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I'm curious about how ancient Roman and Greek commanders went about commanding their troops in battle.

We know leaders engaged in personal combat. Some notable examples are Marcus Licinius Crassus earning the spolia opima in single combat against an enemy chieftain and Brasidas being one of the few Spartan casualties at Amphipolis.

I assume they wore more or less the same armor as the rest of the army. After all, Pericles is depicted wearing a Corinthian helmet (although this is likely to hide his unusually shaped head).

However, I'm having a hard time imagining them in formation, since there's no way they could reasonably command anything from inside a melee. On the other hand, staying out of formation would probably make t easy targets for enemy cavalry and light troops. Did they carry a shield and standard infantry equipment? Or were they mounted and surrounded by a bodyguard like Alexander the Great?

Given that the LCS program to put it bluntly has failed, was there any merit to it?

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Where frontlines are unclear and units positions are chaotic how do modern infantry balance cammo with the visible signals that your friendly?

In ukraine there is an odd contradiction between common and high vis blue, yellow, and red tape.

How have other armies dealt with this, epecially in civil wars?

I have not seen colorful or unique uniforms or IDs in places like Syria, Yugoslavia, or Iran-Iraqi (save for IRGC headbands).

I've been reading Geoffrey Wawro's book about the Franco-Prussian war and he argues that Prussian tactics of basically swarming French positions were wasteful and not innovative. I am somewhat suspicious that he argues from an assumed conclusion that puts all the blame on bad French generals (Bazaine!) and low morale of the French troops and concedes very little to the Prussians. Every battle description is basically the Prussians attack, get wiped out by French chassepot and mitrailleuse fire but then feckless French generals and dispirited French infantry refuse to counter-attack and sit around waiting until the Prussian artillery gets into range and blasts them away, then the cowardly Frenchmen drop all their kit and run away. I don't know it seems a bit cartoonish. I gather that he's trying to explain that the unearned self-confidence of the Germans (and other countries who studied at the time the Franco-Prussian war) led to the catastrophe of WW1 and it's probably correct at some level but still seems to discount a very creditable performance by the Prussians in the war of 1870.

Beep bop. As your new robotic overlord, I have designated this weekly space for you to engage in casual conversation while I plan a nuclear apocalypse.

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Maybe this is a bit retrospective but speed indeed had projected significant difference in terms of tactical flexibility and rapid response capability when a capital ship was required.

Could there be a chance that HMS Tiger receive her own version of massive refit and upgrade like her peers in the battle-cruiser squadron?

So, I stumbled upon these below numbers a bit ago and frankly, they're bothering me. Now, I solemnly, pinky swear I'm no wehraboo but even so, this vast gap doesn't quite mesh with my knowledge of campaigns that are part of this period (roughly 01.09.1944 - 16.12.1944) or my general reading about fighting in Europe. If true these would seem to point to staggering casualty effectiveness of the US army over Wermacht. I'm hoping for a second opinion or for same factoid that would make these make sense.

3rd Army: On page 592-593 of Official History Lorraine Campaign own casualties are given as 55,128 and POWs as: "Although the number of Germans killed and wounded cannot be determined with any degree of exactness, it is known that at least 75,000 prisoners passed through the Third Army cages during the Lorraine operation" https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-E-Lorraine/USA-E-Lorraine-14.html

1st Army: Page 616 of Siegfried Line Campaign "The First Army incurred 47,039 battle casualties* during the Siegfried Line Campaign. (This was approximately half the number of German prisoners taken." "Although any attempt to fix German losses on a numerical basis would be little better than a guess, personnel losses obviously were high. This is evident from the fact that at least 95,000 prisoners passed through First and Ninth Army cages during the Siegfried Line Campaign.1"
*(US Ninth Army incurred additional 10 000 casualties) https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-E-Siegfried/USA-E-Siegfried-27.html

The way I see it, reasons to be weirded out are:

• going by official history, both of the aforementioned armies captured more POWs than they themselves sustained total combat casualties. This is a massive discrepancy between the two sides. First Army's Missing and Captured are given as 4860, about twenty times less.
• Fall 1944 is a period of near stalemate or gradual but slow progress in abhorrent weather. In other words there aren't large operational encirclements or periods of pursuit that could create large prisoner hauls. The difference had** to be made in tactical combat. Which at least on surface level from my reading I do not see in Hurtgen or drive to the Saar.
• There are plenty of wehraboo stories or the wave of 80's revisionism but I've never seen these above numbers used by pro allied historians to fend this off. Generally even in period of more balanced takes on qualities of each of the armies I think the professionals haven't switched to "Germans just suck"
• As far as I know, most of histories of Battle of Bulge that followed immediately this period and are many more in number or detail, give casualties as near equal or with slight German superiority.

but:

• ** I might be simply underestimating effects of encirclements of Aachen or Metz. There had to thousands of troops captured there. For now the numbers I'm seeing quoted [Ambrose(I'm sorry) given 5,600 for Aachen.] are not enough to make up the difference but maybe I'm missing some.
• The allies were capturing civilian, non-combat personnel, occupational and administrational staff that they would point to POW cages and count them. I have no idea whether this was actually thing but could amount to substantial numbers.
• The newly raised volksgrenadier divisions rushed to the front were actually of really bad quality. Germans just managed to pour enough reinforcements for the front to not crumble despite this.

I guess the Green Books could be simply wrong ? Either author made a mistake or omitted the truth, or there were some mistakes in reporting the POWs at ground level ? Perhaps double counting when moving prisoners from one level to the next ? Never seen this process described in detail so no clue.

This series of questions will be a little unfocused because I have a theory that I'm hoping your answers will help me explore.

The theory is in the question above - we are using large, expensive, complex machines that are (fundamentally) light / medium tanks or tank destroyers as recon / multi-purpose vehicles and that is adding unnecessary cost and logistics complexity to a modern military.

Here are the questions I have that I'm hoping will spark a conversation that helps me explore the thought.

1. How would a WW2 style armored car have performed during the GWOT in Iraq and Afghanistan? For example, if everywhere the US used an up-armored HUMVEE or MRAP for anything besides light troop transport (convoy security, shuttling people back and forth, recon, heavy armored force screening, rapid small logistics resupply to engaged forces, etc.) those vehicles had been replaced with something like an M8, Humber, Sd.Kfz. 232, or BA-10, how would those vehicles have performed. (For the sake of the question assume spare parts, ammo, etc. is available. I'm not interested in 'There's only one functional SD.Kfz 234 in the world so one mine and...' type answers.)

2. Given the attrition rate demonstrated in Ukraine, would a light cannon / autocannon armed WW2 style armored car give similar results to the BMPs, Bradleys, and MT-LBs for less money? For example, and given the prevalence of ATGMs and drones, if you needed to probe an enemy held town to identify the presence of enemy tanks would something like a Sd. Kfz. 222 provide the same results as a BMP-2 for less money?

3. Given the sheer number of units produced and the radical number of different types of light wheeled vehicles they're building, is this a question the Chinese PLA is already exploring?

4. Why do most modern wheeled vehicles mutate into something that looks much more like a light tank or tank-destroyer rather than simply remain a light recon vehicle?

5. Is it really cheaper / more effective to mandate that an autocannon and ATGM armed tracked and moderately armored vehicle that spends much of its time engaging and / or avoiding MBTs ALSO be able to carry 5 - 7 infantrymen?

6. In general, do you see a use case for light armored cars replacing heavier tracked AFVs - either in a modern military or a "third world" military or do you think the time for armored cars has come and definitively gone?

*MODS - if this would be better as several posts, or an individual post for each of the five questions, please let me know - I'll be happy to divide it up.

When reading about designs of rifles it's often stated they it operates like the old rifle to be familiar for soldiers. I guess an prime example of this is Russian AK series.

But is it actually hard to retrain soldiers? For example France switched from FAMAS to HK416, Germany G36 to HK416 and China Type 81>95>191. Did any of them had problems switching?

How about WW2 where lots of small arms where rushed into hands of troops? Did M1 carbine require much training or did troops just pick it up from the depot if available?

Today is the 60th Anniversary of the Battle of Long Tan.

An important battle to remember.

For the sacrifice of the soldiers from D Coy and 1 APC Sqn.

For all of the lessons learnt. Here are a couple that I learnt from interviewing Dave Sabben and Harry Smith.

1. Mobilisation can be done well. Great instructors, with strong experience and the facilities can provide hard training that forges civilians into very capable soldiers.

2. Train hard, fight easy. Harry Smith pushed D Coy harder than the other companies. At first it was resented, and then the Coy started to realise that they were better. They needed that esprit de corps during the battle.

3. Artillery. Good shooting goes without saying. On time and on target. But what really makes a difference is artillery logistics. A WO2 with Korea experience increased the number of rounds on position because he knew how hard it is to resupply bulk ammunition. He knew the lads would need it if they got into trouble. The 105s ended up firing over 3,000 rounds.

4. Force Design. A number was agreed on for how many soldiers were to deploy to Vietnam. It is calculated quickly and without a lot of thought. The Government wouldn't allow even a temporary increase. That limited what could be done and how hard everyone had to work. And what was available to respond on that day.

5. We TEWT for attack and defence at 3:1 ratios. The enemy doesn't.

Here are a series of interviews with Dave Sabben and Harry Smith that I was very privileged to do a few years ago. Well worth the listen. https://theprinciplesofwar.com/category/long-tan/

Looking for info on handheld explosive launchers, because today I learned that the RPG-7 doesn't just create a massive area-of-effect explosion, but focuses all the explosive energy into a column to pierce through tanks and stuff.

The reason I ask is I'm 3D modeling some fantasy video game weapons and I'd like to base a rocket launcher and its ammo off of real world examples. Do you guys know some kinds of rocket propelled ammo that do explode in an area of effect?

Basically the title. The Abrams and Leopard 2 are present in military fleets all around the world and even the Leclerc has a decent foothold in the Middle-East.
I'm aware of the CR2's shortcomings, but were they really so numerous as to cause basically every attempt of exporting the tank to fail as hard as they did?

A book source that I've had for a long time described General Lee before Gettysburg as:

"Lee was not in good health. In March, he sustained an attack of pericarditis - inflammation and swelling of the pericardium or membranous sac enclosing the heart - which had incapacitated him for a while. He had recovered sufficiently to command at Chancellorsville, but historians have speculated as to the degree to which the after-effects of the disease, including pain and a general slowing down of the system, might have influenced his conduct of the subsequent campaign; and since he remained silent on the subject, an answer will not be forthcoming".

The book also referred to Lee's planning the Day 3 attacks (known as the Pickett-Pettigrew-Trimble Assault aka Pickett's Charge) as:

"There seems to have been little doubt in Lee's mind that the battle should continue, although his thoughts were those of a tired man and lacked the spark of imagination".

As far as i know, there was in fact a gap between the Tiger being introduced, and the soviets developing a reliable means to deal with it. So how exactly was the issue addressed? Evasion? Focus fire? Encircling?

Obviously the gulf war was a textbook example of a one-sided military engagement where better logistics, training, technology, and planning led to a lopsided defeat, but was there ever any way for Iraq to have succeeded in dealing a significant blow to the Coalition?

I'm not talking about Iraq actually destroying the coalition in the battlefield, I mean them at least being able to inflict a significant amount of casualties to not make the war look entirely lopsided (I.e, 1,000 to 4,000 casualties). Was this ever possible?

During WW2 basically every power decided at some point that nose guns, dorsal guns and a tail gun were ideal for large bombers with some variation.

But for ventral guns it seems that "bathtub" mounts with flexible guns only able to fire in a forward or rearward arc were preferred by the Luftwaffe, a ventral ball turret was preferred by the USAAF and no ventral armament whatsoever preferred by the RAF.

How did these different arrangements affect bomber survivability if much at all?

I got very confused recently looking up 19th century artillery.

For the big guns of Napoleon's time, I understand the classification. These were smoothbore muzzle loaders, firing primarily round balls that would bounce on hard ground like a pebble on the water and crush everything on their way. No complex shapes, just balls of lead with a specific weight and the bore would always be a little wider than the projectile, so you could still load it once black powder fouling had built up. The free encyclopedia told me that the French 12-Pounder Canon obusier de 12 had a caliber of 121mm, the American version of the same gun a caliber of 117mm and the American 6-Pounder M1841 a caliber of 93mm.

But then we get into rifled artillery with conical projectiles. The Prussian 4-Pfünder Feldkanone C/64 (4-Pounder Krupp gun for the horse artillery) supposedly had a caliber of 78.5mm (and was also referred to as the 8cm Stahlkanone C/64 for some reason), while the American 10-Pounder Parrott rifle either had a caliber of 2,9 inches (74mm) or 3 inches (76,2mm), which I assume refers to projectile and bore respectively.

I get why rifled guns using conical projectiles would have a smaller caliber for their weight than smoothbore pieces firing round shot. But how is it possible the 10-Pounder Parrott and 4-Pounder Krupp C/64 had almost the same caliber with such a radically different projectile weight?

How do you translate projectile weight designations for these rifled guns to caliber anyways?