Since Rob Refsnyder hit a go ahead pinch hit home run, I thought today would be a good day to write about something that I’ve been thinking about and something that is always a contentious issue for fans. It tends to bring out more aggressive feedback when let’s say Dan Wilson PHs Luke Raley for Connor Joe with runners on, but with today’s events I figured perhaps discourse around pinch hitting might be more receptive between the majority anti-PHers and minority pro PHers.
This article is from a couple years ago but this Fangraphs write-up on the subject still has trends that hold and has had me considering that question that never goes away for fans: wouldn’t a warm bat that has been hitting hot be better than a cold bat coming off the bench? The article can basically be summed up as PH numbers are on the rise, PH situations have risen in platoon advantage situations, the rise can be partially attributed to roster expansion and universal DH, and numbers for PHers have improved since 2002 but are still not league average (single season peaks at 92 wRC+). The last part I think is what is at heart of fans’ gripes with their favorite team’s manager who all so happen to be the worst manager in the league. Platoon numbers might show advantage for certain hitters based on pitcher handedness, but pinch hitting is usually not successful. So while everything else the article mentions dispels the notion that Dan Wilson is conspiring against your favorite left handed hitter only to give plate appearances to that “wait that guy is Asian?” right handed hitter with an Anglican name, fans have held on to that last part anytime a pinch hit situation does not work out.
While I don’t think agreement can ever be reached here, I do think taking the single season peak of PHs (92 wRC+) according to the Fangraphs article, Luke Raley’s career numbers versus southpaws (56 wRC+), and the Monty Hall problem can at least inform fans why all managers do this. If you’re not familiar with the Monty Hall problem, it goes like this:
- You are a contestant on a game show and you can get a prize from 1 of 3 doors
- You pick any of the doors: a 1 in 3 chance
- The host reveals one of the unchosen doors to reveal it has no prize
- The host gives you the chance to switch
- Mathematically you are better suited to switch because when you first picked it was a 1 in 3 chance. It’s unlikely you picked the right one so you should switch to the remaining door, which has a 1 in 2 chance of being the correct door.
Back to baseball, we can both look at the best possible scenario for PHers (92 wRC+ in a single season) and Luke Raley (56 wRC+). Pinch hitting is worse than the average bat that was in the starting lineup (92 wRC+ is not good and is even the BEST case scenario). However, when a lefty comes in for Luke Raley that is a lot like the first choice you made in the Monty Hall problem. You already know your odds are not good with your first choice, but now you have the opportunity to pinch hit (switch doors). You are not necessarily going to get an on base result (or win the prize), but mathematically doing something is a whole lot better than doing nothing. The Fangraphs article describes it as picking the lesser of two evils, but I think there’s further intrigue here (intrigue for nerds whose interests crossover between philosophy, stats, and baseball) when we consider the infamous Monty Hall problem.
Luke Raley represents any original starter or your average bat that you’re going to play because most starting pitchers are in fact right handed and minus your stars most hitters have a strong side platoon. The opposing manager knows this because they are allegedly not dumb, so you construct a starting lineup knowing that you have to utilize a guy with a 56 wRC+ at some point. You are entering in with bad odds that will be at play. And once that opposing manager decides it’s time to bring in a lefty, you can stick with those bad odds you had all along. And while those odds are something you are considering before the game starts, it’s certainly a lot harder for everyone around you to think about the fact that those were the odds when in situations independent of those odds (e.g. when Raley bats against the RHPs) your original starter may have gotten two hits and a home run. But those moments shouldn’t matter because they don’t change the original odds of that left on left match up.
I bring up the Monty Hall problem because I think the perception around it is similar to pinch hitting. While the conclusion the problem presents is stated as unequivocal, there are still arguments against this thesis. With good reason I might add: it tends to go against human intuition. If you didn’t know the problem beforehand, you typically would think it shouldn’t matter if you switch or stay. Practically speaking, games are built to keep you from winning. What’s more, going with your gut instinct is something humans hold dearly. It should feel like whatever decision you make can yield a loss as equally as a win.
Starting Luke Raley is obviously a no brainer against a RHP, but almost inevitably you will have a 56 wRC+ hitter in your lineup. It’s certainly not 0 or lower so he can get a hit, just like you can win the prize. And maybe you feel good about Raley, especially if he just hit a home run or two. Just like you felt really really good about your first door selection. To boot, Raley is an overall better hitter (mostly because he hits exclusively in situations that he’s going to get you optima results). But the math says you have this guy on the bench who’s hitting way better than a 56 wRC+ against this type of pitcher, like 100 points better. But PHing is hard and in fact you’re probably not getting a good result there either. The game is working against you but you have two choices: you could do nothing or be proactive. Across the league managers have decided that if there’s enough of a platoon advantage (Fangraphs article also has some data about that), then going with the cold PHer is simply worth it rather than going for the sure statistical improbability —the one the manager accounted for before first pitch was thrown. You planned this game knowing you will be in this situation and nothing about how the game has shaped changed that improbability, and the opposing manager (the host) is putting you in a damned if you do or damned if you don’t situation. But that’s why your GM supplied you with a good right handed hitter. Pinch hitting usually sucks; you probably won’t get a hit. But when you have a chance to move away from the low odds situation you projected for something that is better (albeit still not good) odds, then the decision becomes clear for a manager.
One thing from the article I also wanted to touch upon more discusses the whole Connor Joe situation. Ignoring his clutch 2 RBI single that tied the game in the 11-9 win over the Cardinals, you likely wanted to go full Robespierre on Dan Wilson for ever thinking minor league AAAA player Connor Joe should ever pinch hit over Luke Raley. You can get behind career major leaguer Rob Refsnyder getting a PA but what’s the evidence for Connor Kok-Wy Joe, who was just brought up from the minor leagues like a week prior? The article talks about how PHing ramps up throughout the year especially in September. Why? Rosters expand. Managers play for 162 games. You’re going to have an extra player down the stretch. Who’s going to help you the most? Hard to know unless you don’t play them in crucial situations in April. A fully healthy squad doesn’t have Connor Joe, especially with the looming Colt Emerson call up. But call ups will happen. Who should come up? What does the September roster look like in an extra inning game where you need a win to secure the AL top seed and you’ve burned through your bench? Maybe the guy who did it before. I don’t know what trends for pinch hitting look like throughout the year but if your gut says that pinch hitting is hard because you’re a cold bat, it’s potentially similar reasoning to say that pinch hitters get better the more times they see the situation.
This perhaps leads to a more conclusory perspective on the role of pinch hitting. Teams are constructed to have them. You want to ramp up your relievers to be able to pitch multiple days in a row come October. Managers want to make the best possible team for October and while every game matters, optimizing the potential of all 26 members of your roster is an important aspect of baseball managing. Getting pinch hitters as many looks as possible in the situations they are best at isn’t too different from getting your relievers work. You can wonder if Luke Raley could have gotten that hit against a lefty, but it’s equally on the mind of a manager to ensure there aren’t impact contributions from the rest of the bench being left off the board.