Laws of the Universe and mental designation
Hello friends,
I have been having something on my mind for quite some time. Because this is a somewhat complicated answer, I wrote it in my native language and then translated it. Hence, its grammatical "perfection"
Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka holds that all phenomena are merely designated by conceptual consciousness, lacking svabhāva under ultimate analysis. For ordinary objects this is usually explained through a distinction between causal dependence and designative dependence: a phenomenon doesn't need a mind causally present at its arising, only that no intrinsic essence survives analysis.
My question is about truths that seem to hold with a different kind of necessity than ordinary conventional designation. Mathematical theorems and the formal structure of physical law appear true independent of any act of designation — a Pythagorean relation doesn't wait on convention to hold, unlike the boundary between "mountain" and "hill," which clearly does depend on conceptual imputation.
The same question seems to apply to karmic law. Not the individual karmic events themselves, but the lawlike regularity that specific causes ripen into specific effects — that regularity seems to hold from its own side, independent of being conceptually posited. This case feels sharper than physics, since karma is internal to the tradition rather than an external import.
So: how does Prāsaṅgika account for this category of lawlike necessity — mathematical, physical, and karmic — if at all?
The truth of a²+b²=c² is expressed through symbols and apprehended by a mind, but the relation itself does not appear to depend on being designated in order to hold. Mathematical and physical laws are not, in this sense, mentally designated — they are mentally known or apprehended (a different relation than 'dogs pa, conceptual imputation), but their holding does not appear to require a mind imputing them.
One might try to avoid this by positing some prior process — a "law-generating" mechanism, multiversal or otherwise — that produces these laws. But this only pushes the problem back a level: the laws governing that generating process would themselves need to either be mentally designated (regress) or hold independently of designation (conceding the point one level up).
There is also a fine-tuning problem regarding the laws that govern the universe. From the Prāsaṅgika point of view, even these laws should be produced through dependent origination, with conceptual mind as a necessary condition for their existence as determinate phenomena. But this raises a difficult question: if these laws are produced — or constituted — through the intervention of mind, whose mind is it?
It cannot be the mind of any individual sentient being. So is it a collective mind? But a collective mind is, presumably, nothing over and above the aggregate of individual minds — did they somehow collectively converge on positing exactly the right constants, down to the relevant decimal places, with zero margin for error? A small deviation in any of these constants and the universe could not support the conditions for stars, chemistry, or life to arise at all — including, presumably, the very minds supposedly doing the positing. Is it some kind of universal or cosmic mind, prior to and independent of individual continua? If so, this starts to look less like Prāsaṅgika's prajñaptimātra and more like some form of idealism with a transcendent or universal consciousness doing the constituting — a position quite far from anything Candrakīrti or Tsongkhapa would want to commit to.
And if no mind was needed for these laws to be fine-tuned and operative prior to any sentient being's existence, then it seems the laws held — and were already exquisitely precise — entirely independent of mental designation, which is the conclusion Prāsaṅgika denies in principle for any phenomenon whatsoever.