u/DragonfruitCalm261

I was notified by the AFOSI FOIA office that they have completed their portion of my appeal, and that they have forwarded my appeal to "AF/JAC Information Litigation Branch" for continued processing. Apparently AF/JAC is the "Civil Law and Litigation Directorate within the United States Air Force Judge Advocate General's (JAG) Corps."

Is this normal? Will this be a lengthy process?

In 2001, u/therealgariac made an interesting post on his website. On a chance encounter, he spotted a military UV-20A/PC-6, a military CN-235, a private Cessna Caravan 208, and a private Cessna Caravan 208B at "Base Camp." According to the Special Nevada Report, September 23, 1991, "Base Camp is used as a staging and support area for field personnel and as a recreation area for military and contractor personnel," in the vicinity of the Tonopah Test Range and the Nellis North Range. Both military planes were registered to the "427th Special Operations Squadron." After researcher Andreas Parsch filed a Freedom of Information Act request, the Air Force said the unit exists to "provide Short Take Off/Landing (STOL) aircraft and tactically qualified crews to support training requirements for the U.S. Army Special Operations Forces community, providing SOF personnel opportunities to train on various types of aircraft for infiltration and exfiltration that they may encounter in lesser-developed countries in which they train or provide training."

The two Cessna Caravans were registered to a firm known as One Leasing Inc. One Leasing had an interesting past. On February 13, 2003, a Cessna 208 (registration N1116G) leased by One Leasing crashed in Colombia. After the crash, one American and a Colombian aboard were killed by FARC rebels, and three Americans, among them Marc Gonsalves, a former Air Force intelligence officer, were taken hostage and held by FARC for more than five years before being freed in a 2008 Colombian military rescue. When ABC News and others dug into One Leasing, the incorporation papers listed AAS Inc. of Hampton, GA, also known as Atlanta Air Salvage, as the incorporator, with Ronald B. Powers as its president. The men aboard were eventually established as contractors for California Microwave Systems, a Northrop Grumman subsidiary, conducting aerial drug and guerrilla surveillance under a program called the "Southcom Reconnaissance System."

Shortly after these events, N403VP, one of the Caravans seen at Base Camp, passed to Worldwide Aviation Service LLC (33 S Last Chance Gulch, Helena, MT, a lawyer's address used by a number of aircraft linked to CIA "rendition" flights) and flew to Pope AFB on several occasions in 2003, the same base where the 427th Special Operations Squadron is a tenant unit. After this, Ronald B. Powers lived in relative anonymity until his arrest on August 8, 2013. In a Department of Justice press release titled "Former Air Force Employee and Two Contractors Charged with Bribery, Theft of Government Funds, Fraud, and Making False Statements Relating to Air Force Contracts," the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Florida announced that a federal grand jury had returned a 34-count indictment charging three men with conspiracy, bribery, theft of government funds, disclosing or obtaining contractor bid and proposal information, honest services mail fraud, money laundering conspiracy, and making false statements.

According to the indictment, the three defendants engaged in the following scheme. John N. Sims, a retired USAF officer working as a contractor and later a civilian Air Force employee, accepted bribes from George G. Cannady and Ronald B. Powers. In exchange, Sims steered USAF contracts to companies controlled by Cannady and Powers, using insider information he supplied, including Air Force operations, acquisition, and pricing data, to help them win work in support of a "USAF activity." Powers used his expertise and ability to locate, lease, and provide the equipment and items the activity required, while Cannady used his to obtain the contracts. Separately, Sims unlawfully retained classified national-defense information. Ultimately, Sims would lose his military pension for retaining these classified materials, under the Hiss Act, the federal statute (5 U.S.C. § 8312) that strips federal annuities from employees convicted of certain national-security and disloyalty offenses.

Many of the court documents related to this trial were sealed. This case was so secretive that a SCIF had to be constructed in the Pensacola courthouse. According to the prosecutors, the defendants believed that the USAF would face "a Hobson's choice of either prosecuting the defendants and risking the disclosure of significant classified activities that could jeopardize the National Defense, or not doing anything about the fraud." However, the USAF chose to prosecute anyway, stating that "the USAF, through this prosecution, has agreed to place this extremely sensitive, classified program at risk" to send a message.

Now, what on earth is this "USAF activity"? What were these contracts? What was the classified information Sims retained? The press release doesn't say. So I had to dig deep. I pulled the entire docket on PACER and read through hundreds of pages of court documents.

First, let's discuss Sims's background and a little of his history in the USAF, as I believe it offers some of the most detail into this program. According to LinkedIn, after around 12 years in the Air Force, Sims attended the School of Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS) from January 1997 to January 1999. (The school was later renamed the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, hence the modern "SAASS" acronym in the quote below.)

https://preview.redd.it/j1xoazxx8d9h1.png?width=532&format=png&auto=webp&s=d14fd26fd41e34efb03d12b70055e9cc6df89637

According to their website, "SAASS creates warrior-scholars with a superior ability to develop, evaluate, and employ airpower within the complex environment of modern war. Upon completion of all requirements and with faculty recommendation, graduates receive a master of philosophy degree in military strategy." Sims's thesis, in attainment of his master's degree, was titled "Shackled by Perceptions: America's Desire for Bloodless Intervention."

Sims's essay begins with the line "Conventional wisdom holds that Americans eschew casualties," and this is the basis for his core argument. The conventional wisdom that the American public cannot tolerate losses is wrong, and it is dangerous to base military doctrine and policy on that premise. If we advertise this doctrine to adversaries, we teach them that it is possible to inflict a handful of losses on troops and paralyze American action, putting adversaries at an asymmetric advantage.

If this timeline is accurate, Sims was assigned as Chief of Air Force Strategy Development shortly after finishing SAAS. In a 1999 SAAS thesis by Maj Thomas Deale, the author cites "Maj John N. Sims, HQ USAF/XOCI, Bullet Background Paper on the Halt Phase, September 1998." This would indicate that Sims was assigned to USAF/XOCI from 1997 to 1999.

What is USAF/XOCI? Results on Google are sparse. However, a DTIC search reveals the following citation: "Background Paper, HQ USAF/XOCI, C2ISR Integration Division, subject: Effects Based Operations [EBO]," listed in yet another academic paper, Constraints, Restraints, and the Role of Aerospace Power in the 21st Century. There are a few references to USAF/XOCI in the public domain, mainly academic citations to internal DOD memoranda, and many of these relate to the development of strategy in relation to EBO.

Let's touch on EBO, because it may help shed light on Sims's later classified work. According to Air Force Magazine, EBO posits that the purpose of a military operation is to achieve a desired strategic, operational, or tactical effect, such as neutralizing the enemy or holding him in check, but does not in every instance require the destruction of the enemy force, especially at the expense of high casualties. The article explains that EBO originated in the Air Force in the 1990s and was a hot topic for war colleges and military journals until the term was disavowed by order of the commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command in 2008.

According to "Transforming Warfare with Effects-Based Joint Operations," C2ISR enhances capabilities by "dramatically reducing, and in some scenarios, even eliminating the need for US land forces to engage powerful enemy army units in close combat." C2ISR lets EBO work, and Sims was posted to the division building it.

Sims's 1997 thesis warned that American casualty-aversion was a weakness. An adversary who understood it could inflict a handful of losses and paralyze American action. EBO offered a way out. If you can win by effect instead of attrition, you never take those casualties in the first place. Sims would spend the next two years at XOCI helping to build the doctrine designed to close the gap his thesis had identified.

In 1999, Sims left USAF/XOCI. As far as I can tell, there are no publicly available references to Sims, or to what he did, between 2000 and 2013, which is the first date that appears in court documents pertaining to his activities at the Air Force. In AFOSI photographs of Sims's personal belongings, we can see several farewell messages penned to him. One reads, "Good luck in your next assignment and try not to forget us little people." Another appears to say, "Seriously, have fun being back in the cockpit and command."

https://preview.redd.it/hk6mzjag9d9h1.png?width=428&format=png&auto=webp&s=3b403bd15498fdd98045c7cf9a6eea1f1b68e0ba

https://preview.redd.it/ushljk5p9d9h1.png?width=692&format=png&auto=webp&s=5610fdbfab7f79a929d8c346e790fcc332e919f3

In 2004, personnel documents describe Sims's role as a "Supervisory Intelligence Operations Specialist," with a GS-0132-14 pay grade. The position-classification standard maintained by the USAF Civilian Personnel Office states that this occupation includes intelligence research and analysis, along with the organization of activities for the collection of raw intelligence and the dissemination of finished intelligence. As the title indicates, Sims's position was supervisory in nature.

The documents explain that Sims was "Chief of Special Projects," heading the Special Projects Flight. This program executed tasks directed by the Secretary of Defense. Sims served as a senior advisor to the unit commander and was required to communicate with the Department of State, DCA, DoD, AFOSI, DIA, NSA, and the FAA for the planning, coordination, and execution of exercises and mission tasking. Sims was required to possess a TS/SCI clearance.

The personnel document states that the employee must be able to integrate aircraft movements to achieve a tasked objective, including the development of aircrew mission set-up packages and [redacted] training and [redacted] communications plans approved by NSA. It states that they must have knowledge of [redacted] operations doctrine and DIA [redacted] policies, to include domestic and overseas command relationships. It also states that Sims was responsible for deception planning to protect the integrity of missions.

It proceeds to state that failure to meet aspects of the mission could place U.S. lives in danger and sacrifice multi-million-dollar resources. It states that the employee is the primary expert in [redacted] plans and one of the leading authorities on [redacted] planning. According to a memorandum submitted by the unit commander, from a component of USAF HQ that is redacted in the memo header, out of the 29 applicants on the Air Force Candidate Referral Certificate only Sims had the experience critical to fulfilling the position.

In a separate memorandum for the approval of "uncontrollable" overtime, it states that Sims was selected as a Supervisory Intelligence Specialist for [redacted] Command's most classified organization. I believe the redacted text is "Air Force Special Operations Command," and I'll explain why shortly. This memorandum also goes over some of Sims's duties, activities, and initiatives from March 2007 to June 2007. These include a three-day meeting at the Department of Transportation, a nine-day course taught in Portland, OR, and a two-day [redacted] meeting in DC on a classified topic. He also wrote classified air plans, audited Presidential (POTUS) policies for protecting [three-letter redaction] against [redacted], formulated CONOPS, and reviewed upcoming classified GWOT (Global War on Terrorism) plans.

I believe the redacted portion reads Air Force Special Operations Command. I have edited this document to show how it might fit.

The personnel document also states that the organizational location of this position was the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, SAF/AAZS. I have not been able to find any information on SAF/AAZS. According to the Air Force Historical Research Agency, SAF/AAZ was formed in March 2014 for security, special program oversight, and information protection. According to a document released by Steven Aftergood, SAF/AAZ is responsible for overseeing and implementing SAP (Special Access Program) policy within the Air Force. Given the nature of Sims's work, I suspect SAF/AAZS had similar duties to SAF/AAZ, or is possibly a predecessor. The court documents themselves go no further than describing a "classified Air Force program" and never use the term "special access program." I would be very interested to hear if anyone has more information on this office.

https://preview.redd.it/k1kiiqwajd9h1.png?width=742&format=png&auto=webp&s=66a6ff73088f4247a67b59ceacb90ee2e4aa1953

This personnel document, as well as separate court documents, states that Sims was first hired as a contractor. The documents present a work order similar to the one he was hired under, a "SETA IV" work order. We'll come back to this detail shortly, because it supports the claim that Sims was part of a classified organization under AFSOC.

During Sims's sentencing, his defense attorney went into more detail about his role. He stated that pictures were shown to the court of Sims returning from Iraq and various other countries in service of his country. He also stated that Sims had been "detained" in the service of his country, but did not go into further detail because the facts were classified. The defense also submitted two letters from Lieutenant General Hester attesting to Sims's work for the Air Force. Sims himself described spending two and a half hours with General Hester during his 2010 resignation from the program. Sims's own description of the mission was that he was "hired as a contractor to implement a vision that was very difficult, had never been done before... hired to try to take a program into the future and to replace legacy tactics, techniques, procedures, capabilities, operational support, [and] infrastructure with very little guidance on how to do that."

This formed one of Sims's justifications for his actions, a claim during sentencing that Powers and Cannady provided a unique set of abilities, expertise, and equipment to support the USAF, and that Sims acted altruistically in setting up these contracts. It does not, however, excuse the fact that he took bribes and concealed his involvement from the USAF.

I believe I have now covered most, if not all, of the details relating to the organization to which Sims was assigned that are contained in the unsealed court documents. We will now turn to the actual contracts awarded in support of this classified activity, the companies set up to obtain them, and a little more about Powers. Unfortunately, I do not believe I have enough information to determine what this classified activity actually pertained to, but I will provide enough evidence to make an educated guess.

According to the Statement of Facts that Sims signed when he pled guilty, the scheme moved roughly $5.5 million in USAF contract money in total, of which about $4.2 million flowed through Company A between 2005 and 2009. For his help, Sims received 35 payments from Cannady between December 2005 and April 2009, totaling exactly $193,601.96, the figure his own attorney would later round to "$193,000 over five years" The court documents identify three companies, Company A, Company B, and Company C. The documents do not disclose their identities, but I will explain what we know about each, so we can hopefully use the power of deduction to uncover them.

Company A

• Created by Powers in the early 2000s. Sat dormant.
• In November 2004, all three signed a share-purchase agreement for equal shares. (Private document, not filed publicly.)
• In January 2005, Sims drafted the USAF contract requirements that built in the use of Company A.
• First contract awarded in September 2005, a month after Company B was secretly formed.
• In February 2005, Powers gave Company A to Cannady, who became the sole owner.
• Won a series of contracts worth about $4.2 million (2005 to 2009), including a 2007 aircraft lease-service contract worth approximately $420,000.
• Cannady also used Company A to renovate and lease an aircraft hangar to the activity. The USAF paid for the renovation up front via a $50,000-per-year rebate over eight year

Company C

• Created on September 27, 2007, by Powers and Cannady.
• Used to obtain a further contract worth approximately $900,000 in USAF work, with insider information provided by Sims.
• Powers obtained the contract in or about September 2007.

Company B

• Incorporated in a state outside Florida (Nevada), founded in August 2005 as a 50/50 partnership between Sims and Cannady.
• Became the sole owner of Company A via an operating agreement signed in the spring of 2006. (Private document, not filed publicly.)
• Existed to conceal the arrangement.

First, I signed up for OpenCorporates and searched for all three individuals, coming across the following companies. I performed an exhaustive search for companies owned by John Norman Sims and found no responsive results. I believe it is possible that if Sims created a company, possibly Company B, it may be impossible to discover, since he may have used a registered agent. Since we know the companies were established in the early 2000s, August 2005, and 2007, we should be able to whittle down the list.

Assuming Powers and Cannady established these firms under their real names, we are left with the following. Companies established between the early 2000s and 2007 by Powers include AIR QUEST, INC.; ATLANTA AIR LEASING INC.; and ATLANTA AIR RECOVERY & STORAGE, INC. For Cannady, these include CENTURION AVIATION CORPORATION (Nevada), INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT SUPPORT (Nevada), GLOBAL OPERATIONS GROUP, and ATLANTA AIR SERVICE. I will not include the rest of these companies, as one was founded in 2013 and the others in the early 1990s or late 1980s.

https://preview.redd.it/vlezl0dhbd9h1.png?width=505&format=png&auto=webp&s=451be09c082f9e0c416d25e385bc3875ab1d0f67

https://preview.redd.it/k5v1qi1nbd9h1.png?width=500&format=png&auto=webp&s=3bed9806b967123a953c059bc1cc3d39db19b41c

Let's start with Company A. Immediately, we notice ATLANTA AIR SERVICE, owned by Cannady. This naming scheme also appears to be popular with Powers. Recall that Company A was established in the early 2000s, was created by Powers, sat dormant, and Cannady became the sole owner in 2005. It also obtained a lease for a hangar, and the cost was paid up front by the USAF. Let's bring up the Georgia business entity database and view the articles of incorporation.

First, we see that Atlanta Air Services, Inc. was established in 2002 (the early 2000s), and that George G. Cannady is the CEO, CFO, and Secretary. Let's dig deeper, pull up the filing history, and pull the 2003 Annual Registration.

https://preview.redd.it/a5sryzstbd9h1.png?width=582&format=png&auto=webp&s=c0809ddcc87015bebbe35a0633c53d73e2f28499

https://preview.redd.it/4kpcrp38cd9h1.png?width=577&format=png&auto=webp&s=0943c071bcf65f1534ba46e793028fc6cd568778

Bingo. The CEO in 2003 was Ronald B. Powers. A closer look at the Annual Registration reveals that Powers last appears as CEO in 2004, and Cannady appears as CEO in March 2005. According to the court documents, Cannady became CEO in February 2005. This is a strong candidate for Company A.

Next, I performed a comprehensive search for Atlanta Air Services, Inc., hoping to find information related to the hangar lease arrangement. It was not hard to find. In the Horry County Council regular meeting minutes, I found the following text:

"Second reading public review of Ordinance 198-05 authorizing the administrator to execute a lease agreement with Atlanta Air Services, Inc., for Hangar 359 on Myrtle Beach International Airport premises. Mr. Hardee moved to approve, seconded by Mr. Worley. There was no public review. Sheryl Schelin spoke on the revised ordinance stating that Atlanta Air Services had requested the removal of a guarantee provision of performance of a lease and in lieu of that they be allowed or mandated to pay annual rent in advance. Mr. Barnard moved to amend to remove the guarantee provision of performance of a lease and add a mandate to pay annual rent in advance, seconded by Mr. Schwartzkopf. The motion to amend passed."

This reveals that Atlanta Air Services, Inc. executed a lease in 2006 for Hangar 359 at Myrtle Beach International Airport. It also reveals that Atlanta Air Services requested that they be allowed or mandated to pay annual rent in advance, although it does not mention that they set up a rebate to be paid to Cannady, or that the USAF paid the lease up front. I am currently in the process of obtaining these lease documents. So now we can establish the following about Company A:

Company A

• Created by Powers in the early 2000s. Sat dormant.
• In February 2005, Powers gave Company A to Cannady, who became the sole owner.
• Cannady also used Company A to lease an aircraft hangar.

I cannot verify the rest of the details. I have performed a diligent search for these contracts and I am not able to find any match. I believe this is because they were classified contracts. For instance, if you search Atlanta Air Services, Inc., you will notice that it has a CAGE code. CAGE codes are identifiers used by the U.S. federal government and NATO to identify business locations and contractors. In other words, Atlanta Air Services was set up to do business with the federal government. Yet despite holding a CAGE code, it has not obtained any contracts that I can find after a diligent search of SAM.gov and Loren Data's SAM Daily, and a search for all aircraft leasing contracts issued by the USAF during the dates the court alleges the contracts were obtained returns no responsive match. It is worth mentioning that a company that is registered to do federal business but shows zero public contract records is what a classified contracting relationship looks like from the outside.

Unfortunately, I was also not able to find a candidate for Company B or Company C. Cannady does have two companies that were established in Nevada, International Flight Support and Centurion Aviation Corporation. However, neither of these companies was established in 2005. I believe this company was possibly established using a registered agent, with representatives, possibly lawyers, sitting as officers, making it impossible to identify the company using either name alone. I was also not able to find a company established on September 27, 2007, by either Cannady or Powers.

Next, let's discuss the evidence which suggests the organization Sims belonged to, and that the contracts were provided in support of, was under AFSOC. First, Sims own LinkedIn admits that he was apart of AFSOC. Sims lived in a residence in Florida located about a half-hour's drive from Hurlburt Field, which serves as headquarters for AFSOC. Second, we mentioned the SETA IV task order. SETA contracts are typically umbrella contracts. The government issues a master contract that defines the scope of work and pre-approves vendors. When a specific agency needs technical assistance, it issues a task order under the umbrella.

If we perform a search for SETA IV on SAM.gov, we find the parent solicitation, FA0021-09-R-0004, and the notice itself states in plain text that "Headquarters Air Force Special Operations Command (HQ AFSOC) at Hurlburt Field, FL" was the issuing command.

https://preview.redd.it/y8uxwg48dd9h1.png?width=941&format=png&auto=webp&s=0cec49ecf1e251970bd8290a36d4d31278d802e4

However, the "Special Mission Support" Performance Work Statement disclosed in the court documents is only an example of a similar task order. It cannot be the exact work order Sims was hired under, because Sims worked as a civilian from 2007 to 2010, and the work order in evidence is dated 2010.

However, if we view the list of vendors under this contract, we see the name "WinTec Arrowmaker." If we look at LinkedIn, we see that Sims worked for WinTec Arrowmaker from 2004 to 2007. WinTec is therefore an AFSOC SETA prime, and Sims's own employment history places him inside it. If we perform a search for the earlier SETA III vehicle, we find a similar contract issued by AFSOC to WinTec Arrowmaker in 2005 under SETA III.

https://preview.redd.it/yk6v9g5vcd9h1.png?width=935&format=png&auto=webp&s=dadf07ea05192574d3110a2d344e49abca05a649

The dates do not line up perfectly with Sims's 2004 start, but the presolicitation was issued in 2004, so he could plausibly have been hired under it. The Statement of Facts states Sims was "hired by an United States Air Force contractor" from April 2004 to February 2007, so it is also possible that he worked under WinTec Arrowmaker for a short period before the contract was actually approved.

Now let's discuss Powers's background. Powers's Sentencing Memorandum contains a wealth of information, though it is worth remembering that the memorandum was written by his defense.

Powers's attorneys admitted his involvement in the Colombia mission, stating that "in the early 2000s, Mr. Powers' company assisted the Department of Defense with a surveillance mission in Columbia by providing modified aircraft." The memorandum also includes a letter supporting Powers's character from Thomas Howes, one of the three Americans held by FARC for more than five years after the 2003 crash. Howes was captured aboard an aircraft leased from one of Powers's own companies, and yet he wrote in support of Powers, praising him from "their 17 years of work together in aviation."

The memorandum also includes a letter from Joseph Fluet, a retired U.S. Army helicopter pilot who, according to the filing, "purchased several aircraft from Mr. Powers for use on a crucial U.S. Government program overseas," a relationship his lawyers describe as "multi-year, multi-million dollar." It also quotes a June 13, 2007 letter from the Department of the Air Force, on a redacted letterhead, signed by Mark D. Pruitt, Lt Col, USAF. Writing to apologize for a "mishap" involving Powers's aircraft, Pruitt states that "the aircraft that you provide for us are a crucial part of the training that we provide pilots before they are sent overseas to execute operations." According to RocketReach, "Mark Pruitt brings experience from previous roles at L3 Technologies, Air Force Special Operations Command and United States Air Force,"

https://preview.redd.it/uxwritqndd9h1.png?width=653&format=png&auto=webp&s=a4be6dbcc1e28843715f93b30c310739bff5ad73

The document also contains photographs of Powers's challenge coins and patches. Units typically hand these out to contractors who work with them. They include a patch from Big Safari, a secretive Air Force organization responsible for modifying aircraft for special reconnaissance and special-mission use, one from the 66th AOS, and one from the 427th Special Operations Squadron. The 427th is the same unit whose aircraft appeared at Base Camp in the Nevada desert. You can find these patches on a post I recently made on r/area51.

https://preview.redd.it/vvubrohqid9h1.jpg?width=430&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=bc783ab61fa20ecf1277013f97c6451de6ecf371

Finally, let's recap what we know about these contracts. They were issued in support of a classified activity run by what one memo called a Command's "most classified organization," likely Air Force Special Operations Command. The activity used planes owned by civilian contractors, operating from civilian airfields. According to the personnel document, the aircraft involved communications plans approved by the NSA. Sims, the "Chief of Special Projects" and head of the "Special Projects Flight," was the officer who drafted the requirements and administered these contracts. He came to this role after serving as a Chief of Air Force Strategy Development at USAF/XOCI, which was responsible for Command, Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance integration. Powers, who supplied the aircraft, had previously provided similar civilian aircraft for surveillance flights over Colombia, and may have a connection to Big Safari, which modifies aircraft for special-mission use.

Simply put, I believe these aircraft were used for a clandestine aviation program that relied on civilian aircraft to do things the U.S. does not want attributed to the U.S. military. I do not believe this particular unit was tied to the Colombia operations. The statements that photos of Sims in Iraq were shown to the court, and that he had been "detained" in the service of his country, lead me to believe this was an international program. The involvement of the NSA and DIA leads me to believe it may have supported SIGINT for the Air Force using civilian planes.

I have created a Google Drive containing of all of the files I acquired from PACER. I am working diligently to obtain more information about this program and I will update the community when I learn more.

https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1-mR0YLgcwkdfup9cDmEvGBIVZ8P1CubN?usp=sharing

David Grusch has insisted he will only discuss the classified material he claims to hold inside a SCIF, and has worked with Congress to arrange a venue for that testimony. Yet both he and Congress have stayed vague about which intelligence compartments those proceedings would actually cover.

I set out to answer what kind of classified information is at issue, who controls access to it, and whether there is effective oversight of it. According to The Hill,

"To get the information from Grusch, who said he was unable to discuss specifics on what he told the Pentagon's watchdog arm, lawmakers want to sit down with the former official in a sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF) to get additional information from him.

The group has been blocked, however, by officials that have informed them that Grusch doesn't currently have security clearance to discuss the issues in a SCIF, according to Burchett. 'I think we'll get there eventually, it's just frustrating. I'm ready to go and the American public are ready to go,' he said.

Luna argued the SCIF with Grusch would help lawmakers better understand the type of legislation they need to write regarding UAPs. She said she supports legislation that would declassify information on the phenomena."

A SCIF is simply a secured facility for handling intelligence subject to SCI control systems, and establishing one for a congressional inquiry is not unprecedented.

https://preview.redd.it/fa8yy5wew98h1.png?width=578&format=png&auto=webp&s=328ee3e29859a90df404cccc27d0e89595100803

In 2016, for example, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence conducted an investigation into Edward Snowden's 2013 unauthorized disclosures of classified NSA documents, reviewing classified intelligence within SCIFs. In that case, the intelligence subject to SCI fell under the HCS-O-P (HUMINT Operations and Products), SI-G (SIGINT GAMMA), and TK (IMINT) control systems.

Beginning in 2023, the AARO reached out to Grusch to schedule an oral history interview, conducted in support of the Historical Record Report (HRR), the Congressionally directed report mandated by the FY 2023 NDAA. Under the NDAA, the AARO was given the right to receive UAP-related information at any classification level, regardless of any nondisclosure agreement, and it provided memos from the DoD SAPCO and the ODNI CAPCO to prove it.

Grusch nonetheless repeatedly declined an interview, on the grounds that these authorizations didn't adequately cover his specific security concerns as a former agency-level SAP and CAPCO security manager. In this email exchange, Grusch is very specific as to which compartment his intelligence falls under the purview of.

"Furthermore, as discussed Friday, I am seeking a ODNI CAPCO determination to absolve an oral history interview subject of any NDA's relating to UAP-related and adjacent (as stated above) IC CAP information. Additionally, in my particular case, in order to horizontally protect a portion of my oral history testimony previously provided to ICIG and the intelligence committees, we would need to conduct the interview at the HCS-Operations (O) Restricted Handling (RH) level (IAW DNI CAPCO manual Sec. 4)."

Here, Grusch requests that ODNI CAPCO issue a determination formally releasing him from any NDA covering UAP-related as well as adjacent IC CAP information. He argues that, in spite of the NDAA, he cannot speak about this information because these programs sit adjacent to UAP-related materials and would inevitably be exposed in the interview.

He also claims that the testimony he gave to the ICIG and additional intelligence agencies was handled at the HCS-O/RH level, and that because his prior testimony was given at that level, any AARO interview must be conducted at the same level to protect it, keeping it within HCS-O/RH rather than exposing it in a less-restricted setting.

"Has the CIA Office of Security (OS) or Directorate of Operations (DO) provided a memo in this regard for oral history interview subjects? Has the OS provided a memo to also cover managed-need-to-know (MNTK) projects not directly reported to ODNI CAPCO?"

He then asks whether the CIA OS or DO has issued a memo authorizing disclosure for oral history interview subjects, and whether any such memo covers MNTK projects, programs deliberately kept off ODNI CAPCO databases. His point is that if a program isn't registered with CAPCO, the CAPCO memo issued in support of the NDAA won't reach it.

"Lastly, what signed policy does AARO have to receive non-title-10 SAPs (ie, DOE and NSC)? Has the EOP NSC Security Director, Director National Program Management Staff OUSD (l&S), or DOE SAPCO/SAPOC provided a memo similar to the DoD SAPCO memo you provided?

Finally, Grusch asks whether the AARO is authorized to receive non-Title 10 SAPs, meaning SAPs owned outside the DoD. Because the DoD SAPCO memo he was given was signed by a DoD authority, he argues, it speaks only for DoD-owned programs. He wants equivalent memos from the DOE SAPCO/SAPOC and the NSC security director. Now let's look at whether Grusch's arguments hold up against the law.

The strongest part of Grusch's argument is the mismatch between how the NDAA was written and how classified programs are structured. The NDAA's definition of "UAP-related" is broad, defined as

"any activity or program by a department or agency of the Federal Government or a contractor of such a department or agency relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena, including with respect to material retrieval, material analysis, reverse engineering, research and development, detection and tracking, developmental or operational testing, and security protections and enforcement."

Grusch's point is that this definition doesn't match how the compartments are actually built. We can take a look at a real-world classification guide to see what he means. The NSA's Security Classification Guide for the USS Liberty incident was one of the documents disclosed in the Snowden leak.

https://preview.redd.it/or0vzizlw98h1.png?width=648&format=png&auto=webp&s=db84878c95ac5f82dd07770428c59bddd2fea266

A Security Classification Guide (SCG) is a document that tells everyone working on a program what is classified, and why. Every person read into a program works from its SCG. The SCG allows those read into the program to understand what each fact is, it's classification level, and the date it can be declassified. Even though this guide covers one incident from 1967, unclassified facts sit beside highly sensitive ones about intelligence gathering.

The NDAA only carves out "UAP-related" information. If a UAP-related activity were documented in a guide like the Liberty guide, where protected material is mixed with ordinary classified material, then disclosing the UAP information would risk exposing the non-UAP information associated with it. That is the crux of Grusch's "entanglement" problem.

However, Grusch's assertion that he must be absolved of any NDA before conducting an interview is perhaps the weakest part of his argument. Section 1673 of the FY 2023 NDAA is unusually broad. It authorizes AARO to receive UAP-related information "regardless of any... nondisclosure agreement," and memos released by both the DoD and ODNI state that providing such information to the AARO constitutes an authorized disclosure. Congress wrote this law specifically to override the NDA problem Grusch raises.

Furthermore, Section 1673 isn't a Title 10 statute. It's codified under Title 50 U.S.C. § 3373b. It doesn't care whether the program is owned by DoD, DOE, or the NSC. But here's where we get to what is perhaps Grusch's best argument. The statute and the memos are two different things. The statute gives the AARO the authority to receive, but the memos are what the AARO claims will absolve Grusch from his personal obligation to the program owner.

The DoD SAPCO memo was signed by a DoD authority. Likewise, the ODNI CAPCO memo covers IC CAPs for the same reason. They can authorize disclosure of DoD/IC-controlled SAP and/or CAP information because the DoD owns those programs. But neither signer has authority over a non-Title 10 SAP. If Grusch's information is tied up in these programs, these memos will not absolve him, even if the law authorizes AARO to receive it.

Grusch has spoken more about these non-Title 10 (non-DoD) SAP programs in recent months. In a recent interview with Judicial Watch, Grusch explained how it is supposedly possible for the White House and National Security Council to construct a SAP in such a way as to avoid any reporting to Congress.

"So here's one of the loopholes they use, right? So there's White House special access programs. There was something called covert access programs, 50 U.S. Code 3093. Those are the programs reported to Gang of Eight, Gang of Four. You know, that's like assassination stuff, et cetera. You know, other things the government doesn't acknowledge. But there's a, you know, a way to develop a White House SAP that is non-covert action. White House special access program, if you look in the law, there are no reporting carve-outs or requirements to tell the speaker or the majority leader or anything like that. And so that was one of the tricks of the trade, burying it over in the Department of Energy, but also keeping it in these non-covert action programs that five people on the NSC know about and the president at one time. And then, you know, it has custodianship over across the Potomac in McLean."

Let's examine whether or not this argument is plausible. First, Grusch seems to conflate "covert access programs" with covert action under 50 U.S.C. § 3093. I have not been able to find this term defined in any statute or policy available to the public. Section 3093 concerns covert action findings and Gang of Eight notification, which is different from SAP reporting. But is it possible for the White House to create Special Access Programs?

Unfortunately, Grusch never cited the actual law in question. However, it is possible, and according to a ClearanceJobs.com blog post, it is not unprecedented.

"Contrary to popular belief, Yankee White is not a formal security clearance. It's a term used to describe the White House security clearance process. Colloquially, it's part of a White House Special Access Program, requiring rigorous FBI background investigations for individuals in positions with close or direct access to the president. The process involves both investigators, who conduct background checks, and adjudicators, who determine clearance eligibility. The White House Security Office oversees adjudications, while the FBI manages the investigative portion."

But is it possible for the White House to create SAPs that do not have to be reported by "burying them in the DoE", or keeping them in non-covert action programs only known about by the President or NSC at one time, with custodianship over "across the Potomac in McLean"?

I was not able to find any statute that explicitly gives the Executive Office or NSC this authority. However, we can examine national security law to see if it is, or was theoretically possible. SAP reporting statutes consist of four regimes, one for DoD programs, one for NNSA/DOE nuclear programs, one for the IC, and a 2022 "catch-all" that covers everything else.

Three are nearly identical, and require annual reporting.

§ 119(a)(1) (DoD) "Not later than March 1 of each year, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the defense committees a report on special access programs."

§ 2426(a)(1) (NNSA/DOE) "Not later than February 1 of each year, the Administrator shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on special access programs of the Administration."

§ 3348a(a)(1) (catch-all) "Not later than February 1 of each year, the head of each covered element shall submit to congressional leadership a report on each covered program carried out by that covered element."

The fourth is different. The IC provision imposes no budget deadline and no schedule.

§ 3091(a)(1) (IC) "The President shall ensure that the congressional intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities of the United States, including any significant anticipated intelligence activity."

You'll notice that each of these statutes is highly specific. Section 119 reaches "the Department of Defense." Section 2426 reaches "the Administration" (NNSA). Section 3091 reaches "intelligence activities." None of these statutes reaches the Executive Office of the President or NSC.

This gap was addressed by § 3348a. It does this by defining a "covered element" as any part of the government that is not DoD, not NNSA, and not an IC element, and a "covered program" expressly includes "any similar sensitive program established anywhere in the Federal Government, including one established at the direction of the President."

This provision did not exist until March 2022 and I have not identified a publicly available statute specifically addressing SAP reporting for an Executive Office of the President or NSC-originated program before the 2022 catch-all provision. This is one of the cleanest illustrations of a reporting gap, but it is not the only place Grusch points to.

Recall that he also suggested one "trick of the trade" was burying it over in the Department of Energy. As we have just discussed, DOE SAPs are covered by statute, § 2426(a)(1), which requires the NNSA Administrator to report Special Access Programs to the congressional defense committees annually. So why would DOE be an attractive place to hide a program if the reporting requirement reaches it?

First, congressional oversight of the DOE is admittedly loose. In a War Zone article, Steven Aftergood, director of FAS's Project on Government Secrecy, discusses the Department Of Energy's opaque regulatory environment,

"the quality of oversight depends on many factors, including Members' level of interest, the expertise of committee staff, the cooperation of the agency, and the attention of the press and public interest organizations… With respect to secrecy and classification at DOE, my impression is that congressional oversight is nearly non-existent. But that is true regarding classification policy across the board."

As the author proceeds to explain, it isn't exactly clear how these committees would effectively oversee a large swathe of DOE SAPs, a concern that was later echoed in official reviews of DOE security and oversight. In 1999, a Special Investigative Panel under the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board published A Report on Security Problems at the U.S. Department of Energy. This report found glaring issues in DOE security policy and went as far as to advocate for the abolishment of the current oversight system for the national weapons laboratories.

"Congress should abolish its current oversight system for the national weapons labs. Just as the profligate morass of DOE contractors and bureaucrats has frustrated the critical national interest of safeguarding our nuclear stockpile, so has the current scheme of Congressional oversight with roughly 15 competing committees laying claim to some piece of the nuclear weapons mission."

The investigation portrayed the DOE as institutionally dysfunctional, describing a bureaucracy resistant to reform and plagued by weak accountability. More than two decades later, it appears that many of these underlying concerns persist. As noted in the War Zone article, questions surrounding oversight, transparency, and the management of highly sensitive programs continue to emerge, suggesting that the issues identified in 1999 were never fully resolved.

Furthermore, unlike the other statutes, § 2426 contains a unique waiver provision which requires closer analysis.

"(e) Waiver Authority (1) The Administrator may waive any requirement under subsection (a), (b), or (c) that certain information be included in a report under that subsection if the Administrator determines that inclusion of that information in the report would adversely affect the national security. The Administrator may waive the report-and-wait requirement in subsection (f) if the Administrator determines that compliance with such requirement would adversely affect the national security. Any waiver under this paragraph shall be made on a case-by-case basis. (2) If the Administrator exercises the authority provided under paragraph (1), the Administrator shall provide the information described in that subsection with respect to the special access program concerned, and the justification for the waiver, jointly to the chairman and ranking minority member of each of the congressional defense committees. (f) Report and wait for initiating new programs. A special access program may not be initiated until (1) the congressional defense committees are notified of the program; and (2) a period of 30 days elapses after such notification is received."

This is the most permissive waiver provision among the statutes. It allows the NNSA to start a program immediately, before the wait, subject only to the after-the-fact notification to the four defense-committee leaders. In 2020, the 2012 DOE Declassification Guide (effective through 2018) was released under FOIA. This document elaborates on DOE SAP policy.

"More sensitive SAPs may be designated as unacknowledged. In those cases, any details beyond the mere fact that unacknowledged SAPs or PSAPs exist, in general within the Government or DOE/NNSA, are classified. Unacknowledged SAPs may also be of sufficient sensitivity to warrant waiver of the normal Congressional reporting requirements as authorized in Public Law 106-65, Section 3236 (and successors REDACTED)"

According to this document, unacknowledged DOE SAPs may be of sufficient sensitivity to warrant the waiver of normal Congressional reporting requirements. Note the word "normal." Section 3236 of Pub. L. 106-65 is the enacting law for 50 U.S.C. § 2426. As we just covered, 50 U.S.C. § 2426 allows the waiver of normal Congressional reporting requirements. However, a careful reader would also notice that the document refers to a successor to 50 U.S.C. § 2426. Like most of this document, this section is redacted. In this case, the portion is redacted under FOIA because it would "disclose techniques, procedures, or guidelines for investigations/prosecutions that could risk circumvention of the law"

However, what almost certainly follows after "and successors" is a citation to an internal DOE policy document. According to this guide, the document names a specific DOE manual as the controlling SAP procedures manual.

"Section C of DOE M 470.4.4, Information Security, dated January 16, 2009, establishes general requirements for SAPs in DOE and NNSA... Detailed requirements regarding the SAPs and instructions for initiating them are contained in DOE Manual 471.2-3B, Special Access Program Policies, Responsibilities, and Procedures Manual, dated October 29, 2007, and in the supplement to the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM) which addresses SAPs."

According to the DOE Format Guide for Site Security Plans (SSPs) from October 2008, DOE M 471.2-3B, Special Access Program Policies, Responsibilities, and Procedures, is listed as (OUO). This reveals that the document is not classified, but is withheld from public release as Official Use Only. What this means is that the internal DOE policy governing SAPs is itself restricted from public release.

This means the public cannot independently verify what, if anything, Congress is ultimately told. These three features make DOE an environment where oversight challenges are more difficult to evaluate from outside the agency, a waiver provision more permissive than any other statute, sitting on top of congressional oversight that may not function effectively, governed by rules the public is not allowed to read.

Next, let's address Grusch's point about horizontal protection in regard to HCS-O/RH programs. This is a legitimate concern. Protected HUMINT testimony should not have to be given again in a less secure setting. This issue can be avoided by conducting the testimony in an appropriately secure environment, such as a SCIF.

Let's talk a little about the HCS-O control system. This compartment is used "to protect exceptionally fragile and unique HUMINT operations and methods. Each clandestine HUMINT collector organization is authorized to activate an operations compartment upon the approval of the CIA/Deputy Director of Operations." The information requires the ORCON and NOFORN dissemination markings as well, and dissemination outside the CIA is highly restricted.

This is why Grusch asks whether the CIA's Office of Security or Directorate of Operations has issued a memo authorizing disclosure for oral history interview subjects. He's asking AARO whether it has obtained a release from the CIA, the same way it got memos from the DoD SAPCO and ODNI CAPCO. This is because the CIA controls the HCS-O equities. Management and access decisions for the compartment are handled through CIA channels, including the Directorate of Operations. This is somewhat similar to his non-Title-10 argument. Just as the DoD SAPCO and ODNI CAPCO memos cannot release a DOE program because the DoD does not control it, those same memos cannot release HCS-O material because the CIA controls that compartment. Grusch claims that his ICIG report was handled underneath this control system. If his report genuinely sits in HCS-O, this would imply that the material originated from a human source, and HCS-O would be the appropriate way to handle this material. Here, there is a charitable interpretation, and a less charitable one. The charitable reading is that his information really is fragile human-source intelligence, in this case, insisting on the most restrictive tier within HCS is to protect a source from exposure. The less charitable reading is that Grusch is insisting on the use of this control system to raise the barriers to the interview.

Having worked through whether the law supports Grusch's position, it's worth returning to the AARO documents themselves. Alongside a memorandum cataloguing AARO's repeated attempts to interview Grusch and his repeated refusals, a forwarded email thread among senior defense and intelligence officials shows them working through the same questions in private. Two issues arose during my analysis. First, the timestamps in the exchange don't sort into a clean order. The timestamps contradict each other. I believe this may have been because of a time zone mismatch or possibly transcription errors. I've reconstructed the most coherent timeline the documents support, but the actual order cannot be known with any certainty. Second, the released thread ends without resolution. The final email asks pointed questions to the AARO director that go unanswered.

[Redacted], June 7, 2023, 10:24:52 PM (this looks like the thread opener based on context)

Sean: Grusch confirmed to me that he does not intend to avail himself of the AARO "Safe harbor" process to tell you what he spent many hours telling the DoD IG, the IC IG, and the two intelligence committees about UAP. He has reported through the media in recent days that he was not able to share some of the information he has with the two intelligence committees because they lacked the program accesses. Assuming accurate media reporting, that means that he has told either/both DoD/IC IGs about one or more SAPs that the Intel Committees are not accessed to. The Armed Services Committees are not allowed by process rules to interview Grusch about any of this because the IC whistleblower process is tightly controlled by the Intel Committees. What this means is that the DoD/IC IGs know something from Grusch that Congress as a whole is not aware of. That is a reason for you to go to the IGs and ask for access, as they deem appropriate, for you to [review] what Grusch is reporting. If waived programs are involved, there would need to be a way for you to convey this to our staff directors. But there is also just a basic reason for you to try to get all the information that Grusch has provided to the IGs.

Kozik, Wednesday, June 7, 2023, 5:36 PM

Weighing in. There's no way in heck that DoD and IC IG will give any third party raw information, ever. IG investigations are a black box for a reason. The best Sean will get from them is a filtered report that the IG releases to everyone. Bottom line, best COA is still for Mr. Grusch to speak to AARO per their confidential process (the one Congress directed in law). If he doesn't, I fear the best assessment you will ever get from AARO is a reflection of a reflection. FYI, Sean won't have an access problem, ie he has no SAP/CAP restrictions, it's just the IG divide. Of course, if he did speak to the intel committees, they could always provide their transcripts/notes to Sean for his review. My two cents.

[Redacted], June 7, 2023, 5:41:46 PM

Really helpful, Dave, thanks. Did not know that executive branch folks are in the same boat we are. Will urge Grusch to come through Sean's portal.

Kirkpatrick, June 7, 2023, 5:50 PM

All, I did speak with the DoDIG. They went on my behalf to the ICIG to request the classified transcript. Why? Because Grusch gave NOTHING to the DoDIG and claimed the same thing he told you, that it was IC compartmented information and they couldn't have it. The ICIG declined to acquiesce to my request. I am fairly confident I know what compartments he is referring to, because I did my job, but I cannot confirm 100% if he doesn't come see me. As DK points out, the SSCI could give me the transcript. Sean

Grusch's original 2023 disclosures went through the IC/DoD whistleblower process. He filed a complaint with the ICIG and spoke to the DoDIG. While an IG investigation is active, whistleblower-protection restricts who can ask about it and what the complainant can repeat outside that process. Here, Kozik suggests that Kirkpatrick take an indirect approach and get transcripts/notes from the intelligence community.

Kirkpatrick asserts that Grusch's argument wasn't tailored to the AARO. He'd already made it to the DoDIG and gave them nothing of substance. From a skeptic's point of view, this could seem like a boilerplate excuse. Or, you could view it as consistency of his principles, he applied the same handling logic regardless of who was asking. Kirkpatrick also discloses that he already tried the IG route. He had the DoDIG approach the ICIG, and "the ICIG declined to acquiesce."

This reveals a significant detail. One of the only remaining paths for the AARO to obtain anything of substance was Grusch voluntarily committing to an interview. Of course, the other option would be for Kirkpatrick to obtain transcripts from the SSCI. However, getting the transcript from the SSCI requires the SSCI to choose to give it up. Under the resolution governing the SSCI (S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. § 8(c) (1976)), classified information in the committee's possession is non-disclosable by default.

https://preview.redd.it/xo84srg5y98h1.png?width=1231&format=png&auto=webp&s=f727e6c70ee7e1f28f6bea26507e1cb31e0d8d57

It may be shared only at the committee's discretion under regulations it sets for itself, with a written record of each transfer. This exposes a limit in AARO's safe-harbor process. Section 1673 authorizes AARO to receive UAP-related information regardless of any nondisclosure agreement, but this authority does not allow the AARO to compel the release of material from whoever holds it. Even if Grusch sat for a full AARO interview, the testimony he had already given to the ICIG would remain inside the inspector-general process, controlled by the SSCI. The AARO could obtain a fresh account from Grusch. It could not take the existing record.

The thread shows this. Kirkpatrick had the DoD IG approach the ICIG for Grusch's classified transcript, and the ICIG declined. Any portion held by the SSCI would face a separate lock. Under S. Res. 400 § 8(c), the committee may share classified material it holds only at its own discretion, with other Senate committees or Members, and with no mechanism for release to an office like AARO. The receipt authority Congress wrote into § 1673 cannot substitute for either body's consent.

[Redacted], June 7, 2023, 5:56:19 PM

Sean, press reports indicate that he said he could not provide everything he knows to the INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES because they were not cleared, so I concluded that he had access to some DOD SAP that the Intel Committee are not accessed to, and inferred that the IC IG would not have access either.

Kirkpatrick, June 7, 2023, 6:53 PM

Let me expand a bit. I know everything he was briefed to and had access to, and have far greater access. So he did not have access to some DoD SAP that the IC didn't have (and if he did, he could've told you). Similarly, he didn't have access to some IC CAP that couldn't be shared. If he "found" some program, he wouldn't know who's it was unless he had super user access or someone who did helped him look it up. He didn't. Therefore, he can't make the argument that whatever he "found" couldn't be shared. If he or others thought it was an illegal program, then again, he can't make the argument that it couldn't be shared with either the DoD or the IC committees based on his assertion they didn't have clearances. It sounds very much like playing the two halves against the middle to hide something.

Here, an undisclosed sender makes a reasonable inference from recent press reports. Grusch had claimed he couldn't give everything to the intelligence committees because they weren't cleared, so the sender "concluded" he had a DoD SAP the intelligence committees can't access, and inferred the ICIG couldn't either. A program the intelligence committees can't access is exactly the sort Grusch describes in the Judicial Watch interview. There are two readings. Either it's a conventional DoD SAP compartmented away from the IC committees, which is the sender's conclusion, or it's a non-Title-10 program, which would also explain why the intelligence committees aren't accessed, but for a different structural reason, namely that it isn't theirs to oversee in the first place.

Kirkpatrick makes a rebuttal to this argument by claiming to have comprehensive knowledge of Grusch's access. He argues that if Grusch had a DoD SAP the IC lacked, he could simply have told the IC. And if he found the program, he couldn't know who it belonged to without the "super-user" access he didn't have, therefore he can't claim what he found was unshareable. However, this rebuttal sits in conflict with his earlier email. If these two timestamps are accurate, at 5:50 he said he was "fairly confident... but I cannot confirm 100% if he doesn't come see me." At 6:53 he claims to "know everything he was briefed to and had access to, and have far greater access." Nothing seems to have changed between the two emails except Kirkpatrick's tone. Two hours earlier he could only say he was "fairly confident"; now he claims to know exactly what Grusch had access to. Earlier, Kirkpatrick described his understanding as incomplete. Later, he expressed much greater confidence. The record does not explain the change.

[Redacted], June 8, 2023, 11:19 AM

He cannot tell SASC staff ANYTHING once he entered the IG process. We are forbidden from even asking. Furthermore, if a waived SAP is involved, he cannot talk to SASC staff about it because we are not accessed.

Kirkpatrick, June 8, 2023, 11:24 AM

He wouldn't know if it was waived if he "found" it, and as I said, I know what he was actually briefed to. I've been told by the IG the UAP related investigation has been closed for a year, he is free to tell us, and you're free to ask. There is no excuse for not providing an authorized disclosure.

[Redacted], June 8, 2023, 11:27 AM

You know how things work. He could have heard that a pgm is waived. What do you mean by "you're free to ask"? What UAP-related IG investigation are you referring to? The one on Grusch or the broader review?

Here is where the email exchange ends, and we're left with more questions than answers. I was a bit confused about the wording in the first email in the June 8, 2023 chain. The email states, "Furthermore, if a waived SAP is involved, he cannot talk to SASC staff about it because we are not accessed." If we assume that this email was sent from an AARO official, it doesn't really make any sense. Whether AARO is read into a program has nothing to do with whether Grusch can talk to SASC staff. I believe that this email was sent from SASC staff. If we take this assumption, we really see a Kafkaesque situation begin to unfold. The SASC can't interview him because of the ICIG, the AARO can't get the IG file because they were denied by the ICIG, and the SSCI transcript is locked from the AARO behind the committee's own discretion. Even if Grusch's claims are empty, this information is effectively locked from a Senate committee and a DoD office which are both entitled to oversight.

Kirkpatrick addresses this with an argument that has been used throughout this thread. It is not possible to discover whether a program is waived without being read into it. The redacted official provides an obvious rebuttal, he could have heard that it was waived. I will address these claims.

Is it possible for an official to learn whether or not a program is waived without being read into the program? First, the public funding trail is obscured. Waived SAPs are a subset of unacknowledged SAPs, and as explained in DoD's SAP Overview training, funding for unacknowledged SAPs is "often classified, unacknowledged, or not directly linked to the program." Unlike acknowledged SAPs, which may carry a code name in budgetary documents like the NDAA or the FYDP, waived programs are typically invisible to the public unless they are leaked or referenced in ancillary documents.

Second, a waiver is not a marking that appears in databases or on documents. As we have covered, waived SAPs are defined in DoD policy as those "for which the Secretary of Defense has waived applicable reporting requirements under Section 119." The Federation of American Scientists, summarizing the same DoD Instruction, puts it plainly. Acknowledged and unacknowledged SAPs must both be reported to Congress, while waived SAPs are "exempted by statute (10 U.S.C. § 119(e)) from normal congressional notification requirements," such that "only eight senior members of the congressional defense committees may be advised of the program." Waiver status is not stamped on documents like classification levels or control systems. As Kirkpatrick himself put it, one could not know a program was waived merely by "finding" it. This is exemplified by the NSA case discussed below.

If it is impossible to learn a program's waiver status through inference, is it possible at all? As anyone with Kirkpatrick's background would know, the redacted official's claim that "he could" have heard it is certainly not an exotic scenario. In fact, I have found two reported cases of supposedly waived programs that surfaced publicly in the media. These include the Pentagon's use of a humanitarian NGO in North Korea, and an exposé of the NSA's domestic surveillance program in 2005. As we have just discussed, it is unlikely in both of these cases that the waiver status came to light through inference. It is far more plausible that it came directly from people who were read in.

In the case of the North Korean story, the reporter's account relied on the testimony of more than a dozen current and former military and intelligence officials, several of whom spoke on condition of anonymity because disclosure of the program risked prosecution. We can reasonably assume the waiver status was disclosed by one of these insiders, though this is an inference, and the article states the program was waived without specifying which source supplied that detail.

The NSA case is murkier. The program was exposed publicly in late 2005, and NBC News characterized it as a waived SAP briefed only to congressional leadership. But the article does not identify the source of that claim, and the waiver label is not corroborated by primary sources. For instance, although many classified documents about it were released through the Snowden disclosures, none of the released documents is known to reference its waiver status. In both cases it is highly likely the information came from someone read in, but in neither case can the claim be confirmed. The label is based on reporting that cannot be independently verified through available sources.

We see a consistent pattern in these cases. The known instances of waiver status becoming public have come through journalists reporting on information provided by individuals with access to the program. As far as I can tell, waiver status has never surfaced through the release of the designation itself or through references in publicly available documents. This suggests that waiver status can be disclosed, but it is not something that can be independently verified through public records alone. It is therefore plausible that Grusch heard from a source that a program was waived. However, without additional evidence, there is no way to determine whether the claim was accurate or whether it was based on mistaken information.

Finally, let's discuss the last claim in the final email. Kirkpatrick said the IG investigation closed "a year" ago, so Grusch is "free to tell us, and you're free to ask." It seems that the official isn't accepting this explanation. As we established, the closure of an IG investigation lifts one gate. It does not lift the classification itself or SSCI jurisdiction over the information. In a narrow sense, AARO is "free to ask" since the IG case no longer bars the conversation, but it may be overstated if it implies Grusch is now free to disclose the information he is supposedly privy to.

The official then asks Kirkpatrick to clarify which UAP-related investigation he's referring to. The ICIG complaint specifically concerned Grusch and the retaliation he claims to have suffered as a result of his testimony, which the ICIG found "credible and urgent." The DoDIG disclosure specifically addressed the concern that UAP-related information was being withheld from Congress. So when Kirkpatrick asserted that "the UAP-related investigation has been closed for a year," he never said which of the two he meant.

It matters which IG Kirkpatrick is referring to. If he means the ICIG complaint, its closure would not change the policy governing disclosure. The official, in effect, asks the director to show his work, and the released record contains no answer. Grusch's claims raise legitimate questions about whether the statutes enacted in the FY2023 NDAA can effectively provide oversight of programs concealed within a classification system that is widely acknowledged as overused and fragmented.

At the same time, the existence of these barriers does not by itself confirm the underlying claims about any specific program. Ultimately, the central issue is not whether a program can theoretically be hidden from public view, but whether there are reliable mechanisms for oversight to determine what exists and who controls it. For the time being, it seems that these questions remain unresolved.

I initially filed a FOIA request to DISA for financial documents related to ISLAND SUN, they returned one responsive record. It was released in full. It's a Joint Staff memorandum requesting expenditure of program funds:

• Program: ISLAND SUN (PE 0603734K / "PE63734K")
• Request Number: IS DIMR 90013
• Vehicle: MIPR
• Project Title: ABDICATE Civilian Pay (2nd Qtr)
• Amount: $729,000.00 (FY89)
• Addressed to: Director, National Security Agency, ATTN: W. Scott Kingsley, Assistant Comptroller, 9800 Savage Road, Ft. Meade, MD
• Signed by: James A. Julian, CAPT, USN - Chief, Special Technical Operations Division, J-3

The signer is corroborated by his Defense Superior Service Medal citation. It documents his service as Action Officer; Branch Chief, Electronic Warfare and Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures Division; and Chief, Special Technical Operations Division, Operations Directorate, the Joint Staff, from August 1981 to January 1990. It credits him with seeing "the need for a global Special Technical Operations capability" and with establishing "the joint policy, funding, doctrine, and plans" for STO.

Per William Arkin, Code Names (2005), ISLAND SUN is a Planning and Decision Aids System. It describes (PDAS) as an STO system for compartmented communications and planning of clandestine military operations, which officially supports the planning and execution of IJSTO. Arkin notes it was formerly a DoD special access program and that PDAS was installed at at least ten sites.

This is confirmed by the government in later unclassified Joint Staff budget exhibits:

The Joint Staff FY2008/2009 Budget Estimates (Feb 2007): PDAS "is an automated information system protected under a Secretary of Defense directed special access program" that "supports the planning and execution of Integrated Joint Special Technical Operations (IJSTO)." (Budget Activity 4.)

Joint Staff FY2020/2021 Budget Estimates February 2020) describes PDAS as a classified program operated by the Navy, a command-and-control system providing capabilities to OSD, the Services, Combatant Commands, the Intelligence Community, and Coalition partners for operational planning/coordination of SAPs. It states PDAS "is the system for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) for IJSTO," a worldwide network meeting Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 503 requirements, and provides office automation, document/information management, collaboration, voice, and video tools across distributed CONUS/OCONUS locations.

This program ran from FY89 to at least 2022 which is a 25–30+ year lifespan, evolving into a worldwide secure collaborative planning enterprise. It is owned by the CJCS/Joint Staff, operated by the Navy and was developed by the DCN/DISA. This would explain why a Navy O-6 in a joint J-3 billet signed the original memo. The role of the NSA under sub-project ABDICATE is not exactly clear.

The current governing policy, DoDD 5205.07, "Special Access Program Policy", lays out the role PDAS serves.

The CJCS "develops, maintains, and executes the IJSTO process," uses it to apportion SAP-protected capabilities to Combatant Commands (CCMDs), and must "ensure the availability of an authorized information system to facilitate the IJSTO process." PDAS would serve the role of an authorized information system.

The directive defines the key verbs, Inclusion and apportionment. Defined respectively,

The process of sharing CPI associated with SAP-protected capabilities or information with CCMDs and Military Services for awareness and understanding. Inclusion provides information about the capability but does not provide any authority to plan, deploy, or employ the capability.

and

"Formally providing a SAP-protected capability or information to CCMDs via the IJSTO process for use during deliberate planning, crisis action response, and operational employment"

So, a SAP capability is included (awareness), then apportioned through IJSTO to the planning command, and PDAS is the compartmented environment where read-in planners actually build that capability into the operation plan, connecting the few people cleared for both the SAP and the operation across OSD, the Joint Staff, the commands, the IC, and cleared coalition partners.

Essentially, PDAS is the secure, access-controlled "room" where SAP capabilities and real operational plans are allowed to meet. A recent Job Posting for a Integrated Joint Special Technical Operations (IJSTO) Specialist in Fort Meade, MD states they prefer the applicant complete the "PDAS Operators Course", have experience working within SAP, SCI, or ACCM environments, and the ability to develop and support CONOPS, OPLANs, OPORDs, and contingency plans in alignment with combatant command objectives.

Sources

• FOIA-released DISA memorandum (ISLAND SUN / PE63734K; Req. No. IS DIMR 90013; ABDICATE – Civilian Pay 2nd Qtr; FY89), signed CAPT J. A. Julian, USN, Chief STOD/J-3
• Defense Superior Service Medal citation, CAPT James A. Julian, USN (DoD 1348.33-M), service Aug 1981–Jan 1990
• William M. Arkin, Code Names: Deciphering U.S. Military Plans, Programs, and Operations in the 9/11 World (2005) ISLAND SUN / PDAS entry
• The Joint Staff, FY2008/2009 Budget Estimates (Feb 2007), BA 4 PDAS mission description
• The Joint Staff, FY2020/2021 Budget Estimates (Feb 2021)
• DoDD 5205.07, "Special Access Program Policy" (Sept 12, 2024) IJSTO process, apportionment/inclusion, CJCS information-system requirement

I filed a FOIA for "Island Sun" which is listed as a Special Access Program in "Code Names" by William Arkin. I am in the process of filing a FOIA request for most, if not all Special Access Programs in this book. Many of these SAPs are 30+ years old, so hopefully some of these projects will actually see the light of day.

It is a fun process because if some of the information is already in the public domain, it gives you a little bit of leverage, especially in the case of a Glomar Response like I was sent. In this case, I initially filed a FOIA with DISA. I was only sent a travel voucher, DISA actually asked me if I really wanted a lousy travel voucher. And it would turn out to be pretty useful when I filed an appeal with the NSA.

Here is the denial I was sent,

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request dated 28 April 2026, for "records held by your agency relating to a specific funding transaction associated with the program "ISLAND SUN" (Program Element 63734K)". Your letter was received on 29 April 2026. Please refer to the case number above should you need to contact us about this request. Because there are no assessable fees for this request, we did not address your fee category. Your request has been processed under the provisions of the FOIA. 

Your request is seeking intelligence records and records revealing the existence or nonexistence of intelligence records, relating to program "ISLAND SUN". This Agency has determined that the fact of the existence or non-existence of the materials you request is a currently and properly classified matter in accordance with Executive Order 13526, as set forth in Subparagraph (c) of Section 1.4. Thus, your request is denied pursuant to the first exemption of the FOIA which provides that the FOIA does not apply to matters that are specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign relations and are, in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive Order. 

In addition, your request is being denied based upon the third exemption of the FOIA. This Agency is authorized by various statutes to protect certain information concerning its activities. The third exemption of the FOIA provides for the withholding of information specifically protected from disclosure by statute. The fact of the existence or non-existence of intelligence records relating to program "ISLAND SUN" is exempted from disclosure pursuant to the third exemption. The specific statutes applicable in this case are Title 18 U.S. 

Code 798; Title 50 U.S. Code 3024(h); and Section 6, Public Law 86-36 (50 U.S. Code 3605). 

Case: 122468 Please be advised that the Agency reasonably foresees that disclosure of the existence or non-existence of the requested information would be harmful to an interest that is protected by the identified exemptions. 

Although we cannot confirm or deny the existence of the records you seek, the following general information about intelligence may be useful to you: NSA collects and provides intelligence derived from foreign communications to policymakers, military commanders, and law enforcement officials. We do this to help these individuals protect the security of the United States, its allies, and their citizens from threats such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, foreign espionage, international organized crime, and other hostile activities. What we are authorized to do, and how we do it, is described in Executive Order 12333. Information about how NSA conducts signals intelligence activities is available on the websites of NSA (www.nsa.gov) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (www.dni.gov). 

You may appeal this decision. If you decide to appeal, you should do so in the manner outlined below. NSA will endeavor to respond within 20 working days of receiving any appeal, absent any unusual circumstances. 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

And here is my appeal. Hopefully it works. I don't have high hopes, but it's worth a shot.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I am writing to appeal the Agency’s response, dated March 21st 2026 to my FOIA request in the above-referenced case. The Agency issued a Glomar response, refusing to confirm or deny the existence of records relating to the program ISLAND SUN (Program Element 63734K), citing Exemptions 1 and 3.

I appeal that determination on the ground that the fact whose existence the Agency declines to confirm, a connection between NSA and ISLAND SUN has already been officially disclosed by a component of the Department of Defense.

Basis for appeal: official acknowledgment.

A Glomar response is not sustainable where the specific information it protects has already been officially acknowledged through public disclosure by the agency or an authority that can be attributed to it. See Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007); ACLU v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

To overcome a Glomar, the prior disclosure must (1) be as specific as the information requested, (2) match the information previously disclosed, and (3) have been made public through an official and documented disclosure. Those conditions are met here.

In response to a separate FOIA request I filed with the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA, successor to the Defense Communications Agency), DISA officially released to me an unredacted Department of Defense record that establishes the precise connection the Agency’s Glomar purports to protect. The record is a Joint Staff memorandum dated 15 December 1988, issued by the Chief, Special Technical Operations Division (J-3), addressed to the Defense Communications Agency (Attention: Code H645), subject “Expenditure Request.”

The memorandum requests expenditure of “ISLAND SUN (PE63734K)” funds and directs those funds to: “Director, National Security Agency, ATTN: W. Scott Kingsley, Assistant Comptroller, 9800 Savage Road, Ft. Meade, MD 20755-6000.”

This record, released through official channels by a DoD component, places into the public domain the fact that NSA was a named recipient of funds under ISLAND SUN, Program Element 63734K, the exact program and program element identified in my request. The disclosure is specific, it matches the subject of my request, and it is documented: it was released to me directly by DISA under the FOIA, and I retain the Agency’s transmitting correspondence evidencing that release.

The logical predicate of the Glomar has been removed.

A Glomar response is justified only where confirming or denying the existence of responsive records would itself reveal a properly classified or statutorily protected fact. Here, the fact that NSA has a connection to ISLAND SUN is no longer secret; it has been officially disclosed by the Department of Defense in a record naming NSA, by office and address, as the recipient of program funds. Acknowledging the existence of responsive records would therefore reveal nothing not already in the public domain through official disclosure. Scope of relief requested.

I am not, through this appeal, seeking the Agency’s confirmation that it holds intelligence records, nor am I asking the Agency to disclose classified substantive content. I request only that the Agency withdraw its Glomar response and process my request in the ordinary course, issuing a determination on the existence of responsive records. To the extent any responsive records are located, the Agency remains free to assert applicable exemptions on a document-by-document basis, subject to its segregability obligations.

The narrow question on appeal is whether the Agency may continue to refuse to confirm or deny the existence of records when the underlying fact has already been officially acknowledged. It may not.

Enclosures.

I enclose (1) a copy of the DISA-released Joint Staff memorandum dated 15 December 1988, and (2) the DISA correspondence transmitting that record to me under the FOIA.

I request a determination within the statutory time period. Please direct any correspondence to me at the address above."

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------