The EU semiconductor risk conversation is too Taiwan-centric — the China→Korea causal chain is the bigger exposure [analysis]
I spent the last few weeks building a causal-modelling analysis of EU
semiconductor supply chain geopolitical risk, using GDELT event data
and Granger causality testing. Three findings I didn't expect:
- The highest-impact causal pathway for EU semiconductor exposure is
not Taiwan — it's the China → Korea industrial-output chain. Granger
testing shows Chinese political-risk shocks propagate to Korean
industrial output with a 6-8 week lag. Korea (Samsung, SK Hynix) is
arguably a more critical node for EU supply than Taiwan in several
sub-sectors, and it gets far less attention.
- Japan looks like a structural pivot. The 12-month trajectory shows
rising military-escalation signals and sharply falling
international-cooperation signals. The "Japan as reliable anchor"
assumption may be underweighting Tokyo's security-first realignment —
and Japan controls 60-70% of advanced photoresists.
- Russia's specialty-gas leverage (neon, krypton) was a real
2022-2024 disruption but is now largely neutralised — substitution to
Korean and Australian sources is 60-70% complete. By late 2026 this
vector is basically dead.
The methodology: GDELT 2.0 events → CAMEO classification → geo-weighted
risk indices → Granger causality network → statistical forecast
ensemble. Happy to discuss the approach or any of the findings.
The full node-country breakdown and scenario modelling got too long
for a Reddit post — happy to go deeper on any specific country or
the causal methodology in the comments if people are interested.