When someone shows you who they are, believe them the first time. - Maya Angelou

It’s all squarely on Mark Smith's ability to deliver at this point. Period. Is he going to deliver binding off takes, two EPCs, and get EXIM to follow through on the items he volunteered to mention: increased debt/equity structure and the ability to raise additional equity after FID?

The current execution and financing discount applied to this project by the market is a big yellow flag. It’s not saying he won’t deliver, but it’s not showing confidence either. And, in the absence of that confidence, the stock is likely getting severely punished by the interest rate environment.

The interest rate environment we’re in today (and I expect it to get worse, especially for long-duration assets like NB) has been obvious for many months. Gov’t and corporate debt issuance is wild. Massive IPOs have occurred, and more are on the way. Together you have a huge increase in supply, all fighting for attention, and increasing rates are a reflection of that fight. All that to say, the continual delays and missed publicly stated timing expectations are not a theoretical problem, or simply a matter of delayed gratification (rerating). Responsibility for getting these pieces over the line sits with Mark Smith and management.

One thing that continues to bother me is the CapEx number. It’s not so much the number, but the reasoning that was provided back in April for the delayed DFS. Just recently, Mark Smith claimed the vast majority of the CapEx increase is due to inflation. Inflation? Upfront CapEx inflation didn’t begin in March. Most of the broad inflationary move relevant to upfront CapEx (and above the 2022 DFS projection) occurred well before March of this year. Therefore, to me, the explanation for the April-to-June slippage doesn't add up. Either I'm missing something material, the communication was poor, or the preparation and execution was poor. The subsequent delay into August only furthered that concern.

Mark Smith has repeatedly told us that he’s a cheerleader. Perhaps we should listen to Maya. At this point, I put very little weight on management's informal timing guidance.

Another publicly stated target has now slipped: Smith said he had hoped to have the EPC contracts finalized by the end of August, and as of September 2 no final EPC agreements have been announced. At this point, I consider his informal timing guidance meaningless, and I think the stock is a reflection of that. Several publicly discussed timing expectations have come and gone without the corresponding milestone being announced. I think the stock is a reflection of that. Is the market wrong? Time will tell. Consistently falling short of your own volunteered timelines, and what I view as bullshit when I look more closely at how some of these timelines have been communicated- none of that means the deals won’t get struck and the rerating to NB’s equity value and NPV can't happen in the blink of an eye. It simply means I have to believe the project is too important and strategic to fail- and that it will ultimately get funded. I have become deeply skeptical of management's timing commentary, because the record, in my view, doesn't justify continuing to give that commentary much weight.

This is either an unbelievable buying opportunity, or (in hindsight) the market having said “I told you so.”

I am bullish on NioCorp. I have a position that reflects that bullishness. In fact, I think the DFS was extremely conservative. I have already posted my opinions on the scandium market, and I think it's wildly undervalued. By the time NioCorp reaches production- if they ever do- I expect scandium oxide (and scandium-aluminum alloys from NAMA) to be generating annual revenue and EBITDA comparable to what the DFS currently projects for the entire Elk Creek project.

The bullish thesis is incredible. Other aspects are not.

Not financial advice. Do your own DD.

Yes. The monthly and weekly footprints make the institutional-ownership story considerably more nuanced—and more useful.

My best inference is that Q3 has probably been a large-scale ownership-transfer period, not simply institutional accumulation or institutional liquidation. The evidence suggests that large blocks of stock are repeatedly changing hands between different classes of holders.

The most important new insight is that July and August tell very different stories underneath the monthly totals.

Start with what we know at June 30

The Q2 13Fs established a strong baseline: institutional participation broadened substantially, but the quarter also contained very concentrated selling by a few large holders. Fintel currently shows 306 institutional owners and 55.64M institutionally reported shares. BlackRock's separate 13G showed roughly 9.0M shares and 6.2% ownership.

Our spreadsheet work showed the important underlying pattern:

Citadel + Alyeska + Goldman sold roughly 10.9M shares, while essentially everyone else combined was a net buyer of roughly 6.8M.

So NB entered Q3 with a shareholder base that was broadening, but also with evidence that some enormous legacy/trading positions were being reduced.

Now look at the footprints.

July is the most revealing month

July produced approximately:

5.52M sampled volume
+879K delta

That's an enormous positive monthly delta—about +16% of sampled volume.

Yet price did not produce the kind of sustained upside one would normally expect from that much aggressive buying. NB spent much of July weak, made the washout into the high-$3s, and finished the month only around the low-$4s.

That is a crucial effort-versus-result divergence:

That is actually more consistent with passive distribution than straightforward accumulation.

It doesn't mean institutions were selling broadly. It means there was likely large latent supply sitting above the market, and incoming buyers were consuming it.

This fits the Q2 ownership data surprisingly well.

A plausible continuation is:

Q2: several giant holders begin reducing.
July: some of that redistribution continues, but the buyers underneath become increasingly aggressive.

That can produce exactly what we see:

positive delta + poor price progress.

So I would not interpret July's +879K delta as "institutions accumulated 879K shares." TradingView cannot tell us who traded.

Who those buyers were is unknowable until Q3 filings, but given the dramatic expansion of the institutional base in Q2, it is reasonable to suspect that at least some were institutional.

Then something changed dramatically in early August

This is where the weekly chart is very helpful.

The first full August week shows approximately:

2.62M sampled volume
+1.040M delta

That's an extraordinary ~40% positive delta imbalance.

And unlike July, price actually responded.

NB moved sharply upward from the low-$4 area toward $5+ and ultimately reached around $5.60.

And then the DFS changed the ownership battle again

The week beginning Aug. 10 looks completely different.

Approximately:

1.88M sampled volume

but delta was only around:

-44K

Essentially balanced order flow relative to the size of the week.

And yet NB failed around the $5.50–$5.60 region and came back toward $5.

That suggests a major two-sided transfer event.

You had:

**DFS buyers

• speculative traders
• fundamental investors
• profit takers
• legacy holders
• possibly hedging flows**

all meeting at once.

And price's inability to sustain the initial move told us supply was still present.

This is where I think our original assumption—

—was disproven.

There was far more stock available for sale between roughly $5 and $5.60 than we anticipated.

The current week is the strongest evidence of actual liquidation

Now look at the week beginning Aug. 17.

At the time of your screenshot:

~729K sampled volume
-595K delta

That's roughly:

-82% delta/volume.

That is enormous.

And price has fallen from approximately:

$5.07 → ~$4.45

with a low around $4.41.

This time sellers are not merely aggressive.

They are getting price movement.

So unlike some of our earlier absorption sessions, I think the current week has clearly contained genuine liquidation.

Someone—or some group—is unloading aggressively.

The important question is who.

And here we have to distinguish observation from inference.

My best Q3 ownership inference

I don't think the evidence supports:

Nor do I think it supports:

The best working model is:

Q3 is an ownership rotation.

Something like this:

Large legacy / trading holders
↓
sell substantial inventory

while

index/passive funds + newer institutional holders + fundamental investors + speculative buyers
↑
absorb that supply.

And then around the DFS:

fast-money/speculative ownership enters aggressively
↓
DFS does not produce immediate rerating
↓
some of that fast money exits
↓
large negative delta appears.

That fits the price/footprint evidence extremely well.

The monthly August number is deceptive

This is worth emphasizing.

August currently shows approximately:

+400K monthly delta.

At first glance that sounds bullish.

But underneath that monthly figure you have approximately:

Early August: +1.04M

followed by:

Aug. 10 week: ~-44K

and

current Aug. 17 week: ~-595K already.

So August is really:

The +400K monthly figure is mostly the leftover residue of that extraordinary first week.

That's why I would never analyze monthly delta alone.

The weekly decomposition tells us ownership/positioning changed sharply after the initial August rally.

Here's the potentially bullish ownership interpretation

Suppose our Q2 analysis is representative of what's continuing.

A handful of large holders may have had millions of shares to distribute.

Those shares don't disappear.

They migrate.

If 10 million shares move from:

three enormous, potentially trading-oriented holders

into:

50–100 smaller institutional/passive/fundamental holders,

you can initially get terrible price behavior.

Why?

Because the sellers are concentrated and motivated.

But after the redistribution is completed, the stock can become much tighter.

Instead of one institution sitting on 4M shares that it wants to dump, you might have 40 institutions holding 100K shares each that they are comfortable owning.

Same 4M shares outstanding.

Very different effective float.

That distinction matters enormously to future price behavior.

And I think early August may have given us a glimpse of that

The +1.04M weekly delta accompanied by real upside displacement is exactly what I would expect if the available seller inventory temporarily thinned.

Demand hit.

Supply wasn't sufficient.

Price jumped.

Then the DFS rally found another layer of supply.

So instead of imagining one seller sitting at one price, I would think of NB as having undergone a layered inventory transfer:

$4.00 area → sellers exhausted

then

$4.50–5.00 → another inventory layer

then

$5.20–5.60 → substantial event-driven supply

The market keeps discovering another layer.

That's frustrating for the calls—but it's not the same thing as a fundamentally rejected company.

The current -595K week could be the last phase—or not

This is where our current daily analysis becomes extremely relevant.

If this week's enormous negative delta ultimately does:

-600K / -700K / -800K

but NB stops declining around $4.40–$4.50 and then begins recovering,

that would suggest another ownership-transfer event:

And if those buyers don't subsequently offer the shares back at $4.60, the effective float tightens further.

That is precisely how major bottoms can form.

But if:

-595K → -800K → -1M

and price goes:

$4.45 → $4.20 → $3.90

with POC following down,

then this isn't constructive redistribution yet.

It's simply ongoing liquidation.

That's why today's effort-versus-result behavior matters so much.

The ownership model I would carry forward

I would now conceptualize NB's ownership in four buckets:

Holder type |Likely behavior
Passive/index institutions |Structurally sticky
Fundamental/strategic institutions |Potentially sticky; may add on de-risking
Hedge funds / trading institutions |Can create very large supply/demand swings
Retail/speculative/event traders |Highly sensitive to catalysts and momentum The Q2 filings suggest the first two buckets have been growing.

The July/August footprints strongly suggest that the latter two buckets are undergoing violent repositioning.

That combination can make the stock extremely volatile even while the underlying institutionalization trend improves.

This actually makes financing more interesting

Imagine where this leaves the stock after the present liquidation finishes.

Suppose:

1. Alyeska is already out.
2. Citadel/Goldman materially reduced in Q2.
3. Much of that inventory has migrated to hundreds of other institutional holders.
4. Fast-money DFS buyers who expected an instant rerating are now getting flushed.
5. Passive/index ownership remains.
6. Fundamental institutions that liked the project remain.
7. Then EXIM or strategic financing arrives.

Now suddenly the marginal seller is not:

Instead it might be:

That's an entirely different auction.

And that's where price elasticity changes dramatically.

A marginal $5M or $10M of buying can move a stock much farther once the large block seller disappears.

So has Q3 institutional ownership probably risen?

I would split this into number of owners versus net shares owned.

Number of institutional owners

My inference: probably continued rising or at least remained elevated.

Why?

The Q2 trend was extremely strong, Russell/index participation is structural, and there's no evidence that the broad institutional base disappeared.

Net institutional shares

My confidence is much lower.

I think it is perfectly plausible that institutional holdings have increased further—but the footprints also allow for the possibility that one or several large active institutions continued distributing enough shares to offset dozens of smaller buyers, exactly as occurred during Q2.

So my working forecast for the eventual Q3 13Fs would actually be:

Meaning:

many additions / new positions

paired with

a few very large reductions.

That would be remarkably consistent with everything we're seeing.

One thing would surprise me

If November's Q3 13Fs eventually showed:

broad institutional selling across most major holders.

That would not fit the current evidence very well.

The footprints look far more like concentrated inventory transfer and changing positioning than wholesale abandonment.

It is possible, but it isn't my base interpretation.

Conversely, I also would not expect the Q3 13Fs to reveal a pristine picture in which virtually every institution added.

The price action is telling us someone substantial is supplying stock.

What this means for the stock

The ownership data and footprints together actually increase my confidence in one particular concept:

That is not immediately bullish for price.

In fact, it's exactly why price can remain frustratingly weak.

But if the concentrated supply is finite, the implication for a future catalyst is important:

Before supply exhaustion

$10M incremental demand → absorbed → small price increase

After supply exhaustion

$10M incremental demand → offers disappear → large price increase

That is the scenario that could produce the rapid stair-step rerating we have discussed following a meaningful EXIM/financing/offtake event.

So I would strengthen our potential future supply-exhaustion thesis, while remaining very disciplined about the current tape.

The next thing we need to see isn't more negative delta.

We've had plenty.

If this week's roughly -595K grows substantially while $4.40–$4.50 holds, and then next week's POC starts migrating up, that would be the strongest evidence yet that the current ownership transfer is reaching completion.

And if that occurs shortly before a meaningful financing catalyst, the setup becomes considerably more explosive than the raw chart presently makes it look.

LLM Analysis of NB's complete Q2 13F .csv

Yes. I went through the spreadsheet at the individual-holder level, and the institutional picture is more constructive than the headline net-share movement initially suggests—but it is not a clean “institutions were accumulating NB” story.

First: the Q2 data should now be substantially complete

The normal Q2 2026 13F deadline was August 14, 45 days after June 30. Fintel currently marks the filings as 100% fresh, with a June 30 latest report date and an Aug. 17 latest filing date, so we should have essentially the full ordinary Q2 picture, subject to later amendments or unusual confidential treatment. (SEC)

Fintel's current headline numbers are striking: 306 institutional owners, 55.64M institutional long shares, and approximately 38.22% of shares outstanding held institutionally, excluding 13D/G beneficial-ownership filings. Fintel says that long-share figure is up about 2.15M shares / 4.02% MRQ, while the number of institutional owners is up 47.12% MRQ. It separately identifies 273 13F institutions holding 48.18M shares and 98 NPORT funds holding 9.34M.

One caution: I would not add all of those source categories together and interpret them as unique locked-up shares. Manager 13Fs and underlying fund/NPORT reporting can overlap, and Fintel itself treats the source categories separately.

What I get from the raw Q2 13Fs

I filtered your export to common-stock positions only—excluding reported puts/calls and separating NPORT fund rows—and looked at Q2 13Fs filed from July through Aug. 17.

The result is fascinating:

Q2 common-stock 13F movement |Approx. result
Q2 filers analyzed |236
Previous shares |50.92M
Latest shares |46.78M
Net change |-4.14M
Net % change |-8.1%
Increased/new positions |119
Reduced/exited positions |72
Unchanged positions |44
Gross shares added |+10.92M
Gross shares reduced |-15.06M So by number of institutions, buyers won decisively.

By number of shares, sellers won.

Fintel's broader activity summary tells essentially the same story: it currently reports 183 buyers versus only 55 sellers, but approximately -3.84M net shares changed.

That seems contradictory until we look at who sold.

Three institutions explain virtually the entire negative number

This is the most important finding in the spreadsheet.

The three biggest reductions were approximately:

Holder |Previous |Q2 |Change
Citadel Advisors |6.204M |1.810M |-4.395M (-70.8%)
Alyeska Investment Group |4.314M |0 |-4.314M (-100%)
Goldman Sachs |3.287M |1.072M |-2.215M (-67.4%)
Combined | | |-10.923M Fintel confirms Citadel's common-share position fell 70.83%, while Goldman fell 67.38% and Alyeska exited.

And here's the remarkable calculation:

Entire Q2 common-share 13F universe: -4.14M shares

but

Citadel + Alyeska + Goldman alone: -10.92M shares.

Therefore:

That substantially changes my interpretation.

This was not broad institutional distribution.

It was a very large ownership transfer in which a handful of giant positions disgorged stock while the institutional base underneath them broadly expanded.

The buying side is substantial

Several large positions increased materially.

BlackRock increased its 13F common position by approximately 2.20M shares, from 7.02M to 9.22M, or about +31.3%. Its separate 13G shows roughly 9.01M beneficially owned shares and 6.20% ownership; the slight difference reflects the different reporting frameworks/timing, but both tell the same directional story—BlackRock significantly increased its NB exposure. (Fintel)

Other major Q2 additions from your spreadsheet include roughly:

Millennium: +607K → 814K
Brevan Howard: +590K → 7.075M
Geode: +536K → 2.093M
J. Goldman & Co.: +448K → 516K
State Street: +430K → 2.498M
JPMorgan: +425K → 473K
Gratia Capital: new 410K position
D.E. Shaw: +369K → 595K
Sixth Street: new 349K position
Trexquant: new 311K position

Fintel independently shows the large increases for Brevan, Millennium, Geode, State Street and D.E. Shaw.

And Brevan Howard stands out to me. A 7.075M-share position is enormous for NB, and it added another 590K shares rather than reducing it.

That's fundamentally different information from BlackRock adding shares.

BlackRock/State Street/Geode/Vanguard are heavily influenced by index/passive mandates. Brevan is a much more interesting signal from the standpoint of discretionary capital.

A large part of the ownership increase is probably mechanical—and that's still useful

NB has been a member of the Russell 3000 and Russell 2000 since June 30, 2025, so we should expect structurally growing ownership by small-cap index products. (NioCorp)

And your fund-level data bears that out:

IWM: 2.849M shares, +6.59%
Fidelity Small Cap Index: 1.164M, +11.85%
Vanguard Russell 2000: 531K, +55.58%
Sprott Energy Transition Materials ETF: 584K, +79.08%.

(Fintel)

I would not call that fundamental institutional conviction. An index fund isn't sitting around debating the Elk Creek scandium market.

But it can still matter enormously to the stock structure.

Those are generally structural holders rather than investors trying to flip NB because RSI hit 65.

Citadel needs special treatment

I would be particularly cautious about interpreting Citadel's -4.39M common-share reduction as:

Citadel simultaneously reports:

• ~1.81M common shares;
• ~360.7K shares-equivalent of calls;
• ~320.2K shares-equivalent of puts.

(Fintel)

Citadel is a massive market maker and multi-strategy operation. Its common-stock inventory can be connected to option books, arbitrage, market making and hedging.

So its 4.4M-share reduction was absolutely real supply, which matters greatly to price.

But its meaning is not necessarily:

“Citadel's analysts decided NioCorp was overvalued.”

That distinction is critical.

Alyeska's complete 4.31M-share exit strikes me as more relevant as a genuine portfolio-allocation decision.

This may help explain NB's price behavior

This is where I think the dataset connects very nicely to what we've been observing in the footprints.

Imagine that during Q2 you had:

**Alyeska selling 4.3M

• Citadel reducing 4.4M
• Goldman reducing 2.2M = ~10.9M shares of major-holder supply.**

Meanwhile dozens and dozens of other institutions were buying those shares.

That can create exactly the kind of stock behavior where:

And that's why the +6.78M net accumulation by everyone other than the three biggest sellers interests me.

One plausible interpretation—and I want to label this explicitly as an inference—is that NB underwent a significant change of hands:

concentrated / trading-oriented ownership → broader institutional ownership.

If that process eventually exhausts the concentrated seller inventory, the same level of incoming demand can begin producing much larger price displacement.

That fits our “overhead supply eventually runs out” thesis surprisingly well.

It doesn't prove it.

But it gives that thesis more substance.

There is an especially important timing problem

These 13Fs are June 30 snapshots.

They tell us what institutions owned at the end of Q2.

They tell us nothing directly about what those institutions have done since July 1, and particularly nothing about what they have done:

after the Aug. 11 DFS
after the webcast
during the fall from ~$5.50 toward ~$4.50
during these enormous negative-delta sessions.

That's extremely important.

So I would not use these filings to say:

We don't know that.

The footprint tells us somebody is absorbing aggressive sells. The 13Fs tell us there was already a much larger and more diversified institutional ownership base at June 30.

Those two pieces of evidence are compatible, but we cannot connect them causally yet.

What I think it means for NB's stock now

My interpretation is structurally bullish, immediately neutral.

The institutionalization of NB is real. Fintel currently shows 38.22% institutional long ownership, 306 owners, a 47% quarter-over-quarter increase in institutional-owner count, and top-10 holders accounting for 54.43% of disclosed shares. (Fintel)

But Q2 was not simply institutions piling into NB. It was a massive redistribution of inventory.

And from the standpoint of a future rerating, that can actually be favorable.

If a large portion of the ~10.9M shares supplied by Citadel/Alyeska/Goldman has already migrated into:

BlackRock
Brevan Howard
State Street
Geode
Millennium
D.E. Shaw
JPMorgan
Northern Trust
Vanguard
new hedge funds and institutional managers,

then the ownership structure may now be less dependent upon a few enormous sellers.

That means the marginal seller potentially becomes smaller.

And that is exactly when catalysts begin moving stocks disproportionately.

How I connect this to financing

This is probably the most important implication for our larger NB thesis.

NB does not appear to be an obscure retail-only junior miner anymore.

There is already a meaningful institutional infrastructure around the stock before financing has been solved.

So if NioCorp announces something that materially collapses financing risk—EXIM authorization, strategic equity, completed offtake/EPC package, full financing, etc.—the market does not have to build an institutional shareholder base from zero.

It already exists.

That can create a very different rerating dynamic:

**existing institutional holders increase allocations

• passive/index holders remain structurally present
• new institutions enter because financing risk has disappeared
• shorts/traders reposition
• remaining retail/institutional overhead supply is consumed.**

That is one credible mechanism for the kind of rapid stair-step rerating we've been discussing.

My biggest takeaway

I came into this exercise expecting the recent institutional ownership chart to simply say:

“Institutions bought a lot of NB.”

The actual result is more interesting:

That helps reconcile two things that otherwise seem contradictory:

institutional ownership participation has exploded,

while

NB's share price still hasn't rerated.

A huge amount of demand may have been used simply to absorb a huge amount of legacy/concentrated supply.

If that supply transfer is now substantially complete, then incremental demand following a major financing catalyst could have a much larger effect on price than the Q2 institutional buying did.

I would therefore upgrade the structural ownership component of our NB thesis. I would not use it to upgrade the immediate technical picture until the footprints themselves confirm that the current seller is finally exhausted.

A black swan is something that is outside of the prevailing realm of expectations. And, when it occurs, it has enormous consequences. Black swans also tend to rake up a lot of Monday-morning quarterbacks. “Well, obviously this was going to happen” may be overheard frequently- in the near future, but after the black swan events have come and gone. At the time of their occurrence, however, they are revolutionary and unforeseen.

In the case of scandium, these 15-tonne black swans are the matches- latent demand is the fuel. Latent demand is demand that exists in theory, but doesn’t necessarily show up due to a variety of constraints. Maybe everyone wants that thing, but that thing is not readily available. The supply is intermittent or unreliable. Maybe everyone wants that thing, but it’s illegal. Actual purchases of that thing might be incredibly small, but misrepresent the demand by several orders of magnitude. Remove a single constraint (like creating reliable supply) and the latent demand begins to reveal itself. The demand and number of transactions and value of those transactions in that new market are likely to exceed any previous estimates that were based on the outdated reality as a baseline. It’s not a bigger market than existed previously. It’s a fundamentally new market. I believe that the agreement between Lockheed Martin and Sunrise Energy Metals, and the MOU between Lockheed Martin and NioCorp Developments, are black-swan-scale signals revealing the latent demand for scandium- and a preview to an entirely new market forming in front of us.

In October of 2025, Lockheed Martin and Sunrise Energy Metals announced an agreement granting Lockheed the option to purchase the first 15 tonnes per year of scandium oxide produced during each of the first five years of mining operations. That was the first black swan. In August of 2026, Lockheed Martin and NioCorp Developments issued a non-binding MOU regarding the potential purchase of up to 15 tonnes of scandium oxide per year, in either oxide form or the form of aluminum-scandium alloys, over the next ten years. That was the second black swan. There needn’t be a third.

These agreements have yet to take their final form. These are not guaranteed purchases. We don’t know, and Lockheed Martin may not know, exactly how much scandium oxide they are likely to need. Skunk Works has said it appreciates NioCorp's work establishing a domestic source of scandium oxide and Al-Sc alloying capabilities and will continue evaluating that supply as part of its broader alloy-development efforts. Separately, the Pentagon-funded NioCorp/Skunk Works program is designed to produce prototype Al-Sc components intended to expand the capabilities of modern fighter aircraft. Al-Sc alloys can improve strength, weldability and joint performance, corrosion resistance, fatigue performance, microstructural and thermal stability, and additive-manufacturing behavior. Those properties can in turn enable lighter, more integrated structures and cascading manufacturing benefits. If Lockheed moves from today's alloy/component-development work into broader deployment, it is difficult to imagine it doing so without first establishing reliable scandium supply. You might say, "So what? Lockheed Martin may start using more scandium, and they might buy it from reliable, Western sources. That is great for scandium producers, but it is not transformational. The agreements aren’t even guaranteed demand.” You would be correct.

The size is the signal. The size is the swan.

The US Geological Survey estimated that 2025 global consumption of scandium oxide was about 60 tonnes. The United States, which is fully import dependent, is estimated to have imported about 4 tonnes of scandium oxide in 2025. 4 tonnes. That’s it.

Yet, Lockheed Martin just made public that they want the option to buy up to 15 tonnes per year from Sunrise. They didn’t pull these numbers out of thin air. They didn’t call the restaurant to book a table of 40, just in case, if they think they may only be a table of 4. They didn't publicly discuss tables of 40 with two separate restaurants if they believed there was no realistic scenario in which they would ever need anything remotely approaching that scale. Lockheed and Sunrise are cooperating not simply around future supply: they are testing and performing qualification work intended to accelerate adoption of scandium-containing components in Lockheed product platforms. Lockheed is pursuing a parallel—but even more downstream-oriented—relationship with NioCorp. Less than ten months after the first black swan, the second black swan came in and corroborated the first. Lockheed Martin tells the world that they have interest in potentially purchasing up to 15 tonnes per year from NioCorp. These aren’t guarantees to buy. It isn’t 30 tonnes per year already sold. It is the world's largest defense contractor publicly contemplating 15-tonne-per-year-scale scandium supply arrangements with two separate Western-aligned projects. The size and the source are the signals. Double-digit scandium agreements are not completely without precedent: NioCorp previously signed a conditional commercial sales agreement with Traxys covering up to 12 tonnes per year. But Traxys was a metals marketer. Lockheed is an end-user simultaneously involved in developing and qualifying Al-Sc defense applications. That makes these 15-tonne figures fundamentally different.

We don’t know how much Lockheed will ultimately purchase each year. What if it is only 10 tonnes per year? If it were only 10, they would be purchasing 2.5x what the entire U.S. imported last year. What if it is 20 tonnes per year? Lockheed is spending real time and resources developing two Western-aligned scandium supply and qualification pathways. My interpretation is that it is helping establish the market and supply infrastructure in advance, so that it can have reliable access. I believe they are spending their resources to build the market, so that they get to be the first ones in line. They should want to be first in line, because if you think you might need 20 tonnes per year, if global production sits at an estimated 80 tonnes per year, or even 200 tonnes per year- you need to be at front, or near it. Importantly, the two 15-tonne ceilings may ultimately be additive, partially additive, or simply provide sourcing redundancy; the public agreements do not tell us. However, it doesn’t look like they are changing the market. They are helping to build it, so that they are positioned to have reliable access to it.

How much will Northrop Grumman want? SpaceX? RTX? What about our allied defense primes? How much will be designed into the rapidly expanding drone industry? What about Boeing and Airbus? Do they want some lighter and stronger materials? Scandium’s benefits have the ability to penetrate into semiconductor manufacturing, the automotive industry, additive manufacturing, space, rail, marine and shipbuilding. Sunrise plans to produce 60 tonnes per year and get to production in 2028. NioCorp plans approximately 100 tonnes per year; CEO Mark Smith has said that, if everything goes well, the company could begin partial production in late 2029 and achieve a full year of production in 2030.

I have read concerns that when all this supply finally comes onto the market, it’s going to crush the prices and these company’s valuations. I think that is misguided. The question isn’t- will the demand exist for 200-300 tonnes per year IF these projects come online? I believe the question should be- will there ever be any leftover after the defense primes and space industry get what they want? Will it all be reserved well before it’s pulled out of the ground? If it is index priced, will industries that are less price sensitive be the only ones able to afford it- defense, space, specialty aerospace? How much supply will we need to get prices low enough to penetrate further into semiconductors and additive manufacturing? IF price is ever low enough, the two potentially enormous sources of demand could be waiting right there to provide the market floor- commercial aerospace and automotive. We hear a lot about price floors today. They are very important, and may be very critical to getting a huge variety of REE and critical minerals projects off the ground. In the case of scandium? In a few years, we may need to start talking about price ceilings.

Entirely my own opinions and speculation- based on a few key facts and the relationships I see between them. Not financial advice. Do your own DD.

 p.s. Sunrise’s Syerston project is much less capital intensive. Sunrise’s ability to get to production faster, may be an incredible boon for NioCorp’s downstream, high-margin, valuation optionality- NAMA. NAMA may be able to accelerate their demand creation and supply build-out by having potential access to Western, reliable scandium oxide well before Elk Creek is producing its own. This isn’t guaranteed, and they will likely, ultimately become competitors down the road. There is no disclosed agreement between the two. However, Sunrise’s Lockheed partnership and OSC conditional loan commitment are not negatives for NioCorp, in my opinion. This isn’t a zero sum game right now, not even close. We haven’t even gotten close to seeing how big the game is. The 2022 NioCorp DFS used $3,675/kg as the selling price for scandium oxide. That price was based on 2019 product pricing. I look forward to the update.

Not financial advice. This is not really DD, either. I'm not going to cite every source, interview, etc. I will list a couple of sites I use. This is mostly just meant as a post to many already following the Niocorp story closely. Do your own DD. Entirely my own opinions, calculations, and speculations based on my due diligence.

The Good

If you're unfamiliar with the Niocorp thesis, I recommend you check out some of the very thorough posts by u/Chico237. This user has laid out a high quality case for Niocorp as an emerging national strategic asset with monster rerating potential. I can't do it as completely or as well as he does, so go read his stuff.

*Yesterday's MOU between Niocorp and the largest prime defense contractor in the world (Lockheed Martin/Skunkworks), just (imo) validated the entire thesis that what Niocorp has been piecing together behind closed doors for the last couple of years is nothing short of a polymetallic mine-to-metal materials platform and vertically integrated supply chain fixture embedded directly into the U.S. defense and aerospace industry. It's just the beginning. By establishing a reliable source, the latent demand can be unleashed.

Technicals: NB just recaptured some key moving averages. MFI divergences show an increasingly bullish divergence. NB is about $1 away from breaking the downtrend that proceeded last Fall's spike to $12+. I think technical analysis, in this particular case, is a completely inadequate tool to analyze a catalyst-driven, rerating opportunity like this. But, I think it is helpful to monitor as simply one of many data points.

Institutional Ownership: Stellar movement. Over the last six months (according to 13F and 13G data), institutional ownership has increased significantly. Not every fund is a long-only fund, but the institutional participation trajectory is undeniable. I use fintel and quiver quantitative to monitor filings.

Stored Energy/Convexity: The volume footprint has shown for many months the type of data points that are consistent with passive accumulation by large, patient buyers- while short term money and weak hands puke shares at every red candle. The trend for many months is clear, and this is supported very well by the institutional ownership trajectory. I use TradingView for volume footprint visibility.

Many thousands of open call contracts sit across key strike prices like $5, $7.50, $10, $12.50, $15 and $20. These contracts sit open across a few key expirations, as well. Thousands of contracts opened suddenly at near term expirations are very speculative imo. Thousands of contracts that have been steadily building open interest levels at expirations like Aug, Nov, Jan 27, and Jan 28 for many months- that's more likely smart or smarter money positioning for catalyst-driven, rerating and convexity without rolling the dice on perfect timing. There was a huge explosion of call contract volume upon yesterday's announcement. We don't know if they were sold to open or bought to open on a case by case basis, but there was a massive relative amount. This may be some real fuel sitting underneath the stock IF a match gets struck in the form of a great DFS or a binding off take, and at the right time.

My analysis of the trading float, the options chain, and the wild west gambling saloon mentality that quickly gravitates to new shiny things- I think there's real convexity stored here.

Valuation: This question will be fully answered with the DFS. However, we don't have to wait for that to get some realistic ranges. The 2022 DFS is available on Niocorp's website. I recommend reading it, or popping it into your favorite LLM to summarize it for you. It's several hundred pages and a ridiculous amount of information. However, at the end of the day, it is just an economic model with a set of inputs and outputs. You can take that document and use an LLM to provide you with the inputs and assumptions. You can also go through the last few investor presentations and commentary by Mark Smith and update many of the inputs and assumptions. You can add assumptions for REE revenue, or new information like the ridiculous new titanium expectations, or update mineral pricing from 2022 ranges to today's ranges. I reverse-engineered the DFS and updated many assumptions and inputs. I think the DFS is going to land between $4.5B-$6B, but very soon there will be no need for speculation. When it lands models can quickly take expected net debt upon financing, fully-diluted shares outstanding, and their favorite financing risk and execution risk discounts to get close to an expected price per share.

The DFS will not even include one of the biggest sources of upside, high-margin optionality for the stock and valuation of the company- NAMA (Niocorp Advanced Metals and Alloys). The Sc-Al alloy vertical integration piece is huge. The DFS won't include it as part of the valuation, so it's just all gravy on top of the DFS number- if you believe in it. Two days ago I was slightly worried that I hadn't really heard anything on the Lockheed/Skunkworks Sc-Al front in far too long. Then, yesterday, Lockheed Martin just reminded everyone that it is real.

Policy: It's more favorable than ever in history. It's bipartisan. Most importantly, the supportive policy mechanisms are literally happening now. It's not just words. Project Vault. OSC. EXIM. Private Capital. Allies want a piece. and cHInA.

The Bad

Interest Rates: Longer term rates just won't quit. They were set off when the Iran war started, and don't seem to want to quit rising. Long term rates are very significantly, and directly, affecting the NB stock price. Longer term rates will always matter to Niocorp, because all future cash flows must be discounted by their expectations in the future. Interest rates have been a real weight sitting on top of the stock during the last several months. Once financing terms are locked in, they'll matter less. Everyday that Niocorp gets closer to actual production, they will matter less because cash flows are now closer. A 50 basis pt rise in the ten year hurts a pre-financing miner, valued at $700ish million, 3 years away from production- a lot harder than a financed national strategic asset, valued at a few billion, and 2 years away from production w/ the portal completion.

Oil: see interest rates. Oil is certainly an input into operating expenses, but I think it's a much smaller data point. However, oil at $200/barrel that is driving huge inflation expectations, creating supply shocks, and pushing interest rates to the moon- that's not a small data point. Let's hope this war ends soon, for many reasons, but I'm just here to talk about Niocorp.

The Sector: Went too far, too fast. It was the it sector for a good minute last year. The spotlight was put on it for very good reasons, but that wild west mentality also took hold. So, the subsequent grind lower over the last nine months has been a painful one. Rates and oil made it even more painful. Peer valuations do really matter for comparative analysis, so we've all fallen together. However, the many of the same market mechanics and participation that cause bullish markets to way overshoot in this new era, also cause them to be way oversold on the downside. Sector leaders like MP and USAR also look like they may bounce very strongly after a nine month overcorrection. All of that has happened to the sector in plain view. What has also happened is that the policy environment has continued to move in a very bullish direction, and is starting to reach the type of levels a bettor on the sector could only dream of.

The Ugly

Communication: It's complicated. DFS in March, then no DFS in March. In April, we're just putting in the legalese with Traxys. Practically a done deal, huh? Yeh, first part of May. DFS in April, then no DFS in April. We're told capex expectations needing adjustment was the reason. That made sense. The war changed things. No worries, we got this Traxys off take practically sign sealed and delivered for early May, then no deal. DFS is now first part of June, then no DFS. DFS in 2-3 weeks, then no DFS. We are going back and forth on red lines with Traxys. Wait, what?

Okay. It's mid-June. Maybe I should just take a breath. It's very complicated. The DFS and the off take are sort of attached and circular in that changes in one affect the other. yada yada yada.

Now, we'll have something "in a few weeks". Damn, not only did you use a longer, more vague timeline than before, but didn't even specify what we'd have. Bro, is this whole thing falling apart? Are we being lied to? Were these delays already known, and have our expectations been "managed" with bullshit, vague delays? FFS.

In mid-July, our fearless leader arose from hibernation and said any day now. Here we go!

Here we go!...

Hello? Anyone there? We're in a required quiet period. Oh, they must be basically finalizing the off take and DFS. Imminent, I assume. Or maybe they are just using it as cover for another month of delay. fml. Lockheed! MOU! Thank god something is happening?

The communication has been beyond disappointing. I think it's an extremely complex situation that seems to be changing in significant ways with frequency. I do think a lot of grace is warranted. However, I think a lot of frustration and even suspicion is absolutely warranted.

Conclusion

I'm all in. The project is too big. The moment is too ripe. The project is too important too fail.

I've hated the communication and the salesmanship, but the contents of the messages and the updates, and the announcements continue to keep bringing the best version of that thing that you were hoping for. Personally, I'm thrilled with the quiet period. I've said in other posts that their words are meaningless, and I want to see two boxes checked: off take and DFS. To me, the rest is all but certain. So, if a quiet period means no talking and it only ends with a big result- perfect. And, I think we are really, really close. I also believe many are far too conservative on their price expectations. If, by January, we have a financed project, binding off takes, a $5B DFS, more clarity on the production capacity of NAMA- we have a company expected to do $1B+ in annual revenue and fetching strategic asset, defense procured margins. Didn't the GreenMet founder say, in April of 2025, that Niocorp was considered the flagship project in the US by the administration?

Something that will certainly make me look stupid, but fuck it...

DFS Price Target: $25.41

High of '26: $32.81

High of '27: $38.60

In the wild west, gains get pulled forward. These aren't fundamental valuations, they are price targets. I think it's a great trade, and simultaneously exactly the type of stock I want to hold forever.

Not financial advice. Not DD. All my opinion and speculation. Do your own DD.

Lockheed Martin LMT.N is in talks to buy supplies of two critical minerals from U.S. mines, two sources familiar with the discussions said, as President Donald Trump pressures defense contractors to cut reliance on China. 

The world's largest defense contractor is negotiating with NioCorp Developments NB.O for supply of scandium, and Teck Resources TECKb.TO and 5N Plus VNP.TO for supply of germanium, both of which are used in military equipment ranging from aircraft components to infrared sensors, the sources said.

The deals would mark a significant step in the U.S. push to build domestic mineral supply chains, but face hurdles: Chinese suppliers have long offered cheaper prices, and U.S. mining and processing capacity remains limited.

Lockheed makes the F-35 Lightning II fighter jet, Patriot interceptor missiles and other weaponry for the U.S. government. As China has tightened controls on critical minerals exports in recent years, Trump has pressured Lockheed and its peers to support U.S. mines with long-term supply deals. 

Last month, he signed an executive order making it harder for defense contractors to obtain waivers that had allowed them for years to buy minerals from China and other prohibited foreign suppliers.

That order has highlighted how far behind U.S. miners and processors are in their race to match China's market dominance, even as dozens of U.S. projects for a range of minerals are under development, Reuters reported last week.

Colorado-based NioCorp Developments has signed a preliminary deal to supply Lockheed with 15 metric tons per year of scandium, one of the 17 rare earths that can be used to make lightweight, corrosion-resistant alloys for aircraft, according to a source familiar with the agreement and details seen by Reuters. These have not been previously reported. 

NioCorp will supply the metal from its Nebraska mine, slated to open by 2028 with annual production of 100 metric tons.

The agreement would need to be finalized, although the two companies have an existing relationship as part of a Pentagon-funded research program. 

The contracted volume would be roughly a quarter of global scandium demand, which the U.S. Geological Survey estimates at about 60 metric tons and rising. 

"Both companies recognize how important scandium has become to the future of American defense technology," said Mark Smith, NioCorp's CEO.

Lockheed said it appreciated "the work NioCorp is doing to establish a domestic source of scandium."

The U.S. has not mined scandium since 1969. Rio Tinto RIO.L is the only North American scandium producer, with capacity to produce roughly nine metric tons annually.

GERMANIUM NEGOTIATIONS

Separately, Lockheed is in talks with Teck Resources for a supply of germanium, used to make infrared sensors and other military equipment, a second person familiar with those negotiations said.

Teck mines and produces a zinc and germanium concentrate from its Red Dog mine in Alaska. That concentrate is then smelted in British Columbia and the two metals are separated.

Teck does not break out its annual germanium production but has called itself the largest North American producer and fourth-largest globally. The USGS estimates that global germanium consumption is roughly 60 metric tons annually and rising.

The U.S. imports more than half of its germanium needs.

Lockheed is also in germanium supply talks with Quebec-based 5N Plus VNP.TO, which earlier this year received Pentagon funding to process the metal from recycled feedstock in Utah, the second source added.

"What Lockheed basically wants is a long-term supply chain security," according to the second source. "Because they are under pressure, so they really want to know if the supply is coming from China or elsewhere."

Negotiations with both Teck and 5N have been going on for more than a year. Pricing and the length of the contracts have been sticking points, according to the source.

Representatives for 5N were not immediately available to comment. Teck declined to comment on specific commercial agreements, but said it has agreed to work with the Canadian government to increase germanium processing in British Columbia.

Asked about the germanium discussions, Lockheed said it continuously assesses "the global critical minerals supply chain to ensure access to materials that support our customers' missions."

Chinese critical minerals prices have for years been cheaper than those from Western sources due to differences in mining practices, regulatory standards and other factors. Reuters reported earlier this year that Western governments are trying to set regional minerals prices free from Chinese interference.

(Reporting by Ernest Scheyder in Houston and Divya Rajagopal in Toronto; Editing by Veronica Brown and Sanjeev Miglani)

I heard a rumor that toast is discontinuing xtrachef. Anyone know if this is true?

Only halfway through the week, Niocorp's volume footprint is beginning to really stand out. We're now seeing the largest positive delta and session CVD since September of last year. This is the largest aggressive buying we've seen since then. This week’s footprint may be the first meaningful evidence of renewed accumulation since last fall, but it is not yet confirmed. Confirmation would require price to turn this aggressive buying into acceptance above $4.80–$5.00. Until then, the signal is best viewed as a major demand/supply battle rather than a clean breakout signal.

Adding. Not financial advice. Do your own DD.

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Yesterday in Niocorp, this action occurred in the near term options expirations:

July 2nd 2026

Strike

$4- Volume of 203 on OI of 1; today's resulting OI = 202
$4.5- Volume of 1878 on OI of 35; today's resulting OI = 1896
$5- Volume of 506 on OI of 88; today's resulting OI = 558

July 17th 2026

Strike

$5- Volume of 13,113 on OI of 383; today's resulting OI = 12,959. wow.

This is an enormous amount of option premium that was either used to buy to open or sell to open. It's roughly $394,000 in option premium based on yesterday's prices. This is highly concentrated, so I would expect it's a couple parties with very bullish, speculative positioning OR one massive piece of a covered call strategy. You'd have to own a ton of shares to be selling that many contracts. I find it hard to believe this is not a speculative, bullish buy to open. We've seen them before, notably in May, but this is the largest we've seen by a mile. Also, I think it's worth noting that those short term speculative buys came during an expected catalyst period- and that positioning should've been expected. Given the timing of these and the short term duration, they are quite a bit more peculiar. Maybe just a player trying to make a quick buck on an obviously undervalued stock, or maybe somebody knows something.

Anyways, just thought this was interesting enough to share. If we can move through $5, those options could be a hell of a lot of fuel. Not financial advice. Do your own due diligence.

I think that what we saw at the end of this week was a massive de-leveraging across the Nasdaq, and certainly in most every name associated with the raging Ai bull market. A near 5% single day drop in the Nasdaq is going to hit everything hard, and certainly any high-beta or high volatility stocks. Critical minerals were not spared. Yet, there was a large divergence between the Nasdaq and the S&P 500, and an even larger divergence between the Nasdaq and the Dow. This was obvious all day.

I wasn't encouraged to see what happened across the critical minerals, but there's very little reason to think this extremely high volatility sector would be spared. To be honest, I think that over the last year the critical minerals sector has attracted many of the same short term gamblers that got smoked in the Ai trade yesterday. All you have to do is follow a sub like CriticalMineralStocks to see much of the same nonsense. To be fair, bonds did get hit yesterday while this was happening, and higher rates are going to be a force multiplier to the downside in the sector. However, one thing stuck out to me- the 10yr futures contract opened down quite a bit, and considering the blood bath that continued elsewhere all day, those bonds pretty much held their ground for the rest of the day. That was encouraging. And, as a huge believer in the Niocorp project, I moved some money so I can pick up more as soon as possible. It wasn't until this afternoon that I really wished I would have moved that money last week.

The weekly volume footprint divergence that happened on Friday is kind of astonishing. I pay a lot of attention to the POC. That's the center of gravity. That's the fair value for the last week. That's where most of the business occurred last week. And where is it? At 6.15. It held 6.15 in the face of the late week slaughter. That's a signal, not noise. Also, the bottom price zone of the week saw very aggressive selling and no aggressive buying. You don't need to be aggressive if you can just put limit orders at 5.40 and 5.30 and 5.20 and 5.15 and actually get all the inventory you want when people are throwing their shares out the window at you. The last time this happened was the first week of April and the next week Niocorp jumped nearly 30%. It doesn't mean Niocorp can't trade lower, and it doesn't mean it's going to turn around on Monday and jump 50 cents right out of the gate. I am not Nostradamus, and I can't see the future. But I have to take the totality of the context and make a decision- that's what we do. Not financial advice. Do your own due diligence.

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If you believe (as many do) that Niocorp is on the cusp of signing their binding offtake with Traxys, dropping their updated DFS, and closing on roughly $800 million in EXIM financing...it's worth considering how much of the gap in their valuations (relative to fully-financed critical minerals operations and partially-financed critical minerals operations) will close once financing risk goes to zero.

So, here is the prompt and the result from gpt. Keep in mind that they are undergoing complete vertical integration to produce Scandium-Aluminum master alloy as requested by their partners in defense (Lockheed Martin- Skunkworks). None of that value will be included in the DFS, yet, many expect to learn that NPV simply from their mining and refining operations will be $4B+- even without including the vertical integration that will provide the highest margins. The comparative analysis answer below isn't even using the updated DFS NPV that is supposed to drop any day. It is using the 2022 figure, and yet, there is still a massive gap in valuation due to perceived financing risk- a risk that can plausibly go to zero by the end of this month. According to the CEO's latest announcement, financing is expected in Q2 of 2026.

ChatGPT, Read the latest 10-K from USAR and tell me where they are in terms of production, capacity expansion, margins, etc. in relation to their current market cap of $6.9B. Then tell me where they are in those areas relative to NB's planned financing and production and revenue schedule. I'm looking at USAR's $6.9B market cap and trying to understand how much of the gap NB might close immediately upon EXIM FID, and how much of that gap they might close upon announcement of the binding Traxys offtake and the updated DFS.

https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/0001970622/000197062226000038/usar-20260331.htm

Actually, fold MP into this comparative analysis, as well. They're at a $12.42B market cap today. Here is their most recent 10-Q: https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/0001801368/000180136826000029/mp-20260331.htm

Here is the result. I believe NB may been one of the most slept on opportunities in the space and the market in general. If and when financing risk goes to zero, I expect fireworks. Not financial advice. Do your own DD...

Yes — and the comparison is very favorable to NB if NB gets Traxys binding + a strong DFS + EXIM FID.

Bottom line

USAR is being valued at ~$6.9B while still very early commercially. In Q1 2026, USAR had only $5.7M of revenue, all from Less Common Metals, with just $106K gross profit and 1.9% gross margin. Its Stillwater magnet facility was commissioned but had not yet begun commercial neo-magnet revenue, and Round Top remained pre-mine-construction / feasibility-stage. (SEC)

That means USAR’s valuation is not based on current earnings. It is being valued on strategic mine-to-magnet optionality, U.S. supply-chain scarcity, government support, future capacity, and acquisition-led scale. USAR expects Stillwater Phase 1A to ramp to 600 MTPA magnet capacity by Q4 2026 and Phase 1A + 1B to reach 1,200 MTPA by Q1 2027; it also plans to expand Less Common Metals alloy capacity to 3,000 MTPA by year-end 2026. (SEC)

MP is different: it is already a real operating producer. Q1 2026 revenue was $90.6M, adjusted EBITDA was $36.6M, NdPr production was 917 MT, NdPr sales volume was 1,006 MT, and REO production was 12,983 MT. MP also has a DoW price-protection agreement and is expanding downstream magnet capacity, including a projected 3,000 MT/year magnet capacity commitment at Independence. (SEC)

The key valuation implication for NB

NB at ~$0.85B–$0.9B market cap is being valued much more like unresolved financing risk than like a strategic mineral platform. NioCorp’s existing feasibility-study economics (from 2022) show $2.35B after-tax NPV, 27.6% after-tax IRR, $397.5M average annual EBITDA, and 68% average EBITDA margin over a 38-year mine life. (niocorp.com)

So the question is not whether NB’s planned economics can justify a higher valuation. They can. The question is whether the market believes the project is actually getting built.

Gap-closing framework

Using your assumed 176M fully diluted shares:

Valuation Level	Market Cap	NB Price
Current-ish	~$0.9B	~$5–6
Partial USAR-style strategic rerating	$2B	~$11
Strong post-DFS / binding Traxys rerating	$3B	~$17
Post-EXIM FID / financing credibility rerating	$4B–$6B	~$23–$34
Full USAR market-cap parity	$6.9B	~$39
MP market-cap parity	$12.4B	~$71

My view: binding Traxys + strong updated DFS could plausibly move NB into the $2B–$3B valuation zone. EXIM FID is the event that could move it toward $4B–$6B, because that changes the market’s question from “will this ever be financed?” to “how much of the NPV do we capitalize now?”

USAR proves the market is willing to pay billions for strategic-minerals optionality before full operating proof. MP proves the market pays much more once production, government support, and downstream integration are real. NB is currently trapped between those regimes. Traxys + DFS narrows the gap; EXIM FID is what could close it aggressively.

It's not a huge jump (we don't want that, yet).
There isn't massive volume in the options chain.
However, where the IV is rising (on a relative basis) and where the volume is rotating or building is exciting: it's in the August, November and January '27 contracts. This is a lot more constructive than huge call buying with near-dated expirations. This is more closely associated with rerating and thesis confirmation than high-stakes gambling.

This is one of the more interesting option-chain developments we've seen in NB in several weeks.

A few things jump out immediately.

1. IV is rising across almost the entire catalyst window

Expiration	IV
Jun 5	~108%
Jun 12	~111%
Jun 18	~106%
Jun 26	~102%
Jul 2	~105%
Jul 10	~96%
Jul 17	~116%
Aug 21	~106%
Nov 20	~117%
Jan 2027	~106%

The important thing isn't the absolute number.

The important thing is:

IV is rising while the stock is rising.

That's generally a bullish combination.

Normally:

• stock ↑
• IV ↓

because uncertainty gets priced out.

Instead we're seeing:

• stock ↑
• IV ↑

which means traders are willing to pay more for future upside exposure despite the stock already moving higher.

That usually means the market is beginning to assign a higher probability to a significant event occurring.

2. The August contract remains the center of gravity

You can see it in the OI.

August $7.50

Open Interest ≈ 8,845

August $10

Open Interest ≈ 5,133

Those are still enormous numbers relative to the rest of the chain.

The market is still overwhelmingly focused on:

>

That aligns almost perfectly with your catalyst calendar:

• Traxys
• DFS
• EXIM decision window

August is effectively the "event contract."

3. What I find most interesting is where NEW volume is appearing

Today's volume isn't concentrated in June.

It's appearing in:

• Aug
• Nov
• Jan

That's important.

Because those are not "weekend gambler" expirations.

Those are:

August

Catalyst speculation

November

Post-catalyst positioning

January

Production of a longer-duration thesis

4. The November chain is quietly becoming interesting

Current OI:

• 7.5 strike ≈ 707
• 10 strike ≈ 1,089

Those aren't huge.

But compare them with where the stock is.

At $6.18:

• November 10s are still significantly OTM.
• Yet traders are accumulating exposure there.

That tells me some participants are positioning for:

>

Not merely a one-day spike.

5. January is even more revealing

January OI:

• 5 strike ≈ 4,207
• 7.5 strike ≈ 2,914
• 10 strike ≈ 3,207
• 12.5 strike ≈ 1,935
• 20 strike ≈ 1,070

That is a surprisingly healthy ladder.

What that says:

The market isn't only pricing a binary June/July event.

Some participants are pricing:

>

That's a very different trade.

6. The stock move and IV move are confirming each other

Today:

• Price up ~7%
• IV up
• Volume above average
• Critical minerals sector broadly strong
• MP strong
• USAR strong

This is not a situation where:

>

Instead:

>

That's a healthier environment than a purely isolated spike.

7. What would concern me?

If IV exploded to 140-160% while price stalled.

That would suggest:

• excessive speculation
• crowding
• potential IV crush risk

Instead we're around:

• 105-117% IV

which is elevated but not crazy for a microcap with major catalysts pending. (AlphaQuery)

My read at 12:50 PM CST

The option market appears to be shifting from:

>

toward:

>

That distinction matters.

A month ago, much of the chain looked like traders waiting.

Today:

• stock is pushing through $6
• IV is rising
• August remains dominant
• November and January are seeing meaningful participation

That combination is consistent with traders beginning to price increasing odds of a catalyst-driven revaluation sometime during the June–August window.

It's that the longest-dated speculative contracts (Aug, Nov, Jan) are attracting attention at the same time IV is firming.

That is usually where the earliest signs of a catalyst repricing show up before they become obvious in the common stock.

Today’s volume footprint was one of the more interesting things I’ve seen in a while. Relative to total volume, the delta was more positive than any other day since last August. I checked every single day going backwards, and I just decided to stop when I got to last August. The only two days that were even close to this positive relationship (and they weren’t as good as today, on a relative level) was September 10th and September 11th last year. We all know what happened after that. I’m not expecting a huge spike and new all-time highs without catalysts, but perhaps I need to put the horse before the cart. This action in the plumbing implies nearby catalysts- far more so than any day in March or April when catalysts were possibly on tap. That just caught my eye, so I wanted to share.

Then, I decided to take the volume footprint and ask Mr. Robot to be very specific and play the alternate possibility- and by alternate, I mean opposite. Passive accumulation (what I believe we’ve been seeing everyday for months- and factually supported by a large swath of 13Fs) has some of the very same characteristics as stealth distribution. Has the accumulation reported suddenly reversed and turned into stealth distribution over the last few weeks? Mr. Robot, parse the differences and examine what we’ve been seeing. I’ll post that answer as a reply to this one.

These two environments flash many of the same signals, but they do have key differences. I know what to look for, and I’ve already read the answer. The situation checks many boxes for both, as it certainly would in the instance of either reality. Let’s go, Mark. I’m looking forward the rerating.

I pulled the entire .csv from fintel.io at around 5:15pm CST today. Here is the chatgpt summary and analysis (unedited) of the data from the file...

Executive summary

From the equity 13F file:

Metric	Result
Total institutions/rows	232
Adders / new positions	127
Reducers / exits	66
No change	39
Current institutional shares	51.89M
Prior institutional shares	34.26M
Net share increase	+17.63M
Gross shares added	+23.97M
Gross shares reduced	-6.34M
Current market value	~$229.6M
Institutional ownership vs. 176M fully diluted	~29.5%

The headline is clear: institutional ownership increased materially during the Jan. 1–Mar. 31 reporting period. The net increase was roughly 17.6M shares, equal to about 10.0% of the fully diluted share count.

The biggest adders

Institution	Current shares	Change
Citadel Advisors	6.20M	+6.00M
Brevan Howard	6.49M	+3.92M
Alyeska	4.31M	+2.71M
Goldman Sachs	3.29M	+2.37M
Citigroup	1.14M	+1.12M
Vanguard Portfolio Management	1.01M	+1.01M
BlackRock	7.02M	+636K
Squarepoint	563K	+563K
Jump Financial	370K	+308K
State Street	2.07M	+300K
HITE Hedge	903K	+268K
Alps Advisors	584K	+258K
Geode	1.56M	+250K
Bridgewater	883K	+237K
Point72	506K	+235K

The most important point: this is not just tiny RIAs adding a few hundred shares. The largest net adds came from multi-strat / hedge / quant / broker-dealer-style institutions.

The biggest reducers

Institution	Current shares	Change
Millennium	207K	-985K
Dayah Capital	0	-840K
Counterpoint Mutual Funds	0	-610K
Soviero	0	-380K
Balyasny	92K	-352K
Foursixthree	0	-352K
Gilder Gagnon Howe	0	-345K
Jane Street	392K	-329K
Morgan Stanley	442K	-324K
Deltroit Asset Mgmt	868K	-203K
Arosa	0	-200K
Nuveen	723K	-156K

There were meaningful reductions, especially from Millennium, Morgan Stanley, Jane Street, Balyasny, and several full exits. But the gross adds overwhelmed the gross reductions.

Ownership by style

Approximate classification:

Style	Rows	Current shares	Net change	Market value
Hedge / quant / market-maker / tactical	35	23.57M	+11.75M	~$104.0M
Passive / index / ETF / large asset manager	17	14.23M	+2.98M	~$63.4M
Bank / broker-dealer / intermediary	18	6.81M	+3.49M	~$30.4M
RIA / wealth / private-client	133	6.12M	-0.92M	~$25.7M
Other / unclear	23	0.99M	+0.27M	~$4.5M
Insurance / pension / long-only	6	0.17M	+0.06M	~$1.6M

This is the key read:

The institutional increase is being driven primarily by tactical capital, quant/hedge funds, market-making-adjacent firms, and large financial intermediaries — not by slow-moving traditional long-only institutions.

That does not mean all of the buying is fundamental conviction. It means NB has become a more institutionally relevant liquidity / volatility / catalyst vehicle.

Float analysis

Using the 176M fully diluted share count:

• Institutions now report ~51.9M shares
• That equals ~29.5% of fully diluted shares
• The net increase this period was ~17.6M shares
• That net increase alone equals ~10.0% of fully diluted shares

That is large enough to matter mechanically.

But I would not treat all 51.9M as “locked-up float.” A lot of this ownership is held by firms that trade actively: Citadel, Brevan Howard, Alyeska, Goldman, Citigroup, Squarepoint, Jump, Point72, Susquehanna, etc.

So the float read is:

Reported institutional ownership is now large, but a meaningful portion is tactical and potentially mobile. It can tighten float during accumulation, but it can also become a source of supply during volatility or catalyst disappointment.

Avg. share price paid

The file’s weighted average “avg share price paid” across current institutional holdings is roughly:

• Weighted by current shares: ~$5.20
• Weighted by added shares: ~$5.51
• Simple median across holders: ~$5.73

Important caveat: this should not be read as exact execution price. It is best interpreted as an estimated cost basis / average-price proxy based on reported holdings and Fintel’s methodology. 13Fs do not show exact trade dates or exact purchase prices.

The practical read:

• A lot of current institutional exposure appears centered roughly in the mid-$5s.
• That means the current trading area is very close to the estimated cost basis of many recent/additional institutional holders.
• If NB holds this zone, those holders are not deeply underwater.
• If NB breaks materially below the low/mid-$5s, some recent tactical holders may become more sensitive.

Derivatives 13F file

Derivative exposure is smaller than equity exposure but still meaningful.

Type	Current underlying-equivalent shares	Net change
Calls	2.35M	-822.9K
Puts	760K	-359K

Largest derivative items:

Institution	Type	Current exposure	Change
Susquehanna	Calls	1.37M	-871K
J. Goldman & Co	Calls	409K	+409K
Citadel	Calls	321K	+15.7K
Citadel	Puts	342K	+20.9K
Jane Street	Puts	70K	+26.5K
Jane Street	Calls	36K	+10.9K
Peak6	Calls	50K	-81.9K
Balyasny	Calls	0	-100K
Brevan Howard	Calls	0	-210K

The derivative read is mixed:

• Call exposure declined overall, mainly because Susquehanna, Brevan Howard, Balyasny, and Peak6 reduced calls.
• Put exposure also declined overall, despite some adds by Citadel and Jane Street.
• This does not scream “institutions massively loaded upside calls” during Q1.
• Instead, it looks like derivative books were repositioned or de-risked, while equity ownership expanded strongly.

That distinction matters.

My read

The equity 13Fs are bullish for institutional engagement and float absorption, but not cleanly bullish in the “long-only conviction accumulation” sense.

The best interpretation is:

NB became a much more institutionally active stock during Q1. Large tactical funds, quant desks, banks, and market-making-adjacent firms increased equity exposure materially, while derivatives exposure was more mixed and in some cases reduced.

For your trading thesis, that implies:

• the float is more institutionally held than before,
• the stock is more sensitive to catalyst repricing,
• liquidity can disappear quickly in either direction,
• the mid-$5s are probably an important cost-basis / positioning zone,
• and the name is increasingly being treated as a catalyst-volatility instrument, not just a dormant mining story.