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Tillemans, Tom J.F. "Pramāṇa in Tibet: Debate Traditions (Bsdus grwa)". In J. A. Silk, R. Bowring and V. Eltschinger (eds.), Brill's Encyclopedia of Buddhism Online, (Brill, 2025) doi: https://doi.org/10.1163/2467-9666_enbo_COM_3128
Open Access Link: https://www.academia.edu/150269676/Pram%C4%81%E1%B9%87a_in_Tibet_Debate_Traditions_Bsdus_grwa_?source=swp_share

In this article, Tom J. F. Tillemans examines the traditions of logic and debate (bsdus grwa, "Collected Topics") within Tibetan monastic centers of learning. Rather than confining the study of logic to theoretical treatises, Tibetan monks actively utilized this logical apparatus as a dynamic pedagogical tool in live monastic debates. In these encounters, where the respondent remains seated and the challenger stands, what comes to the fore is not merely cerebral sharp wittedness and rhetorical skill, but also a remarkable level of physical engagement, incorporating full body language, energetic gestures and rhythmic posturing.

Operating under a highly rule governed structure reminiscent of a chess match, the challenger attempts to refute the respondent’s position by formulating a series of consequences (thal 'gyur, Skt. prasaṅga) typically structured as: "Take A as the subject; it follows that it is B, because it is C". Faced with this challenge, the respondent is strictly limited to three legitimate replies:

1. 'Dod (I accept / agree that A is B),
2. Rtags ma grub (The reason is unestablished, i.e., maintaining that A is not C),
3. Khyab pa ma byung / Ma khyab (There is no pervasion, i.e., maintaining that not all Cs are Bs).

Hesitating or failing to reply within a matter of seconds is considered a de facto defeat, indicating that the consequence has successfully undermined the respondent's stance. When the challenger manages to force the respondent into relinquishing their root thesis (rtsa ba’i dam bca’), the challenger marks complete victory by clapping their hands three times and exclaiming, "Rtsa ba’i dam bca’ mtshar, mtshar, mtshar!" (roughly translated as "Shame, shame, shame on your root thesis!") or "tshar" ("The root thesis is finished!").

Beyond strict formal moves, these debates also feature playful sophistries and mnemonic set pieces. For instance, if an opponent makes a faulty inductive leap (arguing that A is B merely because an isolated instance of A is B) the respondent can concisely expose the fallacy by invoking the shorthand phrase "Knowable thing and crushed garlic" (shes bya sgog rdzog) or "garlic ground by pestle and mortar" (shes bya sgog gtun ma).

Furthermore, because Tibetan debate logic (bsdus grwa) prioritizes formal internal consistency over ontological existence in the external world, debaters can effortlessly engage in arguments involving non-existent or impossible entities, such as "a rabbit's horn" (ri bong rwa) or "the child of a barren woman".

One of the most striking conclusions Tillemans draws is that Tibetan debate developed a sophisticated, nascent formal logic, one largely independent of specific propositional content and distinct from the metaphysically grounded pramāṇa of Indian Buddhist thinkers. This clearly demonstrates that Tibetan monastic institutions were intellectually vibrant, formally nuanced and highly advanced centers of dialectical inquiry.

Jenkins, S. (2026). Sanskrit Antecedents for the Expression ‘Pure Land’ and Its Related Cosmology and Soteriology: A Preliminary Report on Studies in the Indian Origins of Pure Land Thought and Practice. Religions, 17(3), 319. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel17030319

Open Access Link: https://www.academia.edu/165805305/Sanskrit_Antecedents_for_the_Expression_Pure_Land_and_Its_Related_Cosmology_and_Soteriology_A_Preliminary_Report_on_Studies_in_the_Indian_Origins_of_Pure_Land_Thought_and_Practice?source=swp_share

Abstract
This is a preliminary report on a study of Indic precedents for Pure Land traditions. It contests anglophone scholarship that find those traditions to be predominantly East Asian constructions in discontinuity with Indian Buddhism. The first part, related to previously unpublished research, disputes a common leading point of such arguments that the expression pure land, jingtu, has no Sanskrit antecedents. The article will show that Sanskrit antecedents for jingtu are in fact abundant. The second part summarizes previously published work showing that the cosmology, soteriology, and buddhology of buddhakṣetras have explicit foundations among the heavens and devas. The third part forecasts research for Kenneth Tanaka’s “Other Power” project. ‘Other‑power’ has been seen as discordant with Indian traditions, when even abhidharma sources state that, through ‘a single mind of faith in Buddha to the marrow of one’s bones, one can overcome infinite bad karma.’ The salvific power of the names of buddhas is a common concept in Indian Buddhism, declared even by Nāgārjuna. Not discounting Chinese and Japanese creative contributions and acculturation, Pure Land traditions are in strong natural continuity with Indian Buddhist thought.

Drewes, D. (2025). The Return of the Bodhisattvas and Other Possible Explanations for the Appearance of Mahāyāna Sūtras. 
Numen, 72(4), 397-420. https://doi.org/10.1163/15685276-07204012
Open Access Link: https://www.academia.edu/130386260/The_Return_of_the_Bodhisattvas_and_Other_Possible_Explanations_for_the_Appearance_of_Mahayana_Sutras_Numen_2025_?source=swp_share

In this paper, Drewes examines the methods through which Mahāyāna sūtras emerged and established their authority. He begins by reviewing three existing scholarly theories regarding the origins of these sūtras, ultimately explaining why "The Return of the Bodhisattvas" stands as the most plausible framework. These three theories are as follows:

1. The Inspiration Theory: According to this view, the emergence and authority of Mahāyāna sūtras were driven by pratibhāna, or inspired speech.
2. The Dream and Meditation Theory: This theory posits that the sūtras derived their authority from intensive meditative focus on the Buddha and Buddha-fields, leading to revelations about the Dharma received through meditative visions or dreams.
3. The Return of the Bodhisattvas Theory: This is the scenario Drewes finds overwhelmingly and consistently across dozens of Mahāyāna sūtras themselves. It explains why these texts, despite claiming to be the Buddha's own words, only appeared centuries after his death: their revealers were bodhisattvas who had already heard the teaching from the Buddha in person, and who vowed to return to the world at a future time of the Dharma's decline (paścima kāla) to reveal and spread it. From this pattern, Drewes further argues that the Mahāyāna/bodhisattva path was not conceived as a choice made in one's present life to pursue Buddhahood over arhatship. Rather, its adherents saw themselves as having already been bodhisattvas for eons, now returning to a world in need.

"Did the Buddha exist?" by Alexander Wynne
Journal of the Oxford Center for Buddhist Studies Vol. 16, 2019, pp. 98-148
Open Access link: https://jocbs.org/index.php/jocbs/article/view/193

Wynne refers to Rhys Davids’s observation: the dialogue style in Pāli texts is so distinctive and consistent that it seems implausible for it to have been fabricated by a committee.

He points out that inscriptions from the Ashoka era indicate the existence of a comprehensive canon at that time, similar in structure to the modern day Pāli Tipiṭaka. He draws attention to the fact that oral transmission (as seen in the Vedic tradition) could be maintained with high accuracy over centuries, implying that the texts likely remained reliable even before being committed to writing. He argues that, although there was no central authority to oversee the texts after the Buddha, the fact that the corpus is so free of contradictions makes large scale fabrication impossible.

He illustrates how the inscriptions found at Sanchi, Piprahwa, and Deorkothar strikingly align with canonical and post canonical narratives. He notes that the relic casket inscription at Piprahwa confirms the existence of the Shakyas and the narrative regarding the preservation of the Buddha’s bones, while the Deorkothar inscriptions corroborate the lineage associated with his disciple Anuruddha. He presents the correspondence between independent material findings and textual details as strong counter evidence against pure skepticism.

Wynne indicates that the world described in early texts characterized by small towns, limited trade, and a near absence of coinage and bricks belongs to a period prior to the Mauryan Empire (5th century BCE). He contrasts this with the imperial world depicted in later Buddhist texts, which is based on long distance trade and a money economy. He concludes that the few references to coinage and bricks in the "Vinaya" indicate that the compilation process remained open until shortly after the Buddha’s death, yet the core of the text was preserved intact.

He points out that the places associated with the Buddha (Kapilavatthu, Lumbinī, Kusinārā) were insignificant provincial settlements at the time, noting that a more important setting would have been chosen had a legend been fabricated. He interprets the fact that the Buddha is portrayed as a figure existing "outside the center" (even in Magadha, which later came to be regarded as the virtual capital of Buddhism) as a detail inconsistent with an invented hero. He considers the distribution of the relics in a manner contrary to the Buddha’s own wishes, and the fact that the nearby city of Sāvatthī did not stake a claim to a share to be credible precisely because these details are inconvenient.

He shows that while the narrative of the first sermon was embellished with mythological details over time, the fact that Koṇḍañña and Assaji appear not yet to have attained liberation in other passages contradicts this idealized account. Drawing an analogy with the legal principle of statements made against one’s own interest, it interprets such contradictions (where the text works against its own claims) as a sign of the text's reliability.

Wynne points out that the names given for the Buddha’s family distinguish him from being the “empty” figure that skeptics claim he was. He draws attention to the presence of numerous unheroic, minor details in the texts such as his sleeping on a pile of leaves, his satisfaction in relieving himself, his back pain and his death from bloody diarrhea. He argues that such mundane, unglamorous details are inconsistent with the construction of a myth and instead bear the marks of a real person. He suggests that early texts focused on the Buddha’s teachings rather than his biography (with biographical interest growing only after his death) which implies that the texts originated directly from the founder himself.

He draws attention to a distinctive trait of the Buddha’s personality: his fondness for silence and solitude, citing recurring examples such as his preference for being alone in the forest, his quiet acceptance of invitations and his avoidance of noise. He argues that this consistent theme of “silence” serves no obvious didactic purpose and thus reflects a genuine personality trait rather than a fictional construct.

He interprets the Buddha’s silence or refusal to answer directly when faced with metaphysical questions (such as the infinity of the world or the state of existence after death), he argues that this reflects an attitude of silence that is both pragmatic and metaphysically cautious. He contends that such a peculiar teaching method that one so open to misinterpretation could not be the product of a committee, as committees would not choose to embrace such risky ambiguity.

He conveys that in his dialogue with the Brahmin Upasīva, the Buddha challenged the Upanishadic notion of "liberation at the moment of death" by employing the metaphor of an "extinguished flame" teaching instead that liberation occurs in the present and in an inexpressible manner. It notes that the concepts of meditation associated with the Buddha’s first teachers (Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta) aligned with early Upanishadic thought, yet the Buddha steered this legacy in a unique direction. It concludes that a distinctive doctrinal system in which silence, pragmatism and inexpressibility are so deeply intertwined points to a real and specific founder.

Wynne summarizes the evidence collectively: the absence of expected contradictions within the vast corpus, the consistent reflection of the pre-imperial world in the texts, the limited presence of mythological elements and the fact that the early texts are far more realistic when compared to Mahāyāna texts. He argues that all of this leads to the conclusion that the system of doctrine (original, coherent and embodied particularly in the teaching of non-self) is too personal in nature to be the product of a committee.

He concludes that his work demonstrates the baselessness of the extreme skepticism surrounding the Buddha, arguing that early texts offer reliable testimony beyond reasonable doubt. He likens his method to inductive theories, a theory cannot prove every single detail but it strongly supports the overall picture.