Why is the strategy of retreating to shorten the front lines, and then counterattacking in critical sectors, the strategy of Wehrmahcht post Kursk , not considered a sane and sort of workable strategy to at least hold Eastern front? from collapsing?, given manpower shortages of USSR
So, I am reading Pritt Buttar book" The Reckoning" detailing the late winter early autumn offensives in southern front around Kiev, Brody, Dubno, of soviet Army in 1943-1944.
From the offensives, its clear that the Fortress strategy of Hitier was the most harmful and dangerous order by Hitler that very rapidly degraded, not only the precious panzer divisions in trying to relieve the encircled garrisons, but to also taking away thier freedom at operational level, especially when its clear that southern front is at its breaking point, and needs to shorten its front line ASAP, or it wasn't far away from another Stalingrad along the banks of Southern Bug and Dviena.
I know this has been discussed thousand times , but I can't just understand why all modern discourse seems to hesitate to blame Hitler from absolute collapse of eastern front in 1944 onwards post Kursk? Even in encircled state with weak, hungry demoralised state, creme le creme tank armies of Soviet UNION under efficient commanders are unable to break German encirclement after repeated attacks. Even at this stage, Germans enjoy a healthy quality in not only the training of Tank crews , but of numerical superiority and qualitative superiority in artillery supporting the operational needs of infantry and combined arms instead of just bombardment at beginning of assault.
The unreliable Tigers and Panthers (at this stage) is unstoppable whenever they are able to reach the frontline despite heavy investment by advancing Soviet armies into anti tank guns.
Commanders at every level of every Army, battalion commanders, regiment commanders, ss army commanders, every commander wants to retreat the untenable positions when Soviet tank (and sometimes cavalry corps) have bypassed their flanks , there was no point in holding the position. Everyone wanted to retreat, because they knew what would happen if theu don't, they would be encircled, and they may or may not break out but they 100 percent would have to abandon all thier heavy weapons, would require substantial resources in form of relief forces and would 100 % stop existing as effective fighting force).
No seriously, read about these campaigns from the perspective of not only soldiers fighting, but from local commanders to army commanders, the repeat of events all the time, predictably, was extremely STRATEGICALLY harmful for German war aims.
On other hand, despite cards stacked against them, these well trained troops stopped the ultimate collapse of Southern front, but all the well trained forces were attrited. 3rd, 11th , 14 th Panzer army were left not even 34 tanks between them at March 1944. And unfortunately, no reinforcements were coming.
Soviet Army was deeply operationally efficient at this stage now. They often attacked at the junction of two armies that defenders were dispersed in opposite directions. The air power was finally in thiet favour. But extreme manpower shortages plagued their grand aims.
Anyway, It's clear that retreating was the only choice. Nikolov bridgehead was a stupid fantasy of Hitler that bled his units dry in trying to defend it , and the front facing Malinokvsky's 3rd UKR front faced the brunt when Odessa was captured in a dash. Hitler was actively harming the war aims in Eastern front. His most experienced war hardened troops were dying in droves, experienced tank crews dying in droves.
Why is Hitler defended when he ordered his troops to stand fast? I want to steer the discussion post Kursk. Thier was only one viable strategy, that had a good chance of working, retreat and counterattacking the forward probing elements of Soviet Tank armies. Shortening the front line and giving jist a tiny bit of rest and replenishment to troops worked wonders for their fighting capacity, even at this stage of war.
Why Hitler's stupid decisions to stand fast has so many defenders among both military historians and WW2 enthusiastic is beyond me. Conditions on the ground, troops understood better than the high command on Berlin. No kidding, he believed that troops were cowards, and not adhering to Nazism when casualities reached more than 60 -70 percent in manpower in almost all divisions after breakout from encirclements, that of any sane commander wouldn't have let form in first place.
Many say that military commanders too supported Hitier's decisions when it's not true. There always was request from chief of staff, OKH that retreat should be permitted, because Manstein put his request with authority and pleaded with conviction. But H wasn't to be convinced. And its not that he didn't allowed the retreat, but allowed it if the fortess was to be held on .
I want to limit this discussion post Kursk to the conclusion of Bagration, in this time period