u/Inner-Traffic-7296

Image 1 — Another NFE Altamira spot cargo? AMUR RIVER appears to be lining up for an offshore loading
Image 2 — Another NFE Altamira spot cargo? AMUR RIVER appears to be lining up for an offshore loading

Another NFE Altamira spot cargo? AMUR RIVER appears to be lining up for an offshore loading

There may be another spot / third-party LNG cargo developing at NFE's Altamira FLNG facility.

The latest official vessel schedule published by ASIPONA Altamira, updated on August 19, lists the LNG tanker AMUR RIVER for an operation on August 21 at 08:00.

What makes this interesting:

  • AMUR RIVER is a 149,700 m³ LNG carrier.
  • MarineTraffic shows the vessel arrived at the Altamira anchorage on August 19 at 10:46 and is currently at anchor offshore.
  • Its reported draft is only 9.2 m, which appears consistent with the vessel arriving in ballast/light condition rather than carrying a full LNG cargo.
  • The official ASIPONA schedule lists the operation as “ABARLOAMIENTO” — an alongside/mooring operation — with an estimated duration of 24 hours.
  • The agent is Logística y Suministro Tritón, S.A. de C.V.

That last point is particularly interesting.

In ASIPONA’s official July 15 vessel-programming minutes, the same Tritón agency reported that:

PALU LNG would proceed to the NFE complex, berth alongside the NFE PENGUIN, and export 80,000 m³ of LNG.

Immediately afterward, ENERGY ENDURANCE was scheduled to do the same thing and export another 150,000 m³ of LNG.

So there is already a very recent precedent:

Tritón + LNG carrier + offshore alongside operation → NFE PENGUIN LNG export.

Now AMUR RIVER has arrived offshore Altamira and is being handled by the same agency for another “abarloamiento” operation.

There is another important clue.

According to Dynagas LNG Partners’ SEC filings, AMUR RIVER is under a long-term charter to SEFE Marketing & Trading Singapore, with the charter running into 2028.

That makes this look less like NFE simply repositioning LNG internally to Puerto Rico and more like a possible third-party sale to SEFE, or another short-term/spot cargo arranged through SEFE.

If AMUR RIVER loads close to its full capacity, the cargo could be roughly 145,000–150,000 m³ of LNG.

My interpretation

This is not confirmed yet as an NFE cargo.

The August 19 ASIPONA schedule does not explicitly state “NFE PENGUIN,” nor does it provide an LNG loading volume the way the July minutes did.

But the combination of:

1. a nearly empty LNG tanker arriving at Altamira,
2. an offshore “abarloamiento” operation,
3. the same shipping agent that handled the July NFE exports, and
4. AMUR RIVER being controlled commercially by SEFE

makes another NFE Altamira third-party LNG sale a fairly strong possibility.

The next confirmation points should be:

  • whether AMUR RIVER actually moves alongside the NFE offshore complex,
  • whether its draft rises materially after the operation,
  • the next ASIPONA programming minutes,
  • and its AIS destination after departure.

If its draft jumps from ~9.2 m toward loaded levels and it departs Altamira, that would be a strong indication that another full NFE cargo has been lifted.

This would also be notable because July already showed 230,000 m³ of explicitly documented NFE LNG exports through PALU LNG and ENERGY ENDURANCE.

If AMUR RIVER is another ~150,000 m³ cargo, Altamira's Q3 external sales activity may be materially stronger than it initially appeared.

Sources:

ASIPONA Altamira — Programa Estimado de Arribos y Buques, updated August 19, 2026

ASIPONA Altamira — Acta de Programación de Buques, July 15, 2026, Circular No. 000668

MarineTraffic AIS — AMUR RIVER, IMO 9317999

Dynagas LNG Partners — 2025 Form 20-F / fleet charter information

This is vessel-tracking analysis and inference, not confirmation of a commercial transaction.

u/Inner-Traffic-7296 — 1 day ago

NFE Altamira may have shipped ~320,000 m³ of LNG in July — potentially $105M-$115M of Q3 revenue exposure

I went through the available Altamira port records, U.S. customs data and vessel movements, and July looks much stronger than it initially appeared.

There appear to be three separate Altamira LNG movements tied to Q3 2026.

1. ENERGOS PRINCESS — ~90,000 m³ to Puerto Rico

U.S. customs data shows:

  • Vessel: ENERGOS PRINCESS
  • Bill of Lading: ENHEFLNG53
  • Origin / Place of Receipt: ALTAMIRA, MEXICO
  • Arrival: July 22, 2026
  • Destination: San Juan, Puerto Rico
  • Cargo: 38,584.772 metric tons
  • Volume: 566,928.87 LNG barrels
  • Equivalent LNG volume: roughly 90,000 m³

This is an actual customs-recorded cargo, not an estimate.

NFE's own restructuring materials say Puerto Rico gas pricing is:

  • Island-wide GSA: 115% Henry Hub + $7.95/MMBtu
  • San Juan 5&6: 115% Henry Hub + $6.50/MMBtu

July Henry Hub averaged approximately $2.89/MMBtu.

That implies a Puerto Rico selling price of roughly:

$9.82-$11.27/MMBtu

90,000 m³ LNG is approximately 1.94 million MMBtu, implying roughly:

$19M-$22M of downstream revenue

depending on which Puerto Rico pricing bucket the gas ultimately falls under.

2. PALU LNG — 80,000 m³ from Altamira

This one is particularly interesting because we have an official Mexican port authority document.

ASIPONA Altamira's July 15 vessel-programming meeting states that PALU LNG was scheduled to arrive at the NFE complex and berth alongside NFE PENGUIN for:

“exportación de 80,000 m3 de gas natural licuado”

So:

  • Vessel: PALU LNG
  • Altamira operation: mid-July
  • LNG loaded from NFE Penguin: 80,000 m³
  • Approximate energy content: 1.72 million MMBtu

PALU subsequently called at Freeport before moving toward Europe, so I am counting only the 80,000 m³ specifically identified by Altamira authorities as NFE LNG, not the vessel's eventual full cargo.

July European TTF averaged approximately $18.07/MMBtu.

Using TTF simply as a market benchmark:

1.72M MMBtu × ~$18.07 = ~$31M

So the Altamira portion of the PALU cargo could represent roughly $30M-$31M of LNG value.

3. ENERGY ENDURANCE — 150,000 m³

The same official Altamira document states that ENERGY ENDURANCE would berth alongside NFE PENGUIN after PALU LNG finished operations and load:

150,000 m³ of LNG for export

AIS history confirms ENERGY ENDURANCE was at Altamira roughly July 17-20, and it subsequently crossed the Atlantic into the Mediterranean/Suez route toward Egypt.

  • Vessel: ENERGY ENDURANCE
  • Altamira: approximately July 17-20
  • NFE LNG scheduled for export: 150,000 m³
  • Approximate energy content: 3.23 million MMBtu
  • Subsequent route: Egypt / Suez

This is the biggest of the three July movements.

July TTF averaged $18.07/MMBtu, while Egypt has recently been paying premiums over TTF-linked LNG prices.

Using roughly $18-$19/MMBtu as a reasonable benchmark gives:

3.23M MMBtu × $18-$19 = ~$58M-$61M

Again, the actual contract price is not publicly known.

Total July Altamira LNG identified

ENERGOS PRINCESS: ~90,000 m³

PALU LNG: 80,000 m³

ENERGY ENDURANCE: 150,000 m³

Total: approximately 320,000 m³ LNG

That is approximately:

6.9 million MMBtu / 6.9 TBtu

Using the observable Puerto Rico contract prices and July international LNG benchmarks, I estimate the revenue represented by these LNG volumes at roughly:

$105M-$115M

This is NOT a reported NFE revenue number. It is a rough valuation of the LNG movements based on publicly available quantities and market/contract pricing.

Why this matters for NFE Q3

NFE's March 2026 restructuring materials projected CoreCo Q3 2026 results of approximately:

  • Gas revenue: $179M
  • Power revenue: $33M
  • Capacity revenue: $17M
  • Other revenue: $68M
  • Total revenue: $298M
  • Adjusted EBITDA: $58M

The ~$105M-$115M represented by these three LNG movements alone would therefore be equivalent to roughly:

~60% of NFE's projected Q3 gas revenue

and

~35%-40% of projected total CoreCo Q3 revenue.

Obviously these cargoes were probably already contemplated to some degree in management's forecast, so they should NOT simply be added on top of the $298M forecast.

What matters is that we now have public evidence that a meaningful portion of the expected Q3 gas activity actually occurred.

There is also a potentially important margin story.

NFE's March materials targeted an Altamira FLNG production cost adder of around $2.46/MMBtu excluding 115% Henry Hub.

With July HH at ~$2.89, that implies a theoretical run-rate LNG production cost around:

115% × $2.89 + $2.46 ≈ $5.78/MMBtu

Even assuming actual Q3 costs are somewhat higher — around ~$6/MMBtu — LNG sold into an $18-$19/MMBtu international market potentially carries a very large commodity spread.

Very roughly, these three cargoes could generate $60M+ of cargo-level gross margin before shipping, vessel charter costs, terminal costs, SG&A and other expenses.

That is NOT the same thing as EBITDA, but for a company currently going through a liquidity-sensitive restructuring, this level of Altamira utilization is meaningful.

And the biggest takeaway for me is this:

Altamira isn't just producing LNG for Puerto Rico anymore.

In July we appear to have:

  1. A Puerto Rico cargo
  2. A partial international cargo via PALU LNG
  3. A large 150,000 m³ international cargo apparently headed toward Egypt

If this export cadence continues through August and September, Q3 Altamira results could look substantially better than Q1, when NFE reported only $43.9M of LNG cargo-sale revenue.

Sources

Official ASIPONA Altamira vessel-programming record — July 15, 2026:
https://puertoaltamira.com.mx/upl/sec//Acta_programacion_2026-07-15_13_44.pdf

ENERGOS PRINCESS U.S. customs / Bill of Lading:
https://www.importgenius.com/suppliers/nfe-altamira-flng-s-de-rl-de-cv

NFE March 2026 restructuring materials — FLNG cost, Puerto Rico pricing and Q3 financial forecast:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1749723/000174972326000008/cleansingmaterials.htm

EIA Henry Hub monthly prices:
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngwhhdm.htm

Reuters — July LNG prices:
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-lng-exports-stall-july-despite-higher-lng-prices-2026-08-03/

PALU LNG vessel tracking:
https://maritimeoptima.com/public/vessels/pages/imo%3A9636735/mmsi%3A229582000/PALU_LNG.html

ENERGY ENDURANCE vessel tracking:
https://maritimeoptima.com/public/vessels/pages/imo%3A9948695/mmsi%3A538010699/ENERGY_ENDURANCE.html

As always, I used AI to translate and articulate my thoughts.

u/Inner-Traffic-7296 — 11 days ago

Drone attacks are not related to NFE.

NFE has already sold the contract due to a lack of funds. Currently, the contract is being carried out using vessels owned by Energos Infrastructure and operated by Wilhelmsen.

sec.gov
u/Inner-Traffic-7296 — 22 days ago

Good News & Bad News.

A problem has occurred at the Puerto Rico power plant.

The Klondike Project, which was valued at zero, is coming back to life.

u/Inner-Traffic-7296 — 1 month ago

ships update

The Energy Endurance is currently en route to Korea or Japan via the Panama Canal.

The Energos Maria is waiting off the coast of Puerto Rico with spare gas.

The Energos Princess is stably supplying gas in Puerto Rico.

Our cute nfe penguin is filling up its gas again.

The Energos Grand is carrying a generous amount of gas and supplying it to La Paz, Mexico.

NFE's business is still ongoing, and it is believed that there is significant upside potential depending on how the asset sale proceeds.

u/Inner-Traffic-7296 — 2 months ago

Everyone here knows that I’m bullish on this company.

But now, the stock has finally fallen to around $0.43 — roughly the level that reflects the fully diluted share count. In other words, the market seems to be pricing NFE as if the company will not be able to redeem or retire any meaningful portion of the preferred equity.

I believe that is a distortion.

This price action looks heavily influenced by two temporary forces: large-scale shorting ahead of the expected Russell ETF removal on June 26, and arbitrage shorts used to hedge the massive amount of new shares that may be issued through the restructuring.

But this supply-demand imbalance could break, especially after the reverse split. And once the stock is trading at these depressed levels, the real opportunity becomes clearer: the preferred equity may not need to be redeemed at full face value.

Many people still seem to assume that the $2.5 billion preferred equity must be paid back with $2.5 billion in cash. But if you read the restructuring documents carefully, there is language that points to discounted repurchases or negotiated exits.

If NFE can stabilize operations around its Puerto Rico contracts, sell selected assets, and use the proceeds to retire preferred equity at a discount, the valuation framework changes dramatically.

At that point, the common stock may no longer be able to stay suppressed at these levels.

And ironically, the same creditors who are currently weighing on the stock could eventually become aligned with higher equity prices. After the restructuring, they will become the largest shareholders. Once that happens, their incentive may shift from suppressing the price to supporting a higher valuation.

That is why I believe the current price does not reflect the true optionality here. It reflects fear, forced selling, hedging, and temporary technical pressure.

If NFE survives this transition and uses discounted preferred equity retirement effectively, the upside from here could be much larger than the market is willing to admit.

reddit.com
u/Inner-Traffic-7296 — 2 months ago

You are not alone.

I have posted many comments here over the past few days. There were many people struggling, and many who sent me private messages. Since I am not American and English is not my native language, I use a translator, but I still conversed with many people. The conclusion I reached was that most of those writing here feel both distress and loneliness. Men and women, adults and teenagers. Those with friends and those without. It was surprising and heartbreaking to see that everyone here—who cannot be divided by any specific definition—feels lonely. At the same time, I felt a sense of pity seeing that most of those I spoke with found great comfort in just a few words from me. Unfortunately, I was unable to leave comments for everyone here, but if you message me anytime, I will be able to talk to you sooner or later. You are not alone. Even if it feels like the world is tormenting you, never let it defeat you. Your small act of courage will surely change you.

reddit.com
u/Inner-Traffic-7296 — 2 months ago

NFE Altamira DOE Filing

https://preview.redd.it/kfa736jpr76h1.png?width=801&format=png&auto=webp&s=5e03c5d531066851d187d8adee4982eb98584360

https://preview.redd.it/njo396jpr76h1.png?width=790&format=png&auto=webp&s=aa9eb5deee0dd031a8171522df7f0688a7a27093

https://preview.redd.it/4hfr6fzqr76h1.png?width=771&format=png&auto=webp&s=884be31a87e9143d7b8c37b04b9b0a0342730e6a

https://preview.redd.it/ez6gn7jpr76h1.png?width=716&format=png&auto=webp&s=711e003721e57e1ce109da3648f2aeb97b82b766

https://preview.redd.it/873kv6jpr76h1.png?width=782&format=png&auto=webp&s=ef368fd1981dce5e5cb0ca4ba7b1e756c3e8df6a

https://preview.redd.it/jzh6najpr76h1.png?width=763&format=png&auto=webp&s=4aed32b7001aee0391ca4b290255c02ad8e7666f

https://preview.redd.it/ezacu6jpr76h1.png?width=739&format=png&auto=webp&s=78e671e2f85d2c6c53b27012b11ee9c429a328c9

https://preview.redd.it/7ra986jpr76h1.png?width=714&format=png&auto=webp&s=7877fed8d1991cf4c7d96f6416a363817dce6ab1

https://preview.redd.it/e3hnr7qrr76h1.png?width=768&format=png&auto=webp&s=f8a1528917038acd547ea26d7bb99ee8ec20a5db

https://preview.redd.it/6o6he7jpr76h1.png?width=743&format=png&auto=webp&s=60e1f756b968249b1c6acffb04e0d7f59efc52b6

It is a DOE change-in-control filing because the upstream ownership and voting control of NFE will change after the restructuring.

The filing says NFE Altamira is an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of New Fortress Energy, and Mexico FLNG owns the Altamira FLNG Project. The project exported its first LNG cargo on August 9, 2024.

The filing also explains that NFE Altamira has two DOE export authorizations:

FTA authorization:
158 Bcf/year through December 31, 2050.

Non-FTA authorization:
145 Bcf/year, but only from August 31, 2024 to August 30, 2029.

NFE had originally requested the Non-FTA authorization to run through December 31, 2050. DOE only granted five years. NFE filed a request on April 1, 2025 to extend the Non-FTA term to 2050, and DOE has not acted on that request yet.

That is one of the most important parts of this filing.

Now look at why the change-in-control filing was necessary.

Under the restructuring support agreement, NFE will separate BrazilCo from the remaining NFE/CoreCo business. Creditors will receive 65% of NFE common stock before the MIP and before any preferred conversion. NFE will also issue preferred stock with up to $2.5 billion liquidation preference, and the preferred stockholders will vote on an as-converted basis together with common stockholders.

The filing identifies three investment groups that are expected to hold between 10% and 20% of NFE voting securities after the restructuring:

Capital Research and Management Company
Fidelity Management & Research Company
Strategic Value Partners

DOE treats ownership or voting power of 10% or more as creating a rebuttable presumption of control. That is why NFE had to file this change-in-control notice.

Here is how I read each group.

Capital Research and Management Company / Capital Group

This is not a small distressed fund. Capital Group is one of the largest long-term asset managers in the world. Its presence gives the post-restructuring equity base more institutional credibility. But it also means NFE will face more pressure for capital discipline, less reckless capex, and more focus on cash flow.

Fidelity Management & Research

Fidelity is another major institutional holder. But we should not assume Fidelity is a single activist-style investor with one simple agenda. The filing says Fidelity or its affiliates advise, sub-advise, or manage more than 80 funds and accounts that will acquire NFE equity. Some of this may be credit recovery, some may be equity exposure, and some may be different fund strategies. Still, Fidelity’s presence makes post-restructuring NFE more investable and more institutionally owned.

Strategic Value Partners

SVP is the most important one to me. SVP is a distressed and special situations investor. This is the group most likely to push for hard restructuring discipline: asset sales, JV transactions, cost cuts, deleveraging, and recovery maximization.

SVP is not here to protect legacy common shareholders emotionally. SVP is here to maximize recovery on the capital structure.

This is the real meaning of the filing.

NFE is moving from founder-led growth mode to creditor-supervised recovery mode.

That does not mean common is dead. But it means the common thesis must be framed correctly.

Legacy common is not a clean ownership claim on Altamira.

Legacy common is now a junior recovery option on CoreCo. That option becomes valuable if:

Altamira keeps producing,
Puerto Rico cash flow grows,
DOE clears the change in control,
DOE extends Non-FTA authorization to 2050,
CoreCo buys back or refinances the preferred,
and non-core assets are sold or JV’d intelligently.

The key date in the filing is June 26, 2026.

NFE asks DOE to act by June 26 on the change in control. More importantly, NFE also asks DOE to act by June 26 on the pending request to extend the Non-FTA authorization through December 31, 2050.

My interpretation:

Change in control cleared:
Neutral to mildly positive. It removes a restructuring closing risk.

Change in control delayed:
Mildly negative. It adds uncertainty.

Non-FTA extended to 2050:
Strong positive. That would materially improve Altamira’s long-term value for refinancing, JV, asset valuation, and the CoreCo recovery thesis.

Post-restructuring NFE will be controlled by large institutional and distressed investors, especially CRMC, Fidelity, and SVP.

Altamira appears to remain a core CoreCo asset.

And the biggest upside in this filing is the pending request to extend Non-FTA authorization from 2029 to 2050.

reddit.com
u/Inner-Traffic-7296 — 2 months ago

NFE fair price

Here is my updated NFE valuation framework after including:

  1. the 50% debt-exchange effect,
  2. the management incentive plan,
  3. Puerto Rico pipeline cost savings,
  4. historical NFE / LNG infrastructure EBITDA multiples,
  5. NFE’s unusually high short interest.

This is not a price target. It is a framework.

All prices are shown both pre-split and after a 50-for-1 reverse split.

Reverse split price reference only:

$0.50 pre-split = $25 post-split
$1.00 pre-split = $50 post-split
$2.00 pre-split = $100 post-split
$3.00 pre-split = $150 post-split
$5.00 pre-split = $250 post-split

Basic assumptions:

Post-restructuring CoreCo debt after the 50% debt-exchange effect: about $570M
Preferred equity after the 50% debt-exchange effect: about $2.46B
Current share count basis: about 286M shares pre-split
Base recovery multiple: 8.5x EV/EBITDA
Upside recovery multiple: 10.0x EV/EBITDA

Why 8.5x?

Before the debt crisis became the main story, NFE often traded around roughly 9x-11x EV/EBITDA.

Large LNG names such as Cheniere and Venture Global can trade at 10x+ EV/EBITDA.

I am not saying NFE deserves a Cheniere multiple immediately.

But if New NFE proves normalized EBITDA, Altamira production, Puerto Rico cash flow, and a credible preferred-reduction path, then 8.5x is not aggressive.

It is a discounted recovery multiple.

10x is the stronger LNG-platform recovery case.

Important MIP adjustment:

The management incentive plan is not small.

The restructuring documents reserve:

10% of CoreCo common stock before preferred conversion,

and 7% of CoreCo preferred stock

for the CoreCo MIP.

The proxy describes the new reserve as roughly a 7% overhang.

So in my math, I apply roughly a 7%-10% haircut versus a no-MIP calculation.

There is also a separate FLNG2 sale incentive plan.

If FLNG2 is sold or monetized, the FLNG2 MIP pool equals:

2% of proceeds up to $200M,

3% of proceeds from $200M to $400M,

5% of proceeds above $400M.

Examples:

$400M FLNG2 monetization = about $10M MIP pool

$800M FLNG2 monetization = about $30M MIP pool

$1B FLNG2 monetization = about $40M MIP pool

So FLNG2 monetization still helps, but not 100% of gross proceeds should be treated as value to common.

Short interest adjustment:

NFE is not a normal low-short stock.

Recent short interest data shows roughly 43M-46M shares sold short.

Depending on the source, that is roughly 20%-30%+ of the float, with days-to-cover around 6-12 days.

That does not change fundamental value by itself.

But it can change how fast the stock reprices if positive catalysts arrive.

A high short base can amplify moves if:

restructuring closes,

Nasdaq listing risk is reduced,

asset/JV proceeds are announced,

preferred reduction becomes visible,

Altamira cash flow improves,

Puerto Rico GSA cash flow becomes clearer,

or LNG export pricing improves.

So I separate the analysis into two layers:

  1. fundamental value,
  2. possible short-covering / momentum overshoot.

Case 1: Full preferred dilution / no meaningful preferred reduction

Assume EBITDA: $415M

At 8.5x:

$415M × 8.5 = EV of about $3.53B

Minus debt of about $0.57B = equity value of about $2.96B

After full preferred conversion and MIP dilution, existing common may retain around 4.0% of the final equity.

$2.96B × 4.0% = $118M

$118M / 286M shares = about $0.41 pre-split

At 10x:

$415M × 10.0 = EV of about $4.15B

Minus debt of about $0.57B = equity value of about $3.58B

$3.58B × 4.0% = $143M

$143M / 286M shares = about $0.50 pre-split

So I would put the full-dilution survival case around:

Pre-split: $0.40-$0.55
Post-split: $20-$27.50

This is the harsh survival case.

Short interest does not help much here because the fundamental common recovery is still weak.

Case 2: Some asset sales / JV proceeds reduce preferred

Possible sources:

Shannon LNG
Klondike
Nicaragua
FLNG2 partner/JV

I do not assume these are easy full-cash sales.

Some may be partial JV proceeds, development-right monetization, project-level financing, or partner contributions.

Assume NFE reduces preferred by about $750M-$1.0B.

After MIP dilution, existing common may retain roughly 13%-16% of the final equity.

Assume EBITDA: $415M

At 8.5x:

EV = $3.53B

Minus debt of about $0.57B = equity value of about $2.96B

$2.96B × 13% = $385M

$2.96B × 16% = $474M

Divide by 286M shares:

$385M / 286M = $1.35

$474M / 286M = $1.66

At 10x:

Equity value = about $3.58B

$3.58B × 13% = $465M

$3.58B × 16% = $573M

Divide by 286M shares:

$465M / 286M = $1.63

$573M / 286M = $2.00

Because asset proceeds may not all go directly to preferred repayment, I would haircut this case to:

Fundamental value:

Pre-split: $1.25-$1.90
Post-split: $62.50-$95

With short-covering / momentum overshoot:

Pre-split: roughly $1.50-$2.25
Post-split: roughly $75-$112.50

Case 3: Company normalizes and refinances part of the preferred with new debt

This is my main recovery case.

If NFE normalizes EBITDA and restores credit access, the company should be able to replace part of the preferred with debt.

Debt is much less dilutive than preferred converting into common.

Assume:

EBITDA: $450M
Debt after refinancing: around $1.5B

At 8.5x:

$450M × 8.5 = EV of about $3.83B

Minus debt of about $1.5B = equity value of about $2.33B

After MIP dilution, if preferred is meaningfully reduced, existing common may retain around 23%-28% of the final equity.

$2.33B × 23% = $536M

$2.33B × 28% = $652M

Divide by 286M shares:

$536M / 286M = $1.87

$652M / 286M = $2.28

At 10x:

$450M × 10.0 = EV of about $4.50B

Minus debt of about $1.5B = equity value of about $3.00B

$3.00B × 23% = $690M

$3.00B × 28% = $840M

Divide by 286M shares:

$690M / 286M = $2.41

$840M / 286M = $2.94

So I would put the main recovery case around:

Fundamental value:

Pre-split: $1.90-$2.90
Post-split: $95-$145

With short-covering / momentum overshoot:

Pre-split: roughly $2.25-$3.50
Post-split: roughly $112.50-$175

For me, this is the key recovery case.

Case 4: Asset/JV proceeds + operating cash flow + Puerto Rico pipeline savings

The San Juan-to-Palo Seco gas pipeline matters here.

Palo Seco has historically relied on about 50 LNG truck deliveries per day.

Rough calculation:

50 trucks/day × 10,000 gallons LNG/truck = 500,000 gallons LNG/day

1 gallon LNG is roughly 0.083 MMBtu

500,000 gallons/day × 0.083 = about 41,500 MMBtu/day

Annualized:

41,500 MMBtu/day × 365 = about 15.1M MMBtu/year

That is about 15 TBtu/year of LNG logistics exposure.

If the pipeline reduces trucking/logistics cost by only $0.50-$1.25/MMBtu, the annual margin improvement could be:

15.1M MMBtu × $0.50 = about $7.5M/year

15.1M MMBtu × $1.25 = about $19M/year

So I would treat the pipeline as roughly $8M-$20M of potential annual EBITDA improvement, plus reliability benefits.

At 8.5x EBITDA, that is roughly $68M-$170M of additional EV.

At 10x EBITDA, that is roughly $80M-$200M of additional EV.

That alone does not change the whole story, but it strengthens the Puerto Rico margin case.

Assume:

EBITDA: $500M-$520M
Debt: around $1.5B

At 8.5x:

EV = about $4.25B-$4.42B

Minus debt of about $1.5B = equity value of about $2.75B-$2.92B

After MIP dilution, if preferred is reduced enough that existing common retains around 28%-37% of the final equity:

$2.75B × 28% = $770M

$2.92B × 37% = $1.08B

Divide by 286M shares:

$770M / 286M = $2.69

$1.08B / 286M = $3.78

At 10x:

EV = about $5.00B-$5.20B

Minus debt of about $1.5B = equity value of about $3.50B-$3.70B

$3.50B × 28% = $980M

$3.70B × 37% = $1.37B

Divide by 286M shares:

$980M / 286M = $3.43

$1.37B / 286M = $4.79

So I would put this case around:

Fundamental value:

Pre-split: $2.70-$4.80
Post-split: $135-$240

With short-covering / momentum overshoot:

Pre-split: roughly $3.25-$5.75
Post-split: roughly $162.50-$287.50

Case 5: LNG disruption / stronger export pricing adds upside

This is not my base case, but it matters.

If LNG logistics disruption continues, non-Hormuz LNG becomes more valuable, and Altamira captures better export pricing, EBITDA and the multiple can both move higher.

Assume:

EBITDA: $550M
Debt: around $1.6B

At 8.5x:

$550M × 8.5 = EV of about $4.68B

Minus debt of about $1.6B = equity value of about $3.08B

After MIP dilution, if common retains 32%-42% after preferred reduction:

$3.08B × 32% = $986M

$3.08B × 42% = $1.29B

Divide by 286M shares:

$986M / 286M = $3.45

$1.29B / 286M = $4.51

At 10x:

$550M × 10.0 = EV of about $5.50B

Minus debt of about $1.6B = equity value of about $3.90B

$3.90B × 32% = $1.25B

$3.90B × 42% = $1.64B

Divide by 286M shares:

$1.25B / 286M = $4.37

$1.64B / 286M = $5.73

So I would put this case around:

Fundamental value:

Pre-split: $3.40-$5.70
Post-split: $170-$285

With short-covering / momentum overshoot:

Pre-split: roughly $4.00-$7.00
Post-split: roughly $200-$350

Case 6: Louisiana / DPA / strategic LNG platform optionality

This is not my base case.

This is the option-value case.

If Louisiana or another major LNG infrastructure option comes back, the market may stop valuing NFE as only a distressed restructuring story and start valuing it as a strategic LNG platform again.

After including MIP dilution, I would frame this only as:

Fundamental value:

Pre-split: $5.00+
Post-split: $250+

With short-covering / momentum overshoot:

Pre-split: potentially higher
Post-split: potentially much higher

Conclusion:

NFE’s high short interest does not create value by itself.

But it matters a lot for price action.

If there is no preferred reduction, no refinancing, and no clear cash-flow improvement, shorts may not need to cover quickly.

But if NFE shows:

preferred reduction,

asset/JV proceeds,

credit access restoration,

Altamira cash flow,

Puerto Rico GSA margin,

San Juan-to-Palo Seco pipeline cost savings,

or stronger LNG export pricing,

then 43M-46M short shares can become real buying pressure.

My central recovery case is still Case 3:

fundamental value around $1.90-$2.90 pre-split,

or $95-$145 post-split.

But with short-covering pressure, that same case could overshoot toward:

roughly $2.25-$3.50 pre-split,

or $112.50-$175 post-split.

The key question remains:

How much preferred equity can NFE eliminate before it converts?

Altamira and Puerto Rico are the base.

Export cargoes are the upside.

Shannon, Klondike, Nicaragua, FLNG2, and Louisiana are option value.

The short interest is the accelerant.

reddit.com
u/Inner-Traffic-7296 — 3 months ago

New fortress energy Altamira export. mar

https://preview.redd.it/qk5atysprp2h1.png?width=876&format=png&auto=webp&s=bec1bf8451be3e8e160fb14ea3dc1805ea304b7e

https://preview.redd.it/ailgoysprp2h1.png?width=964&format=png&auto=webp&s=8a32ab5dc69ce51c9f4bcda6aadc5fd420c39ff1

https://preview.redd.it/ibzh3btprp2h1.png?width=824&format=png&auto=webp&s=a0cce4a41100c64ea67bcadde36944fd609ccd58

https://preview.redd.it/v6623ysprp2h1.png?width=772&format=png&auto=webp&s=e218f7eb81fb3e9c77baaec04091c07076aa3aca

https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2026-05/Natural%20Gas%20Imports%20and%20Exports%20Monthly%20March%202026.pdf

I think there is an important point many people may be missing about Altamira and NFE’s Q1 2026 numbers.

According to the DOE LNG export data, Altamira exported 9.6 Bcf in Q1 2026, across 3 cargoes to 3 countries, with a YTD average export price of $10.55/MMBtu.

On paper, that looks like roughly:

9.6 million MMBtu × $10.55 = about $101 million of export value.

But in NFE’s Q1 2026 10-Q, reported LNG cargo sales revenue was only about $43.9 million, while cargo sales costs were about $44.5 million.

At first glance, that looks terrible. It makes cargo sales look almost break-even or slightly negative.

But I do not think the conclusion is that simple.

The key issue is that DOE export value is not the same thing as NFE’s recognized cargo sales revenue.

Some Altamira LNG volumes may have been used to support NFE’s downstream terminal customers, especially Puerto Rico/San Juan, rather than being recognized as standalone cargo sales. NFE also says in the 10-Q that FLNG 1 production is being used to meet current customer demand.

There is another important clue: inventory.

NFE’s LNG and natural gas inventory increased from about $100.1 million at year-end 2025 to about $134.9 million at March 31, 2026.

That is an increase of about $34.8 million.

NFE also disclosed that its LNG inventory weighted-average cost was about $8.38/MMBtu.

So the inventory increase roughly represents:

$34.8 million ÷ $8.38/MMBtu = about 4.15 million MMBtu

That is roughly the size of one LNG cargo, or slightly more.

Altamira exported 9.6 Bcf over 3 cargoes, so the average cargo size was around:

9.6 Bcf ÷ 3 = 3.2 Bcf per cargo

This means it is quite possible that one cargo was produced, loaded, or in transit around quarter-end, but had not yet been fully recognized as revenue in Q1.

If one Altamira cargo was not recognized until Q2, the revenue timing effect could be roughly:

3.2 million MMBtu × $8.40/MMBtu = about $27 million

or, using the YTD average price:

3.2 million MMBtu × $10.55/MMBtu = about $34 million

So I think the most reasonable interpretation is this:

Altamira is real and active, but Q1 reported cargo sales may understate the actual economic activity because of timing, accounting classification, and downstream customer supply.

That does not mean there is a hidden $100 million profit sitting somewhere. The margin may still be thin, especially because NFE’s inventory cost was around $8.38/MMBtu, almost the same as Altamira’s March export price of $8.40/MMBtu.

As always, please correct me if I missed something or if any of the numbers need adjustment.

reddit.com
u/Inner-Traffic-7296 — 3 months ago

Irish LNG terminal remains central to New Fortress Energy plan as energy giant restructures

https://preview.redd.it/25pirzhtwg2h1.png?width=1528&format=png&auto=webp&s=7c28701eaae5ec1c0c5d8b92701abbe2fc72e531

https://www.businesspost.ie/uncategorized/irish-lng-terminal-remains-central-to-new-fortress-energy-plan-as-energy-giant-restructures/

New Fortress Energy is restructuring heavily, but Shannon LNG has not disappeared from the company’s plan.

In NFE’s latest 10-Q, the company still lists its Ireland Facility as a current development project. NFE says it intends to develop and operate an LNG facility and power plant on the Shannon Estuary near Tarbert, Ireland. It also states that the Irish planning application for the LNG terminal and power plant is being reconsidered after the High Court quashed ABP’s previous refusal.

The same filing says NFE still carries about $36.5 million of permits, development rights and easements related to Shannon as of March 31, 2026.

The Irish planning file is also active. Case PA08.322568 covers the Shannon Technology and Energy Park, including a power plant, battery storage system, FSRU, jetty, onshore receiving facilities and related works.

https://preview.redd.it/8hv9m4mwxg2h1.png?width=990&format=png&auto=webp&s=a67cad3506b3704e7d1aa70c9d3df322b0f55938

https://www.pleanala.ie/en-ie/case/322568

Separately, the High Court upheld permission for the 600MW gas-fired power plant and 120MW battery project in April 2026.

https://preview.redd.it/suqbf120yg2h1.jpg?width=1178&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=90bbcb3fc9762463db586ffecafaccbd649b4001

https://www.arthurcox.com/knowledge/challenge-against-the-shannon-lng-limited/

Meanwhile, NFE’s 2024 data center push through Klondike looked much bigger at the time. The company said Klondike had over 1,000 acres across Brazil, Ireland and the U.S. for behind-the-meter data center development. But in the latest 10-Q, the current development projects are focused on FLNG2, Brazil, Nicaragua and Ireland — not Klondike/data centers.

So the takeaway is simple:

NFE is cutting, restructuring and reducing capital commitments, but Shannon LNG/Ireland Facility is still listed as a live development asset.

https://preview.redd.it/e3r3qze8yg2h1.jpg?width=864&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=05911d2695002160bd3dc7578d669468a091aa87

https://www.moffattnichol.com/uk/project/shannon-lng

reddit.com
u/Inner-Traffic-7296 — 3 months ago