I haven't seen much discussion about this here, but there is currently a potentially important operational issue developing in Puerto Rico.

According to Puerto Rican newspaper El Nuevo Día, an LNG tanker that NFE wants to bring into San Juan Bay has been unable to enter because of a dispute between New Fortress Energy and the San Juan harbor pilots.

The pilots argue that the vessel exceeds the dimensions allowed under an agreement previously approved by the federal court.

The local articles do not identify the tanker by name, but vessel-tracking data strongly suggests that it is AMUR RIVER.

AMUR RIVER is a roughly 149,700 m³ LNG carrier, approximately 288 meters long and 44 meters wide.

Its recent AIS/voyage history is very interesting:

• It was at Altamira, Mexico, where NFE operates FLNG1.
• It departed Altamira on September 13.
• It called at Kingston on September 17.
• Its voyage data showed San Juan, Puerto Rico as the destination, with a September 17 ETA.
• AIS data currently places the vessel in the Puerto Rico / Virgin Islands area.

Meanwhile, El Nuevo Día reported on September 19 that the tanker involved in the dispute was still waiting several miles offshore while NFE and the harbor pilots tried to resolve the issue.

This is not just a paperwork dispute.

Because the LNG tanker could not enter, San Juan Power Plant Unit 6 and seven temporary generators had to operate on diesel instead of natural gas, at least until Monday.

A federal judge reportedly urged NFE and the pilots to work together to avoid a fuel-supply crisis.

There is also a bigger issue behind this.

The San Juan pilots have said that Energos Maria is the largest LNG tanker that can currently dock at the terminal under the existing arrangement.

NFE has been trying to dredge the area around its San Juan terminal so larger LNG vessels can use it, but both the U.S. Coast Guard and the San Juan harbor pilots have raised objections to NFE's dredging proposal.

The Coast Guard's concern is that allowing much larger vessels to remain moored there for extended periods could interfere with navigation in the bay.

So this may be revealing a structural bottleneck in NFE's Puerto Rico LNG supply chain:

Altamira FLNG → large LNG carrier → San Juan

works only if the vessel can actually enter San Juan Bay and berth at NFE's terminal.

If NFE increasingly relies on larger LNG carriers, but the pilots will not bring them in without changes to the current restrictions, NFE either needs:

1. an agreement with the pilots,
2. approval for its dredging project,
3. smaller LNG vessels,
4. or some other logistical solution.

This doesn't mean Puerto Rico operations are permanently disrupted, and I'm not claiming that this issue alone caused NFE's recent stock decline.

But NFE dropped more than 11% in the latest session on elevated volume, and I suspect many U.S. investors aren't following the Puerto Rican local press at all.

So while everyone is focused on the restructuring, dilution and the upcoming registration of creditor shares, there is also a real operational problem happening right now in one of NFE's most important markets.

The next thing to watch is simple:

Does AMUR RIVER actually enter San Juan?

If it does, this may turn out to be a short-term dispute.

If it remains offshore or NFE has to replace it with a smaller vessel, then the San Juan terminal's vessel-size limitation becomes a much more important issue for the investment thesis.

Sources:

• El Nuevo Día, September 18 — dispute over entry of NFE LNG tanker into San Juan Bay
• El Nuevo Día, September 19 — tanker remaining several miles offshore; San Juan generation forced to use diesel
• El Nuevo Día / U.S. Coast Guard reporting on NFE's San Juan dredging application
• Maritime Optima AIS / vessel data for AMUR RIVER (IMO 9317999)

NFE in 2029: How Much Gas Could It Control, and What Could the Stock Be Worth?

I've been trying to look beyond NFE's restructuring and ask a much simpler question:

What could this company actually look like by the end of 2029?

Not next quarter.

Not the next short squeeze.

Not the next restructuring filing.

When I put together NFE's potential LNG supply, downstream demand, EBITDA potential, and post-restructuring capital structure, I think the long-term risk/reward becomes much more interesting.

1. NFE could be connected to more than 5 MTPA of physical LNG supply

By the end of 2029, the potential physical LNG portfolio could look roughly like this:

Supply source	Physical capacity
FLNG1	~1.4 MTPA
Venture Global Plaquemines	1.0 MTPA
Venture Global CP2	1.5 MTPA
FLNG2	~1.4 MTPA
Total	~5.3 MTPA

NFE's filings sometimes round FLNG1 to 1.5 MTPA, but I am using 1.4 MTPA to be conservative.

The Venture Global contracts contribute another 2.5 MTPA in total: 1.0 MTPA from Plaquemines and 1.5 MTPA from CP2.

But I would not give NFE 100% of FLNG2 economics.

NFE says FLNG2 still requires roughly $750 million to $1.5 billion to complete and that it intends to bring in a third-party development partner.

So my assumption is that NFE ultimately retains only 30% of FLNG2 economics.

That gives NFE economically attributable LNG supply of:

FLNG1: 1.4 MTPA

Plaquemines: 1.0 MTPA

CP2: 1.5 MTPA

30% of FLNG2: 0.42 MTPA

Total:

~4.32 MTPA

Using NFE's rough conversion of around 50 TBtu per MTPA, that equals about:

216 TBtu per year

2. Even after downstream expansion, a large amount of LNG could remain

My normalized downstream demand assumptions are:

Puerto Rico: 70 TBtu

Nicaragua: 22.6 TBtu

Mexico: 12.5 TBtu

Ecuador: ~25 TBtu

Operating losses / boil-off: ~5 TBtu

Total:

~135 TBtu

Against about 216 TBtu of attributable supply, that leaves roughly:

81 TBtu

available for merchant LNG sales.

That is approximately:

1.6 MTPA

In other words, even after supplying Puerto Rico, Nicaragua, Mexico, and assuming Ecuador becomes another meaningful downstream market, NFE could still have more than 1.5 MTPA available for external LNG sales.

3. This is where the earnings leverage becomes very large

Instead of assuming today's extreme LNG spread lasts forever, I prefer to calculate several possible net merchant margins.

For 81 TBtu of merchant LNG:

Net merchant margin	Merchant EBITDA
$5/MMBtu	~$405M
$8/MMBtu	~$648M
$10/MMBtu	~$810M
$12/MMBtu	~$972M
$15/MMBtu	~$1.22B

Every $1/MMBtu change in net margin across 81 TBtu changes annual EBITDA by approximately:

$81M

That is enormous operating leverage.

4. Then add the downstream businesses

Using margins broadly similar to those NFE has used in previous forecasts, I estimate normalized downstream EBITDA at approximately:

Puerto Rico: $276M

Nicaragua: $85M

Mexico: $68M

Turbine portfolio: $75M

Ecuador: ~$88M

Less SG&A: ~$120M

That gives approximately:

$470M

of downstream EBITDA before merchant LNG upside.

So my normalized end-of-2029 / 2030 run-rate cases are roughly:

LNG environment	Estimated EBITDA
Weak LNG market	~$0.9B
Healthy LNG market	~$1.1B-$1.3B
Strong LNG market	~$1.45B
Very strong LNG market	~$1.7B

For valuation purposes, I use:

$1.3B EBITDA

as my central case.

That is not my bull case.

5. What could $1.3B of EBITDA make NFE worth?

A mature LNG infrastructure company can trade around 10x EV/EBITDA.

I am therefore using:

10x EV/EBITDA

as a normalized valuation assumption.

This is not a guarantee that NFE will receive a 10x multiple.

It is simply a scenario where NFE is no longer valued as a distressed restructuring and is instead valued as a functioning LNG infrastructure company.

At $1.3B of EBITDA:

$1.3B × 10 = $13B enterprise value

Now we have to deal with the capital structure.

6. Scenario A: NFE refinances and fully redeems the preferred stock

Post-restructuring CoreCo debt is roughly:

$700M

The restructuring also created 2,454,936 Series A preferred shares with an initial liquidation preference of $1,000 per share.

That is approximately:

$2.455B

initially.

The preferred accrues at approximately:

3% in year one

5% in year two

7% in year three

If none of it is redeemed until near the 2029 mandatory conversion date, the liquidation preference could grow to roughly:

$2.85B

Now assume NFE is producing $1.3B-$1.5B of annual EBITDA by that point.

It should look completely different to lenders than it does today.

If NFE refinanced the entire $2.85B preferred balance with ordinary debt at around 6.5%, annual interest on that refinancing would be about:

$185M

Including the existing $700M of CoreCo debt, total debt would be about:

$3.55B

At $1.3B EBITDA:

Debt / EBITDA = ~2.7x

At $1.5B EBITDA:

Debt / EBITDA = ~2.4x

Even if the entire $3.55B carried a 6.5% interest rate, annual interest would be approximately:

$231M

against $1.3B of EBITDA.

That is a completely different leverage profile from today's NFE.

7. What could the common stock be worth if the preferred is redeemed?

Post-restructuring common shares are approximately 16.32 million.

To be conservative, I use approximately:

17 million diluted common shares

Central case:

EBITDA: $1.3B

10x multiple: $13B EV

Less total debt after refinancing the preferred: ~$3.55B

Common equity value:

~$9.45B

Divide that by approximately 17 million shares:

~$555 per share

Using the same assumptions:

EBITDA	10x EV	Equity after ~$3.55B debt	Approx. share price
$1.0B	$10.0B	$6.45B	~$379
$1.3B	$13.0B	$9.45B	~$555
$1.5B	$15.0B	$11.45B	~$672

This assumes the entire preferred redemption amount is financed with debt.

If NFE pays part of the preferred using internally generated cash, the required debt could be lower.

8. Worst-case capital structure: NFE redeems none of the preferred

This is the scenario that common shareholders should worry about most.

If the preferred is not redeemed, it mandatorily converts in 2029.

The initial conversion rate is:

46.441271 common shares for each preferred share

With 2,454,936 preferred shares outstanding, that would create roughly:

114 million additional common shares

Including existing common shares and some additional dilution, I use approximately:

131 million fully diluted shares

That is massive dilution.

But there is one important difference.

NFE would not need to borrow $2.85B to redeem the preferred.

So in this scenario I leave only about:

$700M of CoreCo debt

against enterprise value.

At $1.3B EBITDA and a 10x multiple:

Enterprise value: $13B

Less debt: $700M

Common equity value:

$12.3B

Divide by approximately 131 million shares:

~$94 per share

Using the same methodology:

EBITDA	10x EV	Equity after ~$0.7B debt	Fully diluted shares	Approx. price
$1.0B	$10.0B	$9.3B	~131M	~$71
$1.3B	$13.0B	$12.3B	~131M	~$94
$1.5B	$15.0B	$14.3B	~131M	~$109

This is the result I find most interesting.

The worst-case capital-structure scenario is not necessarily:

The preferred converts and today's common becomes worthless.

The dilution would be brutal.

But if NFE actually becomes a company producing $1B-$1.5B of EBITDA, even the much smaller remaining percentage owned by today's common shareholders could still represent substantial value.

9. What if 10x is too optimistic?

Then use:

8x EBITDA

At $1.3B EBITDA:

8x EBITDA = $10.4B enterprise value

Assume zero preferred redemption and full mandatory conversion.

Subtract $700M of debt:

$9.7B common equity value

Divide by approximately 131 million fully diluted shares:

~$74 per share

So even under:

• an 8x multiple
• zero preferred redemption
• maximum preferred dilution

the calculation still produces roughly:

$74 per share

Again, this depends entirely on NFE actually reaching the EBITDA assumptions.

10. Why I would personally hold until 2029

Before the reverse split, NFE was around $0.3296.

On a 1-for-50 reverse-split basis, that is approximately:

$16.48 per share

Using that as a reference:

Worst-case dilution, $1.3B EBITDA, 10x multiple

~$94 per share

That is roughly:

5.7x

the $16.48 reference price.

Preferred fully redeemed, $1.3B EBITDA, 10x multiple

~$555 per share

That is roughly:

34x

the same reference price.

Even the more conservative case of:

8x EBITDA

zero preferred redemption

full dilution

produces approximately:

$74 per share

or roughly:

4.5x

the $16.48 reference price.

For comparison, money earning 5% annually in a bank account for three years grows by only around:

16% total

Obviously, a bank deposit and NFE are not comparable investments.

A bank deposit does not carry construction risk, permitting risk, LNG price risk, refinancing risk, dilution risk, FLNG downtime risk, or bankruptcy risk.

NFE carries all of those risks.

That is exactly why the potential return is so different.

But if by 2027 and 2028 I continue to see:

• Nicaragua approaching operation
• Puerto Rico expansion progressing
• Plaquemines volumes arriving
• CP2 remaining on schedule
• FLNG2 securing a credible development partner

then personally I would rather hold the stock into 2029 than try to trade every 20%, 30%, or 50% move along the way.

I do not know of any normal bank deposit that can compound fast enough to match the potential upside if this operating thesis actually works.

The risk is obviously much higher.

But so is the potential reward.

For me, the important question is no longer:

Where will NFE trade next week?

The important question is:

If NFE becomes a company producing $1B-$1.5B of EBITDA, what is one post-restructuring common share actually worth?

After running both the preferred-redemption scenario and the worst-case full-conversion scenario, I think that is a question worth waiting until 2029 to answer.

This is scenario analysis, not a price target or a guarantee.

Hidden Information in the NFE Restructuring Filing #3: Why Did the 2027 EBITDA Forecast Fall from $451M to $326M?

One of the most alarming numbers in the NFE restructuring materials is the change in the 2027 forecast.

In March, the company Cleansing Case projected approximately:

$451M of 2027 AEBITDA

By the September restructuring close, the new Financing Case projected:

$326M

That is a reduction of:

$125M

At first glance, this looks like a major deterioration in the underlying business.

But when you break down the filing and compare it with what is happening on the ground in Puerto Rico and Nicaragua, a different picture emerges.

The September Financing Case was deliberately created as a stressed scenario to determine how much additional capital NFE would need while maintaining at least $100M of liquidity.

NFE explicitly says the Financing Case was designed to incorporate potential contingencies, and it concluded that approximately $165M of additional capital could be required, with $135M funded at closing.

So the first important point is:

The $326M figure is not necessarily a normalized estimate of NFE earnings power.

It is a downside liquidity planning case built to make sure the company could survive several delays and adverse assumptions at the same time.

Now look at what actually changed.

1. The operating bridge is even more revealing

NFE provides a direct comparison of its 2027 operating assumptions.

Excluding remaining novation proceeds and net ship margin:

March Cleansing Case:

$410M

September Financing Case:

$299M

The pieces are:

Existing New NFE business:

$160M → $250M

+$90M

Puerto Rico conversions:

$90M → $0

-$90M

Nicaragua:

$85M → $41M

-$44M

Turbines:

$75M → $8M

-$67M

So the existing business actually improves by about $90M.

The major losses come from growth projects being delayed or removed from the 2027 case.

That is a very different story from:

The existing NFE business deteriorated by $111M.

It did not.

2. Puerto Rico conversions: $90M disappeared

In March, NFE assumed approximately:

20 TBtu of additional Puerto Rico gas conversions

at approximately:

$90M EBITDA

In the Financing Case:

20 TBtu → 0

and

$90M → $0

Why?

The filing itself does not explicitly say:

The $90M was removed because the San Juan dredging and terminal expansion were delayed.

So this part requires analysis.

But the public permitting record gives us a very strong clue.

NFE applied to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to dramatically improve the operational capability of its Puerto Nuevo LNG terminal.

The application calls for:

• deepening the berth from roughly -32 feet to -41 feet MLLW
• approximately 15,000 cubic yards of dredging
• moving the effective berth line farther into the harbor
• installing new permanent breasting dolphins
• continuous LNG carrier occupancy once completed

And USACE states the purpose clearly:

to allow the existing terminal to receive and unload fully laden LNG carriers.

This matters because the Puerto Rico growth thesis requires substantially more LNG throughput.

NFE already has a seven year PREPA gas supply contract for up to 75 TBtu per year, while the original March case assumed significant additional gas conversions beyond current consumption.

But the dredging project has become more complicated.

In early September, the U.S. Coast Guard and San Juan harbor pilots formally objected to the proposal.

Their concern was that the larger LNG vessels could be moored almost continuously and interfere with navigation in San Juan Harbor.

USACE then asked NFE to respond to those concerns.

Notice the timing.

The original March plan assumed:

20 TBtu / $90M

Then the Financing Case simply assumes:

0 TBtu / $0

My interpretation is that NFE chose not to underwrite the Puerto Rico conversion upside until the physical LNG logistics bottleneck is resolved.

That is not the same as saying the Puerto Rico opportunity disappeared.

It means the company no longer assumes that the infrastructure expansion will be available in time for 2027.

3. Existing Puerto Rico earnings were also reduced

There is another important change.

The original 2027 Puerto Rico base business assumption was:

$165M

The Financing Case reduced it to:

$118M

A decline of:

$47M

NFE also specifically notes lower consumption because of extended maintenance at San Juan Unit 6.

So Puerto Rico was hit twice:

Existing operations:

$165M → $118M

New conversions:

$90M → $0

The company is effectively saying:

Assume lower existing Puerto Rico consumption and give no credit for conversion upside in 2027.

That is an extremely conservative way to model Puerto Rico.

4. Nicaragua tells a similar story

The March Nicaragua assumptions were:

COD: January 2027

Remaining CAPEX: $109M

2027 EBITDA: $85M

The September Financing Case changed them to:

COD: July 2027

Remaining CAPEX: $142M

2027 EBITDA: $41M

That is:

+$33M of CAPEX

and

-$44M of 2027 EBITDA

with a six month delay.

At first this looks strange because the 300MW power plant itself is essentially complete.

The March presentation described the power plant as 100% complete and ready for commissioning, while saying the marine terminal infrastructure was still under development.

So the problem is not the power plant.

The problem is the LNG delivery infrastructure.

5. Puerto Sandino has already gone through major design changes

This project has repeatedly changed its marine configuration.

In February 2024, the approved design used:

Energos Freeze FSRU

→ Restricted Catenary Mooring

→ approximately 5.3 km of subsea pipeline

→ land pipeline

→ 300MW power plant

CRIE documentation records a total gas pipeline length of 10.823 km, including 5.327 km offshore.

But NFE then requested another modification.

In August 2024, CRIE approved a substantially different structure under CRIE-30-2024.

That design involved a protected marine terminal and jetty arrangement, an FSU and fixed regasification concept, and the offshore pipeline section was removed.

The current CRIE public index still identifies CRIE-30-2024 as the modification governing Central Puerto Sandino.

So far, this is already a project that has been redesigned multiple times.

6. But the NFE 2026 documents point back offshore again

This is where it gets interesting.

The March 2026 restructuring presentation describes the current Puerto Sandino terminal as:

Receiving Terminal

→ Permanent Mooring System

→ Subsea Pipeline

→ Existing Land Pipeline

→ Power Plant

The presentation specifically labels the terminal development with a subsea pipeline and a permanent mooring system.

That does not perfectly match the 2024 CRIE approved configuration.

And this is not just an old diagram.

NFE recently advertised a 12 month Project Controls & Contracts Engineer position in Puerto Sandino.

The job specifically says the employee will oversee marine and onshore construction related to:

subsea pipeline

Pipeline End Manifold or PLEM

related gas infrastructure

including cost control, contractor change orders and schedule delays.

That is strong evidence that the current execution scope again includes offshore pipeline infrastructure.

7. Now the $33M CAPEX increase makes much more sense

NFE has not publicly stated:

The additional $33M of Nicaragua CAPEX was caused by another redesign of the Puerto Sandino marine terminal.

So this cannot be presented as confirmed fact.

But compare the facts.

Old assumption:

$109M remaining CAPEX

January 2027 COD

Then we see:

• permanent mooring
• subsea pipeline
• PLEM
• marine construction
• a 12 month project controls assignment
• continued schedule management and contractor change orders

And the new assumption becomes:

$142M remaining CAPEX

July 2027 COD

That is exactly the kind of pattern you would expect from a marine infrastructure scope change.

So my conclusion is that the Nicaragua deterioration is much more likely to be:

terminal redesign + marine execution risk

than a deterioration in the economics of the 300MW power plant itself.

8. The $41M Nicaragua forecast is not a new annual earnings estimate

This is another important detail.

The reduction from:

$85M → $41M

almost perfectly matches the six month COD delay.

In other words:

The project did not suddenly become a business that earns only $41M annually.

It simply loses roughly half of 2027 because commercial operation moves from January to July.

The implied normalized annual EBITDA remains close to:

$80M-$85M

if the project operates for a full year.

This is a timing problem, not necessarily a permanent earnings impairment.

9. The turbines show the same pattern

The mobile generation assumption also moved.

Cleansing Case:

Start: October 2026

2027 EBITDA:

$75M

Financing Case:

Start: April 2027

2027 EBITDA:

$8M

That is another:

-$67M

in the 2027 operating bridge.

Again:

The turbines did not disappear.

The revenue moved to the right.

10. Meanwhile, the existing New NFE business actually improved

This may be the most overlooked part of the entire table.

The underlying NFE business excluding the three growth initiatives goes from:

$160M → $250M

The major changes include:

Puerto Rico base business:

$165M → $118M

Mexico:

$65M → $84M

Market volumes:

$30M → $168M

SG&A:

-$100M → -$120M

Net result:

+$90M

So despite the Puerto Rico reduction, the existing CoreCo and New NFE business actually has a higher EBITDA forecast in the Financing Case.

This is why I do not think the $326M number should be read as evidence that the New NFE business model collapsed.

11. And there are other conservative assumptions too

The Financing Case also assumes:

FLNG cost adder:

$2.90 → $3.50

to account for unplanned downtime.

Third party gas supply start:

January 2027 → July 2027

UK restructuring close:

end of Q2 → middle of Q3

Professional fees:

approximately +$50M

because of the delayed restructuring close.

NFE itself says the decline in 2027 AEBITDA is primarily affected by delays in third party gas supply counterparties.

So the $451M → $326M change is not one single problem.

It is a combination of deliberately conservative assumptions.

So what does the $326M forecast actually mean?

This is how I read it.

It does not mean:

NFE permanently lost $125M of annual EBITDA.

It means something much closer to:

For the 2027 liquidity case, assume several growth projects arrive late or contribute nothing, while operating costs and restructuring costs are higher.

That explains why the Financing Case required approximately:

$165M of new capital

and why NFE raised $135M at closing.

The two largest project specific issues now appear much easier to understand.

Puerto Rico

The demand opportunity still exists, but expanding LNG throughput depends on a San Juan terminal dredging and mooring project that is facing serious permitting and navigation objections.

Nicaragua

The 300MW power plant is substantially finished, but the marine LNG infrastructure appears to have undergone another execution and design change involving permanent mooring, subsea pipeline and PLEM work, which fits both the +$33M CAPEX and the six month delay.

That is how NFE can go from:

$451M

to

$326M

without the core business itself collapsing.

The real question is therefore not:

Did NFE permanently lose $125M of EBITDA?

The real question is:

Do these delayed growth projects actually come online?

Because if Puerto Rico conversion volumes eventually return, Nicaragua produces a full 12 months of earnings, and the turbine portfolio is deployed, the earnings profile after 2027 could be materially higher than the Financing Case implies.

This is Part 3 of my series on hidden information in the NFE restructuring filings.

Sources: NFE September 2026 Financing Case and Form 8-K; March 2026 Transaction Update; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers San Juan permit application SAA-2026-00110; U.S. Coast Guard and San Juan harbor pilot objections; CRIE-30-2024; and current NFE Puerto Sandino project hiring materials.

Hidden Information in NFE Restructuring Filing #2: What Price Did the Creditors Actually Put on NFE Common Stock?

There is a number buried in the NFE restructuring documents that I do not think has received enough attention.

It may tell us something very interesting:

What value did the restructuring creditors implicitly assign to NFE common stock when they negotiated the deal?

The answer appears to be:

About $0.43 per old NFE share

or

$21.53 per share after the 1 for 50 reverse split.

Here is the math.

As part of the restructuring, creditors received the new Series A Mandatorily Convertible Preferred Stock, now trading under the ticker NFEGP.

According to the final NFE Certificate of Designations, each NFEGP share has an:

Original Liquidation Preference = $1,000

The same filing establishes the initial mandatory conversion ratio:

1 NFEGP = 46.441271 NFE common shares

So the implied conversion price of NFE common is simply:

$1,000 ÷ 46.441271 = $21.5326 per NFE share

The restructuring documents also implement a 1 for 50 reverse split of NFE common stock.

Therefore, on the old pre split basis:

$21.5326 ÷ 50 = $0.43065

So the economic relationship negotiated into the restructuring implies:

NFE common = approximately $0.4307 pre split

NFE common = approximately $21.53 post split

That number is interesting because the last NFE pre split market price was around $0.33.

In other words, the conversion price embedded in the creditor restructuring was roughly 30% above the public market price immediately before the restructuring closed.

I think this is one of the most overlooked numbers in the entire restructuring.

Why does this matter?

These were not retail investors guessing about NFE on Reddit.

The restructuring was negotiated by sophisticated creditors who had access to detailed financial projections, asset information, liquidity forecasts, restructuring advisers and months of negotiations with the company.

They agreed to exchange billions of dollars of debt for a package that included:

• New debt
• NFE common equity
• NFEGP preferred equity
• BrazilCo ownership

And when the final NFEGP security was created, the negotiated economics established:

$1,000 of preferred liquidation preference

against

46.441271 shares of NFE common stock upon mandatory conversion.

Mathematically, that embeds a common stock conversion value of:

$21.53 post split

or:

$0.4307 on the old share count

Important distinction

I am not saying the creditors performed a DCF and concluded:

NFE common stock has a fair value of exactly $21.53 per share.

That would be too simplistic.

NFEGP is senior to the common stock, carries cumulative PIK dividends, has redemption protection and has very different rights from common stock.

So $21.53 should not automatically be treated as the current fair value of NFE common stock or as a price target.

But I think it is fair to call it what it is:

The implied common stock conversion price embedded in the restructuring negotiated between NFE and its creditors.

And in my opinion, that makes it far more meaningful than an arbitrary analyst target.

The creditors could have negotiated a very different conversion ratio.

They did not.

They settled on:

46.441271 shares for each $1,000 preferred share.

That produces:

$21.5326 per NFE common share

And now NFEGP gives us a second piece of information

Once NFEGP begins freely trading, we can also see whether the market values that $1,000 liquidation preference at par, above par or below par.

For example:

If NFEGP trades at $1,000:

$1,000 ÷ 46.441271 = $21.53 NFE equivalent

If NFEGP trades at $800:

$800 ÷ 46.441271 = $17.23 NFE equivalent

If NFEGP trades at $1,200:

$1,200 ÷ 46.441271 = $25.84 NFE equivalent

So NFEGP could become a very useful real time indicator for how the market values the creditor side of the restructuring.

But before the market even sets that price, the restructuring documents themselves already give us one important reference point:

$21.53 post split

$0.4307 pre split

That is the conversion price embedded in the deal negotiated by the creditors.

And considering where NFE was trading immediately before the restructuring closed, I think that is worth paying attention to.

One more thing is important.

This conversion price is not a hard floor for NFE common stock.

Nothing in the restructuring forces NFE common to trade at $21.53.

The creditors received an entire recovery package that included debt, common equity, preferred equity and other assets.

Therefore, they could still have an acceptable overall recovery even if NFE common trades below the implied conversion price.

But the $21.53 level is still important because it provides a negotiated reference point connecting the $1,000 preferred liquidation preference to the NFE common equity.

That is why I view it as an important valuation anchor rather than a guaranteed floor.

This is Part 2 of my series on hidden information in NFE restructuring filings.

Source: September 11, 2026 NFE Certificate of Designations for the Series A Mandatorily Convertible Preferred Stock and related Form 8-A filing.

Hidden Information in NFE's Restructuring Filing #1: Ecuador

I found a small provision in NFE's new restructuring documents that I think is much more important than it looks.

In the final CoreCo Credit Agreement dated September 11, 2026, NFE specifically defines:

“Specified Jurisdiction”: Ecuador and Nicaragua.

Nicaragua makes perfect sense. NFE already has a major power project under development there.

But why Ecuador?

NFE currently has no publicly announced active Ecuador project.

This gets much more interesting when you read the provisions attached to that definition.

The new credit agreement specifically allows NFE to incur up to $150 million of financing related to chartering, leasing or acquiring maritime assets used to:

• produce LNG
• transport LNG
• store LNG
• regasify LNG
• deliver LNG cargoes
• deliver power

in a “Specified Jurisdiction.”

The agreement even specifically lists:

vessels, tugs, ISO containers, regasification equipment and related equipment.

And again, the only two countries defined as Specified Jurisdictions are Ecuador and Nicaragua.

That does not prove NFE has already signed a new contract in Ecuador.

But I do not think this is random boilerplate either.

NFE has history in Ecuador

In 2021, NFE submitted a proposal to the Ecuadorian government involving Termogas Machala.

The proposal reportedly included:

• a 25-year concession for Termogas Machala
• approximately $650 million of initial investment
• expansion of power generation capacity
• NFE supplying the natural gas
• a 25-year power purchase agreement

In other words, this was a classic NFE integrated LNG-to-power model: import gas, build LNG/regas infrastructure, supply the power plant and lock in long-term power revenues.

The project never closed, largely because of the political and procurement process.

But Ecuador has become interesting again in 2026.

Look at what Ecuador is doing right now

The Ecuadorian government announced a 920 MW thermal generation program this year.

That plan includes Machala III — 200 MW, which is still listed as a project rather than a completed contracted plant.

Even more interestingly, ELECAUSTRO has recently been requesting proposals for the:

rental and operation of a dual-fuel thermal power plant using natural gas as the primary fuel and Diesel No. 2 as the backup fuel.

The latest proforma deadline was September 7, 2026.

Now compare those dates:

September 7: Ecuador receives pricing proposals for natural-gas-fired generation.

September 11: NFE closes its restructuring, and its final credit agreement still specifically identifies Ecuador as one of only two “Specified Jurisdictions,” with up to $150M of financing capacity for LNG vessels, tugs, ISO containers and regasification equipment.

That timing caught my attention.

The structure may be different this time

I would not necessarily expect NFE to revive the exact 2021 Termogas proposal.

The more interesting possibility is a lower-capex project.

Something like:

LNG carrier / FSU
→ tugs or ISO containers
→ onshore LNG storage
→ modular regasification
→ gas-fired generation

NFE has used variations of this model elsewhere.

And this would explain why the restructuring agreement does not simply refer to financing an FSRU.

It explicitly names:

vessels + tugs + ISO containers + regasification equipment.

That combination looks much more like a flexible LNG logistics system than a traditional large onshore LNG terminal.

Why I think this matters

NFE just went through a restructuring in which creditors scrutinized the company's future business plan in extreme detail.

These lenders were not giving NFE unlimited freedom to pursue projects anywhere in the world.

Yet the final agreement specifically created exceptions and financing flexibility for operations in exactly two countries:

Nicaragua — an already known NFE project.

and

Ecuador — where NFE supposedly has no currently announced project.

That is the part I find difficult to dismiss.

My interpretation:

I think NFE has preserved a real Ecuador business opportunity that has not yet been publicly announced.

It could still be preliminary.

It could be a bid rather than a signed contract.

And there is currently no public evidence that NFE has won an Ecuador contract.

But after reading the restructuring agreement, I think Ecuador deserves to be added to the list of NFE projects worth monitoring.

Watch for:

NFE / New Fortress Energy
Atlantic Energy
LNG supply
Machala
Machala III
ELECAUSTRO / CELEC
FSU or LNG carrier
ISO container
regasification equipment

in upcoming Ecuador procurement announcements.

One more speculative point: Energos Maria is currently heading to Turkey for major dry-dock work. I am not saying Maria is going to Ecuador, and there is currently no evidence connecting the vessel to an Ecuador project.

But Maria is an LNGC/FSU, and if NFE chose a floating-storage-plus-onshore-regas model rather than a full FSRU, this is exactly the type of vessel configuration that could theoretically support such a project.

For now, Ecuador is not a confirmed project.

But I don't think the word “Ecuador” ended up in NFE's final September 11 credit agreement by accident.

NFE has already sold the contract due to a lack of funds. Currently, the contract is being carried out using vessels owned by Energos Infrastructure and operated by Wilhelmsen.

But now, the stock has finally fallen to around $0.43 — roughly the level that reflects the fully diluted share count. In other words, the market seems to be pricing NFE as if the company will not be able to redeem or retire any meaningful portion of the preferred equity.

I believe that is a distortion.

This price action looks heavily influenced by two temporary forces: large-scale shorting ahead of the expected Russell ETF removal on June 26, and arbitrage shorts used to hedge the massive amount of new shares that may be issued through the restructuring.

But this supply-demand imbalance could break, especially after the reverse split. And once the stock is trading at these depressed levels, the real opportunity becomes clearer: the preferred equity may not need to be redeemed at full face value.

Many people still seem to assume that the $2.5 billion preferred equity must be paid back with $2.5 billion in cash. But if you read the restructuring documents carefully, there is language that points to discounted repurchases or negotiated exits.

If NFE can stabilize operations around its Puerto Rico contracts, sell selected assets, and use the proceeds to retire preferred equity at a discount, the valuation framework changes dramatically.

At that point, the common stock may no longer be able to stay suppressed at these levels.

And ironically, the same creditors who are currently weighing on the stock could eventually become aligned with higher equity prices. After the restructuring, they will become the largest shareholders. Once that happens, their incentive may shift from suppressing the price to supporting a higher valuation.

That is why I believe the current price does not reflect the true optionality here. It reflects fear, forced selling, hedging, and temporary technical pressure.

If NFE survives this transition and uses discounted preferred equity retirement effectively, the upside from here could be much larger than the market is willing to admit.

I have posted many comments here over the past few days. There were many people struggling, and many who sent me private messages. Since I am not American and English is not my native language, I use a translator, but I still conversed with many people. The conclusion I reached was that most of those writing here feel both distress and loneliness. Men and women, adults and teenagers. Those with friends and those without. It was surprising and heartbreaking to see that everyone here—who cannot be divided by any specific definition—feels lonely. At the same time, I felt a sense of pity seeing that most of those I spoke with found great comfort in just a few words from me. Unfortunately, I was unable to leave comments for everyone here, but if you message me anytime, I will be able to talk to you sooner or later. You are not alone. Even if it feels like the world is tormenting you, never let it defeat you. Your small act of courage will surely change you.