Follow-up: If the line is harm, how should harm be defined?
In a previous post, I shared a moral principle I’ve been thinking through:
The line is not difference.
The line is harm.
A few people pointed out, fairly, that this only works if “harm” is defined carefully. Otherwise, anyone can stretch the word to mean “I’m uncomfortable,” “I’m offended,” or “I didn’t get my way.”
I don’t think harm can mean mere discomfort.
Being challenged is not automatically harm.
Being disagreed with is not automatically harm.
Being criticized is not automatically harm.
Losing the ability to dominate or control someone else is not harm.
But I do think harm can be more than physical injury.
Harm can involve threats to safety, dignity, consent, freedom, livelihood, bodily autonomy, belonging, or the ability to live without being degraded, exploited, or controlled.
So maybe harm has to be judged through questions like:
Who is being made unsafe?
Who is being degraded?
Who is being controlled?
Who is being exploited?
Who is being denied dignity or freedom?
Who has power here?
Who can freely say no?
Who benefits from calling this harmless?
Who benefits from calling this harmful?
I don’t think harm should be defined only by the person accused of causing it, because people often minimize the harm they cause.
But I also don’t think harm should be defined only by the person claiming it, because the language of harm can be weaponized too.
So I’m landing somewhere around this:
Harm must be examined through consequence, context, consent, dignity, power, and material reality.
That does not solve every hard case, but maybe it gives us better questions.
Does this make the original idea stronger, or does it still leave too much room for misuse?