Taxes were imposed with required stamps

So yesterday I posted "UNTOLD HISTORY: How many times did vetoes block Cyprus from passing bills/laws between 1960-1964? The answer is different from what many thought."

And we read out of 249 laws and bills 1 vetoed 2 defeated in parliment.

Many pointed that one of the bills which couldn't pass was about fiscal policy (collection of taxes).

And we have been told that Turkish Cypriots abused their veto power, and authorities couldn't even collect taxes, and the state couldn't function.

My grandmother had a presidential pension by Makarios's direct executive decree during that time because she received an honorary title awarded to mothers who give birth to and raise 10.

This made me wonder how on earth she received periodic pensions in those days. It wasn't coming from a pension fund in the colonial budget. So I looked at the official bills what laws were active and what fiscal laws were passed or blocked. Here is the real Untold Story:

TLDR:

According to the Constitution, Communal Chambers collected taxes from the respective community.

The state had separate taxes, like import/export customs bills and taxes collected with stamps, which were printed by the state and sold.

The bill, which was defeated in parliament regarding the separation of powers by a simple majority(50%+1), was meant to change the constitution to take TAX collection from communities to the state.

Customs taxes were collected by the state until the current bill's expiration date; then Makarios used executive orders, and taxes continued to be collected until the Supreme Court declared this executive power unconstitutional and against the law.

TC legislature pushed for the implementation of existing laws, such as municipal and communal state appointment ratios.

TC legislature offered a new customs bill; during disagreements on the bill, customs tax collection for foreigners passed unanimously from the parliament.

Makarios ordered the disregard of Supreme Court decisions.

Neutral President of the Supreme Court, Ernst Forsthoff, realized the rule of law had collapsed. He resigned in protest in April 1963.

For contex:
Belgium couldn't form a Government for 652 days due to a severe regional political impasse and separation of powers, driven by deadlocked linguistic and coalition negotiations between December 2018 and October 2020.

Most recent EIU Democracy Index: Belgium ranked #10 globally; Cyprus ranked #36 globally.

DETAILS:

Republic of Cyprus Constitution 1960:
Article 87(1): The Communal Chambers shall, in relation to their respective Community, have competence to exercise... legislative power solely with regard to the following matters:
...
(f) the imposition of personal taxes and fees on members of their respective Community in order to provide for the respective needs and for the matters necessary of execution which are within the competence of the Communal Chamber.

• Exclusive Jurisdiction: The tax was strictly personal and could only be imposed by a Chamber on individuals belonging to its own ethnic community.
• Earmarked Spending: The revenue generated from Article 87 taxes was constitutionally confined to financing the spheres managed by the Chambers: religious matters, education, culture, and courts handling personal civil disputes (such as marriage and divorce)

The Republic of Cyprus (RoC) did collect import and export taxes during this period.
Unified Beginnings (1960)

When Cyprus gained independence in August 1960, the new state inherited the existing British colonial customs infrastructure. Under Article 188 of the Constitution, all colonial laws remained temporarily in force. The RoC Customs & Excise Department operated uniformly across the island, employing both Greek and Turkish Cypriots to clear goods and collect import duties.

The Expiration: When the temporary extension expired in March 1961, Turkish Cypriot deputies refused to vote for another renewal. They used their veto to demand concessions on separate municipalities and the promised 70:30 public employment ratio.

Presidential Decrees: President Makarios ordered customs officials to continue collecting duties based on the expired colonial rates. The Turkish Cypriot leadership called this unconstitutional.

Official RoC financial records from 1961 confirm that millions of pounds were successfully generated through central Import Duties, Harbour Dues, and Wharfage Dues. [1]

The Supreme Constitutional Court of Cyprus (SCC), presided over by neutral German jurist Ernst Forsthoff, evaluated the tax crisis by strictly upholding the letter of the 1960 Constitution.

The Court ruled that President Makarios's attempts to bypass Parliament and collect trade and income taxes via executive decrees were unconstitutional and illegal. [1]

The Ruling: The Court declared Makarios's decrees null and void, asserting that collecting taxes under expired colonial laws via decree violated Article 24 (which required explicit legal authorization for public burdens) and directly undermined the separation of powers. [1]

Acceptance of "Foreigner Only" Laws as a Compromise (Simple majority veted yes from both communal chambers)

To salvage the state's finances legally, the House of Representatives later passed targeted bills like the Income Tax (Foreign Persons) Law and the Customs Tariff Law (No. 32 of 1961). Because these laws applied exclusively to foreign nationals and international corporations, they did not directly infringe upon the domestic rights of either community and were passed with bipartisan support. The SCC validated these specific laws because they followed proper parliamentary channels rather than executive decrees. [1]

The Consequence: The Court maintained that even if a veto resulted in a total legislative standstill, the executive could not invent temporary powers to circumvent it.

When it became clear the SCC would rule against the Greek Cypriot positions, Makarios publicly declared in February 1963 that if the Court ruled against his government, he would simply ignore its decisions. [1]

When government refused to enforce his judicial rulings, the neutral President of the Supreme Court, Ernst Forsthoff, realized the rule of law had collapsed. He resigned in protest in April 1963, effectively dismantling the supreme judicial arbiter of the island and setting the stage for the outbreak of intercommunal violence later that year. [1, 2]

First day of Cyprus House of representatives.

We have been told that Turkish Cypriots abused their veto power, the parliment or the government blocked in every possible way, and the government couldn't pass any decision, **but Cypriot President Glafcos Clerides wrote his memoirs, entitled "Cyprus My Deposition": "*****The veto powers were not used either by the President or the Vice President on any law or decision of the House of Representatives..***."

This sentence in the book made me wonder, so I looked at the official bills that passed, which were vetoed, and also compared them with other countries. Here is the real Untold Story.

TLDR:
During 1960 till 1964
Cyprus had 249 laws/bills passed; 1 Vice Presidential Veto*, 2 Parliamentary Defeats, and 1 Supreme Court ruling declared a law unconstitutional occurred.*

Liechtenstein had 134 laws/bills passed; 1 was Vetoed, many bills were amended, and many bills couldn't pass in Parliament, as a parliamentary defeat occurred*.*

United States of America had 3678 laws/bills passed; 34 were Vetoed*, many bills were amended, and many bills couldn't pass in Parliament as a parliamentary defeat occurred.*

The only official Veto used once by the Vice President of Cyprus between 1960 and 1964:

The Cyprus Army Organization (1961–1962):

• Under the 1960 Constitution, the formation of the military was subject to a communal breakdown.
• The Turkish Cypriot Minister of Defence proposed an army structure separated at the company level to protect communal identity, whereas the Greek Cypriot cabinet majority insisted on fully integrated units at all levels.
• Vice President Küçük used his final executive veto power to block the Greek-Cypriot cabinet plan, resulting in the decision not to form a joint national army. [1, 2, 3, 4]

The other three bills were rejected, delayed, or found unconstitutional by the Supreme Constitutional Court.

The Municipalities Crisis (Constitutional return for reconsideration of the House/ Delay)

• The Issue: The 1960 Constitution mandated the creation of separate Greek and Turkish municipal councils in the island's five largest towns. Greek Cypriots viewed separate municipalities as the first step toward geographic partition (taksim) and attempted to unify them under a single, majority-controlled administration. [, 2, 3]
• The Mechanism: While he did not have an absolute veto over domestic municipal policy, Vice President Küçük used his constitutional right of return (delayed). He sent the cabinet's integrated municipal plans back for mandatory reconsideration. [1, 2]
• The Outcome: When neither side compromised, the existing municipal laws expired on December 31, 1962. President Makarios attempted to rule the towns by executive decree, which the Supreme Constitutional Court ultimately ruled unconstitutional. [1, 2]

The Legislative Defeat/Vote Down (The Separate Majority Veto)

• The Issue: Article 78 of the Constitution granted a legislative "veto" to both communities by requiring a separate simple majority of both Greek and Turkish members of parliament to pass any laws concerning taxes, duties, or electoral systems. [1, 2]
• The Actions: Working in tandem with the Turkish Cypriot parliamentary faction, Vice President Küçük supported the systematic voting down of key government bills:
  • The Custom Duties Bill (1961): Blocked by Turkish Cypriots to pressure the government into implementing the mandatory 70:30 civil service employment ratio.
  • The Income Tax Bill (1961): Blocked for the same reasons, leaving the newborn republic completely devoid of an official national income tax framework. [, 2, 3]

The number of successfully passed and enacted bills stayed almost the same each year, in contrast to portrayed political instability:

• 1960: 37 laws (Passed between independence on August 16 and December 31).
• 1961: 73 laws (Marked by intense friction, including the blocking of major tax framework bills).
• 1962: 71 laws (Characterized by deepening stalemates over municipal divisions).
• 1963: 68 laws (Passed prior to the outbreak of intercommunal violence in December, which froze joint governance).

Total of 249 laws vs 1 Veto, 1 unconstitutional, 2 parliamentary defeat = ~ 0.4%-1%

FOR COMPARISION:

Liechtenstein a key European nation that passed fewer than 100 legislative bills or laws per year during the 1960 to 1964 period.

This smaller, low-population state offers an accurate legislative comparison to Cyprus.

• 1960: 26 official entries (capped by LGBl 1960/26, the State Budget/Finance Act for 1961).
• 1961: ~30 official entries (including the landmark Banking Act of 1961 modeled on the Swiss banking framework).
• 1962: ~35 official entries.
• 1963: 43 official entries (capped by LGBl 1963/43, the State Budget/Finance Act for 1964).

Liechtenstein: 1 Veto

• Veto Power: The Reigning Prince of Liechtenstein holds some of the most robust executive veto powers of any European monarch. Under the constitution, a bill passed by parliament or approved via public referendum cannot become law without the formal sanction (signature) of the Prince. [1, 2, 3, 4]
• Vetoes (1960–1964): 1 veto occurred. In 1961, Prince Franz Josef II famously used his princely sanction to veto a new game hunting law (Jagdgesetz). Even though the citizens had narrowly approved the initiative by 51% in a referendum, the Prince opposed the framework. Supported by the ruling parties, the government quickly redrafted the bill, and an improved hunting law was successfully passed and approved by the public in 1962. [1, 2, 3]

Total 134 bills vs 1 Veto= ~ 0.7%

United States Veto Breakdown (1960–1964)

The timeframe spans the final year of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s presidency, the entire administration of John F. Kennedy, and the first year of Lyndon B. Johnson's presidency. [1, 2, 3]

• 1960 (Eisenhower): 4 bills vetoed (2 regular vetoes, 2 pocket vetoes)—notably, two of Eisenhower's regular vetoes this year were overridden by Congress (the Postal and Federal Employees' Salary Increase Acts).
• 1961 (Kennedy): 8 bills vetoed (5 regular, 3 pocket).
• 1962 (Kennedy): 12 bills vetoed (7 regular, 5 pocket).
• 1963 (Kennedy / Johnson): 2 bills pocket-vetoed by Johnson in late December after Kennedy's assassination.
• 1964 (Johnson): 8 bills vetoed (4 regular, 4 pocket). [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]

Breakdown of Enacted Laws by Congress

Because U.S. legislative sessions run in two-year cycles ("Congresses") rather than neat calendar years, the totals span three different congressional terms: [1, 3, 4]

• 86th Congress (Second Session, 1960): Enacted 847 laws total, comprising 417 Public Laws and 430 Private Laws. This period wrapped up the final year of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s presidency. [1]
• 87th Congress (1961–1962): Enacted 1,480 laws total, comprising 885 Public Laws and 595 Private Laws. This covers the first two years of John F. Kennedy's administration. [1]
• 88th Congress (1963–1964): Enacted 1,351 laws total, comprising 666 Public Laws and 685 Private Laws. This session spanned the final year of JFK's presidency and the first year of Lyndon B. Johnson's legislative push. [1, 2, 3]

Total of 3678 laws vs 34 Vetos. ~ 1%

 "Now people can see and decide for themselves."

Deciding to have your own conclusion means gathering facts, thinking for yourself, and forming a personal judgment instead of just copying others. 

This polyester clothing was found in hidden graves in Cyprus. (Nil Köksal/CBC News)

Study sample: relatives of ~428 TCs and ~461 GCs who identified missing persons answered the questionnaire.
The gender figures only cover those missing persons.

Source: https://www.cmp-cyprus.org/Assessing Families Needs of Identified Missing Persons 2022/ 09 UNRF-BAUSRA

Cypriot Missing Persons (sample of 888)

• Males: 803→ 90%
• Females: 84 → 10% (“Nearly 13% of all Cypriots still considered to be missing are female.” Among those still unaccounted for, 1,072 people refer to the still-missing persons as of March 2019) CMP Publication: An Integrated Multidisciplinary Approach to Resolve Long-Standing Unidentified Human Skeletal Remains in Cyprus, Forensic Science International 320

Broken down by period:

• 1963–67: 176 men, 18 women
• 1974: 627 men, 67 women

Greek Cypriot Missing Persons (sample of ~460)

• Males: 438 → 95% (all ages)
• Females: 22 → 5%

Broken down by period:

• 1964: 6 women (almost no men shown)
• 1974: 438 men, 16 women

→ Almost everyone disappeared in 1974, and men made up the overwhelming majority.

Turkish Cypriot Missing Persons (sample of 428)

• Males: 365 → 85% (all ages)
• Females: 63 → 15%

Broken down by period:

• 1963–67: 176 men, 12 women
• 1974: 189 men, 51 women

→ Men were the clear majority in both periods.

Disclaimer:

Conflicting claims:

Turkish Cypriot official release dated 19 February 2015: Turkish Cypriot Comity of Missing Persons member stated, "...according to the list of missing persons, all the missing Turkish Cypriots were civilian, and 25-28% of them were women and children*,* %12 of Greek Cypriots were women and children*, and* %55 of them were Greek and Greek Cypriot soldiers*".*

These figures should be treated as a statement by one of the three CMP members rather than as an officially published or independently audited CMP statistic.

Other female numbers that sometimes appear in unverified sources come from the old, inaccurate Greek Cypriot list of 1,619 missing persons, not from the official CMP lists or reports. That previous inaccurate list still included people who had actually died in known circumstances (such as in hospital or in combat), cases where remains or graves were later identified, duplicates, and poorly documented entries that did not meet the agreed criteria for the official UN list. When these errors were cleaned up in the mid-1990s, the official total dropped to 1,510 Greek Cypriots, so any demographic figures based on the higher, uncorrected number, including higher female counts like (113-116 out of 1619 ~7%), are unreliable and should not be treated as accurate CMP numbers.

Comprehensive, publicly released age-and-gender tables for the full current TC list (or updated ones for the GC official list) do not appear to have been published by the CMP.

Gary Rafalovsky, Director of Swarmly

Instead of usual negative news, here is a success story from Cyprus.

Swarmly was founded in 2018 and graduated from ARIS, an early-stage accelerator based in Cyprus, without any major government, defense, or EU funding.
Swarmly (based in Limassol, Cyprus) has funded its growth primarily through its founders and operational revenue rather than major public venture capital investment rounds. Its initial seed funding round was fully financed by the company's founders.
https://www.f6s.com/company/swarmly.aero

TESTED IN UKRAINE, ADDED TO THE INVENTORY IN CYPRUS.

The Cypriot National Guard has incorporated Poseidon H10 unmanned aerial vehicles, used in the war in Ukraine, into its artillery units. Developed by Cypriot company Swarmly Aero, the systems are said to operate in environments of intense electronic warfare and jamming. Defense Review reports that over 200 H10S have been produced in Ukraine, accumulating a total flight time exceeding 100,000 hours.

The vertical take-off and landing system is used for target detection, coordinate transmission, firing correction, and damage assessment. The UAVs, which are reported to be able to identify targets up to 70 kilometers away, are planned to be operated in conjunction with NORA howitzers and TAMNAVA multi-barrel rocket launchers.

https://www.swarmly.eu/
https://www.thenationalherald.com/even-small-eu-nations-go-big-on-arms-production-sending-drones-to-the-ukrainian-front-and-beyond/

Swarmly - Battle Field Proven UAS USV System PDF

A source news about the letter of Nestor Bessios, which was republished in Rizospastis
https://www.alt.gr/stratiotis-eldyk-kataggellei-ethniki/

"These things happen with the knowledge of the Command, which must stop them here and now... no soldier should tolerate such slogans being chanted against other nations." Nestor Bessios.

Dimitrios Ioannidis(4th from left) and other generals by Telegraph.co.uk

https://www.ekathimerini.com/in-depth/1189434/the-dramatic-38-minutes-of-a-national-tragedy/

The executive editor of Kathimerini, Alexis Papachelas, shone a light in his extraordinary book “A Dark Room.”

A 38-minute clip from that day(the briefing room at the Greek Ministry of National Defense on Mesogeion Avenue where the War Council was held),

which survived on tape, was recently rediscovered and has all the elements of a tragedy.

“What they accuse everyone of here, in the events of 1964, is not declaring the union,” says Ioannidis

“We must be done with this. There will not be more developments than what has already taken place. Because if we do not declare the union the others will invade […] We should call Sampson and tell them to convene cabinet meeting and declare unification with Greece. We will accept it and war will break out....”

“they will in land in Kyrenia. And after they land, they will invade […] The Turks do what they want to do.”

Orders ignored

“go to war with Turkey.”
https://www.ekathimerini.com/in-depth/1189434/the-dramatic-38-minutes-of-a-national-tragedy/

Mobilizisation call up could involve 160,000 Men

https://www.nytimes.com/1974/07/21/archives/reserve-callup-could-involve-160000-men-greece-orders-mobilization.html

The Military Defiance: Testimonies from the military chiefs reveal that the commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Force intentionally bypassed Ioannidis' commands.

They recognized that the chaotic mobilization was an unmitigated disaster, marked by severe logistical failures and a lack of realistic strategic planning, meaning that an all-out war would result in the total destruction of Greece's military.
The Hellenic Parliament’s "Cyprus File" (Φάκελος Κύπρου)

Declassified US State Department Diplomatic Cables

United States intelligence logs from July 1974, preserved by the Office of the Historian under the US Department of State, explicitly recorded Ioannidis' frantic intent to expand the conflict.

At the end of this 38-minute recording from the Hellenic war council, Ioannidis is heard saying: “It seems the pace of events has overtaken us. All cities in Cyprus are currently being bombed.”

For Context: This level of detail wasn't known to the US, Turkey, or the UK while the events were happening.

Turkey was prepared for a Greek offensive, but they didn't have the intel. The UK had intel through their radar planes on the Turkish naval operation that night, but they were also in the dark about Greece.

Ioannidis had previously operated under the dangerous assumption that the United States would intervene and block Turkey from acting on the island.