Why does the Turing Test feel so philosophically naïve?
This is moreso a question for the computer scientists interested in philosophy, but l've noticed that the Turing test is very philosophically naïve for its time. I do know computers were very evidently in a very archaic state, likewise with parallel fields in philosophy (Norbert Wiener, for example, had introduced cybernetics relatively recently). Despite this, Turing still relies upon questions long destabilized by phenomenologists, semioticians, and linguists decades prior. to this day, questions regarding the Turing test will often revolve around more Cartesian concerns, as if the field of computer science could have its questions answered while philosophically
remaining in the 17th Century. I will make it entirely clear that my intentions are not the strawman Turing, perhaps a bit of a summary would suffice. I posted this in r/askcomputerscience and ran into people who claimed Bertrand Russell was only a mathematician (a largely abstract one that never worked in formal logic), perhaps this community won't strawman as often, especially with regards to the sciences