u/IPTalons

[removed]

This notice came on 17 August 2026. The Department of War (DoW) sent notices to 30 US universities. The notices tell the universities to check their ties with foreign entities of concern. The check must cover academic ties, funding ties, and research ties.

The notices name two types of foreign entities:

**•**	Entities on the Section 1286 list. This list comes from the FY19 NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act).  
**•**	Groups connected to renamed Confucius Institutes.

The Office of the Under Secretary of War for Research and Engineering sent the notices. Emil Michael holds this position. He said the DoW will not accept academic partnerships that create risk to national security. Dr. Joseph Jewell is the Assistant Secretary of War for Science and Technology. He said the DoW must protect its research funds from foreign misuse.

Each university must do four tasks before 31 August 2026:

**1.**	Audit all known foreign collaborations.  
**2.**	Check if the audit finds risk to sensitive or export-controlled research.  
**3.**	Write a plan to reduce the risk. The plan may include the end of some partnerships.  
**4.**	Send a report to the DoW. The report must describe the findings and the actions.

If a university does not comply, the university may lose future federal research funds.

The DoW works with other groups on this action:

**•**	House Armed Services Committee  
**•**	Senate Armed Services Committee  
**•**	House Appropriations Committee  
**•**	Senate Appropriations Committee  
**•**	House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party

Why this notice is important for other institutions:

The DoW did not name your institution in this notice. But the notice sends a clear signal to all institutions that receive federal research funds. Research security compliance is now mandatory. It is not optional.

Federal rules now require institutions to show proof of compliance. Institutions cannot only state that they comply. These rules include NSPM-33 (National Security Presidential Memorandum 33), foreign influence disclosure rules, and export control rules.

The DoW gave the 30 universities a short time to respond. This short deadline reveals a problem. Many research security programs cannot give fast answers during an audit. Data about foreign collaborations is often spread across many places. This data includes co-authorship records, funding disclosures, and training records. Each department may hold different pieces of this data. Each researcher may also hold different pieces of this data. For this reason, a routine audit can become a serious risk to funding.

Does anyone here work at one of the 30 named universities?

The National Institutes of Health (NIH) rejects more SBIR and STTR projects because of foreign risk.

The Small Business Innovation and Economic Security Act of 2026 requires federal agencies to explain foreign risk decisions. However, many rejection letters do not give specific reasons for the decision.

We collect information to measure this problem. We want to evaluate options for action, such as:
Contact Congress.

Start legal action under the Administrative Procedure Act.

How you can help

Did you receive a rejection letter? Write a comment below or send a message if the NIH rejected your project for foreign risk this year.

Did the letter explain the reason? Tell us if the NIH gave a clear reason or a general statement.

Share this post: Send this post to other companies and researchers in your network.

Write a comment below or send a direct message.

The National Institutes of Health (NIH) rejects more SBIR and STTR projects because of foreign risk.

The Small Business Innovation and Economic Security Act of 2026 requires federal agencies to explain foreign risk decisions. However, many rejection letters do not give specific reasons for the decision.

We collect information to measure this problem. We want to evaluate options for action, such as:
Contact Congress.

Start legal action under the Administrative Procedure Act.

How you can help

Did you receive a rejection letter? Write a comment below or send a message if the NIH rejected your project for foreign risk this year.

Did the letter explain the reason? Tell us if the NIH gave a clear reason or a general statement.

Share this post: Send this post to other companies and researchers in your network.

Write a comment below or send a direct message.

SBIR Phase I award rates are between 10% and 20%. A rejected proposal is standard. Use this process to write a better proposal:

1. Request a debrief immediately
Do not read only the panel notes. Request a debrief or schedule a call with your Program Director. DoD has strict deadlines for debrief requests.

2. Divide the comments into three groups
Compliance errors: Missing forms, wrong page limits, foreign influence issues, or missing attachments.

Technical problems: The scope of work is too large, or the risk is not clear.

Commercialization problems: Weak market data, unclear customer validation, or team gaps.

3. Correct the primary causes
Reviewer comments show symptoms. Changing one sentence will not raise a low score. You must correct the fundamental risk in your technical or commercial plan.

4. Follow the rules for each agency
NIH: Allows one resubmission with a one-page response to previous reviews.

NSF: Requires a new Project Pitch and a document that describes your changes.

DoD: Treat the resubmission as a new proposal for a new topic.

International collaboration is not a vulnerability—it is the engine of modern science. The most important breakthroughs of the last generation came from symbiotic joint ventures, shared instrumentation, and the free movement of global talent. Any research security approach that treats every foreign partnership as a threat will quietly strangle the very thing it claims to protect.

And yet the memorandum of understanding remains one of the most under-examined documents in the research enterprise. Institutions will spend months negotiating indirect cost rates and publication rights, then sign a partnership agreement with a foreign entity whose ownership structure, government affiliations, and downstream relationships were never independently checked. The risk is not the collaboration itself—it is entering it blind.

The consequences of skipping that step show up later and cost more. Undisclosed ties to entities of concern can jeopardize current federal funding, trigger enforcement scrutiny, and—in critical technology areas—expose an institution to economic espionage and the loss of intellectual property that took decades and millions of research dollars to develop. Across the field, comprehensive programs have remediated more than 4,000 insider risks and protected 20 distinct critical technology categories; the partnerships that went wrong almost always shared one feature in common: no one looked closely before signing.

Grant Hopper closes that gap. As the first AI-enabled due diligence tool purpose-built to assess visiting scholars, prospective researchers, and research grant applicants for foreign influence risk, it lets you evaluate a potential partner efficiently—before the MOU is signed, not after the problem surfaces. Built for academic institutions, government agencies, and corporate R&D teams alike, it turns due diligence from a months-long manual slog into a repeatable step in your partnership workflow.

The goal is not to say "no" to international research. It is to say "yes" with your eyes open. A few minutes of structured due diligence before signing is the cheapest insurance your research enterprise will ever buy.

References
[1] IPTalons — Grant Hopper: https://www.iptalons.com/grant-hopper [2] IPTalons — Products & Services: https://www.iptalons.com/services