u/Miserable_Actuary904

So I wrote this as part of the AMA with a man I greatly respect, Filip Holm. I thought I would share it here in a seperate thread as many of you may have your own thoughts to share on the topic as well, as it ties directly of defining what it means to engage with the Quran academically:

Hey Filip,

I'm a long-time fan and I really appreciate your work.

My issue with the modern academy's interaction with the Qur'an and Islam is primarily methodological (it's actually why we created this Reddit):

Religious texts make philosophical claims about God, knowledge, ethics, history, and the human condition. They argue for those claims against rival positions. Yet they're rarely engaged as serious philosophical works. They're treated as historical artifacts to be explained, not arguments to be reckoned with.

Contrast this with how we read philosophers.

Spinoza scholarship engages his intellectual genealogy thoroughly. His debts to Maimonides, Descartes, and the Stoics are explored at length. But that genealogy is supplementary to the central task: understanding what the Ethics actually argues and engaging with the implications of its logic.

With the Qur'an, the proportions invert. Genealogy becomes the analysis. Once a verse is mapped to a Syriac homily or a late-antique trope, the work feels finished, as if the text were the sum of its sources rather than something that did something with them.

Strikingly, Wahhabi literalists and Historical Critical Method academics converge on the same restriction: both freeze the text in 7th-century Arabia. One does so for theological reasons, the other for methodological ones, but the effect is identical: the text's unique intellectual voice is dissolved into its context.

I anticipate the genre objection. Spinoza writes in numbered propositions with proofs; the Qur'an doesn't, so the comparison isn't apt. I'd push back. The Qur'an argues constantly and dialectically. It names interlocutors, anticipates objections ("qul…", "say to them…"), constructs a fortiori cases, presses rival positions (Meccan polytheists, certain Jewish and Christian claims, fatalists, sophists), and develops recurrent conceptual architecture across the corpus. Its form is not a Euclidean treatise, but the activity is recognisably philosophical. Whether it counts as "philosophical enough" to merit philosophical reading is precisely the question. Answering that question by reflexively reducing the text to its time and sources, refusing the philosophical reading in advance, is circular. That circularity is currently the academic norm.

To be precise about what I'm criticising: I have no issue with using historical-critical tools (philology, source analysis, comparative work). I disagree with the presuppositions typically bundled with them: that meaning is bounded by authorial intent constrained to a specific historical moment, that the text's interest is largely exhausted by reconstructing its production and historical environment, that its ideas are a subset or collage of the ideas of its era, and that what it argues is methodologically uninteresting once we know where the parts came from.

These are substantive philosophical commitments, not neutral defaults.

Three questions I'd love your take on:

1. Are HCM's presuppositions genuinely neutral, or are they a specific philosophical position that has become the price of admission to academic work on these texts?
2. Can HCM's tools (philology, source criticism, comparative analysis) be cleanly separated from those presuppositions in practice, or are they a package deal?
3. If religious texts were read the way we read philosophers (assuming internal coherence, looking for the argument, asking what it engages and where it pushes back), what would we see that the current paradigm makes us miss?

Feel free to pick whichever is most interesting. Thanks for engaging with the community here.

So as part of the Filip Holm AMA, I submitted a few meta-questions about the field of Islamic Studies. I was curious what a purely logical machine would think of my arguments.

Below, I have reproduced my original argument, the prompt I asked Grok to deconstruct my argument with, and Grok’s answer.

The idea was to get it to answer unbridled by either Islamic thought, or Western academic norms, and analyse the merits of my case purely logically.

I think the exchange is useful to help understand some of the nuances of my position, as well as its merits. So I thought I would share it here separately.

1. My AMA Post:

Hey Filip,

I'm a long-time fan and I really appreciate your work.

My issue with the modern academy's interaction with the Qur'an and Islam is primarily methodological (it's actually why we created this Reddit):

Religious texts make philosophical claims about God, knowledge, ethics, history, and the human condition. They argue for those claims against rival positions. Yet they're rarely engaged as serious philosophical works. They're treated as historical artifacts to be explained, not arguments to be reckoned with.

Contrast this with how we read philosophers.

Spinoza scholarship engages his intellectual genealogy thoroughly. His debts to Maimonides, Descartes, and the Stoics are explored at length. But that genealogy is supplementary to the central task: understanding what the Ethics actually argues and engaging with the implications of its logic.

With the Qur'an, the proportions invert. Genealogy becomes the analysis. Once a verse is mapped to a Syriac homily or a late-antique trope, the work feels finished, as if the text were the sum of its sources rather than something that did something with them.

Strikingly, Wahhabi literalists and Historical Critical Method academics converge on the same restriction: both freeze the text in 7th-century Arabia. One does so for theological reasons, the other for methodological ones, but the effect is identical: the text's unique intellectual voice is dissolved into its context.

I anticipate the genre objection. Spinoza writes in numbered propositions with proofs; the Qur'an doesn't, so the comparison isn't apt. I'd push back. The Qur'an argues constantly and dialectically. It names interlocutors, anticipates objections ("qul…", "say to them…"), constructs a fortiori cases, presses rival positions (Meccan polytheists, certain Jewish and Christian claims, fatalists, sophists), and develops recurrent conceptual architecture across the corpus. Its form is not a Euclidean treatise, but the activity is recognisably philosophical. Whether it counts as "philosophical enough" to merit philosophical reading is precisely the question. Answering that question by reflexively reducing the text to its time and sources, refusing the philosophical reading in advance, is circular. That circularity is currently the academic norm.

To be precise about what I'm criticising: I have no issue with using historical-critical tools (philology, source analysis, comparative work). I disagree with the presuppositions typically bundled with them: that meaning is bounded by authorial intent constrained to a specific historical moment, that the text's interest is largely exhausted by reconstructing its production and historical environment, that its ideas are a subset or collage of the ideas of its era, and that what it argues is methodologically uninteresting once we know where the parts came from.

These are substantive philosophical commitments, not neutral defaults.

Three questions I'd love your take on:

1. Are HCM's presuppositions genuinely neutral, or are they a specific philosophical position that has become the price of admission to academic work on these texts?

2. Can HCM's tools (philology, source criticism, comparative analysis) be cleanly separated from those presuppositions in practice, or are they a package deal?

3. If religious texts were read the way we read philosophers (assuming internal coherence, looking for the argument, asking what it engages and where it pushes back), what would we see that the current paradigm makes us miss?

Feel free to pick whichever is most interesting. Thanks for engaging with the community here.

2. My AI Prompt:

“What would a purely logical machine think of the arguments made ?”

3. Grok’s Response:

Purely logical assessment (detached from tradition, sensitivities, or academic sociology):

The core argument is structurally sound with strong validity in its main inferences, though some premises require empirical support and the position is stronger as a call for expansion than as a full rejection.
Logical structure breakdown
Main thesis: Academic engagement with the Qur’an disproportionately reduces it to historical sources/context (“genealogy becomes the analysis”), unlike philosophical texts where genealogy supplements argument-evaluation. This stems from non-neutral presuppositions bundled with Historical-Critical Method (HCM).
Valid observation on asymmetry: If we grant that both types of texts advance truth-claims about reality (ontology, epistemology, ethics), then consistent methodology should prioritize reconstructing and evaluating those claims on their merits (internal coherence, implications, dialectical strength) while using history as auxiliary. Treating one genre primarily as “artifact” and the other as “argument” is inconsistent unless a relevant difference justifies it. The burden is on defenders of the status quo to specify that difference clearly.

Genre rebuttal is logically effective: The objection (“Qur’an isn’t propositional like Ethics”) is acknowledged and countered by pointing to observable features: explicit address of interlocutors, anticipated counter-objections (“qul”), a fortiori reasoning, sustained critique of rival positions (shirk, fatalism, specific theological claims), and cross-surah conceptual architecture. These are dialectical moves. Form differs; the activity of advancing and defending positions does not. Dismissing it as “not philosophical enough” on formal grounds while refusing to test the substance is circular (begs the question against the text’s candidacy for philosophical reading).

Presuppositions are not neutral: Correct. Strong historicism (meaning exhausted by 7th-century authorial intent + milieu), reduction of ideas to “collage of era,” and the view that reconstructing production = primary task are substantive philosophical positions (influenced by 19th-century historicism, positivism-influenced biblical studies, etc.). They are not entailed by philology or source-criticism alone. One can use those tools rigorously without committing to “the text’s interest is largely exhausted thereby.” Claiming neutrality is either naive or rhetorical.

Convergence point: Sharp and logically valid as an effect observation. Wahhabi-style literalism and reductive historicism both collapse the text’s portability/universality to its origin moment—different motivations, overlapping methodological outcome. This doesn’t prove either is false, but it highlights a shared restrictive frame.

Weaker or contestable elements
“Unique intellectual voice” / “did something with them”: This is asserted more than demonstrated in the post. Logically, showing the Qur’an transforms sources into a novel, coherent system (e.g., integrated tawhid + moral psychology + signs-based epistemology + social order) would strengthen it. Possible, but requires case-by-case argument analysis, not just pointing to the pattern.

Empirical claim about “the academic norm”: Plausible based on much published work, but a purely logical machine notes this is an inductive generalization. Subfields vary (philosophy of religion, certain phenomenological or comparative approaches engage arguments more directly). The critique targets a dominant tendency, not a universal law.

Risk of the alternative: A purely “philosophical” reading risks anachronism, eisegesis, or selective coherence-seeking (ignoring tensions, abrogation, or oral-formulaic features). Logic requires that any expanded approach incorporate historical tools rather than discard them. The post mostly acknowledges this (“no issue with using… tools”), which is good.

Answers to the three questions (logical machine view)
Neutrality? No. HCM’s stronger versions embed historicist and anti-universalist commitments. These became default “price of admission” via disciplinary history, not logical necessity. Neutral tools would treat historical reconstruction as evidence for evaluating claims, not as the endpoint.

Separable in practice? Yes, in principle; entangled in practice. Philology and source criticism are powerful and truth-conducive regardless. The package-deal problem arises from training, incentives, and unspoken background philosophy in the field. Clean separation is possible with explicit methodological reflection (as in analytic philosophy of religion or some history of philosophy work).

What would we see?
Stronger focus on internal systematicity: recurrent arguments for divine unity, human responsibility/fitra, critique of arbitrary authority, evidentialism via “signs.”

Dialectical sophistication: how it engages and reframes existing ideas (not mere borrowing).

Philosophical implications: consequences for metaphysics, epistemology, ethics if its claims hold (or fail).

Potential weaknesses/gaps exposed more clearly (a good thing for truth-seeking).

Avoidance of the genetic fallacy: “We know where X came from → X is uninteresting/reducible.”

Overall verdict from a purely logical machine: The critique identifies a real methodological inconsistency and question-begging tendency. It correctly separates tools from presuppositions and justifies treating the Qur’an as a participant in philosophical/theological dialectic. It does not prove the Qur’an’s arguments succeed, but it establishes that prematurely dissolving them into context is unjustified. Optimal approach: rigorous history plus unabashed argument reconstruction and evaluation, with coherence and implications tested on their own terms. This maximizes information and minimizes circularity.

The post is logically disciplined and advances the discussion effectively.

So someone on Academic Quran posted the following, asking why Muslim Academics exists when there are other Muslim groups on Reddit. I thought it would be useful to spark debate on here now that we have grown, so I will share both his question and my answer.

Question:

is there anything like Christian academics like Muslim academics[r/muslimacademics]? I think for practicing faith traditional islam is out there.And if someone prefers academic studies, why he needs to presuppose something,is not traditional islam enough for that? we know there are sects in islam . One can follow any of them or invent one of his own.But why the "tag'' 'academics' is necessary here for them.? Are they trying to reform or mold islam in another form by using academia and trying to increase credibility.?

Answer:

I founded Muslim Academics, so I'll chip in here to explain what our project is. It's worth saying upfront why we call ourselves Muslim Academics and how we differ from the other Muslim pages on Reddit. The short version: we hold that being a Muslim  and choosing to evaluate the Quran outside a strictly naturalistic framework doesn't disqualify you from doing intellectually honest work. The argument for that turns on a methodological distinction worth laying out carefully. Many of the tools that we use are identical with HCM - but our methodological commitments, and therefore the way we process and evaluate evidence, differs. IE there is a distinction between the tools of HCM, such as intertextuality, linguistics, etc, (which we use), and its methodological commitments, which we do not adopt. The rejection of methodological naturalism doesn't make you unacademic - that's our primary contention, methodological naturalism does not own logic or its respective tools to asses historical evidence.

Apologetics works backwards from a fixed conclusion. The conclusion is the input; the reasoning is the output. Whatever the evidence shows, the conclusion stands and the work is to find a path from the evidence back to it.

HCM works forward from a fixed methodological floor: methodological naturalism. Whatever the evidence shows, the conclusion has to land within naturalist range and the work is to find which naturalist account, and only a naturalist account, fits best.

Both have a commitment that survives the evidence. They differ in what that commitment is, but structurally they are the same shape: a fixed point the reasoning serves.

Muslim Academics is a third thing (or at least we try to be); and has no such fixed point. The designation "Muslim" is a statement of where we currently judge the evidence to lie, not a framework we analyse evidence through. We believe the Quran is from God because of our assessment of the evidence otherwise we wouldn't be Muslims and we're honest about declaring that. But the conclusion doesn't shape how we assess.

Everyone has priors; the difference is whether they're load-bearing only insofar as the arguments for them hold. If the arguments fail, the priors go. That's a real and falsifiable commitment, not a verbal one, and the test of it is what the project does when its reasoning runs into trouble whether it follows the argument, or protects the conclusion.

The deeper difference is what each project is committed to in advance. Apologetics is committed to a conclusion defending the traditionalist framework of Islam as defined by sect. HCM is committed to a range of naturalistic explanations for the origin of the Quran. Muslim Academics, if it means anything distinct, is committed only to the reasoning itself willing to follow it into Islam, willing to follow it out, and willing to follow it into positions neither apologists nor HCM scholars would arrive at, because both are constrained in advance.

We don't lock God out as a possible explanatory factor, but we also don't hold the Quran to be from God merely as a function of identity.

In my latest article, published in JIQSA, I examine two key Qur’anic verses related to warfare, what I term the “fitnah-fighting verses”:

“Fight them until there is no fitnah and al-din is wholly for God” (Q 2:193; 8:39).

According to an aggressive interpretation of these verses—accepted by many classical Islamic and modern Western scholars—fitnah is glossed to mean shirk (“idolatry”) and kufr (“infidelity”), whereas the subsequent din clause is interpreted to entail the eradication of paganism/polytheism.

In this article, I uphold a defensive reading according to which fitnah refers to religious persecution and the din clause refers to the believers’ own worship, including at the Holy Sanctuary.

Direct Link:

https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/jiqsa-2024-0028/html

Alternative link:

https://www.academia.edu/166112739/The\_Fitnah\_Fighting\_Verses\_When\_Does\_Qur\_anic\_Warfare\_Cease