increasingly become jet-powered, what can we expect?

Compared to propeller driven aircraft, just how hard is it to shoot down something that is jet-powered? In the Vietnam War, AAA was credited for most of the USA's aviation losses over North Vietnam. If were to extrapolate past performance of AAA, what are possible adaptions to the rise of jet-powered OWAs we can learn from history? Is there any particular caliber of AAA that does well against jets?

I was an enlisted submariner and I'm trying to figure how the other half lived.

I'm reading various things about infantry and infantry officers, and trying to understand what platoon commanders do. Obviously on the boat, junior officers led really tiny divisions, and when they were on watch, orders were to get the boat to do specific things.

Reading the book on what platoon commander's are supposed to do, it seems really wishy washy? Like they have to evaluate, give mission tactics, and adjust......okay. Sure. That is a lot different than if you want to make the boat go faster you have them tell maneuvering to make the boat go faster and it goes faster.

I get they are supposed to give mission tactics to infantry squads using the specific structure of roles with enough flexibility for the squad leaders to adjust and then make changes

1. how hard is it to come up with orders?
2. how frequently do they need changes?

Was reading Wilmot’s The Struggle for Europe (my jam is reading WW2 histories that were written shortly after WW2 from a context perspective, long story). He repeatedly mentions that a major reason for the Italian campaign was strategic-bomber bases for targeting Germany, but it seems like the 15th didn’t make nearly as much of a contribution to the SBC as the 8th did, despite their bases being a lot closer etc? What were the reasons for this? Thanks in advance!

So the general consensus seems to be that most explosions kill people with shrapnel and this doesn't leave much visible damage on the body. That may well be true, but I've also seen footage of soldiers incurring direct hits from bombs in Ukraine, and while they die, their body still remains intact. So does even the concussive blast do much damage to the outer body? I'd imagine the bombs dropped are mostly low yield, and it's them dropping the bombs I see in the Warleak videos.

What did it look like on the small level and on the large level? What was learned, tried and didn't work, general thinking? Also, given how the jägers had an impact on the military, does that make the finnish military back then a... WW1 era german military, doctrinally?

Maybe my understanding of the war is flawed, but it seems like essentially two wars were happening, the conventional one between the two armies, and the civil war between everyday people. Is that the right way to think about it?

Additionally it seems like movements between the armies were inter sped with months or even a year of inactivity, why did this war seem to play out slowly?

I just learn that none of the other naval powers of WW2 use floatplane scout submarine like Japan. I'm not just talking about the I-400 but the regular Cruiser Submarine.

Considering how nobody tried something similar, I'm guessing that the practicality is not there. But did it, both the doctrine and individual designs, managed to achieve anything during the war?

It cannot be economics or alignment with the West, as several kingdoms in the region have them beat here. Nor could it be "necessity", i don't get it.Outside of Iran, why is no other nation in the region interested in a sovereign capable military? especially seeing how flip floppy their "allies" are in providing defense to their interests

Why did the US and Soviet Union switch on Israel?

Prior to the Arab Israeli War the Soviet union was the most pro- israel power barring France and the US was friendly to the Arab Kingdoms to the point of placing an arms embargo on Israel.

After the war the Soviets ween off and collude with Arab revolutionary groups but the US becomes Isreal's main western backer to the point of regional symbiosis. What caused this?

During ww2 german commanders, and the chief engineer often were present in working up their boat to learn the individual kinks of it. They were occasionally relieved but would it be better if the focus was in making each member of a class more identical so you could transfer crew from one to another more seamlessly? An analogy would be Japanese carrier air crews married to a boat versus American squadron that were more transferable.

As far as I understand it, the bayonet was primarily a psychological weapon in early modern warfare. Very few men were actually stabbed with bayonets and melee was the exception, rather than the norm. Usually, when lines of musketeers with bayonets approached each other, one side would just break and run away before they got within stabbing range. It takes intense discipline and training for soldiers who carry neither shields nor armor to actually stand up to a horde of brightly colored screaming men charging at them with long, spiky sticks.

But I've heard from reenactors that wearing armor gives you a lot of confidence. One anecdote I've heard was of a reenactor wearing medieval plate armor being surrounded by a bunch of drunk guys, who could potentially have been dangerous and yet he said he did not feel scared around them.

That makes me wonder. Would musketeers wearing even so much as a cuirass have been more confident facing a bayonet charge?

I know armor for infantry went mostly out of fashion in Europe even before the socket bayonet was introduced, so I don't know whether there has ever been a case of musketeers with bayonets and no armor trying to charge infantry with armor or being charged by them. But maybe there are some overseas engagements I'm missing due to not being well versed in colonial conflicts.

Why do the NVA and liberation front lost in the tet offensive, what do us military officer perspective about the tet offensive? What do you think about the NVA risks and weaknesses when conducting the offensive?