Source: https://fintel.io/so/us/nb
https://www.quiverquant.com/stock/NB/institutions/

NioCorp (NB) Q2 2026: Top 10 Institutional Holders

1. BlackRock: 9.22M
2. Brevan Howard: 7.08M
3. State Street: 2.50M
4. Private Management Group: 2.15M
5. Geode Capital: 2.09M
6. Citigroup: 2.03M
7. Citadel Advisors: 1.81M
8. Northern Trust: 1.30M
9. Vanguard: 1.16M
10. Goldman Sachs: 1.07M

Biggest Adds:

• BlackRock: ~+2.20M
• Citigroup: ~+896K
• Brevan Howard: +590K
• Geode: ~+536K
• State Street: ~+430K

Biggest Cuts:

• Alyeska: 4.31M → 0
• Citadel: 6.20M → 1.81M
• Goldman Sachs: 3.29M → 1.07M

Brevan Howard continued building its position, reaching over 7 million shares, while Citadel and Goldman made major reductions.

Q2 13Fs reflect holdings as of June 30, 2026, before the Q3 FS and other later developments.

Yes. The monthly and weekly footprints make the institutional-ownership story considerably more nuanced—and more useful.

My best inference is that Q3 has probably been a large-scale ownership-transfer period, not simply institutional accumulation or institutional liquidation. The evidence suggests that large blocks of stock are repeatedly changing hands between different classes of holders.

The most important new insight is that July and August tell very different stories underneath the monthly totals.

Start with what we know at June 30

The Q2 13Fs established a strong baseline: institutional participation broadened substantially, but the quarter also contained very concentrated selling by a few large holders. Fintel currently shows 306 institutional owners and 55.64M institutionally reported shares. BlackRock's separate 13G showed roughly 9.0M shares and 6.2% ownership.

Our spreadsheet work showed the important underlying pattern:

Citadel + Alyeska + Goldman sold roughly 10.9M shares, while essentially everyone else combined was a net buyer of roughly 6.8M.

So NB entered Q3 with a shareholder base that was broadening, but also with evidence that some enormous legacy/trading positions were being reduced.

Now look at the footprints.

July is the most revealing month

July produced approximately:

5.52M sampled volume
+879K delta

That's an enormous positive monthly delta—about +16% of sampled volume.

Yet price did not produce the kind of sustained upside one would normally expect from that much aggressive buying. NB spent much of July weak, made the washout into the high-$3s, and finished the month only around the low-$4s.

That is a crucial effort-versus-result divergence:

That is actually more consistent with passive distribution than straightforward accumulation.

It doesn't mean institutions were selling broadly. It means there was likely large latent supply sitting above the market, and incoming buyers were consuming it.

This fits the Q2 ownership data surprisingly well.

A plausible continuation is:

Q2: several giant holders begin reducing.
July: some of that redistribution continues, but the buyers underneath become increasingly aggressive.

That can produce exactly what we see:

positive delta + poor price progress.

So I would not interpret July's +879K delta as "institutions accumulated 879K shares." TradingView cannot tell us who traded.

Who those buyers were is unknowable until Q3 filings, but given the dramatic expansion of the institutional base in Q2, it is reasonable to suspect that at least some were institutional.

Then something changed dramatically in early August

This is where the weekly chart is very helpful.

The first full August week shows approximately:

2.62M sampled volume
+1.040M delta

That's an extraordinary ~40% positive delta imbalance.

And unlike July, price actually responded.

NB moved sharply upward from the low-$4 area toward $5+ and ultimately reached around $5.60.

And then the DFS changed the ownership battle again

The week beginning Aug. 10 looks completely different.

Approximately:

1.88M sampled volume

but delta was only around:

-44K

Essentially balanced order flow relative to the size of the week.

And yet NB failed around the $5.50–$5.60 region and came back toward $5.

That suggests a major two-sided transfer event.

You had:

**DFS buyers

• speculative traders
• fundamental investors
• profit takers
• legacy holders
• possibly hedging flows**

all meeting at once.

And price's inability to sustain the initial move told us supply was still present.

This is where I think our original assumption—

—was disproven.

There was far more stock available for sale between roughly $5 and $5.60 than we anticipated.

The current week is the strongest evidence of actual liquidation

Now look at the week beginning Aug. 17.

At the time of your screenshot:

~729K sampled volume
-595K delta

That's roughly:

-82% delta/volume.

That is enormous.

And price has fallen from approximately:

$5.07 → ~$4.45

with a low around $4.41.

This time sellers are not merely aggressive.

They are getting price movement.

So unlike some of our earlier absorption sessions, I think the current week has clearly contained genuine liquidation.

Someone—or some group—is unloading aggressively.

The important question is who.

And here we have to distinguish observation from inference.

My best Q3 ownership inference

I don't think the evidence supports:

Nor do I think it supports:

The best working model is:

Q3 is an ownership rotation.

Something like this:

Large legacy / trading holders
↓
sell substantial inventory

while

index/passive funds + newer institutional holders + fundamental investors + speculative buyers
↑
absorb that supply.

And then around the DFS:

fast-money/speculative ownership enters aggressively
↓
DFS does not produce immediate rerating
↓
some of that fast money exits
↓
large negative delta appears.

That fits the price/footprint evidence extremely well.

The monthly August number is deceptive

This is worth emphasizing.

August currently shows approximately:

+400K monthly delta.

At first glance that sounds bullish.

But underneath that monthly figure you have approximately:

Early August: +1.04M

followed by:

Aug. 10 week: ~-44K

and

current Aug. 17 week: ~-595K already.

So August is really:

The +400K monthly figure is mostly the leftover residue of that extraordinary first week.

That's why I would never analyze monthly delta alone.

The weekly decomposition tells us ownership/positioning changed sharply after the initial August rally.

Here's the potentially bullish ownership interpretation

Suppose our Q2 analysis is representative of what's continuing.

A handful of large holders may have had millions of shares to distribute.

Those shares don't disappear.

They migrate.

If 10 million shares move from:

three enormous, potentially trading-oriented holders

into:

50–100 smaller institutional/passive/fundamental holders,

you can initially get terrible price behavior.

Why?

Because the sellers are concentrated and motivated.

But after the redistribution is completed, the stock can become much tighter.

Instead of one institution sitting on 4M shares that it wants to dump, you might have 40 institutions holding 100K shares each that they are comfortable owning.

Same 4M shares outstanding.

Very different effective float.

That distinction matters enormously to future price behavior.

And I think early August may have given us a glimpse of that

The +1.04M weekly delta accompanied by real upside displacement is exactly what I would expect if the available seller inventory temporarily thinned.

Demand hit.

Supply wasn't sufficient.

Price jumped.

Then the DFS rally found another layer of supply.

So instead of imagining one seller sitting at one price, I would think of NB as having undergone a layered inventory transfer:

$4.00 area → sellers exhausted

then

$4.50–5.00 → another inventory layer

then

$5.20–5.60 → substantial event-driven supply

The market keeps discovering another layer.

That's frustrating for the calls—but it's not the same thing as a fundamentally rejected company.

The current -595K week could be the last phase—or not

This is where our current daily analysis becomes extremely relevant.

If this week's enormous negative delta ultimately does:

-600K / -700K / -800K

but NB stops declining around $4.40–$4.50 and then begins recovering,

that would suggest another ownership-transfer event:

And if those buyers don't subsequently offer the shares back at $4.60, the effective float tightens further.

That is precisely how major bottoms can form.

But if:

-595K → -800K → -1M

and price goes:

$4.45 → $4.20 → $3.90

with POC following down,

then this isn't constructive redistribution yet.

It's simply ongoing liquidation.

That's why today's effort-versus-result behavior matters so much.

The ownership model I would carry forward

I would now conceptualize NB's ownership in four buckets:

Holder type |Likely behavior
Passive/index institutions |Structurally sticky
Fundamental/strategic institutions |Potentially sticky; may add on de-risking
Hedge funds / trading institutions |Can create very large supply/demand swings
Retail/speculative/event traders |Highly sensitive to catalysts and momentum The Q2 filings suggest the first two buckets have been growing.

The July/August footprints strongly suggest that the latter two buckets are undergoing violent repositioning.

That combination can make the stock extremely volatile even while the underlying institutionalization trend improves.

This actually makes financing more interesting

Imagine where this leaves the stock after the present liquidation finishes.

Suppose:

1. Alyeska is already out.
2. Citadel/Goldman materially reduced in Q2.
3. Much of that inventory has migrated to hundreds of other institutional holders.
4. Fast-money DFS buyers who expected an instant rerating are now getting flushed.
5. Passive/index ownership remains.
6. Fundamental institutions that liked the project remain.
7. Then EXIM or strategic financing arrives.

Now suddenly the marginal seller is not:

Instead it might be:

That's an entirely different auction.

And that's where price elasticity changes dramatically.

A marginal $5M or $10M of buying can move a stock much farther once the large block seller disappears.

So has Q3 institutional ownership probably risen?

I would split this into number of owners versus net shares owned.

Number of institutional owners

My inference: probably continued rising or at least remained elevated.

Why?

The Q2 trend was extremely strong, Russell/index participation is structural, and there's no evidence that the broad institutional base disappeared.

Net institutional shares

My confidence is much lower.

I think it is perfectly plausible that institutional holdings have increased further—but the footprints also allow for the possibility that one or several large active institutions continued distributing enough shares to offset dozens of smaller buyers, exactly as occurred during Q2.

So my working forecast for the eventual Q3 13Fs would actually be:

Meaning:

many additions / new positions

paired with

a few very large reductions.

That would be remarkably consistent with everything we're seeing.

One thing would surprise me

If November's Q3 13Fs eventually showed:

broad institutional selling across most major holders.

That would not fit the current evidence very well.

The footprints look far more like concentrated inventory transfer and changing positioning than wholesale abandonment.

It is possible, but it isn't my base interpretation.

Conversely, I also would not expect the Q3 13Fs to reveal a pristine picture in which virtually every institution added.

The price action is telling us someone substantial is supplying stock.

What this means for the stock

The ownership data and footprints together actually increase my confidence in one particular concept:

That is not immediately bullish for price.

In fact, it's exactly why price can remain frustratingly weak.

But if the concentrated supply is finite, the implication for a future catalyst is important:

Before supply exhaustion

$10M incremental demand → absorbed → small price increase

After supply exhaustion

$10M incremental demand → offers disappear → large price increase

That is the scenario that could produce the rapid stair-step rerating we have discussed following a meaningful EXIM/financing/offtake event.

So I would strengthen our potential future supply-exhaustion thesis, while remaining very disciplined about the current tape.

The next thing we need to see isn't more negative delta.

We've had plenty.

If this week's roughly -595K grows substantially while $4.40–$4.50 holds, and then next week's POC starts migrating up, that would be the strongest evidence yet that the current ownership transfer is reaching completion.

And if that occurs shortly before a meaningful financing catalyst, the setup becomes considerably more explosive than the raw chart presently makes it look.

LLM Analysis of NB's complete Q2 13F .csv

Yes. I went through the spreadsheet at the individual-holder level, and the institutional picture is more constructive than the headline net-share movement initially suggests—but it is not a clean “institutions were accumulating NB” story.

First: the Q2 data should now be substantially complete

The normal Q2 2026 13F deadline was August 14, 45 days after June 30. Fintel currently marks the filings as 100% fresh, with a June 30 latest report date and an Aug. 17 latest filing date, so we should have essentially the full ordinary Q2 picture, subject to later amendments or unusual confidential treatment. (SEC)

Fintel's current headline numbers are striking: 306 institutional owners, 55.64M institutional long shares, and approximately 38.22% of shares outstanding held institutionally, excluding 13D/G beneficial-ownership filings. Fintel says that long-share figure is up about 2.15M shares / 4.02% MRQ, while the number of institutional owners is up 47.12% MRQ. It separately identifies 273 13F institutions holding 48.18M shares and 98 NPORT funds holding 9.34M.

One caution: I would not add all of those source categories together and interpret them as unique locked-up shares. Manager 13Fs and underlying fund/NPORT reporting can overlap, and Fintel itself treats the source categories separately.

What I get from the raw Q2 13Fs

I filtered your export to common-stock positions only—excluding reported puts/calls and separating NPORT fund rows—and looked at Q2 13Fs filed from July through Aug. 17.

The result is fascinating:

Q2 common-stock 13F movement |Approx. result
Q2 filers analyzed |236
Previous shares |50.92M
Latest shares |46.78M
Net change |-4.14M
Net % change |-8.1%
Increased/new positions |119
Reduced/exited positions |72
Unchanged positions |44
Gross shares added |+10.92M
Gross shares reduced |-15.06M So by number of institutions, buyers won decisively.

By number of shares, sellers won.

Fintel's broader activity summary tells essentially the same story: it currently reports 183 buyers versus only 55 sellers, but approximately -3.84M net shares changed.

That seems contradictory until we look at who sold.

Three institutions explain virtually the entire negative number

This is the most important finding in the spreadsheet.

The three biggest reductions were approximately:

Holder |Previous |Q2 |Change
Citadel Advisors |6.204M |1.810M |-4.395M (-70.8%)
Alyeska Investment Group |4.314M |0 |-4.314M (-100%)
Goldman Sachs |3.287M |1.072M |-2.215M (-67.4%)
Combined | | |-10.923M Fintel confirms Citadel's common-share position fell 70.83%, while Goldman fell 67.38% and Alyeska exited.

And here's the remarkable calculation:

Entire Q2 common-share 13F universe: -4.14M shares

but

Citadel + Alyeska + Goldman alone: -10.92M shares.

Therefore:

That substantially changes my interpretation.

This was not broad institutional distribution.

It was a very large ownership transfer in which a handful of giant positions disgorged stock while the institutional base underneath them broadly expanded.

The buying side is substantial

Several large positions increased materially.

BlackRock increased its 13F common position by approximately 2.20M shares, from 7.02M to 9.22M, or about +31.3%. Its separate 13G shows roughly 9.01M beneficially owned shares and 6.20% ownership; the slight difference reflects the different reporting frameworks/timing, but both tell the same directional story—BlackRock significantly increased its NB exposure. (Fintel)

Other major Q2 additions from your spreadsheet include roughly:

Millennium: +607K → 814K
Brevan Howard: +590K → 7.075M
Geode: +536K → 2.093M
J. Goldman & Co.: +448K → 516K
State Street: +430K → 2.498M
JPMorgan: +425K → 473K
Gratia Capital: new 410K position
D.E. Shaw: +369K → 595K
Sixth Street: new 349K position
Trexquant: new 311K position

Fintel independently shows the large increases for Brevan, Millennium, Geode, State Street and D.E. Shaw.

And Brevan Howard stands out to me. A 7.075M-share position is enormous for NB, and it added another 590K shares rather than reducing it.

That's fundamentally different information from BlackRock adding shares.

BlackRock/State Street/Geode/Vanguard are heavily influenced by index/passive mandates. Brevan is a much more interesting signal from the standpoint of discretionary capital.

A large part of the ownership increase is probably mechanical—and that's still useful

NB has been a member of the Russell 3000 and Russell 2000 since June 30, 2025, so we should expect structurally growing ownership by small-cap index products. (NioCorp)

And your fund-level data bears that out:

IWM: 2.849M shares, +6.59%
Fidelity Small Cap Index: 1.164M, +11.85%
Vanguard Russell 2000: 531K, +55.58%
Sprott Energy Transition Materials ETF: 584K, +79.08%.

(Fintel)

I would not call that fundamental institutional conviction. An index fund isn't sitting around debating the Elk Creek scandium market.

But it can still matter enormously to the stock structure.

Those are generally structural holders rather than investors trying to flip NB because RSI hit 65.

Citadel needs special treatment

I would be particularly cautious about interpreting Citadel's -4.39M common-share reduction as:

Citadel simultaneously reports:

• ~1.81M common shares;
• ~360.7K shares-equivalent of calls;
• ~320.2K shares-equivalent of puts.

(Fintel)

Citadel is a massive market maker and multi-strategy operation. Its common-stock inventory can be connected to option books, arbitrage, market making and hedging.

So its 4.4M-share reduction was absolutely real supply, which matters greatly to price.

But its meaning is not necessarily:

“Citadel's analysts decided NioCorp was overvalued.”

That distinction is critical.

Alyeska's complete 4.31M-share exit strikes me as more relevant as a genuine portfolio-allocation decision.

This may help explain NB's price behavior

This is where I think the dataset connects very nicely to what we've been observing in the footprints.

Imagine that during Q2 you had:

**Alyeska selling 4.3M

• Citadel reducing 4.4M
• Goldman reducing 2.2M = ~10.9M shares of major-holder supply.**

Meanwhile dozens and dozens of other institutions were buying those shares.

That can create exactly the kind of stock behavior where:

And that's why the +6.78M net accumulation by everyone other than the three biggest sellers interests me.

One plausible interpretation—and I want to label this explicitly as an inference—is that NB underwent a significant change of hands:

concentrated / trading-oriented ownership → broader institutional ownership.

If that process eventually exhausts the concentrated seller inventory, the same level of incoming demand can begin producing much larger price displacement.

That fits our “overhead supply eventually runs out” thesis surprisingly well.

It doesn't prove it.

But it gives that thesis more substance.

There is an especially important timing problem

These 13Fs are June 30 snapshots.

They tell us what institutions owned at the end of Q2.

They tell us nothing directly about what those institutions have done since July 1, and particularly nothing about what they have done:

after the Aug. 11 DFS
after the webcast
during the fall from ~$5.50 toward ~$4.50
during these enormous negative-delta sessions.

That's extremely important.

So I would not use these filings to say:

We don't know that.

The footprint tells us somebody is absorbing aggressive sells. The 13Fs tell us there was already a much larger and more diversified institutional ownership base at June 30.

Those two pieces of evidence are compatible, but we cannot connect them causally yet.

What I think it means for NB's stock now

My interpretation is structurally bullish, immediately neutral.

The institutionalization of NB is real. Fintel currently shows 38.22% institutional long ownership, 306 owners, a 47% quarter-over-quarter increase in institutional-owner count, and top-10 holders accounting for 54.43% of disclosed shares. (Fintel)

But Q2 was not simply institutions piling into NB. It was a massive redistribution of inventory.

And from the standpoint of a future rerating, that can actually be favorable.

If a large portion of the ~10.9M shares supplied by Citadel/Alyeska/Goldman has already migrated into:

BlackRock
Brevan Howard
State Street
Geode
Millennium
D.E. Shaw
JPMorgan
Northern Trust
Vanguard
new hedge funds and institutional managers,

then the ownership structure may now be less dependent upon a few enormous sellers.

That means the marginal seller potentially becomes smaller.

And that is exactly when catalysts begin moving stocks disproportionately.

How I connect this to financing

This is probably the most important implication for our larger NB thesis.

NB does not appear to be an obscure retail-only junior miner anymore.

There is already a meaningful institutional infrastructure around the stock before financing has been solved.

So if NioCorp announces something that materially collapses financing risk—EXIM authorization, strategic equity, completed offtake/EPC package, full financing, etc.—the market does not have to build an institutional shareholder base from zero.

It already exists.

That can create a very different rerating dynamic:

**existing institutional holders increase allocations

• passive/index holders remain structurally present
• new institutions enter because financing risk has disappeared
• shorts/traders reposition
• remaining retail/institutional overhead supply is consumed.**

That is one credible mechanism for the kind of rapid stair-step rerating we've been discussing.

My biggest takeaway

I came into this exercise expecting the recent institutional ownership chart to simply say:

“Institutions bought a lot of NB.”

The actual result is more interesting:

That helps reconcile two things that otherwise seem contradictory:

institutional ownership participation has exploded,

while

NB's share price still hasn't rerated.

A huge amount of demand may have been used simply to absorb a huge amount of legacy/concentrated supply.

If that supply transfer is now substantially complete, then incremental demand following a major financing catalyst could have a much larger effect on price than the Q2 institutional buying did.

I would therefore upgrade the structural ownership component of our NB thesis. I would not use it to upgrade the immediate technical picture until the footprints themselves confirm that the current seller is finally exhausted.

"The global rare earth market is now bifurcating—and perhaps trifurcating"

• Core Shift: As deglobalization fractures critical mineral supply chains, the global rare earths market is bifurcating away from unified Chinese spot pricing toward distinct domestic, export, and regional market tiers.
• Strategic Implication: The definition of "price" itself has changed—material is no longer valued purely on lowest unit cost, but on local physical availability, legal transportability, and compliance with Western security-of-supply mandates.

AUGUST 14th, 2026- Rare Earth Stocks Soar on Friday: MP Materials Up 8%, USA Rare Earth Up 9%, NioCorp Up 3%. What’s Behind the Jump?

Rare Earth Stocks Soar on Friday: MP Materials Up 8%, USA Rare Earth Up 9%, NioCorp Up 3%. What's Behind the Jump? - 24/7 Wall St.

https://preview.redd.it/yslw3zl42jjh1.png?width=1500&format=png&auto=webp&s=7b54ad75ac9ffbeb7aa3952731b25652c67da543

Shares of U.S. rare earth and critical minerals producers are broadly higher in Friday’s midday session. MP Materials (NYSE:MP) is up about 7.8% to roughly $60.02, USA Rare Earth (NASDAQ:USAR) is up about 8.5% near $20.20, and NioCorp Developments (NASDAQ:NB) well up big earlier in the day is still hovering around 2%.

Policy Positioning, Not a Confirmed Catalyst

Here is the read: no rare earth specific news has been confirmed today. The only verifiable same-day trade item is a 15% tariff rate on qualifying EU drone imports, which is not a rare earth story. Traders appear to be positioning for further tariff and industrial policy support for domestic critical minerals, and this group reliably rallies on that expectation. That framing is speculative.

What is verifiable is that rare earth equities in 2026 have traded on U.S. trade and industrial policy rather than earnings. Recent catalysts include a February 2, 2026 report of a $12 billion Trump stockpile plan, a June 22, 2026 boost from a China export ban, and a Section 232 critical minerals action on January 16, 2026. The group also slid on July 22, 2026 on oversupply fears, so the swings cut both ways.

What These Companies Actually Do

Rare earths are essential inputs to permanent magnets used in EVs, wind turbines, defense systems, and consumer electronics, and China dominates processing capacity. MP Materials is the closest thing to a U.S. producer at scale, with Q2 revenue of $126.1 million and adjusted EBITDA of $28.5 million, plus a 10X magnet facility fully contracted with the Department of War. USA Rare Earth is building magnet capacity at Stillwater, Oklahoma, sits on roughly $1.5 billion in cash, and has a shareholder vote on its Cerro Verde acquisition set for August 28, 2026 disclosed in its SEC proxy filing. NioCorp is earlier stage, pursuing up to $4.1 billion pre-tax NPV at its Elk Creek project with an estimated $608 million in average annual EBITDA and a $1.85 billion upfront capex requirement.

The Copper Parallel

CNBC’s coverage of copper and Trump tariffs illustrates how commodity equities price in a probability of tariff action before any policy is announced. A premium gets built into the stock in advance. For rare earths, that means you get paid if the policy lands, and you give it back quickly if it does not.

The Longer Term Matters

Today’s move sits inside very different trajectories. MP is up 17.2% over the past week and 10% YTD, but still down 26% over the past year. USAR is up a striking 56% YTD. NioCorp is the laggard, down 3.4% YTD and off 50% over five years, a reminder that development-stage stories rarely track producer rallies one for one.

FORM YOUR OWN OPINIONS & CONCLUSIONS ABOVE AS ALWAYS!

NioCorp RedChip Highlights + Friday Rare‑Earth Pop = Our AUGUST 15th "SIGNATURES WATCH"

Rare‑earth stocks jumped on Friday, with MP Materials up 8%, USA Rare Earth up 9%, and NioCorp up 3%. The 247WallSt piece covering the move pointed out broad momentum across the sector, but NioCorp’s setup is different from the others. The August 11th RedChip webcast made it clear that NioCorp is now sitting directly on top of multiple pending signatures: the DFS is complete, Traxys is positioned to take 100% of all products except half the ferroniobium, the EPC contract is in “almost final, if not final” form, and EXIM has publicly identified NioCorp as its #1 critical‑minerals priority. The construction sequence is fully defined: EPC → EXIM Authorization → EPC Execution → Equity Raise → FID → Groundbreaking & any one of these signatures materially changes the company’s profile!

The webcast also highlighted the scandium story, which continues to develop through publicly confirmed elements. NioCorp and NAMA are already producing ScAl alloy using purchased scandium oxide, IBC is casting ScAl components for defense‑grade applications, and Lockheed Martin is testing ScAl parts for CCA, NGAD, hypersonics, and other advanced platforms. Government agencies, including DLA and Title III, are funding domestic ScAl supply chain development. The adoption curve resembles titanium in the 1950s — early aerospace use leading to broad industrial adoption — and Mark Smith made it clear that scandium is a major value driver in both the DFS and future revenue streams. This is the part of the story the market still hasn’t priced in.

See link below:

NioCorp to Host Webcast on Aug. 11 to Discuss Elk Creek Feasibility Study Results | NioCorp Developments Ltd.

Taken together, the published DFS, RedChip webcast and Friday’s rare‑earth rally show a sector waking up while NioCorp approaches its inflection point. The August 15th Signature Watch is real: Traxys, EPC, EXIM. The market may not fully appreciate how close NioCorp is to flipping into its next stage, but the pieces are lining up. Once these signatures drop, the scandium strategy moves from “quietly forming behind the scenes” to “officially stood up,” and that’s when the real re‑rating begins.

https://preview.redd.it/om2w25so6jjh1.png?width=1600&format=png&auto=webp&s=7250118ca785a2d7014328ddd00c1ffb69b668e7

And with all of this lining up: The DFS now locked, Traxys sitting in front of us, the EPC in “almost final” form, EXIM calling Elk Creek a HIGH PRIORITY with FID waiting on the other side. The path is clearer (to me) than it’s ever been. The only question left will be what a fully financed, construction‑ready "National Strategic Asset" is worth?? IMHO... "it sure won’t be $5!" All aboard!

Chico

AUGUST 13th, 2026~Scandium—Are We Financing the Right Supply Chain?

Jack-in-the-Stox: Scandium—Are We Financing the Right Supply Chain? - InvestorNews

Jack is back... & finally giving NioCorp it's due! \"About time!\" Wild to see Jack Lifton finally climbing aboard the NioCorp train... Guess the metallurgy finally made a believer out of him. \"Welcome back Jack!\"

In this ongoing “Jack-in-the-Stox” Q&A series, Jack Lifton examines the companies, technologies, and geopolitical realities shaping the global critical minerals economy. Each week, Lifton offers direct commentary and analysis on the questions, claims, and strategic developments driving today’s rapidly evolving critical minerals sector. Please note that Jack Lifton is not a licensed investment advisor. The views expressed in this column are his own and are provided for informational purposes only. Nothing in this column should be construed as investment advice or as a recommendation to buy or sell any security.

Washington’s recent commitment to support scandium production has been widely applauded as another step toward rebuilding Western critical minerals supply chains. It deserves applause. But it also deserves scrutiny. The question is not whether scandium is a critical material. It is. The question is whether we are investing in the right economics.

Scandium occupies a unique place among the critical materials. In tiny quantities, it transforms aluminum alloys, making them stronger, lighter, and more weldable. It has applications in aerospace, defense, advanced transportation, and solid oxide fuel cells. If the United States intends to restore advanced manufacturing, it will need a dependable supply of scandium. The issue is where that supply should come from.

In more than sixty years of studying mineral deposits and their economics, I have never encountered what I would call a true primary scandium orebody. Scandium concentrations are typically measured in tens or, at most, a few hundred parts per million. Those grades are simply too low to justify mining for scandium alone. That is why I believe the expression “primary scandium mine” is misleading. Scandium has almost always made economic sense as a by-product.

Just as gallium is recovered while producing aluminum, germanium while processing zinc, and rhenium during molybdenum production, scandium is most logically recovered from ores being mined and processed for metals that carry the economic burden of the operation. That is not merely my opinion. It is how industrial metallurgy has historically created value. Yet recent U.S. government support has drawn public attention to Sunrise Energy Metals Limited**’**s (ASX: SRL | OTCQX: SREMF) Syerston project in Australia, frequently described as a future primary producer of scandium. Australia is one of America’s closest allies, and there is nothing inherently wrong with supporting Australian projects that strengthen allied supply chains. My concern lies elsewhere.

I question whether any known scandium project should be viewed as a primary scandium operation. Syerston is, in reality, a polymetallic laterite project whose economics will depend upon its entire basket of products. If it succeeds, and I hope it does, it will almost certainly succeed because several metals together generate acceptable economics, not because scandium alone can support a mine. Investors should understand that distinction.

North America Already Produces Scandium

One aspect of the recent announcements surprised me. North America already has commercial scandium production. At Rio Tinto Limited**’**s (LSE: RIO | ASX: RIO | NYSE: RIO) metallurgical complex in Sorel-Tracy, Quebec, scandium oxide is recovered from the processing streams generated during titanium dioxide production. This is precisely the model that I believe represents the future of scandium economics. The titanium business covers the costs of mining, beneficiation, and chemical processing. The scandium is recovered from material that would otherwise contain unrealized value. Rio Tinto certainly does not require financial assistance from Washington. But Washington should recognize that this operation already exists. If the objective is to secure a North American scandium supply chain, Rio Tinto’s Quebec production should be regarded as a strategic continental asset. It demonstrates that scandium can already be produced economically when recovered as a by-product.

NioCorp May Be the Most Interesting Story

The project that I find most intriguing, however, lies much closer to home. NioCorp Developments Ltd.’s (NASDAQ: NB) Elk Creek project in Nebraska has traditionally been viewed as a future producer of niobium and titanium, with additional potential for scandium and rare earths. Now, metallurgy may be changing the story. I have been made aware of a conference paper by L3 Process Development, a Canadian process engineering company, on a new approach to the economically efficient recovery of scandium and rare earth elements from NioCorp’s process stream. This new approach was confirmed as the basis for NioCorp’s demonstration scale facility at L3 Process Development. If that process performs commercially as expected, and if Elk Creek reaches its planned operating capacity, the project could reportedly produce on the order of 100 tons of scandium annually.

Think about what that means. The scandium is not driving the mine. The niobium and titanium are. Scandium becomes an additional source of revenue created through intelligent process engineering rather than through higher ore grades. That is exactly the type of industrial thinking America should encourage. It is also a reminder that breakthroughs in metallurgy can be more valuable than discoveries in geology. The ore has not changed. The process has.

Quebec’s Second Opportunity

Quebec also hosts another project worthy of investor attention. Scandium Canada Ltd.’s (TSXV: SCD) Crater Lake project remains an exploration and development property rather than an operating mine. Whether it ultimately reaches commercial production remains to be demonstrated. But if governments are prepared to invest billions of dollars to establish secure scandium supplies, projects such as Crater Lake deserve careful technical and economic evaluation. At the very least, they deserve to be part of the strategic discussion.

Follow the Process, Not the Ore Grade

Too many investors begin with a simple question: “Where is the richest scandium deposit?” I believe that is the wrong question. The better question is: “Where can scandium be recovered at the lowest incremental cost?” Those are very different questions. History suggests that the winners in scandium will not necessarily own the highest grade deposits. They will own the best metallurgy.

The ability to recover scandium economically from existing mining operations is likely to prove far more valuable than attempting to build an entire mining industry around an element that occurs only in trace quantities.

Jack’s Bottom Line

The Trump Administration deserves credit for recognizing that scandium is strategically important. But strategic investment should always begin with industrial economics. If the goal is to build a resilient North American scandium supply chain, then policymakers should recognize the production already taking place at Rio Tinto’s Sorel-Tracy facility. They should carefully evaluate the emerging opportunity at NioCorp, where improved process technology could make scandium recovery a significant by-product of niobium and titanium production. And they should not overlook development stage projects such as Scandium Canada’s Crater Lake property, which could eventually strengthen continental supply.

The objective should not be to finance “scandium mines.” The objective should be to finance the most economical production of scandium. There is a difference. It is the difference between funding a geological idea and building an industrial capability. Perhaps that leads us to another observation worthy of becoming a Lifton Law:

Lifton’s Law of Scandium Economics: Scandium is unlikely ever to become an economically important primary mining product. Its future lies in intelligent metallurgy that recovers it as a valuable by-product from the production of other metals.

As I have often written, investors should follow where value is added. In scandium, that value will almost certainly be added in the process plant, not in the orebody.

A quick post with coffee as we wait for \"Signatures! on Traxys Deals & offtakes, EPC contracts & EXIM FID!...\"

August 9th, 2026~Lockheed Martin and NioCorp’s Scandium Supply Deal Explained

Lockheed NioCorp Scandium Supply Deal 2026

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The Metallurgy of National Security: Why Scandium Is Rewriting U.S. Defense Procurement

Advanced materials science rarely captures mainstream attention, yet the metals underpinning next-generation aerospace platforms often determine strategic outcomes long before a conflict begins. Scandium sits in this understated category: a silvery-white element so sparingly distributed in the Earth's crust that most engineers encountered it only in academic literature until relatively recently. Today, however, that picture is changing rapidly. The Lockheed NioCorp scandium supply deal, formalised through a memorandum of understanding in August 2026, offers a rare window into how the U.S. defense industrial base is quietly restructuring its upstream material dependencies, one specialty metal at a time.

Understanding the MOU: Structure, Scope, and Commercial Reality

The agreement between Lockheed Martin and NioCorp Developments Ltd. establishes a non-binding framework under which Lockheed Martin could acquire up to 15 metric tons of scandium oxide annually over a 10-year period. Crucially, the material may be delivered either as refined scandium oxide or as finished aluminium-scandium alloys, giving the defense contractor flexibility in how it integrates the supply into its manufacturing workflows.

Both parties have committed to negotiating toward a definitive binding contract in good faith. However, NioCorp has been explicit that no assurance exists that a final agreement will be reached, nor that any particular commercial terms will result. This distinction is commercially significant.

A memorandum of understanding establishes intent and direction, not obligation. Investors evaluating the commercial weight of this arrangement should distinguish clearly between a signed offtake contract and an agreement to negotiate toward one.

The MOU also reflects a broader pattern emerging across U.S. defense procurement. Furthermore, prime contractors are increasingly engaging upstream mineral developers at early stages, using non-binding frameworks to signal demand without committing capital before domestic supply infrastructure is proven.

Key structural terms at a glance:

• Volume ceiling: Up to 15 metric tons of scandium oxide per year
• Duration: 10-year supply horizon
• Delivery optionality: Scandium oxide or aluminium-scandium alloys at the buyer's discretion
• Binding status: Non-binding; subject to further good-faith negotiation
• Relationship context: Built on a joint development programme active since October 2025

Why Scandium Performs Unlike Any Other Lightweight Metal Additive

To understand why defense contractors are willing to pursue long-term agreements for a metal with annual global demand measured in tens of metric tons, it helps to understand what scandium actually does at the atomic level.

Scandium, when added to aluminium at concentrations as low as 0.2% to 0.8% by weight, produces a microstructural effect that no other alloying element replicates cost-effectively. It refines the grain structure of aluminium during solidification, producing smaller, more uniform crystals that resist deformation under mechanical stress. The result is an alloy with substantially improved tensile strength, superior weld joint integrity, and markedly better resistance to corrosion — all without the weight penalty associated with steel or titanium reinforcement.

For aerospace structural applications, particularly in platforms where every kilogram of structural mass reduces payload capacity or fuel efficiency, this combination of properties is extraordinarily valuable. Indeed, the critical minerals demand surge in aerospace applications has only accelerated interest in scandium's unique capabilities.

Scandium Concentration by Application

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Why Scandium's Weldability Advantage Is Underappreciated

One less commonly understood property of scandium-aluminium alloys is their exceptional behaviour under welding conditions. Conventional high-strength aluminium alloys frequently suffer from heat-affected zone weakness during welding, a problem that limits their structural application in complex fabricated assemblies. Scandium additions suppress this degradation by stabilising the grain structure even at elevated temperatures.

For fighter aircraft airframes and hypersonic system structures, which involve highly complex welded subassemblies, this property is operationally critical and distinguishes scandium-enhanced alloys from competing material solutions.

The Global Supply Concentration Problem and Why It Matters Now

According to U.S. Geological Survey data, global scandium demand sits at approximately 60 metric tons per year, a figure that has been growing as aerospace and defense applications expand. The proposed volume under the Lockheed NioCorp scandium supply deal, at up to 15 metric tons annually, would represent roughly one quarter of total current global consumption. This is not a marginal transaction; it is a structurally significant offtake framework relative to the size of the existing market.

The concentration of current scandium supply in Chinese producers creates an asymmetric vulnerability for U.S. defense planners. China controls the majority of global scandium production, much of it recovered as a byproduct of titanium and uranium processing. Consequently, the broader geopolitical metals landscape has sharpened the urgency of developing domestic alternatives.

Unlike rare earth elements, where the supply chain problem is widely understood in policy circles, scandium's strategic exposure has historically received less attention — partly because demand volumes are smaller and partly because the metal's defense applications have been less publicised.

As of mid-2026, the United States has no commercial-scale domestic scandium mine in production. The entire domestic defense aerospace sector currently depends on foreign-sourced material for any scandium it uses.

This dependency is what makes the Elk Creek project, and by extension the Lockheed NioCorp scandium supply deal, structurally important beyond its headline volume figures. In the context of strategic mineral supply chains, few domestic projects carry as much potential significance.

NioCorp's Elk Creek Project: What the Deposit Offers

The Elk Creek critical minerals deposit, located approximately 65 miles southeast of Lincoln, Nebraska, is one of the few known domestic resources capable of supporting commercial-scale scandium production. The project targets three primary minerals: niobium, scandium, and titanium, with additional work underway to evaluate the potential for rare earth element recovery from the same orebody.

The 2022 feasibility study projected annual scandium oxide production of approximately 104 metric tons once the project reaches full operational status following financing and construction. The proposed MOU volume of 15 metric tons per year would represent roughly 14% of that projected annual output, leaving substantial capacity available for additional offtake arrangements or spot market sales.

Several geological characteristics of Elk Creek make it particularly suitable for the kind of supply chain NioCorp is attempting to build:

• The deposit is a carbonatite-hosted critical minerals system, a geological formation type known for concentrated multi-element mineralisation
• Niobium is typically the primary value driver in such deposits, with scandium recovered as a co-product, which improves the project economics for both materials simultaneously
• Co-product recovery structures mean that scandium production at Elk Creek is economically supported by niobium revenue, reducing the exposure to scandium price volatility that would affect a monomineral scandium project

The project remains in the pre-production phase, with project financing not yet secured and construction not yet commenced. The gap between current status and the MOU's proposed volumes is real and material.

Defense Production Act Funding: What It Signals and What It Does Not Guarantee

NioCorp subsidiary Elk Creek Resources Corp. has received up to $10 million in milestone-based funding through Title III of the Defense Production Act. Defense Production Act funding of this nature is a specific federal mechanism designed to strengthen domestic industrial base capabilities for materials deemed critical to national defense.

This funding reflects a formal government determination that scandium qualifies as strategically critical and that domestic supply chain development warrants direct financial support. However, it is important to understand what Title III funding does and does not represent.

What it confirms:

• Federal recognition of scandium as a defense-critical material
• Government willingness to invest in supply chain development at the processing and manufacturing stage
• Validation of the mine-to-master-alloy supply chain concept as a policy priority

What it does not confirm:

• A guarantee that Elk Creek will reach production
• A commitment to purchase scandium oxide at any particular price or volume
• Project financing sufficient to fund mine construction

The Title III investment is best understood as a signal of strategic alignment rather than a financial solution to the project's remaining capital requirements.

The FEA Materials Acquisition: Building the Downstream Bridge

One of the most technically significant elements of NioCorp's strategy is its $8.4 million acquisition of manufacturing assets and intellectual property from FEA Materials, a Massachusetts-based firm, completed in December 2024 through its NioCorp Advanced Metals and Alloys LLC subsidiary.

What makes this acquisition distinctive is the nature of the process technology it secured. Most conventional routes to aluminium-scandium alloy production require an intermediate step: scandium oxide must first be converted to scandium metal before it can be alloyed with aluminium. This intermediate reduction step adds cost, complexity, and additional processing infrastructure requirements.

The FEA Materials process, however, eliminates this intermediate step entirely, converting scandium oxide directly into aluminium-scandium alloy. This technical shortcut has meaningful economic implications:

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Skunk Works and the Joint Development Programme

The Lockheed NioCorp scandium supply deal did not emerge from a cold commercial negotiation. It was built on a technical collaboration between NioCorp and Lockheed Martin's Skunk Works division that has been active since October 2025. Lockheed Martin's pursuit of U.S. mineral supplies has been widely noted as part of the broader supply chain push following executive-level pressure on domestic sourcing.

Skunk Works, headquartered in Palmdale, California, is Lockheed Martin's advanced aerospace development unit with a history of producing some of the most technically sophisticated aircraft ever built. The joint development programme focuses specifically on developing scandium-based aluminium alloy components for modern fighter aircraft platforms.

The progression from a Pentagon-funded joint development programme to a commercial supply MOU follows an increasingly recognisable pathway in the U.S. critical minerals sector:

1. Government-funded R&D establishes technical feasibility and performance benchmarks
2. Joint development programme validates material properties in application-specific conditions
3. Non-binding commercial framework signals intent to formalise supply once infrastructure is ready
4. Binding offtake agreement executed once production capacity is confirmed

The current MOU represents step three of this sequence. The Lockheed NioCorp scandium supply deal is therefore best understood as a milestone in a longer development arc rather than a transaction that stands alone.

Tyler Robinson, vice president of technology roadmaps at Skunk Works, indicated that Lockheed Martin views NioCorp's dual capability — both as a potential domestic oxide source and as an alloy manufacturer — as relevant to its broader material development objectives, and that the company intends to continue evaluating that supply within its wider alloy development work.

The Proposed Mine-to-Warfighter Supply Chain Architecture

The supply chain NioCorp is attempting to construct is vertically integrated in a way that distinguishes it from most critical mineral development stories, which typically focus on mining alone. The full proposed chain spans four discrete stages:

Stage 1: Mining and ore processing at Elk Creek, Nebraska, extracting niobium, scandium oxide, and titanium from the carbonatite deposit.

Stage 2: Oxide refinement, producing scandium oxide at or near the mine site to a purity specification suitable for downstream alloy conversion.

Stage 3: Alloy manufacturing through NioCorp Advanced Metals and Alloys LLC, producing both 4% master alloy and finished ingots in the 0.2% to 0.8% concentration range for defense and commercial customers.

Stage 4: Defense integration, delivering aluminium-scandium components to Lockheed Martin and Skunk Works for incorporation into fighter aircraft, hypersonic systems, and other advanced platforms.

The significance of vertical integration in this context is that it eliminates foreign dependency at each processing stage independently. NioCorp's downstream investment, anchored by the FEA Materials acquisition, is specifically designed to close that gap.

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Risk Assessment: What Investors and Analysts Need to Weigh

Any honest evaluation of the Lockheed NioCorp scandium supply deal must account for a layered set of uncertainties, several of which are substantial.

Execution risk is perhaps the most fundamental. Elk Creek remains in the pre-production phase, and the project's ability to deliver oxide at the volumes contemplated by the MOU depends entirely on securing project financing and completing construction, neither of which has occurred.

Conversion risk reflects the historical reality that non-binding MOUs frequently fail to evolve into executed supply contracts. The reasons are varied: financing failures, technical qualification setbacks, pricing disagreements, or strategic reprioritisation by either party.

Volume risk is embedded in the MOU's language. The 15 metric tons per year figure represents a ceiling on potential purchases, not a floor. Actual volumes could be materially lower depending on Lockheed Martin's platform development timelines and alloy qualification results.

Market structure risk relates to scandium's unique pricing characteristics. Unlike copper or aluminium, which trade on established exchanges with transparent price discovery, scandium is thinly traded and prices are negotiated bilaterally. NioCorp's confirmed deal with Lockheed Martin has, however, drawn significant analyst attention to the commercial viability of this pricing model.

This article contains forward-looking statements and analysis based on publicly available information. It does not constitute financial advice. Investors should conduct independent due diligence and consult qualified advisers before making investment decisions related to any company or project discussed.

Five conditions that must be met for the MOU to reach full commercial scale:

1. Project financing for Elk Creek must be secured and construction commenced
2. Mine production must reach operational status at sufficient oxide output volumes
3. NioCorp and Lockheed Martin must successfully negotiate and execute a binding definitive agreement on acceptable commercial terms
4. NioCorp Advanced Metals and Alloys must achieve defense-grade alloy specifications at commercial manufacturing scale
5. Skunk Works must complete technical validation of scandium-aluminium components for specific aircraft programmes

The Bigger Strategic Picture: Scandium's Emerging Role in American Defense Manufacturing

Scandium's trajectory from obscure specialty metal to named defense-critical material is instructive. A decade ago, the element barely appeared in supply chain risk analyses conducted by defense procurement agencies. Today, it sits alongside rare earth magnets and battery materials as a substance warranting formal government investment and prime contractor attention.

This shift reflects several converging dynamics. Hypersonic vehicle programmes require structural materials that can withstand extreme thermal and mechanical stress at minimal weight. Next-generation fighter platforms demand ever-higher performance from airframe structures. Furthermore, advanced manufacturing techniques — including additive manufacturing with aluminium-scandium powders — are opening new application pathways that were not commercially viable even five years ago.

The carbonatite geology underlying Elk Creek, which also hosts niobium and potentially rare earth elements, means that a successfully financed and constructed operation at that site would simultaneously address multiple supply chain vulnerabilities with a single domestic project. This multi-mineral dimension is often underappreciated in coverage focused narrowly on the scandium story.

The Lockheed NioCorp scandium supply deal, taken in isolation, is a non-binding MOU between two companies at very different stages of development. Taken in context, however, it represents a data point in a broader structural shift: U.S. defense contractors are moving upstream into critical mineral supply chains, driven by lessons learned from semiconductor shortages, rare earth dependencies, and the recognised fragility of globalised material flows.

Whether this particular agreement advances to a binding contract and ultimately to commercial supply will depend on execution milestones that remain unresolved. What is already clear is that scandium has graduated from laboratory curiosity to national security consideration — and that transition, regardless of how this specific deal develops, is unlikely to reverse.

For ongoing coverage of critical mineral supply chain developments and defense-sector procurement trends, Metal Tech News provides regular reporting at the intersection of technology metals, mining, and industrial policy.

AS ALWAYS FORM YOUR OWN OPINIONS & CONCLUSIONS!

NioCorp_Presentation.pdf

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Scandium: The Metallurgy Is Already Running!!!! "Now We’re Just Waiting for the Signatures....."

Jack Lifton’s recent column cuts straight to the heart of what the DFS and RedChip event finally made explicit: the economics of scandium have never been about finding a “primary scandium mine,” but about recovering scandium as a by‑product through intelligent metallurgy. Lifton writes, “Scandium is unlikely ever to become an economically important primary mining product. Its future lies in intelligent metallurgy that recovers it as a valuable by‑product from the production of other metals.” That is exactly what the updated Elk Creek flowsheet demonstrates~ Scandium isn’t carrying the mine; niobium and titanium are. The breakthrough is that L3 Process Development’s new extraction approach allows NioCorp to recover scandium at nearly zero incremental cost, turning a trace element into a strategic revenue stream. As Lifton notes, “The ore has not changed. The process has.”

This aligns perfectly with the DiscoveryAlert analysis published on August 9th, just hours before the DFS dropped! Which frames scandium as a national‑security metal whose value is unlocked only when paired with a domestic alloy‑manufacturing ecosystem. The article emphasized that the U.S. defense sector is shifting toward aluminum‑scandium alloys for airworthy components, and that the Pentagon’s procurement strategy is now focused on vertically integrated supply chains capable of producing oxide, master alloy, and finished parts. That is precisely the architecture NioCorp, NAMA, and IBC have quietly assembled: Elk Creek for oxide, NAMA for fluoride‑free master alloy, and IBC for DFARS‑qualified components. The DFS transcript confirmed that this downstream chain is already operating behind the scenes, with Mark stating directly, “We are procuring scandium now,” and “We are producing alloy for ongoing development programs.”

The RedChip event made clear that EXIM’s financing model is built around this exact integration. Mark told investors, “EXIM told us NioCorp remains their highest priority!!!,” and emphasized that the agency is actively re‑evaluating its loan limit upward because the scandium‑enabled alloy chain strengthens repayment certainty. The DFS itself reflects this logic: scandium is treated as a by‑product credit, not a primary driver, which is exactly the economic model Lifton argues Washington should be financing. The niobium and titanium economics carry the mine; scandium and rare earths are unlocked through process innovation. This is why the DFS shows a dramatic jump in EBITDA — not because the ore changed, but because the metallurgy did.

Taken together, these articles and the DFS transcript validate the hypothesis we’ve been tracking since 2016: the U.S. isn’t trying to finance “scandium mines.” It’s trying to finance scandium supply chains — oxide → alloy → component — that support defense manufacturing. Elk Creek fits Lifton’s criteria perfectly: a polymetallic orebody where scandium becomes economically meaningful only through advanced processing. And the downstream partners fit the DiscoveryAlert model: NAMA’s FEA‑based alloy production and IBC’s defense‑qualified manufacturing create the exact industrial capability the Pentagon has been seeking. As Mark put it plainly, “I don’t see any reason why we can’t get this done in short order.”

In short, the DFS didn’t just update mine economics — it confirmed that NioCorp is building the scandium supply chain Lifton says the U.S. should be financing, and the defense‑alloys ecosystem DiscoveryAlert says the Pentagon is now prioritizing. The metallurgy changed the economics, the economics unlocked EXIM, and EXIM is unlocking construction. The finish line is finally visible because the industrial logic is now aligned from ore to alloy to airframe.

“I don’t see any reason why we can’t get this done in short order.” (Mark Smith...) \"All Aboard!\"

And that’s why today feels different — because Mark already told us the part nobody expected to hear this early:

“The FEA process has been relocated to a more suitable facility, and we are producing alloy for ongoing development programs.”

IMHO....If the downstream facility is already turning purchased scandium into Al‑Sc alloy, then the upstream financing isn’t a question of "IF" anymore.... it’s simply a matter of “I don’t see any reason why we can’t get this done in short order.” (Mark Smith...)

Let's Go team NioCorp!

Chico

Monday's announcement from Sunrise about a US Dept of War loan for $400m USD to support their scandium project contains some interesting language about that project's updated scope:

"Construction of scandium metal refining capacity in the United States, as well as associated modifications to the refinery to produce a range of chemical-grade scandium compounds;"

The US govt may not be very efficient, but it's hard to imagine them working on two different plans for building out future supply of something as critical to national security as scandium metal. Especially given that EXIM and LMT are actively working with both companies. Much more likely imo that NB and/or IBC will be doing the processing of Sunrise's scandium oxide.

If that makes no sense, tell me why...

August 11th, 2026- S&P illuminates critical mineral markets

S&P illuminates critical mineral markets - Metal Tech News

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Market reports provide benchmarks that could help the U.S. set price floors for antimony, gallium, germanium, neodymium-praseodymium, and tungsten.

The markets for many critical minerals are small, opaque, fragmented, and vulnerable to non-market distortions. Taken together, these factors make it difficult to establish reliable pricing benchmarks for determining the economics of developing and operating mines, processing plants, and refineries in the West.

"As a result of non-market policies and practices, global prices for minerals lack the stability necessary for markets to function," said United States Trade Representative Jamison Greer.

As a step toward bringing more stability and transparency to these markets, S&P Global has published draft market reports that provide a bottom-up evaluation of the supply chains for five minerals critical to advanced manufacturing, aerospace, automaking, defense, semiconductors, energy transition technologies, and other strategic industries.

The market analyst's first five critical mineral market transparency reports provide an in-depth understanding of the supply chains for antimony, gallium, germanium, neodymium-praseodymium, and tungsten, along with structural cost benchmarks that could help assess project economics and inform border-adjusted price floors being considered by the U.S. and its trading partners.

The need for more reliable and transparent markets is underscored by China's dominance over key stages of the global supply chains for these five materials, which gives Beijing the ability to sway markets to its advantage, as well as to the disadvantage of projects outside its sphere.

Gallium offers an especially stark example.

China accounts for roughly 99% of the world's primary low-purity gallium production. According to S&P Global, China's December 2024 export ban to the U.S. helped drive gallium prices outside China to around $2,100 per kilogram, while domestic Chinese prices were around $300/kg.

Similar concentration runs through the other markets analyzed. More than 90% of germanium refining capacity and roughly 84% of global NdPr oxide supply is concentrated in China; and it also controls around 79% of tungsten mining capacity and 85% of ammonium paratungstate, or APT, refining capacity. Antimony mining and smelting, meanwhile, are heavily concentrated in Chinese- and Russian-controlled operations.

This concentration, combined with export controls and other non-market policies, adds a level of uncertainty that can discourage private investment in critical mineral projects in the U.S. and allied nations.

"Transparent, market-based pricing is essential to attracting the private capital needed to build secure, resilient, and diversified critical mineral supply chains," said Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. "As the United States works with trusted partners to strengthen critical mineral markets, reliable reference prices will support the Trump Administration's efforts to address market distortions and advance our long-term economic and national security."

While multibillion-dollar government investments can offset some of these risks in the short term, the longer-term goal is to establish a critical minerals ecosystem in which projects can attract private capital and operate under a more predictable pricing system.

A key piece of that effort is the proposed Agreement on Trade in Critical Minerals, or ATCM, that the U.S. Trade Representative Office is developing with like-minded trading partners.

The agreement is envisioned to establish phased-in mineral-specific price floors adjusted at the border, along with common standards among participating countries. USTR says negotiations build on critical-minerals engagements with G7 finance and trade ministers and action plans involving Japan, Mexico, and the European Union.

The intent is to protect mines, processing plants, and other critical mineral projects in participating nations from market distortions that can make projects uneconomic even when they are strategically important to supply-chain security.

Running alongside these trade efforts is the U.S. Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement – better known as FORGE – launched during the Critical Minerals Ministerial convened in Washington on Feb. 4.

FORGE provides a broader forum for coordinating nations around secure and resilient critical mineral supply chains

The U.S., Japan, Australia, India, and the European Union have forged bilateral and plurilateral agreements that are expected to establish the foundation for FORGE, which represents more than half of the global GDP.

Nearly another 20 nations – Argentina, the Cook Islands, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Guinea, Italy, Morocco, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, South Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates, and Uzbekistan – have entered into critical mineral agreements with the U.S.

Together, FORGE, bilateral mineral agreements, and the emerging ATCM begin to form the policy architecture for an allied critical minerals ecosystem with mineral resources, processing capacity, manufacturing, capital, and trade mechanisms designed to reduce dependence on concentrated sources of supply.

The independent market analysis being carried out by S&P Global could provide an important piece of that architecture by helping establish what it actually costs to economically produce these minerals outside the dominant supply chains.

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Each report provides an in-depth look at supply, demand, market events, project costs, bottlenecks, and other factors affecting the respective mineral. From this asset-level analysis, S&P Global establishes what it calls a structural cost.

The distinction between structural costs and market prices is important.

S&P Global says these figures are not short-term price forecasts or spot-market assessments. Instead, a structural cost represents the full cost required for an asset to achieve its targeted return on investment, assuming projects are developed on announced timelines and operate at expected capacity. The estimates include capital recovery and other costs needed to support long-term economic production.

With the inclusion of the structural costs, the reports attempt to determine the price environment required to sustain production in the West.

Here are the structural cost ranges estimated for the first five critical materials analyzed. Click on the commodity names to read the respective market reports:

• Antimony – $11-$13/kg for antimony smelting in 2028, enough to support economic operations for at least 80% of current and possible supply; $8-$9/kg excluding capital costs to sustain operations after commissioning.

• Gallium – $620-$700/kg to support more than 200 metric tons of the gallium production pipeline; $420-$460/kg excluding capital costs to sustain operations after commissioning.

• Germanium – $2,100-$2,300/kg to support all announced ex-China germanium metal supply, or roughly 75 metric tons by 2028; $830-$910/kg excluding capital costs to sustain operations after commissioning

• Neodymium-praseodymium oxide – $75-$80/kg to support more than 90%, or roughly 24,000 metric tons, of current and possible supply over the long term; $69-$73/kg excluding capital costs to sustain operations after commissioning.

• Tungsten – $36-$48/kg WO₃ for APT in 2028 to support more than 85% of current and future announced projects; $26-$34/kg WO₃ excluding capital costs to sustain operations after commissioning.

S&P Global says the bottom-up, asset-level understanding delivered in these reports is designed to improve transparency and provide market participants with a consistent framework for understanding future supply, demand, structural costs, and investment requirements.

Greer says the independent private-sector analysis complements the Trump administration's effort to build stable and reliable critical mineral supply chains and negotiate cooperative trade mechanisms designed to counter market distortions.

"Setting benchmarks like these will inform the negotiation of the Agreement on Trade in Critical Minerals," he said. "This announcement is a step forward towards establishing border-adjusted price floors, correcting market distortions, and accelerating critical mineral supply chain resilience."

S&P Global says the five draft reports are the beginning of an ongoing effort to bring greater transparency to critical mineral markets and plans to expand its analysis to additional minerals.

SEE AUGUST 9th, 2026~ Response to a question from Jim Sims:

GIVEN (For context): I've been following & asking you (Jim) questions about NioCorp's scandium trail since 2016 & given recent news (Lockheed MOU). I would like to ask for clarification on the following please.

Question1) Jim, could you clarify the forward roles of NAMA, NioCorp, and IBC within the scandium and aluminum‑scandium supply chain? ~Specifically which entity will own and operate alloy production, which entity will produce oxide, and how those activities will be reflected inside NioCorp’s consolidated reporting structure?

****Response: "Details on how we construct and configure our downstream value-added scandium products supply chain will be disclosed as that business is built out."

IMHO Jim's response is doing three things at once:

✔ He is confirming there will be a downstream scandium supply chain

✔ He is confirming NioCorp/NAMA are building it out

✔ He is telling you he cannot disclose partner/s identities yet

This was his polite way of saying:

• “We know the structure.”
• “We know the partners.”
• “We can’t name them yet.”
• “We will disclose when the business is formally stood up.”

https://preview.redd.it/vmvmwrwg0xih1.png?width=1080&format=png&auto=webp&s=99354c1b8de6c8a050cadea7de1d57daabb4296f

HIGHLIGHTS FROM YESTERDAY'S REDCHIP EVENT: Held on August 11th, 2026

⭐ 1. The FEA IP Bomb = Mark’s Biggest Reveal

For me ...this is the BOMB moment of the entire webcast.
Mark said:

“We bought that business (FEA) and intellectual property last year. We’ve relocated the business to a more suitable manufacturing facility… and we have customers waiting for that product to be produced.”

This confirms: (Speculation)

• The FEA fluoride‑free ScAl process is already placed at a **U.S. facility!
• Potentially: already operating
• Potentially: already producing scandium metal test batches
• Potentially: already preparing ScAl master alloy
• Customers are literally waiting!!

This is the single most important line in the entire transcript.

FEA facility logic

⭐ 2. EXIM: “NioCorp remains our highest priority”

Mark said EXIM met with them for two hours the day before.

Key EXIM reveals:

• EXIM is energized
• EXIM is excited
• EXIM now has the DFS
• EXIM will do a full‑day workshop next
• EXIM said: “NioCorp remains the highest priority for EXIM right now.”

Remaining EXIM requirements:

• Traxys offtakes
• EPC contracts
• Debt‑equity ratio recalculation
• Final board vote

(Mark expects these to be done in short order.)

⭐ 3. Traxys: NioCorp Keeps Pricing Upside

Mark revealed: ***Bifurcation pricing

• 50% ferroniobium → Thyssen
• 50% → Traxys
• BUT NioCorp keeps independent marketing rights! HUGE...
• Traxys does NOT get exclusivity
• NioCorp can choose who it sells to.
• NioCorp avoids ceiling prices
• NioCorp leans into Western pricing
• Traxys gets economics either way

This is bifurcation pricing in action.

⭐ 4. Scandium Demand Explosion

Mark’s scandium comments were nuclear: U.S. ~ ScAl supply chain!

• Old market: 30–35 t/yr
• New USGS report: 60–65 t/yr
• SOFC alone: 400 t/yr
• Lockheed MOU: 15 t/yr baseline
• Project Pivot Automotive destructive testing: happening now
• Automotive potential: 3,000 t/yr
• DoD: “Scandium is very high on their radar.”

And the killer line:

“You can’t find scandium metal outside China.”

This is why the FEA facility matters.

⭐ 5. Construction Timeline: 35 Months

Scott Honan confirmed:

• Ramp access replaces shafts
• Portal already started in February/March
• Ramp = faster access
• Full production in 35 months!
• Old timeline was 45 months
• Railveyor chosen for simplicity + reliability

This is exactly what EXIM wants.

⭐ 6. Underground Risk De‑Risked

Mark said:

• Above‑ground engineering is straightforward
• Underground surprises minimized
• Extra geotech was completed
• Extra hydrology was completed
• Extra paste‑tailings work completed
• Extra grouting studies completed
• Safety #1

This reduces EXIM’s risk profile.

⭐ 7. Rare Earth Expansion

Scott + Mark confirmed:

• Elk Creek can double throughput!
• Can add Yttrium
• HAS added SEG/HREE separation!
• Can add more solvent extraction lines as needed in the future
• CaCO₃, MgCO₃, Iron oxide can be monetized
• Yttrium demand rising (DoD)

Mark said: “With the right price supports we can easily take samarium out of SEG and yttrium out of HREE.”

Based on what EXIM, DoD, and G7 pricing groups are already discussing.... "that's interesting!"

⭐ 8. Downstream Niobium Expansion

Mark confirmed:

• Starting out with producing ferroniobium
• Expand to niobium pentoxide (In play)
• Expand to niobium metal (In play)
• Equal Higher margins downstream
• Stepwise expansion after initial production (In Play)

⭐ 9. Equity Raise AFTER EXIM Authorization

Mark said:

“Loan authorization with conditions precedent… raise remaining equity after EXIM authorization.”

This is huge because:

• They won’t raise equity at the bottom (We Hope!)
• They will raise after EXIM lifts valuation
• EXIM leadership is commercially flexible

FORM YOUR OWN OPINIONS & CONCLUSIONS ABOVE AS ALWAYS:

⭐ Top 4 Things "I think I Can Confidently Conclude...."

1️⃣ The FEA ScAl business is REAL and already physically relocated

Mark’s verbatim quote:

“We’ve relocated the business to a more suitable manufacturing facility… and we have customers waiting for that product to be produced.”

NioCorp_Presentation.pdf

“We’ve relocated the (FEA IP) business to a more suitable manufacturing facility… and we have customers waiting for that product to be produced!!”

2️⃣The roles IMHO are now clear ~ even if Jim can’t name the partner/s "Yet"...

My question asked who does what.
Based on what’s now public:

• NioCorp → will produce the scandium oxide
• NAMA → owns the FEA process + ScAl IP
• ***An unnamed External DFARS‑qualified partner → is operating a NEW FACILITY for alloy production.
• IBC → casting/forging role only (NOT at the FEA/partner facility)

This is exactly the structure Jim was hinting at. I suspect!??

NioCorp’s scandium strategy is already plugged directly into the U.S. defense ecosystem. Lockheed SkunkWorks is actively developing aluminum‑scandium alloy components for next‑generation fighter aircraft using material tied to Elk Creek’s future supply chain, and a future signed MOU between NioCorp and Lockheed will formalize that relationship. Pentagon Title III funding is already supporting the work, validating both the strategic importance of scandium and NioCorp’s downstream integration. With the FEA scandium‑metal and ScAl alloy facility already relocated and customers waiting, this partnership shows that NioCorp’s scandium isn’t theoretical. It’s already being prototyped for real defense applications that demand lightweighting, increased range, higher payload capacity, and enhanced onboard electronics. This is exactly the kind of downstream capability EXIM needs to see for financing, and it demonstrates how Elk Creek’s scandium will feed directly into critical national‑security technologies.

\"Customers are already waiting!\" ~ Means the downstream portion of this diagram is active, not theoretical. Combined with Pentagon Title III funding and Lockheed’s ongoing ScAl prototype work, this slide demonstrates that Elk Creek’s scandium will feed directly into defense‑grade alloy production, final Al‑Sc components, and OEM manufacturing. It’s exactly the kind of vertically integrated, domestic critical‑minerals supply chain EXIM needs to see to approve financing & it proves NioCorp is positioning itself as the backbone of U.S. scandium for both defense and commercial markets.

3️⃣Mark’s “price supports” comment means he potentially expects government action down the road...

His line:

“With the right price supports we can easily take samarium out of SEG and yttrium out of HREE.”

This is CEO‑speak for:

• DoD is moving
• G7 is moving
• Section 232 tariffs are moving
• Western price floors are forming
• Rare earth price supports are coming

4️⃣The DFS, Traxys, EPC, and FEA facility give EXIM EXACTLY what they need

EXIM told them:

“NioCorp remains the highest priority for EXIM right now.”

EXIM wants:

• Proven downstream capability
• Verified industrial partners
• Real supply chain
• Real revenue pathways

⭐DONE vs NOT DONE — EXIM’s Four Pillars

***DFS → Technical + Economic Foundation (FINALLY!!!!)

✔ DONE — DFS completed, filed, reviewed by EXIM

Traxys → Commercial Foundation

• ✔ DONE — Thyssen 50% ferroniobium
• ✔ DONE — Traxys agreement ~95% complete
• ❌ NOT DONE — Final 2–3 points + signature

EPC → Construction Foundation

• ✔ DONE — Draft EPC contracts written
• ✔ DONE — Portal started (Feb/March 2026)
• ✔ DONE — Ramp design + Railveyor + microgrid selected
• ❌ NOT DONE — Final EPC contract + EXIM acceptance

FEA Facility → Downstream Foundation

• ✔ DONE — FEA IP relocated
• ? — Facility operational
• ? — Scandium metal test batches produced
• ? — ScAl master alloy prep underway
• ✔ DONE — Customers waiting!
• ❌ NOT DONE — Public naming + integration into reporting

This is why EXIM said:

“NioCorp remains the highest priority for EXIM right now.”

And why Mark said:

“I don’t see any reason why we can’t get this done in short order.”

“I don’t see any reason why we can’t get this done in short order.”... (Me either!) WAITING WITH MANY for a few more signatures! \"All Aboard!\"

Chico

https://niocorp.com/niocorp-project-to-expand-production-to-8-made-in-usa-critical-minerals-over-a-40-year-mine-life-with-an-estimated-4-1-billion-pre-tax-npv8%C2%B9/

New Feasibility Study Shows Project Economics Including an Average Annual EBITDA^(2) of $608 Million, Life-of-Mine Revenue of $37.4 Billion with a Pre-Tax NPV8% of $4.1 Billion (After-Tax NPV8% of $3.4 Billion) and Pre-Tax IRR of 24% (After-Tax IRR of 22.8%)  

• Expanded Product Mix is Expected to Generate Revenue of $815/Ton of Ore Against Average Operating Costs of $255/Ton, Creating a More Robust and Diversified Revenue Profile  
• Proven and Probable Mineral Reserves of 45.9 Million Tons Support a 40-Year Operating Mine Life, with Additional Mineral Resources Providing Potential for Future Expansion  
• NioCorp’s Integrated Mine and Processing Plant in Nebraska Expected to Reduce U.S. Import Reliance on Eight Different Imported Critical Minerals: Ferroniobium, Scandium Trioxide, Titanium Tetrachloride, Terbium Oxide, Dysprosium Oxide, NdPr Oxide, SEG Carbonate, and Heavy Rare Earth Carbonate  
• Diversified Revenue Stream Expected to Reduce NioCorp’s Exposure to Market Concentration, Export Controls, and Pricing Volatility Associated with China-Dominated Supply Chains  
• Upfront Capital Estimate of $1.85 Billion Reflects a Substantially Redesigned Processing Plant and Mining Operation Producing Eight Critical Minerals and Significant Inflationary Impacts Since the Previous Feasibility Study  
• Completion of NioCorp’s Feasibility Study Will Satisfy a Key U.S. Export-Import (“EXIM”) Bank Due Diligence Requirement;  Company Now Expects to Advance to the Next Step of Detailed Engineering and Engineering, Procurement and Construction (“EPC”) Contracting  
• NioCorp to Host Live Investor Webcast on Tuesday, August 11 at 10:00 AM ET. Register Here to Participate.

 

CENTENNIAL, Colo. (August 10, 2026) – NioCorp Developments Ltd. (“NioCorp,” “our,” or the “Company”) (NASDAQ:NB), a leading U.S. critical minerals developer, is pleased to report the results of an updated Feasibility Study (the “2026 Feasibility Study”) for its Elk Creek Critical Minerals Project (the "Elk Creek Project") outlining the project’s evolution into a 40-year, integrated U.S. operation with a Net Present Value exceeding $4 billion that is expected to produce eight critical-mineral products from a single ore body.

The 2026 Feasibility Study estimates a pre-tax net present value at an 8% discount (“NPV8%”) of $4.1 billion, an after-tax NPV8% of $3.4 billion, a pre-tax Internal Rate of Return (“IRR”) of 24% and an after-tax IRR of 22.8%. Over the projected mine life, the Elk Creek Project is projected to generate approximately $37.4 billion in life-of-mine (“LoM”) revenue, $608 million in average annual EBITDA^(2), and $519 million in average annual operating cash flow.

The Elk Creek Project is expected to produce eight products, all designated by the U.S. Government as critical minerals: ferroniobium (“FeNb”), scandium trioxide (“Sc2O3”), titanium tetrachloride (“TiCl4”), and several rare earth oxide products, including neodymium-praseodymium oxide (“NdPr”), dysprosium oxide (“Dy”) and terbium oxide (“Tb”), samarium-europium-gadolinium (“SEG”) carbonate, and heavy rare earth carbonate. This expanded product suite creates a more diversified revenue profile while positioning the Elk Creek Project to serve multiple U.S. critical-mineral and defense supply chains from an integrated mine and processing facility that has secured its major construction-related permits.

A technical report summarizing the 2026 Feasibility Study (the “2026 Technical Report”) was prepared in accordance with National Instrument 43-101 - Standards of Disclosure for Mineral Projects ("NI 43-101") for the Company by Dahrouge Geological Consulting Ltd. and the other Qualified Persons and has been filed on SEDAR+. The 2026 Technical Report can be accessed here.

“Our 2026 Feasibility Study transforms the Elk Creek Project into the kind of critical minerals project the United States needs to have online as soon as possible,” said Mark A. Smith, CEO and Executive Chairman of NioCorp. “Few critical minerals projects in the U.S. can match the Elk Creek Project’s combination of a 40-year mine life, all major construction-related permits already in hand, and the planned production of eight critical mineral products from a single ore body.”

“The United States is heavily reliant on imports for every single one of the products that NioCorp plans to manufacture,” Mr. Smith said.  “NioCorp offers an American-made solution: secure, long-term domestic production of materials essential to national defense, advanced manufacturing, energy resilience, and the technologies that will power the U.S. economy for decades to come.”

“For NioCorp, this feasibility study delivers a larger, stronger, and more highly de-risked project,” he added. “Eight products give us access to more markets, create multiple and highly diversified revenue streams, and reduce our exposure to the price of any one critical mineral. Combined with stronger economics and a 40-year mine life, we are now in a much stronger position to advance detailed engineering and project financing. Our job now is to turn this highly unique and important opportunity in Nebraska into a new source of American jobs, industrial strength, and critical mineral security right here at home.”

Two Important Notes:

• They have been meeting with EXIM, and the highest-ranking employee at the meeting said that Niocorp is their #1 priority right now; and
• Sounds like EXIM is revaluating the amount of the loan and Mark said he doesn't think there is any reason why they wouldn't increase the amount of the loan given the increase in capex. So, that seems to be favorable there will hopefully not be dilution here, which in my view is our biggest risk.

NioCorp to Host Webcast on Aug. 11 to Discuss Elk Creek Feasibility Study Results
#NioCorp #NB

https://niocorp.com/niocorp-to-host-webcast-on-aug-11-to-discuss-elk-creek-feasibility-study-results/

A black swan is something that is outside of the prevailing realm of expectations. And, when it occurs, it has enormous consequences. Black swans also tend to rake up a lot of Monday-morning quarterbacks. “Well, obviously this was going to happen” may be overheard frequently- in the near future, but after the black swan events have come and gone. At the time of their occurrence, however, they are revolutionary and unforeseen.

In the case of scandium, these 15-tonne black swans are the matches- latent demand is the fuel. Latent demand is demand that exists in theory, but doesn’t necessarily show up due to a variety of constraints. Maybe everyone wants that thing, but that thing is not readily available. The supply is intermittent or unreliable. Maybe everyone wants that thing, but it’s illegal. Actual purchases of that thing might be incredibly small, but misrepresent the demand by several orders of magnitude. Remove a single constraint (like creating reliable supply) and the latent demand begins to reveal itself. The demand and number of transactions and value of those transactions in that new market are likely to exceed any previous estimates that were based on the outdated reality as a baseline. It’s not a bigger market than existed previously. It’s a fundamentally new market. I believe that the agreement between Lockheed Martin and Sunrise Energy Metals, and the MOU between Lockheed Martin and NioCorp Developments, are black-swan-scale signals revealing the latent demand for scandium- and a preview to an entirely new market forming in front of us.

In October of 2025, Lockheed Martin and Sunrise Energy Metals announced an agreement granting Lockheed the option to purchase the first 15 tonnes per year of scandium oxide produced during each of the first five years of mining operations. That was the first black swan. In August of 2026, Lockheed Martin and NioCorp Developments issued a non-binding MOU regarding the potential purchase of up to 15 tonnes of scandium oxide per year, in either oxide form or the form of aluminum-scandium alloys, over the next ten years. That was the second black swan. There needn’t be a third.

These agreements have yet to take their final form. These are not guaranteed purchases. We don’t know, and Lockheed Martin may not know, exactly how much scandium oxide they are likely to need. Skunk Works has said it appreciates NioCorp's work establishing a domestic source of scandium oxide and Al-Sc alloying capabilities and will continue evaluating that supply as part of its broader alloy-development efforts. Separately, the Pentagon-funded NioCorp/Skunk Works program is designed to produce prototype Al-Sc components intended to expand the capabilities of modern fighter aircraft. Al-Sc alloys can improve strength, weldability and joint performance, corrosion resistance, fatigue performance, microstructural and thermal stability, and additive-manufacturing behavior. Those properties can in turn enable lighter, more integrated structures and cascading manufacturing benefits. If Lockheed moves from today's alloy/component-development work into broader deployment, it is difficult to imagine it doing so without first establishing reliable scandium supply. You might say, "So what? Lockheed Martin may start using more scandium, and they might buy it from reliable, Western sources. That is great for scandium producers, but it is not transformational. The agreements aren’t even guaranteed demand.” You would be correct.

The size is the signal. The size is the swan.

The US Geological Survey estimated that 2025 global consumption of scandium oxide was about 60 tonnes. The United States, which is fully import dependent, is estimated to have imported about 4 tonnes of scandium oxide in 2025. 4 tonnes. That’s it.

Yet, Lockheed Martin just made public that they want the option to buy up to 15 tonnes per year from Sunrise. They didn’t pull these numbers out of thin air. They didn’t call the restaurant to book a table of 40, just in case, if they think they may only be a table of 4. They didn't publicly discuss tables of 40 with two separate restaurants if they believed there was no realistic scenario in which they would ever need anything remotely approaching that scale. Lockheed and Sunrise are cooperating not simply around future supply: they are testing and performing qualification work intended to accelerate adoption of scandium-containing components in Lockheed product platforms. Lockheed is pursuing a parallel—but even more downstream-oriented—relationship with NioCorp. Less than ten months after the first black swan, the second black swan came in and corroborated the first. Lockheed Martin tells the world that they have interest in potentially purchasing up to 15 tonnes per year from NioCorp. These aren’t guarantees to buy. It isn’t 30 tonnes per year already sold. It is the world's largest defense contractor publicly contemplating 15-tonne-per-year-scale scandium supply arrangements with two separate Western-aligned projects. The size and the source are the signals. Double-digit scandium agreements are not completely without precedent: NioCorp previously signed a conditional commercial sales agreement with Traxys covering up to 12 tonnes per year. But Traxys was a metals marketer. Lockheed is an end-user simultaneously involved in developing and qualifying Al-Sc defense applications. That makes these 15-tonne figures fundamentally different.

We don’t know how much Lockheed will ultimately purchase each year. What if it is only 10 tonnes per year? If it were only 10, they would be purchasing 2.5x what the entire U.S. imported last year. What if it is 20 tonnes per year? Lockheed is spending real time and resources developing two Western-aligned scandium supply and qualification pathways. My interpretation is that it is helping establish the market and supply infrastructure in advance, so that it can have reliable access. I believe they are spending their resources to build the market, so that they get to be the first ones in line. They should want to be first in line, because if you think you might need 20 tonnes per year, if global production sits at an estimated 80 tonnes per year, or even 200 tonnes per year- you need to be at front, or near it. Importantly, the two 15-tonne ceilings may ultimately be additive, partially additive, or simply provide sourcing redundancy; the public agreements do not tell us. However, it doesn’t look like they are changing the market. They are helping to build it, so that they are positioned to have reliable access to it.

How much will Northrop Grumman want? SpaceX? RTX? What about our allied defense primes? How much will be designed into the rapidly expanding drone industry? What about Boeing and Airbus? Do they want some lighter and stronger materials? Scandium’s benefits have the ability to penetrate into semiconductor manufacturing, the automotive industry, additive manufacturing, space, rail, marine and shipbuilding. Sunrise plans to produce 60 tonnes per year and get to production in 2028. NioCorp plans approximately 100 tonnes per year; CEO Mark Smith has said that, if everything goes well, the company could begin partial production in late 2029 and achieve a full year of production in 2030.

I have read concerns that when all this supply finally comes onto the market, it’s going to crush the prices and these company’s valuations. I think that is misguided. The question isn’t- will the demand exist for 200-300 tonnes per year IF these projects come online? I believe the question should be- will there ever be any leftover after the defense primes and space industry get what they want? Will it all be reserved well before it’s pulled out of the ground? If it is index priced, will industries that are less price sensitive be the only ones able to afford it- defense, space, specialty aerospace? How much supply will we need to get prices low enough to penetrate further into semiconductors and additive manufacturing? IF price is ever low enough, the two potentially enormous sources of demand could be waiting right there to provide the market floor- commercial aerospace and automotive. We hear a lot about price floors today. They are very important, and may be very critical to getting a huge variety of REE and critical minerals projects off the ground. In the case of scandium? In a few years, we may need to start talking about price ceilings.

Entirely my own opinions and speculation- based on a few key facts and the relationships I see between them. Not financial advice. Do your own DD.

 p.s. Sunrise’s Syerston project is much less capital intensive. Sunrise’s ability to get to production faster, may be an incredible boon for NioCorp’s downstream, high-margin, valuation optionality- NAMA. NAMA may be able to accelerate their demand creation and supply build-out by having potential access to Western, reliable scandium oxide well before Elk Creek is producing its own. This isn’t guaranteed, and they will likely, ultimately become competitors down the road. There is no disclosed agreement between the two. However, Sunrise’s Lockheed partnership and OSC conditional loan commitment are not negatives for NioCorp, in my opinion. This isn’t a zero sum game right now, not even close. We haven’t even gotten close to seeing how big the game is. The 2022 NioCorp DFS used $3,675/kg as the selling price for scandium oxide. That price was based on 2019 product pricing. I look forward to the update.

NioCorp released its updated 2026 NI 43-101 Feasibility Study today, expanding Elk Creek to 8 Made-in-USA critical minerals over a 40-year mine life, targeting $37.4B in life-of-mine gross revenue and an estimated $4.1B pre-tax NPV8. Average EBITDA margin across the project life is ~67%.

8 products significantly changed the revenue balance so I broke out how revenue and volume actually split across all 8 products.

THE 5 RARE-EARTH PRODUCTS (grouped into 3 baskets)

Magnetic basket — NdPr, Dy, Tb oxides

• LoM avg. production: 756 t/yr
• LoM revenue: $9,219M (24.6% of total mine revenue)
• FS realized price: $138–$4,515/kg

Medium basket — SEG carbonate (Sm-Eu-Gd)

• LoM avg. production: 354 t/yr
• LoM revenue: $113M (0.3% of total mine revenue)
• FS realized price: $8.95/kg

Heavy basket — Heavy REE carbonate (HREC)

• LoM avg. production: 262 t/yr
• LoM revenue: $46M (0.1% of total mine revenue)
• FS realized price: $5.05/kg

Combined REE: 1,372 t/yr, $9.38B revenue (25.1% of total).

THE OTHER 3 PRODUCTS

Niobium — Ferroniobium (FeNb)

• LoM avg. production: 8,095 t/yr
• LoM revenue: $9,780M (26.1% of total mine revenue)
• FS realized price: $23.80/lb (~$52.47/kg)

Scandium — Sc2O3 powder

• LoM avg. production: 118 t/yr
• LoM revenue: $14,331M (38.3% of total mine revenue — the single largest revenue line in the whole FS)
• FS realized price: $1,563/lb (~$3,447/kg)

Titanium — TiCl4

• LoM avg. production: 59,820 t/yr
• LoM revenue: $3,945M (10.5% of total mine revenue)
• FS realized price: $0.85/lb (~$1,874/tonne)

Scandium alone is bigger than all 5 REE products combined. Niobium is right behind it. Between the two, Nb + Sc + Ti = 74.9% of total mine revenue.

REVENUE SHARE BY PRODUCT, RANKED (of $37.4B total LoM revenue)

1. Scandium (Sc2O3) — 38.3%
2. Niobium (FeNb) — 26.1%
3. REE Magnetic (NdPr+Dy+Tb) — 24.6%
4. Titanium (TiCl4) — 10.5%
5. REE Medium (SEG carbonate) — 0.3%
6. REE Heavy (HREC) — 0.1%

Scandium and niobium alone make up 64.4% of the entire revenue model. The 3 non-REE products (Nb+Sc+Ti) make up 74.9%, meaning rare earths are about a quarter of what this mine is worth.

FS PRICE VS. CURRENT SPOT (AUG 2026)

• NdPr oxide: FS $138.41/kg vs. $97.40/kg China domestic (SMM) / $110–125/kg ex-China contract
• FeNb: FS $52.47/kg vs. $43.02/kg SMM / $38.83/kg Brazilian delivered China
• Sc2O3: FS $3,447/kg vs. $751.57/kg China bulk (SMM) — but $3,500–4,200/kg in the Western market post-export-controls, which is basically right where the FS assumption sits
• TiCl4: FS ~$1,874/tonne, sitting between China spot (~$700–1,000/tonne) and US/EU contract prices (~$2,300–2,700/tonne)

The scandium gap is the one worth watching closest — NioCorp's pricing is explicitly modeled on the non-China market that Chinese export restrictions created, not the depressed China-domestic price. If that policy environment shifts, that's the single biggest swing factor in the whole revenue model.

Figures are FS assumptions and spot prices as of Aug 2026, both subject to change. Disclosure: long NB.

I'm looking forward to tomorrow's presentation.

• Material Corporate Actions: If a feasibility study on a mining project, plant expansion, or merger proves the project is going forward or being abandoned, and that decision materially affects the company's financial posture. [1]
• Press Releases or Exhibits: Companies sometimes furnish the results or summaries of a technical or strategic report under Item 7.01 (Regulation FD Disclosure) or Item 2.02/8.01 if they deem the findings market-moving. [1, 2]
• Mining and Energy Regulations: Companies subject to specific reporting standards (like SEC Regulation S-K 1300) may reference technical summary reports or preliminary economic assessments on 8-K filings when announcing formal resource updates or project viability. [1]

An 8-K filing (current report) falls under the standard EDGAR operating rules, meaning it can be submitted after hours but with specific dating impacts.

8-K Submission Timing

• 5:30 p.m. ET Cutoff: If submitted before 5:30 p.m. ET, it is dated and published the same day.
• Post-5:30 p.m. ET: If submitted between 5:30 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. ET, it is processed and posted online that evening, but it receives the next business day's official filing date.
• 4-Day Deadline: The 4-business-day countdown for material events usually starts the day after the event occurs.
• Item 2.02 & 7.01: Earnings releases or Regulation FD disclosures often target specific aftermarket times for public release.

Courtesy of Google AI