Here is my peer-review style critique of Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava epistemology
A recurring epistemological concern in the study of Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava theology is the extent to which its structured theory of pramāṇas—pratyakṣa (perception), anumāna (inference), and śabda (authoritative testimony)—permits principled falsifiability or internal mechanisms of error-correction. While the system is often presented as hierarchically ordered, with śabda-pramāṇa occupying an epistemically superior position in matters pertaining to metaphysics and transcendental reality, this prioritization raises questions regarding the conditions under which scriptural claims may be revised, reinterpreted, or rejected in light of conflicting perceptual or inferential evidence. Specifically, it remains unclear whether the framework provides a non-circular adjudicative procedure for resolving conflicts among pramāṇas that does not ultimately defer to scriptural authority itself. From a critical epistemological perspective, this raises the issue of whether the system is capable of generating robust falsifiability criteria, or whether its hierarchical structure risks epistemic closure, wherein its cosmological and metaphysical claims are insulated from potential disconfirmation by virtue of the very hierarchy that validates them.