u/Effect-Kitchen

Railway crossing barriers at Asok intersection are hit so often that broken barrier arms have piled up into what locals call a “graveyard of barriers.”

It reflects a long-running traffic discipline problem that still has not been solved in Thailand.

Every time a driver ignores the warning signals, crashes through the barrier, or tries to rush across before the train arrives, the damage is not limited to railway property. It puts road users and everyone on board the train at risk.

At many crossings in Bangkok and across the country, barriers are replaced almost constantly. Some locations have accumulated large piles of destroyed barrier arms because the same type of incident keeps happening again and again.

Source: Facebook Page รถไฟกับนายเบิร์ด

TL;DR:
Rail union says the train could stop in ~200m, not 2 km, and that the driver was legally operating under transition rules. They also warn Thailand’s rail system is severely understaffed.
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The State Railway Workers’ Union said the train involved in the “train-bus collision” had a braking distance of about 200 meters, not 2 kilometers.

The union disputed the statement by the Director-General of the Department of Rail Transport, insisting that train drivers’ operating licenses are currently under a legal transition period and that railway drivers are legally allowed to perform their duties.

It also stated that the railway system requires 1,258 train drivers, but currently has only 951, forcing drivers to work almost continuously with barely any weekly rest.

The State Railway Workers’ Union of Thailand issued a statement to clarify public understanding regarding train drivers and operating licenses.

According to the union, the Director-General of the Department of Rail Transport had stated to the media that the driver of the train involved in the incident had not yet received an operating license from the Department of Rail Transport and had been suspended from duty. The union said this statement lacked full context and created widespread misunderstanding, making the public believe that train drivers of the State Railway of Thailand were operating without licenses or legal qualifications.

The union, as the representative of railway workers, said it had to clarify the facts under the law and actual practice in order to protect workers’ dignity and ensure correct public understanding.

1. The Director-General’s statement that the train would have needed to apply the brakes 2 kilometers before the stopping point was incorrect. Effective stopping distance depends on the condition of the locomotive, the hauling load of the train, and other operational factors. On the day of the incident, the train had a hauling load of 578 units and was traveling within the 40 km/h speed limit. Under normal conditions, the train could stop within about 200 meters, not 2 kilometers.

2. Before the Rail Transport Act B.E. 2568 came into force, all train drivers of the State Railway of Thailand had already undergone screening, training, testing, and appointment to perform duties legally under the State Railway of Thailand Regulation No. 3.1, issued under Section 25(3) of the State Railway of Thailand Act B.E. 2494. Therefore, all personnel had passed a legally recognized qualification process and had lawful authority to work before the Department of Rail Transport was established.

3. Although the Rail Transport Act B.E. 2568 was published in the Royal Gazette on December 27, 2025, and came into force on March 27, 2026, Section 156 of its transitional provisions clearly protects existing train drivers, allowing them to continue performing their duties during the transition to the new licensing system. This was intended to prevent a regulatory vacuum and avoid disruption to public rail services.

4. The State Railway of Thailand has not ignored the new law. It has proceeded under Section 156 and submitted license applications for 951 operating personnel to the Director-General of the Department of Rail Transport. So far, only 208 licenses have been issued. If the Director-General’s interpretation were applied, the remaining 743 train drivers would have to stop working, which would mean suspending 743 train services.

In reality, the remaining train drivers, including the driver of the train involved in the incident, had been driving trains for many years before the Department of Rail Transport was established and are currently within the legal transition period. They are therefore legally performing their duties under SRT regulations and applicable law. They should not be portrayed as “unlicensed train drivers,” as the Department’s communication may have led the public to misunderstand.

5. The railway system requires 1,258 train drivers, but currently has only 951. These drivers must work almost continuously, with barely any weekly rest. The union and the SRT have repeatedly urged the Minister of Transport to increase staffing levels to support public service and prevent driver fatigue, especially given that drivers must operate aging locomotives requiring specialized skill. The union said it has consistently emphasized safety improvements as its highest priority.

Source: Sorayuth