u/Beastwood5

Checked last week. Our main base image has 47 known vulnerabilities. We've been pulling it from a public registry for two years, and we’ve never questioned it because its free and it works every time.

Under CRA that math changes. Those 47 CVEs become our liability and not the registry's or the maintainer's. We're the manufacturer shipping a product with known vulnerabilities to EU customers. The regulation doesn't care that we didn't write the vulnerable code. It cares that it's in our product.

There's no patching guarantee on those public images. No SBOM. Nobody committing to fix anything by any deadline. We trusted free and the bill's about to arrive.

I'm not saying everyone needs to panic and rewrite their entire pipeline. But I am saying if you haven't checked what's in your base images yet, now's a really good time. Any thoughts or approaches?

Trying to do the right thing here and integrate CSPM scanning into our deployment pipeline. Security team wants every deploy scanned for misconfigs before it hits production. Devs are ready to riot and honestly i get where theyre coming from.

The scans take 12-15 minutes per run. When youre shipping 20 times a day, thats hours of cumulative waiting. On top of that false positives keep blocking non-critical changes, so devs are losing trust in the tool.

We tried the scan everything approach. It lasted about 3 days before someone found a way to skip the pipeline entirely. Now security is mad about shadow deploys and devs are mad about being treated like children. Nobody won.

Current compromise is scanning only production-bound deployments and letting staging and feature branches through with just linting. But i can already hear the security team sharpening their pitchforks about reduced coverage.

For those whove actually made CSPM in CI/CD work, what did your setup end up looking like? Scanning everything or just prod? And how did you handle the false positive problem without security losing visibility?

15% of cloud breaches per the DBIR are still misconfigs. public S3 buckets, open DB snapshots, overprivileged service accounts. Same three things weve been talking about since 2019.

CSPM tools exist. Block public access settings exist. The fix is literally a checkbox in most cases. So why are orgs still getting breached this way?

Ive started to think its not a tool problem. Its an ownership problem. Nobody wakes up in the morning thinking "I own the S3 bucket security posture." Its everyone’s problem which means its nobody’s.

So, who owns cloud storage security at your org? For those who solved this, what did it? Org structure change, policy automation, something else? Thanks all!!

Trying to cut expenses and boost my savings, but stuck on car insurance. Liability-only is way cheaper and frees up cash monthly, but full coverage feels safer in case of accidents or theft. My car isn’t brand new, but it’s not junk either, repairs would still hurt financially.

For those focused on saving more: did you downgrade to liability-only, or keep full coverage for peace of mind?