▲ 16 r/NFEstock
ships update
The Energy Endurance is currently en route to Korea or Japan via the Panama Canal.
The Energos Maria is waiting off the coast of Puerto Rico with spare gas.
The Energos Princess is stably supplying gas in Puerto Rico.
Our cute nfe penguin is filling up its gas again.
The Energos Grand is carrying a generous amount of gas and supplying it to La Paz, Mexico.
NFE's business is still ongoing, and it is believed that there is significant upside potential depending on how the asset sale proceeds.
u/Inner-Traffic-7296 — 7 days ago
▲ 11 r/NFEstock
The global LNG market is expected to be shaken by the occurrence of an unfortunate accident.
u/Inner-Traffic-7296 — 10 days ago
▲ 12 r/NFEstock
Everyone here knows that I’m bullish on this company.
But now, the stock has finally fallen to around $0.43 — roughly the level that reflects the fully diluted share count. In other words, the market seems to be pricing NFE as if the company will not be able to redeem or retire any meaningful portion of the preferred equity.
I believe that is a distortion.
This price action looks heavily influenced by two temporary forces: large-scale shorting ahead of the expected Russell ETF removal on June 26, and arbitrage shorts used to hedge the massive amount of new shares that may be issued through the restructuring.
But this supply-demand imbalance could break, especially after the reverse split. And once the stock is trading at these depressed levels, the real opportunity becomes clearer: the preferred equity may not need to be redeemed at full face value.
Many people still seem to assume that the $2.5 billion preferred equity must be paid back with $2.5 billion in cash. But if you read the restructuring documents carefully, there is language that points to discounted repurchases or negotiated exits.
If NFE can stabilize operations around its Puerto Rico contracts, sell selected assets, and use the proceeds to retire preferred equity at a discount, the valuation framework changes dramatically.
At that point, the common stock may no longer be able to stay suppressed at these levels.
And ironically, the same creditors who are currently weighing on the stock could eventually become aligned with higher equity prices. After the restructuring, they will become the largest shareholders. Once that happens, their incentive may shift from suppressing the price to supporting a higher valuation.
That is why I believe the current price does not reflect the true optionality here. It reflects fear, forced selling, hedging, and temporary technical pressure.
If NFE survives this transition and uses discounted preferred equity retirement effectively, the upside from here could be much larger than the market is willing to admit.
u/Inner-Traffic-7296 — 13 days ago
▲ 22 r/NFEstock
The commissioning of the Nicaragua project is expected to be in the near future.
u/Inner-Traffic-7296 — 17 days ago
▲ 3 r/SelfHate
You are not alone.
I have posted many comments here over the past few days. There were many people struggling, and many who sent me private messages. Since I am not American and English is not my native language, I use a translator, but I still conversed with many people. The conclusion I reached was that most of those writing here feel both distress and loneliness. Men and women, adults and teenagers. Those with friends and those without. It was surprising and heartbreaking to see that everyone here—who cannot be divided by any specific definition—feels lonely. At the same time, I felt a sense of pity seeing that most of those I spoke with found great comfort in just a few words from me. Unfortunately, I was unable to leave comments for everyone here, but if you message me anytime, I will be able to talk to you sooner or later. You are not alone. Even if it feels like the world is tormenting you, never let it defeat you. Your small act of courage will surely change you.
u/Inner-Traffic-7296 — 19 days ago
▲ 24 r/NFEstock
NFE Altamira DOE Filing
It is a DOE change-in-control filing because the upstream ownership and voting control of NFE will change after the restructuring.
The filing says NFE Altamira is an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of New Fortress Energy, and Mexico FLNG owns the Altamira FLNG Project. The project exported its first LNG cargo on August 9, 2024.
The filing also explains that NFE Altamira has two DOE export authorizations:
FTA authorization:
158 Bcf/year through December 31, 2050.
Non-FTA authorization:
145 Bcf/year, but only from August 31, 2024 to August 30, 2029.
NFE had originally requested the Non-FTA authorization to run through December 31, 2050. DOE only granted five years. NFE filed a request on April 1, 2025 to extend the Non-FTA term to 2050, and DOE has not acted on that request yet.
That is one of the most important parts of this filing.
Now look at why the change-in-control filing was necessary.
Under the restructuring support agreement, NFE will separate BrazilCo from the remaining NFE/CoreCo business. Creditors will receive 65% of NFE common stock before the MIP and before any preferred conversion. NFE will also issue preferred stock with up to $2.5 billion liquidation preference, and the preferred stockholders will vote on an as-converted basis together with common stockholders.
The filing identifies three investment groups that are expected to hold between 10% and 20% of NFE voting securities after the restructuring:
Capital Research and Management Company
Fidelity Management & Research Company
Strategic Value Partners
DOE treats ownership or voting power of 10% or more as creating a rebuttable presumption of control. That is why NFE had to file this change-in-control notice.
Here is how I read each group.
Capital Research and Management Company / Capital Group
This is not a small distressed fund. Capital Group is one of the largest long-term asset managers in the world. Its presence gives the post-restructuring equity base more institutional credibility. But it also means NFE will face more pressure for capital discipline, less reckless capex, and more focus on cash flow.
Fidelity Management & Research
Fidelity is another major institutional holder. But we should not assume Fidelity is a single activist-style investor with one simple agenda. The filing says Fidelity or its affiliates advise, sub-advise, or manage more than 80 funds and accounts that will acquire NFE equity. Some of this may be credit recovery, some may be equity exposure, and some may be different fund strategies. Still, Fidelity’s presence makes post-restructuring NFE more investable and more institutionally owned.
Strategic Value Partners
SVP is the most important one to me. SVP is a distressed and special situations investor. This is the group most likely to push for hard restructuring discipline: asset sales, JV transactions, cost cuts, deleveraging, and recovery maximization.
SVP is not here to protect legacy common shareholders emotionally. SVP is here to maximize recovery on the capital structure.
This is the real meaning of the filing.
NFE is moving from founder-led growth mode to creditor-supervised recovery mode.
That does not mean common is dead. But it means the common thesis must be framed correctly.
Legacy common is not a clean ownership claim on Altamira.
Legacy common is now a junior recovery option on CoreCo. That option becomes valuable if:
Altamira keeps producing,
Puerto Rico cash flow grows,
DOE clears the change in control,
DOE extends Non-FTA authorization to 2050,
CoreCo buys back or refinances the preferred,
and non-core assets are sold or JV’d intelligently.
The key date in the filing is June 26, 2026.
NFE asks DOE to act by June 26 on the change in control. More importantly, NFE also asks DOE to act by June 26 on the pending request to extend the Non-FTA authorization through December 31, 2050.
My interpretation:
Change in control cleared:
Neutral to mildly positive. It removes a restructuring closing risk.
Change in control delayed:
Mildly negative. It adds uncertainty.
Non-FTA extended to 2050:
Strong positive. That would materially improve Altamira’s long-term value for refinancing, JV, asset valuation, and the CoreCo recovery thesis.
Post-restructuring NFE will be controlled by large institutional and distressed investors, especially CRMC, Fidelity, and SVP.
Altamira appears to remain a core CoreCo asset.
And the biggest upside in this filing is the pending request to extend Non-FTA authorization from 2029 to 2050.
u/Inner-Traffic-7296 — 23 days ago
▲ 19 r/NFEstock
NFE fair price
Here is my updated NFE valuation framework after including:
- the 50% debt-exchange effect,
- the management incentive plan,
- Puerto Rico pipeline cost savings,
- historical NFE / LNG infrastructure EBITDA multiples,
- NFE’s unusually high short interest.
This is not a price target. It is a framework.
All prices are shown both pre-split and after a 50-for-1 reverse split.
Reverse split price reference only:
$0.50 pre-split = $25 post-split
$1.00 pre-split = $50 post-split
$2.00 pre-split = $100 post-split
$3.00 pre-split = $150 post-split
$5.00 pre-split = $250 post-split
Basic assumptions:
Post-restructuring CoreCo debt after the 50% debt-exchange effect: about $570M
Preferred equity after the 50% debt-exchange effect: about $2.46B
Current share count basis: about 286M shares pre-split
Base recovery multiple: 8.5x EV/EBITDA
Upside recovery multiple: 10.0x EV/EBITDA
Why 8.5x?
Before the debt crisis became the main story, NFE often traded around roughly 9x-11x EV/EBITDA.
Large LNG names such as Cheniere and Venture Global can trade at 10x+ EV/EBITDA.
I am not saying NFE deserves a Cheniere multiple immediately.
But if New NFE proves normalized EBITDA, Altamira production, Puerto Rico cash flow, and a credible preferred-reduction path, then 8.5x is not aggressive.
It is a discounted recovery multiple.
10x is the stronger LNG-platform recovery case.
Important MIP adjustment:
The management incentive plan is not small.
The restructuring documents reserve:
10% of CoreCo common stock before preferred conversion,
and 7% of CoreCo preferred stock
for the CoreCo MIP.
The proxy describes the new reserve as roughly a 7% overhang.
So in my math, I apply roughly a 7%-10% haircut versus a no-MIP calculation.
There is also a separate FLNG2 sale incentive plan.
If FLNG2 is sold or monetized, the FLNG2 MIP pool equals:
2% of proceeds up to $200M,
3% of proceeds from $200M to $400M,
5% of proceeds above $400M.
Examples:
$400M FLNG2 monetization = about $10M MIP pool
$800M FLNG2 monetization = about $30M MIP pool
$1B FLNG2 monetization = about $40M MIP pool
So FLNG2 monetization still helps, but not 100% of gross proceeds should be treated as value to common.
Short interest adjustment:
NFE is not a normal low-short stock.
Recent short interest data shows roughly 43M-46M shares sold short.
Depending on the source, that is roughly 20%-30%+ of the float, with days-to-cover around 6-12 days.
That does not change fundamental value by itself.
But it can change how fast the stock reprices if positive catalysts arrive.
A high short base can amplify moves if:
restructuring closes,
Nasdaq listing risk is reduced,
asset/JV proceeds are announced,
preferred reduction becomes visible,
Altamira cash flow improves,
Puerto Rico GSA cash flow becomes clearer,
or LNG export pricing improves.
So I separate the analysis into two layers:
- fundamental value,
- possible short-covering / momentum overshoot.
Case 1: Full preferred dilution / no meaningful preferred reduction
Assume EBITDA: $415M
At 8.5x:
$415M × 8.5 = EV of about $3.53B
Minus debt of about $0.57B = equity value of about $2.96B
After full preferred conversion and MIP dilution, existing common may retain around 4.0% of the final equity.
$2.96B × 4.0% = $118M
$118M / 286M shares = about $0.41 pre-split
At 10x:
$415M × 10.0 = EV of about $4.15B
Minus debt of about $0.57B = equity value of about $3.58B
$3.58B × 4.0% = $143M
$143M / 286M shares = about $0.50 pre-split
So I would put the full-dilution survival case around:
Pre-split: $0.40-$0.55
Post-split: $20-$27.50
This is the harsh survival case.
Short interest does not help much here because the fundamental common recovery is still weak.
Case 2: Some asset sales / JV proceeds reduce preferred
Possible sources:
Shannon LNG
Klondike
Nicaragua
FLNG2 partner/JV
I do not assume these are easy full-cash sales.
Some may be partial JV proceeds, development-right monetization, project-level financing, or partner contributions.
Assume NFE reduces preferred by about $750M-$1.0B.
After MIP dilution, existing common may retain roughly 13%-16% of the final equity.
Assume EBITDA: $415M
At 8.5x:
EV = $3.53B
Minus debt of about $0.57B = equity value of about $2.96B
$2.96B × 13% = $385M
$2.96B × 16% = $474M
Divide by 286M shares:
$385M / 286M = $1.35
$474M / 286M = $1.66
At 10x:
Equity value = about $3.58B
$3.58B × 13% = $465M
$3.58B × 16% = $573M
Divide by 286M shares:
$465M / 286M = $1.63
$573M / 286M = $2.00
Because asset proceeds may not all go directly to preferred repayment, I would haircut this case to:
Fundamental value:
Pre-split: $1.25-$1.90
Post-split: $62.50-$95
With short-covering / momentum overshoot:
Pre-split: roughly $1.50-$2.25
Post-split: roughly $75-$112.50
Case 3: Company normalizes and refinances part of the preferred with new debt
This is my main recovery case.
If NFE normalizes EBITDA and restores credit access, the company should be able to replace part of the preferred with debt.
Debt is much less dilutive than preferred converting into common.
Assume:
EBITDA: $450M
Debt after refinancing: around $1.5B
At 8.5x:
$450M × 8.5 = EV of about $3.83B
Minus debt of about $1.5B = equity value of about $2.33B
After MIP dilution, if preferred is meaningfully reduced, existing common may retain around 23%-28% of the final equity.
$2.33B × 23% = $536M
$2.33B × 28% = $652M
Divide by 286M shares:
$536M / 286M = $1.87
$652M / 286M = $2.28
At 10x:
$450M × 10.0 = EV of about $4.50B
Minus debt of about $1.5B = equity value of about $3.00B
$3.00B × 23% = $690M
$3.00B × 28% = $840M
Divide by 286M shares:
$690M / 286M = $2.41
$840M / 286M = $2.94
So I would put the main recovery case around:
Fundamental value:
Pre-split: $1.90-$2.90
Post-split: $95-$145
With short-covering / momentum overshoot:
Pre-split: roughly $2.25-$3.50
Post-split: roughly $112.50-$175
For me, this is the key recovery case.
Case 4: Asset/JV proceeds + operating cash flow + Puerto Rico pipeline savings
The San Juan-to-Palo Seco gas pipeline matters here.
Palo Seco has historically relied on about 50 LNG truck deliveries per day.
Rough calculation:
50 trucks/day × 10,000 gallons LNG/truck = 500,000 gallons LNG/day
1 gallon LNG is roughly 0.083 MMBtu
500,000 gallons/day × 0.083 = about 41,500 MMBtu/day
Annualized:
41,500 MMBtu/day × 365 = about 15.1M MMBtu/year
That is about 15 TBtu/year of LNG logistics exposure.
If the pipeline reduces trucking/logistics cost by only $0.50-$1.25/MMBtu, the annual margin improvement could be:
15.1M MMBtu × $0.50 = about $7.5M/year
15.1M MMBtu × $1.25 = about $19M/year
So I would treat the pipeline as roughly $8M-$20M of potential annual EBITDA improvement, plus reliability benefits.
At 8.5x EBITDA, that is roughly $68M-$170M of additional EV.
At 10x EBITDA, that is roughly $80M-$200M of additional EV.
That alone does not change the whole story, but it strengthens the Puerto Rico margin case.
Assume:
EBITDA: $500M-$520M
Debt: around $1.5B
At 8.5x:
EV = about $4.25B-$4.42B
Minus debt of about $1.5B = equity value of about $2.75B-$2.92B
After MIP dilution, if preferred is reduced enough that existing common retains around 28%-37% of the final equity:
$2.75B × 28% = $770M
$2.92B × 37% = $1.08B
Divide by 286M shares:
$770M / 286M = $2.69
$1.08B / 286M = $3.78
At 10x:
EV = about $5.00B-$5.20B
Minus debt of about $1.5B = equity value of about $3.50B-$3.70B
$3.50B × 28% = $980M
$3.70B × 37% = $1.37B
Divide by 286M shares:
$980M / 286M = $3.43
$1.37B / 286M = $4.79
So I would put this case around:
Fundamental value:
Pre-split: $2.70-$4.80
Post-split: $135-$240
With short-covering / momentum overshoot:
Pre-split: roughly $3.25-$5.75
Post-split: roughly $162.50-$287.50
Case 5: LNG disruption / stronger export pricing adds upside
This is not my base case, but it matters.
If LNG logistics disruption continues, non-Hormuz LNG becomes more valuable, and Altamira captures better export pricing, EBITDA and the multiple can both move higher.
Assume:
EBITDA: $550M
Debt: around $1.6B
At 8.5x:
$550M × 8.5 = EV of about $4.68B
Minus debt of about $1.6B = equity value of about $3.08B
After MIP dilution, if common retains 32%-42% after preferred reduction:
$3.08B × 32% = $986M
$3.08B × 42% = $1.29B
Divide by 286M shares:
$986M / 286M = $3.45
$1.29B / 286M = $4.51
At 10x:
$550M × 10.0 = EV of about $5.50B
Minus debt of about $1.6B = equity value of about $3.90B
$3.90B × 32% = $1.25B
$3.90B × 42% = $1.64B
Divide by 286M shares:
$1.25B / 286M = $4.37
$1.64B / 286M = $5.73
So I would put this case around:
Fundamental value:
Pre-split: $3.40-$5.70
Post-split: $170-$285
With short-covering / momentum overshoot:
Pre-split: roughly $4.00-$7.00
Post-split: roughly $200-$350
Case 6: Louisiana / DPA / strategic LNG platform optionality
This is not my base case.
This is the option-value case.
If Louisiana or another major LNG infrastructure option comes back, the market may stop valuing NFE as only a distressed restructuring story and start valuing it as a strategic LNG platform again.
After including MIP dilution, I would frame this only as:
Fundamental value:
Pre-split: $5.00+
Post-split: $250+
With short-covering / momentum overshoot:
Pre-split: potentially higher
Post-split: potentially much higher
Conclusion:
NFE’s high short interest does not create value by itself.
But it matters a lot for price action.
If there is no preferred reduction, no refinancing, and no clear cash-flow improvement, shorts may not need to cover quickly.
But if NFE shows:
preferred reduction,
asset/JV proceeds,
credit access restoration,
Altamira cash flow,
Puerto Rico GSA margin,
San Juan-to-Palo Seco pipeline cost savings,
or stronger LNG export pricing,
then 43M-46M short shares can become real buying pressure.
My central recovery case is still Case 3:
fundamental value around $1.90-$2.90 pre-split,
or $95-$145 post-split.
But with short-covering pressure, that same case could overshoot toward:
roughly $2.25-$3.50 pre-split,
or $112.50-$175 post-split.
The key question remains:
How much preferred equity can NFE eliminate before it converts?
Altamira and Puerto Rico are the base.
Export cargoes are the upside.
Shannon, Klondike, Nicaragua, FLNG2, and Louisiana are option value.
The short interest is the accelerant.
u/Inner-Traffic-7296 — 1 month ago
▲ 15 r/NFEstock
ships update
Orion Sea still appears to be returning from India.
Energy Endurance brought gas to Brazil and is now returning.
Energos Princess is bringing gas to Puerto Rico.
NFE Penguin still seems to have a lot of gas left. It didn’t transfer everything to Princess.
u/Inner-Traffic-7296 — 1 month ago
▲ 22 r/NFEstock
New fortress energy Altamira export. mar
I think there is an important point many people may be missing about Altamira and NFE’s Q1 2026 numbers.
According to the DOE LNG export data, Altamira exported 9.6 Bcf in Q1 2026, across 3 cargoes to 3 countries, with a YTD average export price of $10.55/MMBtu.
On paper, that looks like roughly:
9.6 million MMBtu × $10.55 = about $101 million of export value.
But in NFE’s Q1 2026 10-Q, reported LNG cargo sales revenue was only about $43.9 million, while cargo sales costs were about $44.5 million.
At first glance, that looks terrible. It makes cargo sales look almost break-even or slightly negative.
But I do not think the conclusion is that simple.
The key issue is that DOE export value is not the same thing as NFE’s recognized cargo sales revenue.
Some Altamira LNG volumes may have been used to support NFE’s downstream terminal customers, especially Puerto Rico/San Juan, rather than being recognized as standalone cargo sales. NFE also says in the 10-Q that FLNG 1 production is being used to meet current customer demand.
There is another important clue: inventory.
NFE’s LNG and natural gas inventory increased from about $100.1 million at year-end 2025 to about $134.9 million at March 31, 2026.
That is an increase of about $34.8 million.
NFE also disclosed that its LNG inventory weighted-average cost was about $8.38/MMBtu.
So the inventory increase roughly represents:
$34.8 million ÷ $8.38/MMBtu = about 4.15 million MMBtu
That is roughly the size of one LNG cargo, or slightly more.
Altamira exported 9.6 Bcf over 3 cargoes, so the average cargo size was around:
9.6 Bcf ÷ 3 = 3.2 Bcf per cargo
This means it is quite possible that one cargo was produced, loaded, or in transit around quarter-end, but had not yet been fully recognized as revenue in Q1.
If one Altamira cargo was not recognized until Q2, the revenue timing effect could be roughly:
3.2 million MMBtu × $8.40/MMBtu = about $27 million
or, using the YTD average price:
3.2 million MMBtu × $10.55/MMBtu = about $34 million
So I think the most reasonable interpretation is this:
Altamira is real and active, but Q1 reported cargo sales may understate the actual economic activity because of timing, accounting classification, and downstream customer supply.
That does not mean there is a hidden $100 million profit sitting somewhere. The margin may still be thin, especially because NFE’s inventory cost was around $8.38/MMBtu, almost the same as Altamira’s March export price of $8.40/MMBtu.
As always, please correct me if I missed something or if any of the numbers need adjustment.
u/Inner-Traffic-7296 — 1 month ago
▲ 11 r/NFEstock
Irish LNG terminal remains central to New Fortress Energy plan as energy giant restructures
New Fortress Energy is restructuring heavily, but Shannon LNG has not disappeared from the company’s plan.
In NFE’s latest 10-Q, the company still lists its Ireland Facility as a current development project. NFE says it intends to develop and operate an LNG facility and power plant on the Shannon Estuary near Tarbert, Ireland. It also states that the Irish planning application for the LNG terminal and power plant is being reconsidered after the High Court quashed ABP’s previous refusal.
The same filing says NFE still carries about $36.5 million of permits, development rights and easements related to Shannon as of March 31, 2026.
The Irish planning file is also active. Case PA08.322568 covers the Shannon Technology and Energy Park, including a power plant, battery storage system, FSRU, jetty, onshore receiving facilities and related works.
https://www.pleanala.ie/en-ie/case/322568
Separately, the High Court upheld permission for the 600MW gas-fired power plant and 120MW battery project in April 2026.
https://www.arthurcox.com/knowledge/challenge-against-the-shannon-lng-limited/
Meanwhile, NFE’s 2024 data center push through Klondike looked much bigger at the time. The company said Klondike had over 1,000 acres across Brazil, Ireland and the U.S. for behind-the-meter data center development. But in the latest 10-Q, the current development projects are focused on FLNG2, Brazil, Nicaragua and Ireland — not Klondike/data centers.
So the takeaway is simple:
NFE is cutting, restructuring and reducing capital commitments, but Shannon LNG/Ireland Facility is still listed as a live development asset.
u/Inner-Traffic-7296 — 1 month ago