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Recent Tribunal of Palermo jure sanguinis citizenship decision on a post-Tajani Decree claim involving pre-1922 US marital naturalization

Recent Tribunal of Palermo jure sanguinis citizenship decision on a post-Tajani Decree claim involving pre-1922 US marital naturalization

Ciao a tutti

We wanted to share a recent first-instance decision from the Tribunal of Palermo, Immigration Section, concerning first and second-generation applicants for Italian citizenship jure sanguinis and a pre-1922 US marital naturalization issue.

This is shared for informational purposes only. It is not a consolidated line of authority, and it should not be read as establishing a general rule. Other Italian courts may decide differently on similar facts.

Why is this decision relevant?

On 21 April 2026, the Tribunal of Palermo, Immigration Section, G.O.P. Carmela Caranna, issued Sentenza n. 2623/2026, recognizing Italian citizenship jure sanguinis to a US-born applicant.

The case was decided under the framework introduced by Decree Law No. 36/2025, commonly referred to as the Tajani Decree, converted into Law No. 74/2025 on May 23 2025.

The decision is relevant because the Italian ancestor was a woman born in Sicily in the late 1800s, who emigrated to the United States and married a US citizen in 1903, before the Cable Act of 1922. Under the US law applicable at that time, marriage to a US citizen could result in automatic acquisition of US citizenship by the foreign wife, without an individual voluntary naturalization act.

The citizenship claim was filed before the Tribunal of Palermo on 16 May 2025, after the 27 March 2025 cut-off introduced by Decree Law No. 36/2025, but before the conversion into Law No. 74/2025. Because of that filing date, letters a), a-bis), and b) of Article 1 are not relevant for the case. The relevant path was instead letters c) / d).

The point worth noting

The decision does not expressly analyze the relationship between Article 3-bis and automatic acquisition of foreign citizenship by marriage.

The reasoning is brief and document-based.

However, the court file included the marriage certificate showing the 1903 marriage to a US citizen. The defense also filed a NARA letter showing no record of voluntary naturalization.

In the motivation, the court refers to the ancestor as someone who had not voluntarily naturalized. The decision does not develop a broader doctrine on pre-1922 US marital naturalization, so caution is needed.

Still, the outcome is worth noting because recognition of Italian citizenship jure sanguinis was granted despite the documented pre-Cable Act marital citizenship issue.

Caveats

This is a first-instance decision from the Tribunal of Palermo with a brief reasoning.

The decision does not establish a general rule on involuntary marital naturalization.

Later case law, including Constitutional Court ruling No. 63/2026 of 30 April 2026, may affect how similar Italian citizenship cases are analyzed going forward.

Why we are sharing it

Many Italian citizenship jure sanguinis cases involving US families include female Italian ancestors who married US citizens before the Cable Act of 1922.

The interaction between pre-1922 US marital naturalization, Italian citizenship by descent, and Decree Law No. 36/2025 remains unsettled.

For that reason, this Palermo decision may be useful to know about, provided it is not overstated.

We are also interested to hear whether anyone has seen other post-Decree Law 36/2025 Italian citizenship decisions involving pre-1922 US marital naturalization or similar facts.

This case was handled by Aprigliano International Law Firm, Milan.

Source: Tribunale di Palermo, Immigration Section, Sentenza n. 2623/2026, published 21/04/2026

For a more in-depth analysis of the decision, you can read the full article in our blog.

UPDATE: you may read the full sentence in English here (the applicants’ personal information is redacted).

Una buona giornata a tutti!

u/ApriglianoFirm — 3 days ago

Ruling No. 63/2026 did not kill jure sanguinis, it changed the battlefield

Ciao a tutti

We wanted to share a legal reading of Italian Constitutional Court Judgment No. 63/2026, because many headlines have described it as the end of jure sanguinis. And we think that is too simplistic. 

The ruling is important, and it is not good news for every applicant. But it did not abolish Italian citizenship by descent in general. 

The Court rejected the constitutional questions raised by the Tribunal of Turin against Article 3-bis of Law No. 91/1992, introduced by the Tajani Decree. That part is true. 

But the ruling did not decide every issue created by the reform. 

1. The real shift: “acquired at birth” vs. “potential” citizenship

For more than a century, Italian jure sanguinis citizenship was generally understood as a status acquired at birth. The consulate or court did not create the citizenship; it recognized a status that already existed, assuming the line was valid and uninterrupted. 

Judgment No. 63/2026 moves toward a different framework. 

The Court treats the position of descendants born abroad and not yet formally recognized as not fully certain, almost “potential”, until formal recognition. 

That is the real legal shift. 

If citizenship was already acquired at birth, a retroactive law that removes it looks, in substance, like a loss of citizenship. If citizenship is only “potential” before recognition, the legislature has more room to redefine it before recognition occurs. 

2. Section 9.1: people who acted but did not get an appointment

Section 9.1 is very important. 

The Court expressly left open the question of people who had initiated the citizenship recognition procedure before 23:59 Rome time on March 27, 2025, but did not receive a consular or municipal appointment by that deadline. 

That matters because, in many jurisdictions, Prenot@mi was structurally saturated: closed calendars, unavailable slots, long waiting lists, and repeated failed attempts. 

The Court did not say these applicants win. 

But it also did not say they lose. 

It said this issue was not decided in the Turin case. 

So the question remains: should someone who tried to act before the cutoff be treated the same as someone who did nothing

3. Section 9.2.2: legitimate expectations

Section 9.2.2 also matters. 

The Court recognized that, from the standpoint of legitimate expectations, applicants who acted cannot necessarily be treated the same as applicants who remained inactive. 

That does not automatically protect everyone who started collecting documents. 

But it makes evidence important. 

Potentially relevant evidence may include: 

  • Prenot@mi attempts;  
  • emails to consulates;  
  • certified communications;  
  • civil record requests;  
  • naturalization record requests;  
  • engagement letters with professionals;  
  • translations, apostilles, or legalization requests;  
  • communications with Italian municipalities, archives, churches, courts, or public offices.

  

The legal question may no longer be only: “Did you have an appointment?” 

It may also become: “Can you prove that you had already begun the recognition process before the cutoff?” 

4. Bologna

This is where the Tribunal of Bologna ruling No. 3335 of April 17, 2026 becomes relevant. 

In a case handled by our firm, the Tribunal recognized Italian citizenship for descendants who had not obtained a consular appointment but had formalized their intention to request recognition before March 27, 2025. 

It appears to be one of the first known Italian decisions after the Tajani Decree to accept this type of argument. 

It is not binding on all courts, and it does not mean every similar case will win. But it shows that the issue is legally real, not theoretical. 

5. The EU law front

The Constitutional Court did not refer the case to the Court of Justice of the European Union. 

But ordinary Italian courts may still be asked to make a preliminary reference to the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU. 

The key EU-law question is whether the reform is truly a rule of “non-acquisition” of citizenship, or whether in substance it operates like a retroactive loss of citizenship for people who, under the previous jure sanguinis framework, would have been treated as Italian from birth. 

If the issue reaches the CJEU, the Court may look at substance rather than labels: proportionality, individual assessment, automatic effects, reasonable deadlines, and whether the person had a real opportunity to protect their position. 

This route is possible, but not guaranteed. 

6. The labeling problem

Article 3-bis does not simply say that citizenship by descent will be more limited going forward. 

It says that certain people born abroad and holding another citizenship are considered never to have acquired Italian citizenship. 

That is the label: “non-acquisition.” 

But if Italian law traditionally treated jure sanguinis citizenship as acquired at birth, then saying today that the person “never acquired” citizenship may produce, in practice, the same effect as a retroactive loss. Italian legal commentary sometimes calls this the truffa delle etichette - the “labeling problem.” 

Changing the label does not necessarily change the substance of the effect. 

Bottom line 

Judgment No. 63/2026 did not close the entire jure sanguinis debate. 

It closed part of the constitutional challenge raised in the Turin case. It left open the position of applicants who acted before March 27, 2025 but did not obtain an appointment. It did not prevent ordinary courts from asking the CJEU to review EU-law issues. And it did not eliminate the deeper question of whether “non-acquisition” is, in substance, retroactive loss. 

So we would avoid both extremes: 

  • “Everyone can still apply.”  
  • “Jure sanguinis is dead.”

  

Both are inaccurate. 

The more accurate answer is: the field is now more technical, more evidence-based, and more dependent on the applicant’s timeline. 

For many applicants, especially those who acted before March 27, 2025, the most important practical step is to preserve every dated piece of evidence showing what they did before the cutoff. 

This is general legal information, not individual legal advice. We’re happy to discuss the legal meaning of the ruling generally, but individual cases depend on the full family line, naturalization history, filing status, appointment history, and documents. 

For a more in-depth analysis of the ruling and its repercussions, you can refer to our latest blog post.   

Una buona giornata a tutti, 

Avv. Salvatore Aprigliano 

 

u/ApriglianoFirm — 17 days ago