Working through TSMC's overseas siting decisions and the India rejection seems less like a one-off and more like a clear pattern. TSMC has now declined formal fab proposals from India ($10B+ in incentives), Singapore, and Qatar — all within roughly the same window.
The thread that connects them: none of these countries have a formal US security alliance. TSMC's overseas footprint after 2020 has been Arizona, Kumamoto, and Dresden — all in countries with treaty-level US relationships and CHIPS-Act-style frameworks. The Carnegie Endowment paper from August 2024 makes this argument explicitly.
A few things I'd love technical input on:
- C.C. Wei has talked about ecosystem and talent as the real gating constraints. Reasonable. But I'm curious whether the 6/7nm fabs in Japan and Germany really had pre-existing local supply chains, or whether TSMC essentially imported the ecosystem along with the fab. If the latter, the "India lacks an ecosystem" argument feels weaker.
- The Tata–PSMC deal at Dholera will be 28-110nm. PSMC is rated 7th-largest foundry (per Tata's own press release; TrendForce ranking varies). What's the realistic ceiling for legacy-node manufacturing in a market projected to be dominated by sub-5nm by 2030?
- Is the talent argument actually load-bearing, or is it a polite cover for the geopolitical concern? Wei has been more direct about geopolitics in private remarks (per Digitimes-sourced reporting) than in public.
Made a 14-minute breakdown that walks through the rejection, the pattern, and what the Tata–PSMC fallback actually represents technically. Will drop the link in a reply if mods are okay with it.