One valve cost Libya almost a million barrels in 5 days. Honestly this tells you more than the election deal

So on September 21 some armed guys shut Valve No. 7 on the pipeline that takes crude from Sharara (Libya's biggest field) up to the Zawiya refinery. And some of them were from the Petroleum Facilities Guard, the people who get paid to protect this stuff. Reuters says the fight was over the Guard's status and funding.

Sharara does around 300-320k barrels a day and output dropped by about 200k. NOC said the valve was back open on September 26. Their count is 942,376 barrels lost, roughly $95 million. A unit at Zawiya also had to shut because it ran out of crude, and Zawiya (about 120k barrels a day) mostly makes fuel for Libyans. So people feel it at the pump before anyone abroad notices.

Now the funny part is the timing. On August 30 the Tripoli government, Haftar's side, the House and the High State Council all signed a UN-backed deal on election rules. Boulos said on September 29 it was a step forward and now it's about actually doing it. There's also a reported US plan that nobody's signed. Dbeibah keeps the executive, Saddam Haftar heads a new presidential body for about three years. Italian press said late September it was losing steam. Take that one as reporting, not fact.

My take: the paper isn't the hard part. If the armed groups stay exactly where they are, they keep the trick they already use. Want your funding recognized? Close a pipe. Meanwhile diplomats are out there saying "unity." NOC has been saying for years that the field is used as a bargaining chip.

And ConocoPhillips and Chevron signed agreements in 2026, with the pitch that output goes up once things calm down. Hard to plan around a country that can't keep one valve open for a week though.

Until whoever controls Sharara answers to one command that doesn't get paid by shutting pipelines, I'd expect talks and shutdowns to keep showing up in the same month. Feels like two stories but it's really one, and the second tells you how the first gets priced.

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u/Ali_Sulimanlib — 11 days ago

New DRI plant in Benghazi could benefit from Europe’s carbon rules and US steel tariffs

This Turkish-Libyan joint venture is building a direct reduced iron plant near Benghazi. The guy running it, Ahmed Gadalla, told Reuters they’re expecting roughly $2.5 billion in total investment and are aiming for commercial production in early 2028.

Capacity is planned at 8.1 million tonnes a year once everything is up, with the first phase at 2.7 million. They’re going the natural gas route instead of coal, which cuts the carbon footprint. About 90% is supposed to be exported, the rest turned into rebar and pipes for the local market. Gas for the first phase is already sorted and they’re putting up their own power station.

The location is kind of perfect right now. Europe’s carbon border tax is live and getting wider, so cleaner iron is becoming more valuable there. Meanwhile the US still has those heavy Trump-era steel tariffs in place, which makes shipping into America a lot less attractive. Add in the ongoing headaches with shipping through the Gulf because of the Iran situation, and a Mediterranean plant starts looking like a useful alternative for European buyers.

Gadalla apparently sees Europe’s climate rules as a real commercial opening. Whether the whole thing actually delivers will depend on construction staying on track and Libya not sliding back into chaos, but the setup looks better than most similar announcements floating around.

Anyone here follow the steel market or North Africa closely? Does this one feel more serious than the usual big-project hype?

https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/major-eastern-libya-industrial-project-seen-drawing-25-billion-investment-2026-09-10/

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u/Ali_Sulimanlib — 16 days ago

Why Russia Is Talking to Libya About Elections

I've been playing around with video editing and AI on my Youtube channel. What do you guys think?

youtube.com
u/Ali_Sulimanlib — 17 days ago
▲ 1 r/u_Ali_Sulimanlib+1 crossposts

With Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb both disrupted, Libya has a geographic opening in the oil market, but it keeps sabotaging itself

Been following the Hormuz and Red Sea disruptions and noticed something that doesn't get talked about much: Libya is sitting on a real advantage right now that it can't seem to capitalize on.

Quick context: Hormuz traffic is down sharply since the current conflict, Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea are dealing with ongoing attacks, and even Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline (built specifically as a Hormuz workaround) has been disrupted. Basically every major route for Gulf crude to reach Europe is under some kind of stress.

Libya's crude doesn't touch any of that. It ships out of Mediterranean terminals straight to European buyers. No strait, no chokepoint, nothing extra to insure against. In a market where freight and insurance costs are moving prices almost as much as the oil itself, that's genuinely valuable. Libya's never going to replace Gulf volumes, but it doesn't need to, a cargo that skips Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb entirely is just cheaper and easier to move right now.

Except then this happened: on September 21st, an armed group shut Valve No. 7 on the Sharara-Zawiya pipeline. NOC put the lost output at around 130,000 bpd. Line's back open now, but this keeps happening. While every other producer is trying to protect its shipping lanes from external threats, Libya keeps losing barrels to internal fights that have nothing to do with the regional war.

No evidence this specific closure was timed to the broader conflict. But it points at the actual structural problem: in Libya, a pipeline valve is a bargaining chip. Whoever controls one piece of infrastructure can cut off revenue the state can't function without. Most of these closures are about salaries, political leverage, institutional turf, not economic sabotage for its own sake, but the barrels are lost either way, and right now those barrels are worth more than usual.

Basically: everyone else's oil risk is at sea. Libya's is still onshore, inside its own pipeline network, and that's the part reserves and geography can't fix.

Anyone here following Libya closely, does this look like it's getting more stable or is this just the baseline now?

u/Ali_Sulimanlib — 18 days ago

I made this infographic about Libya. Thought I'd share it here.

Libya deserves more attention than it gets.

Most people know Gaddafi fell in 2011. What happened after is where it gets messy: rival governments, armed groups, nobody fully agreeing on who's actually in charge.

Then there's the oil. Libya has plenty of it, but having the resource and everyone benefiting from it are two different things. Who controls that revenue has been part of the fight the whole time.

Meanwhile regular people deal with the fallout, spotty services, an economy nobody can plan around.

Made this infographic to lay out the basics without turning it into a textbook. There's obviously way more to it than fits on one image, and people who actually live there can explain plenty of it better than I can.

What's something about the country outsiders consistently get wrong?

u/Ali_Sulimanlib — 23 days ago

Gadhafi's face is now an ecstasy pill design in Libya. The story behind it is bigger than the joke

Gadhafi has apparently become a brand for Libya's drug trade.

Libyan authorities say they seized around 100,000 ecstasy pills shaped like Muammar Gadhafi's head and shoulders, smuggled into the country from Europe.

According to the report, the shipment came through a European country and entered Libya by sea. Authorities intercepted it after receiving intelligence about the shipment. Would a European country try to start something in Libya?

Since 2011, Libya has struggled with fragmented political authority, competing security structures, weak border control and divided institutions. Those conditions create opportunities for smuggling networks. Not just drugs, but fuel, weapons, migrants and other illicit goods.

His regime disappeared, but the political and institutional vacuum that followed created an environment where completely different networks could flourish.

Pretty ironic how Gadhafi spent decades building one of the most recognizable political images in the Arab world to have ecstasy shaped as him.

Makes you wonder who actually benefits from Libya staying this fragmented. A weak, porous Libya isn't just useful for drug traffickers.

https://preview.redd.it/kzzgi3c7qfph1.png?width=1800&format=png&auto=webp&s=cd162fcedbcd9a84dd431e9b63871fbb52410c8c

reddit.com
u/Ali_Sulimanlib — 1 month ago

Libya has oil, a small population, and a Mediterranean coastline. So why is it still one of the only countries where the US advises leaving DNA samples before you go?

Americans traveling to Libya are told to leave a DNA sample first.

That's not a metaphor. That's the actual U.S. State Department guidance. Highest level travel advisory. Kidnapping, terrorism, landmines, no functioning state to call if something goes wrong.

Here's the part that gets skipped.

Libya isn't poor. It has oil, a small population, a Mediterranean coastline, and more raw potential per capita than most of its neighbors. This isn't a resource problem. It's a state capacity problem.

And that raises a question worth sitting with.

In 2011, international intervention helped remove the old regime. What came after was never fully built. Fourteen years later, the U.S. government's own travel advisory reads like a status report on that gap.

So what actually explains it?

Is this mainly a story about outside powers losing interest once the hard, unglamorous work of state building stopped being urgent? Or is it mainly a story about Libyan factions choosing fragmentation and competing power centers over the compromises unity would require?

My honest read: both forces fed each other. International attention moves in cycles, it spikes during a crisis and fades once the cameras leave, and that made it easier for local actors to keep postponing the harder political settlement. Neither dynamic excuses the other. They reinforced each other.

The oil is still there. The location is still there. The population is still small enough that this shouldn't be an unsolvable problem.

What's missing is sustained follow-through, from Libyans and from the outside world, treating state building as a priority instead of an afterthought once the crisis stage passes.

That's the actual headline. Not the DNA samples.

https://preview.redd.it/cleji4y0runh1.png?width=720&format=png&auto=webp&s=782cb364effea4a735a3e33dc4acc3287d13a13f

reddit.com
u/Ali_Sulimanlib — 1 month ago

If your country couldn't grow enough food on its own, would you trust that imports would always show up on time?

Libya doesn't grow most of what it eats. It relies on food coming in from other countries, and that only works smoothly when nothing disrupts it. A war, a blocked shipping route, a sudden price spike, any of those can throw the whole system off fast, and there's not much a country can do about it once it's that dependent.

We usually think of oil as the resource that makes countries vulnerable to the rest of the world. But if food security can unravel this easily, it might be an even bigger risk going forward.

If your country couldn't grow enough food on its own, would you trust that imports would always show up on time?

https://www.ibtimes.com/libyas-food-security-becoming-global-trade-question-3807215

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u/Ali_Sulimanlib — 1 month ago
▲ 4 r/EconomixInsider+1 crossposts

Houthi attacks on southern Saudi Arabia. Are we looking at a wider regional risk?

https://preview.redd.it/maqink6r3boh1.png?width=1240&format=png&auto=webp&s=b887c2997a3c58d3697f2513de106091b12744f6

This conflict may be getting a lot bigger than Yemen.

The Houthis have just launched a major wave of missiles and drones at southern Saudi Arabia, hitting cities and energy infrastructure, including Aramco-related facilities and the Jizan refinery. Reports say 73 people were injured.

What worries me is the combination of energy infrastructure + Red Sea shipping.

If attacks like this continue, are we looking at a conflict that starts affecting oil prices, global trade and maritime security far beyond the immediate region?

Is this a serious regional escalation, or are we overestimating the wider impact?

reddit.com
u/Ali_Sulimanlib — 1 month ago

Libya has oil, a small population, and a Mediterranean coastline. So why is it still one of the only countries where the US advises leaving DNA samples before you go?

Americans traveling to Libya are told to leave a DNA sample first.

That's not a metaphor. That's the actual U.S. State Department guidance. Highest level travel advisory. Kidnapping, terrorism, landmines, no functioning state to call if something goes wrong.

Here's the part that gets skipped.

Libya isn't poor. It has oil, a small population, a Mediterranean coastline, and more raw potential per capita than most of its neighbors. This isn't a resource problem. It's a state capacity problem.

And that raises a question worth sitting with.

In 2011, international intervention helped remove the old regime. What came after was never fully built. Fourteen years later, the U.S. government's own travel advisory reads like a status report on that gap.

So what actually explains it?

Is this mainly a story about outside powers losing interest once the hard, unglamorous work of state building stopped being urgent? Or is it mainly a story about Libyan factions choosing fragmentation and competing power centers over the compromises unity would require?

My honest read: both forces fed each other. International attention moves in cycles, it spikes during a crisis and fades once the cameras leave, and that made it easier for local actors to keep postponing the harder political settlement. Neither dynamic excuses the other. They reinforced each other.

The oil is still there. The location is still there. The population is still small enough that this shouldn't be an unsolvable problem.

What's missing is sustained follow-through, from Libyans and from the outside world, treating state building as a priority instead of an afterthought once the crisis stage passes.

That's the actual headline. Not the DNA samples.

https://preview.redd.it/cleji4y0runh1.png?width=720&format=png&auto=webp&s=782cb364effea4a735a3e33dc4acc3287d13a13f

reddit.com
u/Ali_Sulimanlib — 1 month ago

Qatar just sent a senior official to Benghazi for the first time in 14 years, and it's more interesting than the headline suggests

Qatar's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mohammed bin Abdulaziz Al-Khulaifi, visited Benghazi this week and met Saddam Haftar, the acting commander of the LNA. First senior Qatari visit to eastern Libya since the country split in 2014.

For context if you haven't followed this closely: Qatar has been one of the more consistently pro-Tripoli players in Libya for over a decade. Doha backed the GNA/GNU and factions aligned against Khalifa Haftar's forces going back to the 2014 civil war, while the eastern government and the LNA treated Qatar as hostile. That's not a minor diplomatic footnote, it's been one of the more stable alignments in a conflict where almost everything else has shifted.

This trip wasn't just symbolic either. Beyond meeting Saddam Haftar, the delegation met Belqasim Haftar, who runs Libya's Development and Reconstruction Fund, to discuss investment and reconstruction partnerships. They also met with the LNA's general command specifically to discuss military unification.

My read: this is less a diplomacy story and more a hedging story. Qatar spent a decade fully backing one side. Now it's building a relationship with the other, timed right as a new UN-brokered roadmap (the "4+4" agreement signed this past weekend) puts the LNA inside Libya's formal political process for the first time. If eastern Libya ends up with real institutional power once elections happen, Doha doesn't want to be the capital that has no relationship with Benghazi.

Curious what others think: is this a genuine reset in Qatar's Libya policy, or a hedge that doesn't survive contact with whatever Turkey and Egypt do next? Both have deeper, longer-standing interests on either side of this than Qatar does.

https://preview.redd.it/e9i1kjmr7pmh1.png?width=1200&format=png&auto=webp&s=6089311ad94a6959049843b7e59627abec71d5fc

reddit.com
u/Ali_Sulimanlib — 2 months ago
▲ 15 r/ExLibya+1 crossposts

Libya's new election agreement has one eligibility rule that looks written for a single person: Haftar

Libya signed another elections roadmap Sunday under UNSMIL. Everyone's headline is "elections in 24 months." Skip that part, Libya has said this before, in 2021, 2022, and again this past June. None of those held.

What's actually different is who was in the room and three rule changes buried in the text.

This one came from the "4+4" committee: two reps each from the GNU, House of Representatives, High Council of State, and Haftar's LNA. That last one matters. The June roadmap didn't have LNA's signature, Haftar backed a separate US-brokered plan instead. This time his general command showed up and signed.

Three changes worth knowing:

  1. Presidential and parliamentary results are now separate. Old rules said a failed presidential vote killed the parliamentary result too. Not anymore, one can fail without taking the other down.
  2. No mandatory second round. Over 50% in round one wins outright. Good for whoever already has the widest coalition, bad for anyone counting on a runoff to unite the opposition.
  3. Running for office means automatic resignation. Any candidate, civilian or military, is deemed resigned the moment they announce.

That third rule is the one I can't stop thinking about. There's basically one person in Libya it reads like it was written for. A sitting military commander who's also the country's most powerful political figure can't run for president and keep his current role. Whether that actually holds once it matters is a different question.

One more thing: if the HoR and HCS don't ratify this within a month, the signatories say they'll push it through as a constitutional document and go straight to the UN Security Council for backing. That's not a normal thing to write into an agreement. It reads like the drafters already know where this is most likely to die.

So, genuine question for anyone who knows Libya better than headlines do: does "automatic resignation" mean anything in a country where stepping down from a title has never meant giving up actual power? Or is this clause more symbolic than real?

Source: Reuters, Aug 30 2026, cross-checked against Egypt Today's coverage of the signing.

u/Ali_Sulimanlib — 1 month ago