u/Personal_Ideal_231

People's Deputy German Titov (Independent with WCPSU and CPSU(u) support)

Second man in Space and People's Deputy German Titov is joint candidate of two communist parties. He represents a rejection of fierce militancy and radicalism in favor of warm nostalgia for the better days of the Soviet past. Uncompromising and blunt, Titov, upon receiving the nomination, took control of the election campaign and focused on restoring the social security system, addressing the problems of underfunding in the healthcare and education systems and reviving the Soviet space program. At the same time, communists rejected a sweeping rollback of market reforms and an attack on private property. Titov cautiously supports the restoration of Soviet sovereignty in the Pamirs, but does not emphasize this in the campaign and does not make loud statements about supporting the deployment of even more troops to Tajikistan.

German Titov

Speaker of Council of People's Deputies Alexander Moroz (Socialist Party)

The main winner of the recent parliamentary elections, Alexander Moroz is paving his way to the presidency. He emphasizes his legislative achievements as speaker of the lower house of parliament. A vote for the Socialists is an opportunity to support gentle renewal, rising prosperity, and competent governance without external shocks and the reckless leadership of the bearded general. Moroz relies on the support of the agrarians and the red directors. The Socialist faction has shifted significantly toward the center during his parliamentary leadership, but Moroz instead presents this as a readiness for responsible governance and blames Rutskoy and Kuchma for the government's fall. Socialists block the reckless appointment of Sergey Glazyev as prime minister and, unexpectedly, emerge as defenders of the Central Bank's independence, which Communists want to eliminate. Socialists gently oppose the annexation of the Pamirs and the deployment of troops there, but support the president's actions in Yugoslavia. Moroz, one of Ukraine's favorite sons, is trying to play this card and refuses to play the hawk.

Alexander Moroz

Incumbent President Alexander Rutskoy (Civil Union)

"Don't change horse in midstream", goes a Russian proverb, which has almost become the current president's slogan. His election campaign is built on existing achievements, the support of numerous governors, and a new social program with a clearly social democratic character. In his new term, Rutskoy promises to roll back the "neoliberal reforms" implemented by Kuchma, restore order, touting his existing achievements, and quickly end the war in Tajikistan, drawing on the experience of resolving the conflict in Bosnia. Rutskoy also attacks the Central Bank's "anti-people policies" and promises to quickly repay loans to international investors, allegedly imposed on it by Yeltsin and Yavlinsky, and restore his foreign policy influence. Rutskoy also strives to catch the wave of spiritual revival, but a public divorce and the former first lady on the ballot are hitting him too hard. However, too often, Rutskoy seeks to blame everyone but himself for his failures.

Alexander Rutskoy

People's Deputy and former First Deputy Prime Minister Grigory Yavlinsky (Yabloko)

Former First Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Reform in Yeltsin's government and People's Deputy Grigory Yavlinsky unites moderate democrats around himself. He is the father of the economic reforms that saved the Soviet Union's economy from the brink of collapse, but he also took too many unpopular steps. Yavlinsky's platform advocates the continuation of cautious market economic reforms, arguing that the left's methods for restoring prosperity and funding the social budget simply won't work with current oil prices. At the same time, he criticizes Kuchma for his excessive ties to the new big business. Yavlinsky is the most socially progressive candidate, with strong views on women's rights and linguistic minorities. Yavlinsky supports a definitive end to the war in Tajikistan with the unconditional withdrawal of troops from there and is opposed to any annexations. He also believes that the Soviet Union should abandon its renewed support for Cuba, Angola, and Vietnam. Yavlinsky was born into a Jewish family in Lvov, but he hasn't been very successful in courting Ukrainian electorate. Instead, he enjoys increased support in Belarus, where Yabloko is particularly strong. He opposes confrontation with West and supports continued détente and the further opening of the Soviet market, which is in need of investment. Yavlinsky supports reform of the Ministry of Security and the abolition of the death penalty, as well as the further rehabilitation of political prisoners.

Grigory Yavlinsky

Former Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma (Independent, with United Democrats and Rukh support)

A former aerospace engineer who became a technocratic head of government, Leonid Kuchma rightly believes that he saved the Soviet economy by implementing necessary market reforms and freeing it from the shackles of what the state could no longer control regulation, defeating the barterization of the economy, stabilizing inflation and national currency exchange rate. He is most reformist candidate, having secured the support of the United Democrats and reluctant support of Rukh. Kuchma's Ukrainian language skills improved during the campaign, but he advocates for maintaining Union unity. He is one of Ukraine's favorite sons and trying to play this card. Kuchma emphasizes himself as a strong manager, capable of addressing the real challenges facing the country, devoid of ideological debts, and speaking with a track record of real victories. He is supported by large and medium-sized businesses, which see Kuchma as a protector against the left and the military. Kuchma supports reform of the Ministry of Security and the abolition of the death penalty. The former prime minister advocates maintaining good relations with the West, emphasizing Europe as an essential economic partner for the Soviet Union. Kuchma takes a cautious stance on Tajikistan, not supporting the annexation of the Pamirs or escalation, but believes that Soviet troops should remain in the country until a unified government can be established.

Leonid Kuchma

Former First Lady Lyudmila Novikova-Rutskaya

The former first lady agreed to her campaign to exact revenge on her husband, but unexpectedly emerged as a prominent candidate, captivating the hearts of many women and a vocal critic of the corruption surrounding her husband, unafraid to name his advisers, whom she herself suspected of dishonesty and corruption. Lyudmila lacks a prominent platform, but her entire campaign is carefully managed by a few publicity-hungry journalists. It also plays into Novikova-Rutskaya's hands that none of her opponents dare criticize her openly: her ex-husband, who once backed down, remains silent on the advice of his advisers, and her other rivals don't take her seriously or even promise to offer her this or that position if they win. Novikova-Rutskaya supports the immediate withdrawal of troops from Tajikistan.

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President Rutskoy suffered through another sleepless night in the Kremlin. He hadn't planned to give up and run for reelection, but now he had to make a choice. He had come to power through a cascade of accidents and was still torn between enormous compromises, lacking even a coherent ideology. Rutskoy had accomplished much, but recently he had been undermined. Incumbent president's approval ratings continued to decline. After the conflict with Kuchma, the president realized it was high time to make a choice. Moreover, life itself presented him with three options for conducting the election campaign and building his future image.

Social Democracy with Local Characteristics

Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov is one of the president's closest allies, despite his beginnings as a member of Democratic Russia and an ally of Yeltsin. Popov is a relatively moderate Social Democrat and a leader of the left wing within the ruling party. In addition to a shift toward European social democracy and broad party mobilization, the Moscow mayor could propose organizing broad support for regional leaders, albeit by increasing the powers of governors and republic leaders. Of course, Popov has been accused of various things, from the brutal suppression of "Labor Russia" protests to sympathizing with collaborators during World War II. However, he has remained loyal and seems to offer the most reliable path, one that doesn't require the president to make any drastic moves.

Popov's path is a way to secure the support of regional elites and red-lined leaders who are satisfied with the status quo and stability. Moscow mayor managed to dismantle the regional bloc assembled by Sobchak, securing support in Belarus, Crimea, Gagauzia, Latgale, Tatarstan, Udmurtia, Bashkortostan, and Kazakhstan. He is also willing to bring even communist governors, such as Kuzbass Governor Aman Tuleyev, over to the president's side.

He is supported by Justice Minister Oleg Rumyantsev, head of Central Russia Vasily Lipitsky and almost all the old Social Democrats who survived the turmoil of the 1990s. But isn't it they who brought Rutskoy to his current position?

Gavriil Popov

Homeland, Army, Faith

All the major successes of his first term were achieved thanks to foreign policy and maintaining national unity. Maintaining the army and the Ministry of Security allowed the president to feel the support of armed forces even in the most difficult moments. Trust in the generals helped him effectively resolve the conflicts in Georgia and Chechen-Ingushetia. Only the army didn't try to dissuade him from sending troops into Tajikistan. The invasion of Yugoslavia and the Berlin Agreements marked the peak of the president's popularity in his first term; wounded patriotic sentiment seemed to be reviving.

Rutskoy successfully exploited the mass conversion to Orthodoxy, and the Church as a whole supports him: the president maintains good relations with both Patriarch Alexius II of Moscow and Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev. Meanwhile, while Alexius II at least attempts to maintain neutrality and declares that the church should not interfere in politics, Filaret openly prays for his health, especially after the president supported the canonical Orthodox Church through administrative means during the Kiev Schism.

Beheaded nationalists and patriots see the president as their banner, especially after Yugoslavia. Acting Prime Minister Sergey Glazyev is actively rallying them into a single organization to support the president's reelection, and even former opposition figures on the right are switching to his side. Even those irritating Eduard Limonov's national-liberals and the loudmouthed brawler in parliament, Lysenko, are joining him. However, for this trickle of support to become a broad river, a step toward them is necessary.

Acting Prime Minister Sergey Glazyev

A Deal with the Devil

Money and control over the media. That's what an effective campaign of voters needs. The new Russian capitalists are so afraid of a communist revanche under one guise or another that they are ready to support the president, shower him with money, and switch all media under their control to a pro-Rutskoy propaganda mode. Of course, there's a reason for this.

Journalists have already dubbed this alliance of the country's largest oligarchs the "Seven Bankers," a reference to the Time of Troubles, when Moscow was ruled by boyar families. The president's new friends are interested in further market reforms, but voices from the Ministry of Security claim they have no ties to the Americans. The new young first lady likes these people and the care they provide.

Car king Boris Berezovsky is proposing an ambitious plan to first re-elect the president and then organize a Civil Union majority in the next Duma. He's as cunning as the devil, and his allies are no better: NTV owner Vladimir Gusinsky and banker Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who wants to get their hands on state oil, have no principles other than the desire to make money. However, they are willing to invest in victory on a fair commercial basis, and Rutskoy needs their money now.

Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Boris Berezovsky

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Lyudmila Novikova, still formally First Lady, also had a sleepless night until the divorce proceedings were finalized, despite her unfaithful husband already introducing his young mistress as his new wife. She had no regrets about bringing the conflict to the media, but things have only gotten worse since then. Her husband clearly used all his influence to ensure she didn't get a single ruble during the divorce proceedings. However, she was front and center in Soviet and international newspapers and hoped to finally break into modeling.

"The First Lady should run for president herself to express the anger and disappointment of all Russian women who are experiencing the consequences of their husbands getting lost in politics and card-painting and forgetting normal human feelings", said the talking head of journalist Sergey Dorenko, whose reports had already destroyed the former Communist leader Kuptsov. The nagging thought that poured out of every other newspaper and every third TV show took root in the First Lady's mind. After all, what could be better revenge on an unfaithful husband? Or is it too risky?

Photos from a past life

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1994 elections dealt a heavy blow to the democratic movement, which had lost Boris Yeltsin. Only two democratic factions entered parliament on party lists. However, since then, popularity of both Rutskoy and left has declined. Reformist, Free, and Constitutional Democrats formed a unified faction in Supreme Soviet, and now, after lengthy negotiations, they are meeting in Yekaterinburg to choose their single candidate for the 1996 elections.

To everyone's regret, Boris Yeltsin is no longer a candidate – a second consecutive heart attack has left him deeply ill, and the former prime minister himself barely delivered his welcoming speech at the unification congress. Another clear frontrunner, Eduard Rossel, head of the Ural Republic, also declined to run. The fiercely contested congress is filled with a multitude of aspiring candidates, especially with the two main frontrunners locked in a bitter battle.

St. Petersburg Governor Anatoly Sobchak is the most famous of the old democrats, the leader of the Movement for Democratic Reforms, and the mayor of the second most important city in the country. A former law professor, Sobchak is popular for his role model, considered a patron of business and free enterprise, and has succeeded in creating the most favorable business conditions in the entire Soviet Union in his city. He combines the image of a social conservative and an economic liberal. Sobchak is supported by the active members of the former Democratic Russia. On the other hand, his party failed to win a seat in parliament on party lists, and the mayor's reputation has been tarnished by the Salye Commission investigation, which accused the mayor and his deputy, Vladimir Putin, of ties to organized crime, effectively controlling the entire regional economy and embezzling humanitarian aid. These nominal allies are locked in a fierce battle, not just for the nomination.

Anatoly Sobchak

People's Deputy Marina Salye is the leader of the Free Democrats faction in the Supreme Soviet and the former leader of Radical Democrats in the Supreme Soviet of RSFSR. She is known as a staunch radical democrat, opposed to cooperation with Rutskoy, and a supporter of the fight against organized crime. Salye is the most socially progressive candidate and is far removed from the ostentatious conversion to Orthodoxy popular among democrats, although she herself has not sought to flaunt this. Salye entered into an irreconcilable confrontation with Governor Sobchak, whom she considered a traitor to democratic ideas and an accomplice of criminals. As a result, the Free Democrats factions in the parliaments of St. Petersburg and Northern Russia began blocking Sobchak's entire agenda. In response, media outlets allegedly linked to Sobchak and his aides launched a vicious PR campaign against Salye, culminating in her outing and accusations of same-sex relations. Although the outing was negatively received among democratic activists, it could prove too important for conservative voters, whose support the Democrats need to defeat Communists.

Marina Salye

Nizhny Novgorod Governor Boris Nemtsov, a well-liked young reformist governor, has implemented exemplary economic reforms in his region, setting a model for other Democrats. Nemtsov is not well known and is barely legally eligible for election as president, but he is far removed from the intrigues of the capital and maintains a broad coalition of supporters, from the Greens to the Christian Democrats. He is considered Yeltsin's informal favorite, despite the fact that Yeltsin has not openly endorsed anyone. Nemtsov is perhaps the most moderate of all the Democrats on the possibility of cooperation with the Civil Union, but he is a staunch anti-Communist. Nemtsov is a prominent advocate of non-intervention in the war in Tajikistan and an opponent of any annexations.

Boris Nemtsov

Leader of Conservative Party of Russia, Lev Ubozhko, is a former dissident, a political prisoner, and a staunch anti-Communist who has already become a perpetual candidate. Ubozhko represents an attempt by conservatives and nationalists who have joined the coalition to nominate a candidate acceptable to the majority of democrats. Ubozhko unites patriotic, anti-communist, and conservative ideas, but his reputation is undoubtedly clear of any ties to gangsters. The remnants of the liberal democrats have also joined Ubozhko's coalition.

Lev Ubozhko

Father Gleb Yakunin is a former people's deputy of RSFSR, a Christian dissident and political prisoner, a priest of the Russian Orthodox Church, one of the leaders of the liberal movement within the Church, and a supporter of restoring unity with the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia, founded by White émigrés. Yakunin is the leader of the movement for the rehabilitation of political prisoners and for KGB reform, and he could potentially bring liberals and conservatives together.

Gleb Yakunin

General Lev Rokhlin is the most celebrated military leader since the collapse of the Old Soviet Union. Rokhlin led the operation to overthrow Zviad Gamsakhurdia in Georgia and the operation against the Wahhabis in Mountainous Chechnya, after which he refused to accept the Hero of the Soviet Union award, declaring that he would not accept the award for the civil war. He is not in He is running an open campaign for the nomination, but is widely known and willing to accept the nomination. Rokhlin will attract supporters of a strong hand and order, but few know his true economic and social views.

Lev Rokhlin

Support Grigory Yavlinsky

The former First Deputy Prime Minister and leader of the Yabloko faction in the Supreme Council is running independently, without consulting the United Democrats. Despite this, there is a faction supporting Yavlinsky. He is more socially progressive and economically moderate than the average democrat, and may also be associated with reforms considered painful, or, conversely, be a recognized leader of reformers.

Support Leonid Kuchma

Former Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma has not yet officially launched his campaign, but it is clear to everyone that he will run for president. Kuchma has a reputation as a "strong manager" and a successful reformer, but has not yet presented his platform and is too tied to the "red directors."

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Both communist parties of New Union are choosing their candidates ahead of the 1996 presidential elections, planning to engage in a contest and try to get their candidate through to the second round.

Workers' Communist Party of Soviet Union is a reorganization of "Communists for the Soviet Union" coalition. Workers' Communists continue to radically reject all reforms and refuse to compromise with the Rutskoy government, blaming it for the collapse of the Soviet Union and its capitulation to capitalism and America. Despite this, a moderate wing has emerged within the party during this time, composed of those dissatisfied with the CPSU(U) but also considering the socialists too right-wing.

People's Deputy Viktor Anpilov is the leader of the protest wing of WCPSU and "Labor Russia" movement, which continues to be the loudest voice on the streets calling for the overthrow of Rutskoy. Anpilov enjoys the strongest support among workers, trade unions, and youth within the party. Former journalist doesn't delve too deeply into ideology, although commentators note that his ideology favors radical leftist ideas over statist and dictatorial ones. Anpilov is most willing to court nationalists and the right, for which he is condemned by members of his own party.

Viktor Anpilov

Union Council Deputy Oleg Smolin is a university professor, blind from birth, and former leader of Labor Party. Smolin represents the party's moderate wing, focused on social reform, and is the most active legislator among the Workers' Communists, co-authoring the new Education law. His platform focuses on the effective restoration of pension and social security obligations, avoiding such divisive issues as attitudes toward Stalin and Gorbachev.

Oleg Smolin

People's Deputy Nina Andreeva is an icon of the "anti-perestroika movement" and one of the recognizable faces of the left-wing protest against Gorbachev, who has since attacked Rutskoi. Andreeva is known for lecturing in North Korea in 1992. Within the Workers' Communist Party, Andreeva represents the most uncompromising Stalinists, who see the struggle against reform primarily as a moral and ideological confrontation, intertwined with nostalgia for past greatness. Andreeva demands that the Soviet Union be restored by force, returning not only Tajikistan.

Nina Andreeva

Professor Mikhail Popov is the author of the economic program and the most consistent Marxist within the party. Popov is one of the most famous Marxists in the Soviet Union who take this ideology seriously and attempt to develop it, finding answers to the failures of Brezhnev's "developed socialism" within his own ideology.

Mikhail Popov

If the party congress fails to agree on a single candidate, there is a proposal to nominate German Titov, the second man in space and a member of parliament, for president. The former cosmonaut does not intend to run independently, but has agreed to be nominated. Titov is a moderate and safe option, with a strong reputation. However, he is far from the radicalism of the working-class communists and was rumored to be ready to return to the CPSU(U) faction. However, he could be the party's key to winning moderate votes.

German Titov

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CPSU(u) took second place in the elections and held the position of the main opposition party until the fall of the Kuchma government. Now, United Communists support Glazyev's acting government, forcing Rutskoy to shift left. A fierce nomination battle has erupted within the CPSU(u), as it became clear that Valentin Kuptsov could no longer control the party as he once did.

People's Deputy and former Second Secretary of CPSU Yegor Ligachev, a former ally and then opponent of Gorbachev, is an icon of the old nomenklatura, which wants to recapture 1987. Ligachev was elected as an ordinary deputy from his native Tomsk, but quickly regained influence within the party amidst a vacuum and unrest. He enjoys unquestionable authority among the older section of the party, but is not particularly popular among younger communists and speaks little about his program. Ligachev is a supporter of restoring the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union and curtailing privatization. Nevertheless, Ligachev supports Rutskoy's actions in Yugoslavia and Rwanda and believes that the communists must be prepared to maintain government support at the cost of appointing their ministers.

Yegor Ligachev

People's Deputy and Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine Petr Simonenko, a beloved son of the Donbass who enjoys the support of the "red directors," is considered the second-in-command in new CPSU(u). He has made a fantastic career, yet is still young and popular. Simonenko is supported by miners and their trade unions, as well as the nomenklatura of the "red belt." He hopes to attract additional votes from across Ukraine. He advocates halting privatization and repealing the privatization of "strategic enterprises" and introducing a state monopoly on liquor production. Simonenko criticized Kuchma government, but after its fall, he became one of the key advocates for joining the government.

Petr Simonenko

Union Council Deputy and Secretary of the Party of Communists of Belarus Sergey Kalyakin is literally beloved son of Belarus, the nephew of the head of Belarus, Nikolai Dementey. Kalyakin represents the most moderate, almost openly social democratic wing within the CPSU(U). He is the most cautious on foreign policy and focuses on issues of social support and civil liberties. Kalyakin opposed the deal with the Civic Union, proposing to try to form a coalition with the socialists. Kalyakin is a staunch internationalist.

Sergey Kalyakin

People's Deputy and Second Secretary of Communist Party of Russia Gennady Zyuganov is a young orator and a protégé of young Russian communists. Zyuganov is a proponent of the broadest possible coalition, and he also originated the idea of ​​combining communist and "Russian-Slavic" ideas. He advocates an alliance with right-wing patriots and nationalists, while simultaneously supporting Rutskoy's party's entry into the government.

Gennady Zyuganov

If the party congress fails to agree on a single candidate, there is a proposal to nominate German Titov, the second man in space and a member of parliament, for president. The former cosmonaut does not intend to run independently, but has agreed to be nominated. Titov is a moderate and safe option, with a strong reputation. Titov was elected from Worker Communist, but ready to return to the CPSU(U) faction. However, he could be the party's key to winning moderate votes.

German Titov

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Key Cabinet Positions:

Prime Minister: Boris Yeltsin (1991-1993), Arkady Volsky (acting) (1994), Leonid Kuchma (1994-1996), Sergey Glazyev (acting) (1996)

First Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Reform: Grigory Yavlinsky (1991-1993), Viktor Pinzenik (1994-1996)

Minister of Agriculture: Mikhail Lapshin (1991-1994), Alexander Lukashenko (1994-1996)

Minister of Security: Leonid Shebarshin (1991-1996)

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Vladimir Lukin (1991-1993), Yevgeny Primakov (1993-1996)

Minister of Defense: Dmitry Yazov (1991-1992), Vladislav Achalov (1992-1996)

Finance Minister: Mikhail Zadornov (1991-1993), Viktor Pinzenik (1993-1996)

Economy Minister: Grigory Yavlinsky (1991-1993), Mikhail Malei (1994-1996)

Foreign Trade Minister: Sergey Glazyev (1991-1996)

Justice Minister: Sergey Baburin (1991), Oleg Rumyantsev (1991-1996)

Foreign Policy:

Under Rutskoy, the "parade of sovereignties" ended, taking the form of a "velvet divorce." Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan gained independence from Moscow. At the same time, the second president managed to preserve the "Slavic core" of Soviet Union and suppress most local conflicts through a series of referendums under the "Lukyanov formula". He also secured recognition from the newly independent states of their new borders and the renunciation of their claims to Soviet territory. The most serious complications occurred in Checheno-Ingushetia, where armed uprisings and guerrilla warfare by radical separatists against Soviet government and the appointed head of the republic, General Ruslan Aushev, broke out in the mountainous region in 1993. By 1996, the armed uprisings had been suppressed, and the radicals had lost popularity among the Chechen population. However, a series of terrorist attacks in Grozny and Nazran opened a new security threat from Radical Islamist.

Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe was completed. Some Soviet troops remained in Baltics and Central Asia until 2000, but were withdrawn from Moldova and Transcaucasus. Soviet Union began a forced reduction in its army, focusing on maintaining its nuclear forces.

A significant détente was achieved, and new relations with the United States and European countries began to be built. The peak of the allied relationship came in 1992, when Moscow and Washington agreed to deploy Soviet peacekeepers to Yugoslavia, and a relationship of trust developed between Presidents Rutskoy and Bush. However, after the Clinton administration came to power in Washington, Soviet-American relations began to cool again. Tensions reached their peak with the Novi-Travnik Ambush, when Soviet troops violated their peacekeeping mandate by intervening in the genocide of Bosnian Muslims in the Lašva Valley carried out by Croatian militias. Despite this, the Soviet Union's economic dependence on Western economic aid remained. Relations warmed again after Berlin Agreements on Bosnia (the updated Vance-Lukyanov Plan) and especially after Soviet support for the French-American intervention in Rwanda.

The United States and the Soviet Union managed to achieve significant progress on disarmament and de-escalation issues, where Moscow was forced to yield, but relations between Rutskoy and Clinton were never as warm as before, and the Soviet president himself repeatedly said that he "misses Bush" after yet another difficult negotiation with Clinton.

Fmr US President Nixon and USSRRUE President Rutskoy in Moscow

Rutskoy's first term was marked by a series of raging local conflicts in the post-Soviet space. USSRRUE intervened in the civil war in Georgia, overthrowing President Zviad Gamskhuardia, who was accused of plotting genocide in Adjara, a Muslim-populated region in southwestern Georgia, and installing a transitional regime in Tbilisi led by former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. Meanwhile, the non-intervention of Soviet troops helped Armenia win Nagorno-Karabakh War, while Azerbaijan, weakened by the civil war, found itself in crisis.

However, the most dramatic and unpleasant conflict for Moscow was the war in Tajikistan, where the first post-Soviet government did not last even a year. Soviet troops had to repel multiple attempts by the mujahideen to invade from Afghanistan, while a multi-faceted civil war raged within Tajikistan itself, involving forces of the old nomenklatura, democrats, bandits, Wahhabi Islamists, Pamir separatists, and Uzbek irredentist forces, supported by the Uzbek government, who appealed to the "Lukyanov rule" for their own benefit. In 1995, Rutskoy authorized the deployment of additional peacekeeping forces to Tajikistan, but this only prolonged and exacerbated the war, strengthening the position of Tajik Islamists. The situation was further complicated by the appeal of the authorities of the self-proclaimed Autonomous Republic of Badakhshan, a Pamir separatist entity within the Soviet autonomous region of the same name, to "restore Soviet sovereignty over the Pamirs".

Civil war in Tajikistan

Domestic Policy:

Rise of President Rutskoy allowed the Union to implement the economic reforms it needed. 500 Days program developed by Deputy Prime Minister Grigory Yavlinsky and its sequel, "Agree to Chance", made it possible, with the help of Western financial aid, to implement radical economic reform through shock therapy and relaunch the Soviet Union's socialist economy on a new path. However, tensions between the president and the government led to the resignation of Prime Minister Yeltsin and Deputy Prime Minister Yavlinsky and the curtailment of the privatization of large enterprises. Nevertheless, thanks to the efforts of the new Minister of Economy, Mikhail Malei, creeping privatization took a far more detrimental form, as Yavlinsky had planned: the former directors of enterprises, known as "red directors," became the de facto and then de jure owners, while formally state-owned corporations became de facto independent in the hands of their managers. The most famous example was Gazprom, a giant of the Soviet gas industry, which, under the leadership of its CEO, Rem Vyakhirev, had its own funds to support opposition media and politicians and financed the campaign of Socialist Party. At the same time, the economy was largely under the control of gangsters and clans of employees of Ministry of Security, a fusion of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which were becoming increasingly indistinguishable from each other. Anatoly Chubais, former Minister of State Property Affairs under Yeltsin, described the system that developed under Rutskoy as "gangster cooperative socialism". The anti-crime campaign launched by Rutskoy after 1993 rectified the situation only by allowing former KGB officers to defeat the open gangsters in the market for "power business".

Nevertheless, the main achievement of the Yeltsin government was the conclusion of the new Union Treaty, a complex compromise between the democrats and Rutskoy, and between Army and thousands of street protesters between Moscow and Kiev. The new treaty was signed by 35 republics, culminating in an agreement to simultaneously dissolve Russian FSFR and Ukraine SSR as unified republics. Each of the new republics, however, no longer enjoyed the same independence as it had under Gorbachev's later rule. Supreme and Constitutional Courts of the renewed Union departed for Kiev. 1992 Constitution and the new language law made Ukrainian the second official language, while other indigenous languages, from Rusyn and Latgalian to Buryat and Koryak, received broad rights at the local level.

In response to the strengthening of the newly formed centers of power in the new republics, a new "Law on Local Self-Government (Zemstvo)" was issued by the end of the 1990s, enshrining the mandatory election of governors and mayors and empowering local authorities, taking power away from the republics.

Rutskoy was widely accused of wasting Western aid on funding his own Ministry of Security, which for the first time since Lavrentiy Beria united the KGB and the police under one roof, as well as on controversial programs such as the resettlement of compatriots from the newly independent republics. The president defended himself by arguing that this had prevented genocide of the European (predominantly Russian and Ukrainian) population in Tajikistan and facilitated peaceful resettlement from increasingly hostile Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, rather than simply importing loyal voters. Furthermore, the return of ethnic Circassians from the ravaged Yugoslavia by Soviet peacekeepers was a major operation. Open borders triggered a wave of both emigration and the return of some of the emigrants of previous years.

The defeat in the parliamentary elections did not deal president as severe a blow as his opponents had expected. The victorious Socialists became even more receptive to negotiations than their former allies. Socialist leader Alexander Moroz chaired the Supreme Council, and a compromise candidate, seemingly a technicality, was elected prime minister: Leonid Kuchma, the former head of the Central Ukrainian government, known for his effective economic reforms. A space engineer by training, he shared similar views with Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov, who had become an important ally of President Rutskoy. Rutskoy again succeeded in securing emergency powers from the Supreme Council, this time shared between himself and the prime minister. Kuchma's government managed to make significant progress in combating hyperinflation and the budget deficit, as well as implement financial reform, reverse the nascent barterization of the economy, pay off budget debts to pensioners, and overcome the crisis of non-payment of utility bills. Under Kuchma, the Soviet Union saw its first significant foreign investment, and the gradual privatization of unprofitable state-owned enterprises was once again initiated. The decline in production continued, and the economic shock and decline in prosperity were still felt, but under Kuchma, the population of Soviet Union began to have hope.

Leonid Kuchma

For the future, and this era itself was called the birth of the "Second Russian Capitalism". Having come to power with the votes of the socialists, Kuchma effectively implemented market reforms, which can be explained by the shift of the Socialist Party to the center, but soon came into conflict with the incumbent president.

Rutskoy suspected the popular Kuchma of planning to run in the 1996 elections himself, and the conflict between them began to escalate as early as 1995, especially when the Kuchma government announced plans for a next wave of privatization. During the public conflict between the president and prime minister, Rutskoy dismissed Kuchma, attempting to blame him for the negative developments in the country. Now-former prime minister publicly lashed out at the president and announced his candidacy for the 1996 presidential election. New acting government now relied on Rutskoy's deal with the United Communists.

Lyudmilagate

Alexander Rutskoy with his wife Lyudmila

President Rutskoy's reputation was undermined by an unexpected, scandalous divorce. Rutskoy's second marriage, to fashion designer Lyudmila Novikova, had been for nearly a quarter of a century. She became a model First Lady, on par with the first ladies of United States. This marriage was considered exemplary, and the president himself actively showed off both his sons to the public: Dmitry, born from his first marriage, and Lyudmila's son Alexander, who had been a student during his father's term. However, in reality, the relationship between the spouses was far from normal. Rutskoy was particularly irritated by his wife's desire to interfere, as he himself believed, in politics and run her own business with renowned fashion designer Valentin Yudashkin, whom Rutskoy detested. Relations between the spouses further worsened when Lyudmila began actively defending Yeltsin before his resignation. In 1995, after a nervous heart attack, Lyudmila temporarily became paralyzed on half her body. Her husband visited her in the hospital twice within six months.

After recovering, Lyudmila nevertheless entered into open conflict with her husband, especially after receiving confirmation of his affair with his personal assistant, Irina Popova, 26 years younger than Rutskoy, who even became pregnant by the president. Popova made no attempt to hide their relationship, confirming to the press that the president had long since separated from his wife, and that Rutskoy himself had filed for divorce, proposing a quiet settlement.

Irina Popova and Alexander Rutskoy

Situation was exacerbated by a property dispute between Rutskoy and Novikova, which completely soured their relationship. Lyudmila decided to give a detailed interview to the press. In it, she recounted her husband's numerous infidelities, how she helped him get back on his feet after being wounded in Afghanistan, and how, when she needed help and support after suffering a stroke and paralysis on the left side of her body, Rutskoy offered no assistance. Rutskoy himself, in turn, had the temerity to accuse his wife of infidelity during his service in Afghanistan.

This dealt a huge blow to the president, who had previously cultivated the image of a converted Orthodox Christian. "Lyudmilagate", as the Western press dubbed the most high-profile family scandal in Russia's recent history, had catastrophic consequences—Rutskoy's approval rating plummeted to 20% in a matter of weeks, raising a serious threat of an opposition victory in the elections.

Much has changed in Soviet Union over the past three years. Country ruled by Brezhnev, Andropov and Gorbachev no longer exists, but elected president Alexander Rutskoy, enjoying popular legitimacy and the support of the army and part of the KGB, managed to hold most of the country together, albeit in a different form. This resulted in the sacrifice of two foundations of the Soviet Union: Russian SFSR and Ukrainian SSR were disbanded, incorporated under the new constitution into a much more federalized, renewed Union as multiple separate republics, in accordance with the Yeltsin-Shakhray plan. The army, KGB, and Soviet nomenklatura, remaining loyal to Kremlin, managed to prevent Ukraine's secession, and in exchange, Ukrainian was recognized as the second official language of the new Union, although its use in practice was limited. An extremely liberal law on local languages ​​and numerous concessions to local elites managed to defuse many conflicts. There were some military operations in Mountainous Chechnya, but federal forces were able to help Checheno-Ingush President Ruslan Aushev suppress radical separatists, while moderates were drawn into the parliamentary process.

Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics of Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia is the current name of President Rutskoy's state. Most of its population habitually uses the term "Soviet Union," but Russian patriots are now inclined to call the renewed state "Russia," Ukrainian nationalists "Rus," and Kazakh and Tatar intellectuals "Eurasia."

35 republics of New Union and its neighbors

Soviet parliament had become so dysfunctional that it couldn't even pass a law on a renewed flag and coat of arms for the Union. However, President Rutskoy and his government, through incredible efforts, compromises, threats, and bribery, managed to get through to 1994 and forced the delegitimized Supreme Soviet of USSR to ratify new 1992 Constitution.

Economic reform process was uneven, repeatedly halted by President Rutskoy's interventions and revived by demands from international creditors, on whom the Soviet Union's economy depended. President Rutskoy reluctantly complied with their demands, but overall, privatization did not proceed at the pace expected by the economists from Yavlinsky's group, and he himself finally resigned in late 1992. (A more detailed economic review will follow when describing the results of President Rutskoy's term, but for now it's worth understanding that privatization in Rutskoyland is more similar to the Ukrainian IRL than to the Russian IRL.) These were three difficult years, marked by collapse of old socialist world, sharp impoverishment of people, the rise of banditry and erosion of national pride. Unpopular war in Tajikistan is escalating into a movement for the rapid withdrawal of troops from there. Cautious sociologists' forecasts suggest that the president's popularity is approaching single- or double-digit levels. Nevertheless, in this situation, President Rutskoy is forced to face parliamentary elections in May 1994, aiming to legitimize the new government (previous one fell in the winter), gain the opportunity to govern normally, and ease tensions in the country.

Elections are being held under a new system. Parliament is elected for five years. The upper house of Supreme Soviet, Council of Union, is now elected in single-mandate constituencies. Each region elects two Union deputies from a single-mandate constituency, with winner determined by a simple majority. This is reminiscent of the American Senate elections, except both senators are elected simultaneously. Lower house of Supreme Council, Council of People's Deputies, elects half from party lists with a 4% threshold, and the other half from single-mandate constituencies (see the actual election system for State Duma of Russian Federation).

272 deputies will be elected to Council of Union and 650 deputies to Council of People's Deputies.

This is the first time Soviet voters have encountered such a multitude of electoral blocs, struggling to understand the differences between them. This is partly the president's plan: aware of their own popularity problems, Kremlin political strategists plan to build a new majority by attracting numerous small union parties and independent candidates. Electoral blocs will be on the ballot:

1. "Civil Union" (Pro-Rutskoy, Social Democrat, Law and Order)

The ruling party, or rather bloc, is personally loyal to President Rutskoy and supports his erratic decisions like a weather vane. Formally, "Civil Union" advances a moderate social democratic program, promising social upheaval and continued reforms, and most importantly, order, while extolling the president's past achievements in preserving territorial unity. In fact, the core of "Civil Union" campaign is the idea that the incumbent president is best alternative to all his rivals, demonized by the current administration's propaganda. The incumbent president is actively supported by the main beneficiaries of the past privatization: "red directors," while Rutskoy himself has abandoned attempts to restore elements of a planned economy. Top three include President Alexander Rutskoy himself, Acting Prime Minister Arkady Volsky and Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov.

Electoral bloc "Civil Union" includes the People's Party "Free Russia" (formerly the Democratic Party of Communists of Russia of President Rutskoy), Social Democratic Party of Russia and Russian Social Democratic Center, People's Party of Russia, Civil Congress of Ukraine, Party of National Accord of Belarus, Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs and Federation of Independent Trade Unions.

Acting Prime Minister Arkady Volsky

2. "Communists - For Soviet Union." (Radical Communism, Marxism, Stalinism)

Most radical communists and Rutskoy's implacable opponents on left were able to put forward a unified list. Most of its member organizations had recently been banned by presidential decree following 1992 Moscow riots, but Supreme Court overturned it on the eve of the elections. Evil tongues say this is the result of a behind-the-scenes deal: it is the radical communists who serve as the bogeyman that has compelled the shaky parliament and democrats to support President Rutskoy, fearing a revanche from the Stalinists and radical communists. Nevertheless, no matter how terrifying radical communists may be, they have their own voters. They lack funds, but they have no shortage of agitators. Unlike their more moderate colleagues, the CfSU adheres to radical Marxist positions, rejecting all possibilities of market reforms and putting forward the radical communist program of professor Mikhail Popov, a longtime critic of Gorbachev from the left. The radical communists consider Rutskoy a traitor and plan to initiate his impeachment.

Top three of the radical communist electoral bloc include Viktor Tyulkin, leader of Marxist Platform in CPSU and one of the leaders of the left-wing opposition to Perestroika; Viktor Anpilov, leader of "Labor Russia" movement and the main organizer of 1992 Moscow protests; and Nina Andreeva, an icon of the anti-Perestroika movement.

"Communists - For Soviet Union" electoral bloc includes Russian Communist Workers' Party, All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Union of Communists, Officers' Union, "Labor Russia", United Front of Workers, Party of Labor of Ukraine and Workers' Party of Russia, all of which are radical left-wing remnants of the CPSU.

1992 Moscow protests

3. Communist Party of Soviet Union (United) (Communism, Soviet patriotism, market socialism)

A more moderate remnant of old CPSU, rebuilt from the ground up and more focused on real politics, not just impersonal anger. Communists managed to capitulate to Rutskoy twice on key issues, but try to maintain the illusion that this has not happened. CPSU(u) enjoys the support of some "red directors" and has strong local representation, including their governors and mayors, as well as the support of President of Belarusian Republic, Nikolay Dementey. United Communists are ready to join the next government, but on their own terms, and plan to use their position to push President Rutskoy further to the left.

CPSU(u) includes Communist Party of Russia, Communist Party of Ukraine, Party of Communists of Belarus, and Communist Party of Kazakhstan.

Top three of United Communists' electoral bloc included: former secretary of CPSU Central Committee and head of CPR Valentin Kuptsov, head of CPU Petr Symonenko and first secretary of Central Committee of PCB Sergey Kalyakin.

Valentin Kuptsov

4. Agrarian Party (Agrarians, Pro-Rutskoy).

Former "Food and Medicine" parliamentary group in Supreme Soviet of Russia is the party of Soviet agrarians, Red directors of kolkhozs that privatized these farms. Over the past few years, the agrarians have proven themselves staunch allies of the current president, defending his interests on most issues. However, it was agrarians' position that blocked the law on the free sale of land, blocking the free circulation of agricultural land and its sale to foreign investors. Agrarians have their own governors and mayors, as well as large factions in the republican and regional parliaments.

Agrarian Party electoral bloc includes Agrarian Party of Russia, Agrarian Party of Belarus, Peasant Party of Ukraine, and Peasant Union of Kazakhstan.

Top three candidates in the agrarians' electoral bloc include Minister of Agriculture and Food Mikhail Lapshin, leader of Belarusian agrarians Semyon Sharetsky and leader of the Ukrainian agrarians Sergey Dovgan.

5. Socialist Party (Democratic Socialism, Eurocommunism, Market Socialism)

Socialist Party has clear Ukrainian roots, stemming from a split in the Communist Party of Ukraine and the fruit of the ambitions of its founder and leader, Aleksandr Moroz. Sensing a demand for more moderate left-wing views, Moroz broke with his former allies, becoming a situational ally of the incumbent president, garnering votes in Ukraine. He has secured the support of several minor forces in Russia, as well as some trade unions, and is therefore aiming for parliament. Socialists also have strong support in Gagauzia.

Socialist Party electoral bloc includes Socialist Party of Ukraine, Socialist Party of Workers, Party of Workers' Self-Government, Socialist Party of Kazakhstan, and Confederation of Labor of the Soviet Union.

Top three candidates in the socialist electoral bloc include the head of Socialist Party of Ukraine, Aleksandr Moroz, academic Svyatoslav Fedorov and world chess champion Anatoly Karpov.

Aleksandr Moroz

6. Women's Union (Women's Interests, Center-Leftism, Humanism)

An electoral bloc created by Ekaterina Lakhova, former chair of the Committee on Women's Affairs, Family, Motherhood, and Childhood in the Supreme Soviet of Russia, and Alevtina Fedulova, former head of the Komsomol (the main youth organization of the Communist Party of Soviet Union). They claim to represent the interests of women in the Soviet Union, however they are understood. However, in practice, the Women's Union will be a reliable voice for Rutskoy, with some abstract calls for humanism and increased social commitment in areas related to the protection of women and children.

7. Beer Lovers' Party

Beer Lovers' Electoral Bloc largely arose as a joke among tired political strategists who lost local elections to the Moscow City Council. What began as a joke soon gained unexpected popularity thanks to beer and sausage giveaways, especially in Belarus, where voting for Beer Lovers' Party is seen as a protest. The party's motto is: "Everyone has the right to drink beer, just as they have the right not to drink it." The party's stated goal is "to transform Russia into a country suitable for a safe, well-fed, and peaceful life, for honest work and comfortable beer drinking," promising to protect "the interests of ordinary citizens from the encroachments of bureaucracy and criminality," to support "the purity and quality of domestic beer," and to abolish excise taxes on beer.

The top three candidates in the Socialist electoral bloc include Russian political strategists Konstantin Kalachev and Dmitry Shestakov, as well as Andrey Romashevsky, leader of the Belarusian Beer Lovers' Party.

Beer Lovers' Party is serious business.

8. Movement of Democratic Reforms (Democrats, Pro-Market, Continuation of Reforms)

Moderate Democrats were one of the two pillars of the Yeltsin-Yavlinsky transitional government and maintained its support even after the resignation of Deputy Prime Minister Yavlinsky. However, following the government's resignation and the curtailment of market reforms, they went into opposition. MDR accuses the president of betraying the reformist course and promises to continue necessary market reforms, accusing Rutskoy of unfair privatization, rampant banditry, and embezzlement of Western aid, which the president uses to support Ministry of Security (which merged Ministry of Internal Affairs and KGB). Furthermore, MDR promises continued decommunization and reform of the security services, rehabilitation of Soviet-era political prisoners, which Rutskoy suspended, and opposes the participation of Soviet troops in civil war in Tajikistan. At the same time, the MDR's program carefully speaks of maintaining all social obligations and supporting territorial unity. Some Democrats, led by Galina Starovoitova, support the idea of ​​lustration, but this remains a minority position within the party.

Moderate Democrats are the main opposition force, widely represented in many regional and republican government bodies. MDR member parties hold majorities in the republican parliaments of Northern Russia, Volga-Vyatka Republic, Siberia and Crimea. They are supported by St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoly Sobchak, Crimean President Yuri Meshkov, Nizhny Novgorod Governor Boris Nemtsov, Novosibirsk Mayor Viktor Tolokonsky and many other elected governors and mayors. Democrats want to exert their influence in forming the government with an eye on next year's presidential elections.

Moderate Democrats lost their leader, Boris Yeltsin, who is recovering from a heart attack and will miss the elections, but they still represent a force and are led by recognizable figures. The split between the "Democratic Union" and "Democratic Russia" left the MDR with a majority of old democrats.

Democratic electoral bloc includes Democratic Party of Russia, led by former First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Russia Nikolay Travkin; Party of Unity and Accord, led by Sergey Shakhray, the author of new Constitution; Russian Christian Democratic Party and the Russian Christian Democratic Union, which have finally united under the patronage of former dissident and Orthodox priest Gleb Yakunin; Republican Party of Russia, led by former People's Deputy of Russia and co-author of the language law Vladimir Lysenko; Peasant Party of Russia, led by TV presenter and Supreme Soviet Deputy of USSR Yuri Chernichenko; Republican Movement of Crimea; the Democratic Party of Ukraine, which has the largest opposition faction in the republican councils of Central and Western Ukraine; and the People's Labor Union of Russian Solidarists, which primarily represents émigrés.

Top three candidates in the Democratic electoral bloc include Nikolay Travkin, former adviser to Prime Minister Yeltsin Sergey Stankevich and the main author of the new Constitution, Sergey Shakhray.

Anatoly Sobchak and Sergey Shakhray

9. Free Democratic Party (Radical Democrats, Progressivism, Liberalism)

Split between moderate and radical democrats over the possibility of collaborating with Rutskoy occurred back in 1991. This was compounded by a series of local conflicts inherent in any young mass movement, resulting in the emergence of "Radical Democrats" as a separate force.

Leader of the "Radical Democrats" faction in the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, Marina Salye, became the leader of formation of a separate radical democratic party. New party was named after the German Free Democratic Party and soon became a center of gravity for all forces dissatisfied with Rutskoy and Yeltsin, criticizing them from the liberal flank for betraying democratic ideas, ineffective reforms, and abandoning them. Free Democrats advocate a program of continued radical market reforms, lustrations, reform of the Ministry of Security, greater freedom for the regions and republics, and the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Tajikistan. Free Democrats are only socially progressive party in Soviet Union that supports gay and lesbian rights. They intend to remain in radical opposition to President Rutskoy, but are prepared to form a government with the Free Democrats and smaller factions.

Free Democrats electoral bloc includes Marina Salye's Free Democratic Party of Russia, Vladimir Filenko's Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine, Democratic Union led by dissident and human rights activist Valeria Novodvorskaya, Liberal Party of Ukraine led by former Deputy Prime Minister of Central Ukraine Oleg Soskin, "Choice of Russia" party led by former Minister of State Property Anatoly Chubais, Party of Economic Freedom of the President of the Russian Commodity and Raw Materials Exchange Konstantin Borovoy, Belarusian United Civic Party of USSR People's Deputy Alexander Dobrovolsky, Democratic Party of Kazakhstan, and the Russian Party of Social Democracy led by former Perestroika architect Alexander Yakovlev. Free Democrats are supported by Eduard Rossel, head of the Ural Republic.

Top three candidates in the Free Democrats electoral bloc include Marina Salye, Anatoly Dobrovolsky, and Vladimir Filenko.

Marina Salye on FDP protest

10. "Yavlinsky-Bogdankevich-Lukin" Bloc (Yabloko literally Apple) (Social liberalism, Environmentalism)

Another democratic faction occupies a middle ground between MDR and Free Democrats, led by former First Deputy Prime Minister Grigory Yavlinsky, who has united around him a number of small social democratic and environmental organizations opposed to President Rutskoy. Bloc opposes participation in the war in Tajikistan and supports increased rights for republics and regions and the continuation of market reforms, albeit in a more cautious manner. In addition to Yavlinsky, his bloc includes former Deputy Finance Minister Stanislav Bogdankevich and former Foreign Minister Vladimir Lukin, after whom it is named.

Lukin and Yavlinsky

11. Liberal Democratic Party of Soviet Union (Populism, Nationalism, Workers' Interests)

Vladimir Zhirinovsky is not giving up, preparing for another run. Some say he's just Rutskoy's puppet, trying to draw votes from nationalists and leftists, but Zhirinovsky himself disagrees. He's waging a vibrant and visible populist campaign, targeting the poorest sections of society, actively playing the nationalist card and declaring his readiness to fight the communists. The LDPSU's economic program is contradictory: on the one hand, Zhirinovsky wants to protect workers' interests, while on the other, he wants to combat democracy and "liberate the economy from the shackles of bureaucracy." Opponents accuse the LDPSU of having a large criminal element within the party.

In addition to Zhirinovsky, the top three of the LDPSU include the head of the Liberal Democrats of Belarus, Sergey Gaidukevich, and the popular television journalist, Alexander Nevzorov.

Vladimir Zhirinovsky

12. People's Patriotic Front "Fatherland" (National Patriotism, Conservatism, Pro-Market)

Despite the crisis following the failure to nominate their presidential candidate, former patriots from "Russian Unity" faction were able to gather to nominate their own electoral bloc, led by the failed presidential candidate and Supreme Soviet deputy Mikhail Astafyev. Its centerpiece was patriots and nationalists dissatisfied with President Rutskoy's right-wing policies, but disagreeing with Nikolay Travkin, who considered him too moderate. The patriots are in "constructive opposition" to President Rutskoy, supporting his measures to preserve territorial integrity but categorically opposing his economic policies and cooperation with the communists. "Fatherland" balances Russian nationalism and the defense of Slavic unity, attracting some Ukrainian nationalists dissatisfied with the excessive liberalism of Rukh. "Fatherland" is trying to maintain the guise of a "demo-patriotic" and national-liberal organization, concealing its internal radicals.

New alliance's core members include former parliamentary group "Russian Unity," Mikhail Astafyev's Constitutional Democratic Party - People's Freedom Party, which bills itself as a restored pre-revolutionary party of the same name but has no real ties to it, Viktor Aksyuchits's Russian Christian Democratic Movement, Union of Russian Cossacks, Conservative Party of dissident and political prisoner Lev Ubozhko, Nikolay Lysenko's National Republican Party of Russia, and a number of smaller organizations.

Top three candidates in the national-patriots' electoral bloc include Mikhail Astafyev, mathematician, academician, and dissident Igor Shafarevich, and Lev Ubozhko.

Igor Shafarevich

13. Movement (Rukh) of Free Peoples (Separatism)

Electoral bloc of People's Movement (Rukh) of Ukraine, Belarusian People Front, Vainakh Democratic Party, and Congress of the People of Kazakhstan represents a tactical alliance of legal separatists. The movement demonstratively uses Ukrainian as its primary language, even in its name, and aims to "finish what was started in 1991." President Rutskoy constantly threatens to ban the Rukh, but in reality, it plays the same role as the radical communists and the LDPSU.

The top three candidates in the separatist electoral bloc include Vyacheslav Chornovol, head of the Galician Ukrainian Republic, Zenon Poznyak, leader of the BPF faction in the Supreme Council of Belarus, and Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, chairman of the VDP.

Rukh does not field candidates nationwide and cannot win elections.

Vyacheslav Chornovol

14. Eurasian Congress (Regionalism)

While Rukh is a radical separatist movement of Western Slavic republics, Eurasian Congress unites the far more cunning and incremental leaders of Asian autonomous regions: primarily Kazakhstan, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Gagauzia. Despite the formal representation of a number of Russian candidates and the promotion of "Eurasianism" as its ideology, the Congress is primarily a party of regional elites willing to trade support with the central government.

Eurasianist electoral bloc includes Alexander Dugin's Eurasian Movement, People's Unity Party of Kazakhstan, All-Tatar Cultural and Educational Center, Council of Elders of Gagauzia, and Association of Koreans in Russia.

You can also write-in any party or politician from the described territories who has at least thought about getting involved in politics in 1990s.

VOTE HERE

On February 10, 1991, polling stations open for the first round of the USSR presidential elections. These elections take place following the unexpected assassination of Mikhail Gorbachev and mark the first time President of Soviet Union is elected by a direct vote of the citizenry. Voting proceeds in all republics of the Soviet Union, despite the local conflicts that have already begun to flare up. Amidst the collapse of the planned economy, the economic crisis is deteriorating rapidly; in some regions, even the supply of bread has begun to face disruptions. Republics and Union are sinking ever deeper into "legislative war", enacting mutually contradictory laws, while the economic blocs within Russian and Union governments find themselves in a state of near-direct confrontation. Meanwhile, Communists in Russian Supreme Soviet have launched a counterattack, successfully blocking legislation on the free trade of land. Yavlinsky has already attempted to tender his resignation; however, the situation in Lithuania and Latvia is rapidly escalating—though, for the moment, direct clashes have been successfully averted. Dialogue with the United States and European nations has effectively been suspended, as President Bush cautiously waits to determine precisely with whom he should be conducting negotiations. Final shock comes in the form of the disastrous, confiscatory monetary reform hastily implemented by Ryzhkov government in January. The presidential election is expected to cut through this Gordian knot of contradictions—before it is too late.

Boris Yeltsin (Independent; Democrat; proponent of market reforms and national sovereignty of the republics).

Following the assassination of Mikhail Gorbachev, the leader of the democrats stands as the most prominent politician in the Soviet Union. Although Yeltsin lost the battle for the right to head the Russian parliament, he remains a powerful and popular figure. In late January, "Democratic Russia" and its allied organizations mobilized over 300,000 demonstrators in central Moscow, serving as a stark reminder to the Russian Supreme Soviet of where the true affections of the city's residents actually lie. Yeltsin is campaigning on three key themes: immediate, radical economic reform; continued democratization; and support for the sovereignty of the republics. The further west one travels, the more Yeltsin’s words are interpreted as a call for outright independence. Against the backdrop of rising tensions in Baltics, the democratic candidate visited Latvia and Estonia, urging local authorities to participate fully in the Soviet presidential elections. Within Russia itself, Yeltsin’s staunchest supporters are the authorities of the autonomous republics. Furthermore, Yeltsin has capitalized on the escalating tensions in Transcaucasia, pledging support to Armenia in Karabakh conflict and offering assistance to Georgia in the reintegration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Yeltsin is openly backed by the "architects of Perestroika": former CPSU Central Committee Secretary Alexander Yakovlev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. Yeltsin has garnered the support of the major democratic forces across the three Slavic republics— People's Rukh of Ukraine, Democratic Russia, and the Belarusian Popular Front—as well as a multitude of smaller groups. Yeltsin’s team relies on the Interregional Deputies' Group in USSR Supreme Soviet, democratic factions in Russian Supreme Soviet, and democratic deputies at other levels of government—including those who have already secured control of the city councils in Moscow and Leningrad.

Boris Yeltsin

Alexander Rutskoy (Independent; Reformist; Proponent of a Renewed Union Treaty).

Elevation of an Air Force colonel to the position of de facto head of the Russian Republic proved to be the most unexpected event of 1990. Elected as a compromise candidate, Rutskoy succeeded in rallying his own faction of centrist reformers around him, deftly navigating the political terrain between radical democrats and orthodox communists. A motley coalition comprising communists, reformers, moderate democrats, and patriots rallied around Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of RSFSR. Rutskoy is prepared to implement market-oriented economic reforms, placing high hopes on the Shatalin-Yavlinsky "500 Days" reform plan, while also recognizing the necessity of engaging in negotiations with Western partners. At the same time, Rutskoy intends to safeguard the state unity of the Soviet Union by concluding a new Union Treaty.

Following Gorbachev's death, it was Rutskoy—in his capacity as Russia's leader—who, unexpectedly even to himself, emerged as a figure arguably more influential than Acting President, Lukyanov. In effect, a dual power structure took root in Moscow: following meetings at the Kremlin, Defense Minister Yazov and the Acting Chairman of the KGB Shebarshin, would hold "consultations" with Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Russia, Alexander Rutskoy. A vote for Rutskoy represents a "third option" for those who believe it is possible to preserve the Soviet Union—along with all its attendant advantages—while simultaneously implementing social reforms. Over the course of a brief campaign, Alexander Rutskoy succeeded in cultivating an image among voters as a man with a concrete platform—and one whose ties to old nomenklatura were even weaker than those of Boris Yeltsin.

Democratic Party of Communists of Russia, founded by Rutskoy's supporters, continues to gain new members, while his candidacy enjoys the backing of numerous smaller reformist, social-democratic, and patriotic political forces. Rutskoy has also secured the support of a significant segment of "Russian Unity" after the patriots failed to field a single candidate. Democrats are prepared to vote for Rutskoy in a second-round runoff against Polozkov, while Communists are ready to vote for Rutskoy against Yeltsin. All that remains is for one of them to secure a spot in the top two.

Alexander Rutskoy

Ivan Polozkov (CPSU; conservative commusnist; opponent of market reforms; proponent of restoring and preserving the Soviet Union as it existed in 1985)

Nomination of Ivan Polozkov represents an urgent attempt by the remnants of Communist Party to revitalize their ranks. Communists are left with only the vestiges of a rapidly disintegrating infrastructure; Polozkov’s election—despite his being a "new face"—signaled a conservative coup within the party. Nikolai Ryzhkov, Prime Minister of Soviet Union, might have become Gorbachev’s successor; however, a heart attack shattered his health—and, along with it, his plans for the nomination. Polozkov’s platform consists of a critique of Perestroika, a promise to roll back market reforms and return to the status quo of 1985, as well as a pledge to implement emergency recovery measures and strengthen the vertical chain of command. Polozkov’s primary centers of support lie within Baltic Interfronts and among leadership of Central Asian republics, who effectively control the electoral process within their respective territories.

Ivan Polozkov

Aman Tuleyev (CPSU; Regionalist; Kazakh)

As Chairman of the Kemerovo Regional Executive Committee and the Regional Council of People's Deputies (serving de facto as both governor and head of the regional parliament for the Kemerovo Oblast) and a People's Deputy of RSFSR, Aman Tuleyev emerged as an unexpected candidate. Formally, he represents the interests of the miners in his home region; in practice, however, he is using this campaign as a means to avoid endorsing any of the major candidates.

In his campaign platform, Tuleyev proposed reducing bureaucratic red tape in the economy and granting the regions greater economic autonomy. Tuleyev advocates for the preservation of kolkhozes, the conversion of military production facilities to civilian use, and the maintenance of social guarantees for the population. He proposed developing industry first and foremost, and to temporarily restrict the right to hold rallies in order to strengthen labor discipline.

Tuleyev does not expect victory and is not conducting a campaign across the entire territory of Soviet Union.

Aman Tuleyev

Vladimir Zhirinovsky (Liberal Democratic Party of Soviet Union, Populist, Russian nationalist, Democrat, and proponent of preserving USSR).

Zhirinovsky’s campaign was conducted under the slogans: "I want to raise the Russian question!", "I will lift Russia from its knees!", and "I will defend Russians!". Defense of Russian interests within the territory of USSR was the central plank of his election platform. Liberal Democrat attacks both Yeltsin and the Communists.

Zhirinovsky believes that ceasing aid to socialist countries, attracting foreign investment, and transitioning from a national-territorial administrative structure to a purely territorial one will bring an end to the socio-economic crisis. He promises to prevent the collapse of Soviet Union, permit all forms of economic activity, and lower the price of vodka. Zhirinovsky pledges to resolve the conflict between the RSFSR and Union center, adopt a new Union constitution, abolish conscription, and demand the repayment of foreign debts.

The patriots failed to nominate a single candidate capable of securing the support of the entire Congress.

Vladimir Zhirinovsky

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The leadership of what remained of Communist Party proved completely unprepared to find itself without Gorbachev. Formally, the upper hand within the party was seized by the remnants of the conservatives—those left without their former leader, Yegor Ligachev, whom Gorbachev had forced into retirement for resisting Perestroika.

These conservative remnants managed to oust Yeltsin and his supporters from the party, and subsequently to seize control of RSFSR Communist Party, expelling Rutskoy and his allies in the process. Immediately following Gorbachev's assassination, the chief "architect of Perestroika" Alexander Yakovlev along with his entire team, was expelled from CPSU. Vadim Bakatin, the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs—who had been regarded as a reformer—was also forced into retirement. (In the USSR, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was primarily a police ministry; it also commanded the Internal Troops, the fire services, and the prison system).

Communist nomenklatura relied upon a rapidly disintegrating party infrastructure; the "Union" parliamentary group in USSR Supreme Soviet; RSFSR Communist Party; "Communists of Russia" and "Russia" parliamentary groups within the RSFSR Supreme Soviet; Communist Parties of Ukraine and Belarus (which remained—for the time being—loyal); and Interfronts of Baltic republics. Nomenklatura of Central Asian republics also remained—albeit conditionally—loyal to the central government; however, sentiments there were already beginning to shift toward the question: "When do we start dividing up the assets?"

Under these circumstances, Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee was compelled—behind closed doors—to choose from among three candidates to nominate as the official standard-bearer of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for the post of President of the USSR.

Acting President Anatoly Lukyanov.

Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet and Interim President of the USSR. Lukyanov is an utterly colorless nomenklatural apparatchik—the quintessential illustration of what the CPSU had degenerated into. A jurist and one of the architects of 1977 Constitution, he began as a supporter of Gorbachev but, by the time of the latter's demise, had increasingly begun to drift into opposition to Perestroika. Lukyanov remains a relatively obscure figure—strictly a compromise candidate—yet he possesses the potential to keep the CPSU firmly on its course of defending a peculiar status quo; for younger communists, he represents an opportunity to prepare for the subsequent battle over the party's remnants. He spearheaded a ruthless purge of the "architects of Perestroika" a campaign that resulted in the expulsion from the party of Alexander Yakovlev, former Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Vadim Bakatin. Lukyanov enjoys his strongest support among elected deputies at all levels who remain loyal to the party.

Anatoly Lukyanov

Nikolai Ryzhkov, Prime Minister of the Soviet Union.

In 1981, Nikolai Ryzhkov—then a little-known First Deputy Chairman of Gosplan (USSR State Planning Committee)—was personally selected by Yuri Andropov to spearhead economic reforms within the Soviet Union. Ryzhkov remained a member of Gorbachev’s inner circle until the very end; it was Gorbachev who, in 1985, appointed this protégé of his own political father to the post of Prime Minister of the USSR. Ryzhkov is, in essence, both the architect and the embodiment of all the economic reforms undertaken during the Perestroika era. Much like Gorbachev, he completed a political journey that took him from reformer to conservative. Ryzhkov is a household name throughout the Soviet Union, and in the eyes of the Soviet electorate, it is he—rather than Lukyanov—who is perceived as the country's second-in-command. Since September, Ryzhkov has been campaigning for the immediate resignation of the Russian government led by Volsky and Yavlinsky, having categorically rejected their proposed plan for market-oriented reforms. Ryzhkov is a target of attacks by the democrats; Anatoly Sobchak—Chairman of the Leningrad Soviet (and de facto head of the Leningrad administration)—accuses him of involvement in the "ANT case," an attempted smuggling operation involving the illicit export of 12 T-72 tanks abroad.

Nikolai Ryzhkov

Ivan Polozkov, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party

Ivan Polozkov—First Secretary of the Krasnodar Krai Committee (and de facto head of the Krasnodar regional administration)—first gained nationwide prominence as the man who covered up that very "ANT case." He did not accuse Ryzhkov directly, but he did participate in the subsequent investigations and the search for those responsible. Later, Polozkov stood as the Communist candidate in the election for Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of RSFSR. Although he failed to win the election himself, the Communists—under Polozkov's leadership—managed to block the election of Boris Yeltsin, an outcome that had seemed all but inevitable prior to the vote. In the summer of 1990, Polozkov spearheaded a purge of Russian Communist Party, rooting out reformists and supporters of Rutskoy, thereby preventing the latter from seizing control of the party. On the other hand, Polozkov is a seasoned nomenklatural apparatchik—albeit one who successfully ascended from the local level to the federal stage. Polozkov is a staunch Communist who leans toward the conservative wing—not an obscure, unknown figure in Moscow like the "National Socialist" Baburin. He governed a vast region, not merely a law school faculty. If the Party requires renewal during these turbulent times, Polozkov represents a reliable choice for Communists.

Ivan Polozkov

Vote here.

Amidst haste and panic, a congress of deputies from all levels "Unity" is convening in Moscow; the event is organized by a coalition of patriots united under the "Russian Unity" faction within the Supreme Soviet of RSFSR. This contradictory and still-fragmented political force has, nonetheless, decided to attempt to field its own candidate for the presidency of the Soviet Union. The ranks of the patriots are heterogeneous; they have been bolstered by defectors from Democrats and Communists, as well as entirely new faces. The congress is weighing two main options: to support Alexander Rutskoy or to nominate their own candidate. If the congress drags on or fails to agree on a unified course of action, the "patriots" could simply find themselves without a candidate of their own—a scenario that would spell the end of this political force.

Anatoly Salutsky

A nuclear engineer by education and a journalist and writer by vocation, Anatoly Salutsky emerged as one of the most prominent critics of Perestroika from the patriotic flank. He first clashed with proponents of Perestroika as early as 1988, when he delivered a high-profile address opposing the "resettlement of unpromising villages"—a government program dating back to the 1960s that was systematically destroying the Russian countryside. Salutsky was the patriots' candidate in the election for Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Russia; arguably, he best embodies the position of those who advocate for preserving the patriots as an independent "third force"—one committed to fighting for the preservation of the Soviet Union, yet not for the preservation of old nomenklatura.

Anatoly Salutsky

Veniamin Yarin

A factory worker from Nizhny Tagil, Yarin first caught the attention of Party officials after participating in the forceful dispersal of an environmental protest rally. He served as a delegate to 19th Party Conference. Speaking at the conference, he criticized the Prosecutor's Office for initiating criminal proceedings against individuals responsible for violating environmental regulations. Later, he supported—though ultimately unsuccessfully—the proposal to allow workers to cast their votes based on their workplace constituencies rather than their place of residence.

In March 1989, he was elected as a People's Deputy of the USSR. He served as a member of the Supreme Soviet of USSR and sat on the Supreme Soviet's Committee on Women's Affairs, Family Protection, Motherhood, and Childhood; he was also a member of the Communist Deputies' Group and the "Constructive Interaction" group. He joined the Interregional Deputies' Group but subsequently—without formally withdrawing from the group—adopted a critical stance toward it.

He was one of the founders of the United Front of Workers of USSR (an organization established with the support of the CPSU to counter the opposition movement in the name of the "working class"); he served on the UFW’s leadership council and acted as its co-chairman. Following his election as a member of the USSR Presidential Council, he was expelled from the UFW, as the latter had adopted a critical stance toward Gorbachev’s reforms. He subsequently aligned himself with the "patriots" and was elected to the Supreme Soviet of RSFSR, where he became a member of the "Russian Unity" faction. Yarin is the most vehement opponent of any alliance with the democrats and a staunch advocate for dialogue with orthodox communists. No one knows whether this man possesses any genuine convictions or a conscience.

Veniamin Yarin

Valery Skurlatov

Komsomolec and postgraduate student, Valery Skurlatov was first expelled from the CPSU back in 1965 for authoring a "Code of Morals" that party authorities deemed "fascist." In the years that followed, he spent time living underground, participated in an unsolved savings bank robbery, translated the works of Nazi authors, re-emerged into legal society, and cycled through numerous jobs—transitioning from a research scientist to a journalist and science editor. In 1975, he published "Zionism and Apartheid"—the book that would bring him fame. The book made him a popular figure within the far-right "Pamyat" society. According to his own accounts, in the early 1980s, there were proposals to appoint him as the leader of this movement; however, his candidacy failed to garner support from KGB. During the 1970s and 1980s, Skurlatov published prolifically; in particular, his articles appeared in the almanacs "Along the Roads of Millennia" and "Secrets of Ages", as well as in the magazine "Technology for Youth", where, together with like-minded individuals, he advanced ideas regarding a "Russian pagan prehistory."

He signed his articles using both his own name and various pseudonyms. He regarded Russians (whom he termed "Slavo-Rus") as "Aryans" and identified them with a wide range of ancient peoples, including the Scythians, Cimmerians, Indo-Iranians, and Etruscans. According to Skurlatov, Russian civilization is thousands of years older than any other, and a warrior cult was widespread among the ancient Russians. In Skurlatov's view, the Russians were tribes of herdsmen who roamed from Hungary to Central Asia—rather than agriculturalists, as "official science" maintains.

From 1983 to 1985, Skurlatov taught at the Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University, where he delivered a special course titled "A Critique of Zionist Ideology". The syllabus for this special course, prepared by Skurlatov, was officially published in 1984 with a print run of 2,000 copies. He was a member of the All-Russian Society for the Protection of Nature and Cultural Monuments.

Skurlatov was one of the most influential authors among Soviet "anti-Zionists" and marginal Slavic neopagans; however, prior to the onset of Perestroika, his renown did not extend beyond these specific circles. During the Perestroika era, he participated in the organization of a number of new political movements, such as Interregional Association of Democratic Organizations, among others. He organized the Russian People's Front and became one of its secretaries. In 1990, he served as secretary of the Russian Democratic Forum. In the summer of 1990, acting on behalf of this organization, he issued a manifesto titled "Program of Action—90." None of these organizations were recognized by democrats. In 1990, he established Committees of National Salvation in the Baltic states, with the aim whose objective was to retain the Baltic republics in USSR.

Valery Skurlatov

Mikhail Astafyev

Electrochemical engineer. From 1988 to 1990, Mikhail Astafyev participated in the establishment of informal "voters' clubs" in Moscow. In 1989, during the elections for People's Deputies of the USSR, he joined Moscow Popular Front (MNF), becoming one of the leaders of its "Democratic Faction," which adhered to a non-socialist orientation. On August 1, 1989, he was elected Deputy Chairman of the MNF Council of Representatives.

In January 1990, he participated in the creation of "Democratic Russia" bloc of candidates for People's Deputies. Initially, the bloc was intended to be named "Democratic Elections-90," but Astafyev insisted on changing the name. In the spring of 1990, with the support of the "DemRussia" bloc, he was elected a People's Deputy of the RSFSR representing the Dzerzhinsky Territorial District No. 11 (Moscow).

He participated in the "revival" of the pre-revolutionary Constitutional Democratic Party; however, he had already begun to forge closer ties with the "patriots" and persuaded them to support Travkin. While remaining a member of "Democratic Russia," he joined the "Russian Unity" group of deputies. He is arguably the strongest candidate in terms of collecting the signatures required for presidential nomination. Astafyev is supported by the most moderate patriots—those who advocate for rapprochement with the democrats and seek to purge the "patriots' congress" of communists and extremists.

Mikhail Astafyev

Vyacheslav Demin

A descendant of cossacks, former dissident, political prisoner and artist. In 1983, he founded the Revolutionary Social Democratic Party, but by 1984, he had already been imprisoned. He was released under the amnesty of 1987. Upon returning to Moscow, he temporarily withdrew from political activity; however, by 1989, he had resumed his protests against the Soviet regime. He adopted monarchist views, though he continued to collaborate with democrats. In early 1989, for participating in an unauthorized rally organized by the Democratic Union—led by Novodvorskaya—he was arrested and brought to trial. This time, however, the court did not impose a prison sentence, opting instead for an administrative penalty. Together with his friends and like-minded associates, he began advocating for the restoration of the monarchy in Russia and collecting signatures in support of the canonization of the Imperial Family. In late 1989, he and his associates established an initiative group dedicated to signature collection and street campaigning; this group subsequently participated in the proceedings of the first congress of Popular Front in Yaroslavl.

Demin is an Orthodox monarchist, a proponent of the veneration of the Tsar Nikolai II, and an advocate for the restoration of pre-revolutionary Russia—yet he remains willing to collaborate with any effective political allies. Demin enjoys the support of various Orthodox organizations as well as the resurgent Cossack movement (though, in terms of the historical accuracy of their reenactments, the latter still falls short of the standards set by Tolkien enthusiasts).

Vyacheslav Demin

Viktor Aksyuchits

Philosopher by education, Aksyuchits left the CPSU in 1978 for religious reasons. He engaged in the production of religious and political samizdat (underground literature), an activity that subjected him to repression by the KGB: he was expelled from his postgraduate program at Moscow State University (MSU), subjected to searches and interrogations, had his personal library confiscated, and faced an unofficial ban on working in his professional field. For nearly a decade, he was compelled to work as a foreman for seasonal construction crews in various regions across the country.

From the mid-1980s onward, his writings were published in émigré and Western European periodicals. As one of the earliest figures in the cooperative movement—and thus one of the first Soviet entrepreneurs—he was also among the pioneers of international trade.

In 1990, he was elected a People's Deputy of the Russian Federation and served as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Relations with Foreign Organizations within the Supreme Soviet Committee on Freedom of Conscience, Faith, Mercy, and Charity. He also served as Co-chairman of the "Russian Unity" parliamentary group. He was the initiator and co-author of 1990 RSFSR Law "On Religious Beliefs," which repealed the Leninist and Stalinist decrees regarding religion, dissolved the Council for Religious Affairs—an institution of the state atheist regime—granted freedoms for religious activity, officially designated Christmas Day as a public holiday, and exempted religious activities from taxation.

Since 1990, he has served as the leader of Russian Christian Democratic Movement. Initially, this movement was part of the "Democratic Russia" coalition, though it soon distanced itself from Boris Yeltsin. Aksyuchits was the most prominent advocate for an alliance between reformers and Alexander Rutskoy; however, he strove to maintain the "patriots" as a distinct political force rather than allowing them to be subsumed by other factions.

Viktor Aksyuchits

Viktor Alksnis

Air Force Colonel Viktor Alksnis was the only candidate at Congress of Patriots who did not hail from Russia proper. He began his political career in 1988, when he publicly spoke out against the Popular Front of Latvia, an organization whose stated goal was Latvia's secession from the USSR. From 1988 to 1989, he served as a member of the Organizing Committee for the Interfront (International Front of Working People) of Latvian SSR.

On May 21, 1989, he was elected a People's Deputy of the USSR, representing the Yugla National-Territorial District No. 294 in Riga. From June 1989, he was a member of the Interregional Deputies' Group. In October 1989, he became one of the initiators and leaders of the largest parliamentary group within the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR— "Union" group—though he soon began to distance himself increasingly from the party line.

In 1990, he was elected as a deputy to the Supreme Council of Latvia, representing Riga District No. 62 in the Vidzeme Suburb. He joined the "Equality" faction, which united communists and advocates for the civil rights of the non-indigenous population.

In May 1990, he participated in the establishment of Committee for the Protection of the Constitutions and Rights of Citizens of the USSR and Latvian SSR, and became a member of the committee (which was subsequently transformed in November 1990 into All-Latvia Committee for Public Salvation).

Alksnis is driven by a single, simple objective: to prevent the dissolution of the Soviet Union—a goal for which he is prepared to align himself with any strong leader.

Viktor Alksnis

Amidst all these candidates—most of whom remain largely unknown to the majority of the Soviet public—another idea is taking shape: to nominate Alexander Solzhenitsyn for the presidency of USSR. The most renowned of living Soviet dissidents currently resides in Vermont and is unaware of this plan; however, Gorbachev has already reinstated his citizenship, and nothing stands in the way of nominating Solzhenitsyn for the presidency. This is a manifesto rather than a concrete political platform. If patriots succeed in nominating Solzhenitsyn, they will place at the head of their ticket a figure whose name rivals Yeltsin's in terms of public recognition.

Alexander Solzhenitsyn

Vote here.

On November 7, 1990, at 11:09 a.m., moving alongside a column of demonstrators, Alexander Shmonov approached the Mausoleum, where the leaders of the USSR - headed by Gorbachev - was stationed. The traditional holiday demonstration celebrating the October Revolution was a mandatory ritual that the Soviet leader could not forgo. Shmonov managed to slip in between the marching columns. His presence went unnoticed by KGB agents. When he was just 47 meters from the Mausoleum, Shmonov whipped out a sawed-off shotgun, took aim at Gorbachev’s head, and pulled the trigger. The shot was a stroke of incredible luck, yet it defied no laws of physics and ballistics. The very first bullet struck Gorbachev in the head. The first President of the USSR died instantly. Senior Police Sergeant Mylnikov attempted to thwart Shmonov by striking the barrel of his weapon. Arriving moments later, KGB agents apprehended the assassin.

We barely knew Mikhail Gorbachev

The television broadcast of the demonstration was abruptly interrupted at 11:10 a.m. and replaced by a classical music concert.

Report from"Vremya" TV program, November 7, 1990:

"During the holiday demonstration on Red Square, the President of the USSR, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, was assassinated. The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Anatoly Ivanovich Lukyanov, has assumed the duties of Acting President. According to the Press Service of the USSR Committee for State Security (KGB), a resident of Leningrad has been detained; he fired two shots from a sawed-off hunting rifle in the direction of the reviewing stand. An investigation is underway"

Acting President Anatoly Lukyanov

Address to the Citizens by the Acting President of the USSR, Anatoly Lukyanov, November 7, 1990:

Comrades! In this hour of grave crisis for our country, I address you. We have suffered an irreparable loss. Today, a terrorist’s bullet cut short the life of the President of the USSR, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. Pursuant to Article 127.10 of the Constitution of the USSR, I have assumed the duties of the President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Mikhail Gorbachev’s contributions to our country will not be forgotten. His work of building a new, democratic Union will be continued. My task in the capacity of Acting President is to hold early presidential elections within the prescribed timeframe—elections in which the Soviet people will elect a new president. Long live the Soviet Union!

Supreme Soviet of USSR demonstrated a sprinter's pace in its legislative work by adopting the law on presidential elections. The deputies strove to resolve the suddenly arisen crisis as quickly as possible—an effort in which they were fully supported by the Acting President.

KEY PROVISIONS OF THE LAW "ON THE ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE USSR"

- Candidates for the presidency of the USSR may be nominated by Union-level political parties, trade unions, and mass socio-political movements.

- Work collectives possess the right to nominate candidates for the presidency of the USSR, provided that the nominated candidacy is supported by no fewer than one hundred thousand citizens of the USSR.

- The nomination of candidates for the presidency of the USSR must be completed no later than 25 days prior to the elections.

- The ballot for the secret vote in the presidential election shall include candidates supported by one hundred thousand citizens or by no fewer than one-fifth of the total number of People's Deputies of the USSR.

- A candidate shall be deemed elected President of the USSR if, during the election, they receive a majority of the votes cast by the voters who participated in the ballot.

Vladimir Kryuchkov, Chairman of KGB of USSR, has been relieved of his duties. Leonid Shebarshin, Head of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, has been appointed Acting Chairman of the KGB of USSR. In one of his final decrees, Kryuchkov significantly expanded the staff and powers of the KGB of RSFSR.

Supreme Soviet of USSR has held a discussion regarding the work of chekists. Although everyone is satisfied with the resignation of Kryuchkov—who became the scapegoat for Gorbachev's assassination—deputies remain focused on questions regarding the agency's operations. Democrats, reformists and patriots have united in demanding structural reform of the agency, whose performance they have deemed unsatisfactory. Admittedly, however, both wings interpret KGB reform through the lens of their own respective political platforms. Only time will tell whether the issue of state security reform becomes a central plank of the election campaign or is pushed to the background by other matters. For now, the only certainty is that Shebarshin faces the arduous task of navigating between Left and Right while ensuring the continued functioning of the state security apparatus throughout the election campaign.

First round of the USSR presidential election is scheduled for February 10, 1991. In the interim, the various political forces must nominate their candidates. It is already clear that Boris Yeltsin and Alexander Rutskoy—the only two figures enjoying nationwide recognition—will participate in the election. They have transformed from allies into implacable rivals in the battle for the presidency of Soviet Union. However, Vladimir Zhirinovsky—leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union, which was hastily registered by the Ministry of Justice—was the first to successfully secure his candidacy. Conservatives in CPSU Central Committee and Russian Patriots have yet to select their own candidates.

The weakening of central authority is already being felt in the outlying regions. Mass riots fueled by ethnic tensions have erupted in Namangan (Uzbek SSR). Five conscript soldiers and three rioters have been killed.

* * *

Please let me know in the comments if there are any unclear points or dividing lines that require further explanation. I am striving to adapt the specific nuances of this era—and this peculiar system—to make them understandable to an outside observer.

In previous episode

None of the candidates could secure a majority of the votes, and it soon became clear that the time for grand coalitions had arrived. Democrats, reformists and patriots struck a deal to isolate the orthodox communists and their allies. The unity of CPSU was crumbling before everyone's eyes, while Yeltsin managed to rally the democrats once again in the face of a common enemy.

Only Nixon can rival this man in his will to power.

The vote was held to elect Chairman of the Supreme Soviet — head of Russian parliament, and thus of RSFSR itself. Out of a total of 1,060 elected deputies, 986 received ballots; the ballot boxes were found to contain 984 valid votes and 1 spoiled ballot.

First Round of Voting:

Baburin: 435 for, 548 against

Rutskoy: 415 for, 568 against

Popov: 342 for, 641 against

Travkin: 124 for, 859 against

Volkogonov: 124 for, 859 against

The democrats withdrew their secondary candidates in favor of Popov. Technically, their combined vote count exceeded that of Rutskoy. Yeltsin, Stankevich, and Shakhray enforced discipline within their respective factions.

Yeltsin's top allies Sergei Shakhrai and Gennady Burbulis

Second Round of Voting:

Popov: 438 for, 491 against

Baburin: 434 for, 495 against

Rutskoy: 428 for, 532 against

Baburin still could not secure a majority. The democrats temporarily propelled Popov into the lead, but patriots were categorically opposed to him. Fearing Popov's election, the patriots defected en masse to Rutskoy's side. "Change - New Politics" effectively abandoned the democratic camp, throwing its support behind Rutskoy.

Third Round of Voting:

Baburin: 450 in favor, 479 against

Rutskoy: 438 in favor, 491 against

Popov: 424 in favor, 536 against

Baburin fell 31 votes short of election. Orthodox CPSU faction actively attempts to win over Patriots to their side, promising them symbolic concessions. Yeltsin and Rutskoy strike a package deal, brokered by Travkin. The parties harbor little trust for one another, yet their shared animosity toward conservatives runs even deeper.

Vote for First Deputy Chairman of the Council: Democrat Nikolay Travkin is elected with 660 votes in favor. Popov withdraws his candidacy in favor of Rutskoy. Democrats threaten to halt the voting process if a Chairman is not elected—a move that would leave Travkin serving as Acting Chairman. Many moderate orthodox members conclude that Rutskoy is the preferable choice over Travkin.

Nikolay Travkin

Fourth Round of Voting:

Rutskoy: 664 in favor, 179 against

Baburin: 438 in favor, 491 against

Congress also elects six Deputy Chairmen: Dmitry Volkogonov, Ruslan Khasbulatov and Vladimir Lukin (Democratic Russia); Oleg Rumyantsev and Vladimir Lysenko (Rutskoy's Communists for Democracy); and Kim Yong-un (Patriots). During the allocation of committee assignments, it becomes evident that the ruling coalition intends to isolate the orthodox faction; consequently, many of their members defect to "Communists for Democracy" faction (as Rutskoy’s supporters are now styled), to "Change" or to Patriots.

Khasbulatov and Rutskoy

The next item on the agenda is the election of Chairman of the Government of Russian SFSR. Neither the Democrats, nor the Communists—and certainly not the Patriots—possess, in any substantive sense, a viable economic program. Russian Republic is not yet in a position to pursue an economic policy independent of Soviet Union. However, Rutskoy decides to take matters into his own hands, having lost trust in Gorbachev. At this time, there are two teams across the entire Soviet Union working on economic reforms. One is part of Union government, preparing reforms for Gorbachev. The second is a group of young economists led by academic Stanislav Shatalin and Grigory Yavlinsky - head of the Consolidated Economic Department of USSR Council of Ministers - who developed the "400 Days of Trust" plan. Yavlinsky presents his plan first to Yeltsin, and subsequently to Rutskoy.

Shatalin-Yavlinsky team

Neither Yeltsin - nor, even less so, the combat general Rutskoy - possesses much understanding of economics, beyond the recognition that market reforms are necessary, whatever form they might take. Rutskoy already has his own candidate in mind for the post of Prime Minister: Arkady Volsky: former head of the Special Administration Committee for Nagorno-Karabakh, a People's Deputy of USSR, and founder of Scientific-Industrial Union, first major association of Russian entrepreneurs and industrialists. Reformers and democrats strike a deal once again.

Arkady Volsky is elected Prime Minister of RSFSR, with Grigory Yavlinsky appointed as his First Deputy. Based on the "400 Days" program, a new market reform program—the "500 Days" plan—is drafted.

Arkady Volsky

On June 12, 1990, Declaration of State Sovereignty of RSFSR is adopted. Primacy of Russian laws over Union-wide legislation is established. In Soviet political lexicon of that era, however, "sovereignty" did not signify full independence. On July 13, the State Bank of the RSFSR is established.

White-blue-red flag has been a symbol of democratic and patriotic opposition since 1989.

A "war of laws" ensues between USSR and RSFSR. At the insistence of the "patriots"- on whom Rutskoy still relies - tricolor is adopted as the state flag of the RSFSR. RSFSR Law "On Freedom of Conscience" is promulgated. At 28th Congress of CPSU, Boris Yeltsin and a number of reform advocates left the party. Rutskoy waged a battle against conservatives for the right to lead the Communist Party of RSFSR; however, he lost and was expelled from the Russian party by the conservatives. Democratic Platform officially broke away from the party. Rutskoy's supporters formed "Democratic Party of Communists of Russia," attempting to formally remain members of the CPSU while working alongside democrats.

Rutskoy's ally and so-chairman of DPCR Vasily Lipitsky

In 1990, this still seems possible.

On August 13, President Mikhail Gorbachev issued a decree rehabilitating the victims of Stalinist repressions. And on August 15, he issued a decree restoring citizenship to dissidents who had been exiled from the country - including Alexander Solzhenitsyn.

Over the summer and the first two months of autumn 1990, all the remaining Soviet republics proclaimed declarations of sovereignty. There was no talk of outright independence yet, but the republics were demanding ever-greater rights. In the elections to Supreme Soviet of Georgian SSR, opposition parties, campaigning under slogans of republican independence and the introduction of a market economy, secured a victory. Conflicts began to erupt in South Ossetia and Transnistria.

Rutskoy managed to secure the creation of a separate KGB of RSFSR, thanks to his relationship with Chairman of USSR KGB Vladimir Kryuchkov. Several years earlier, Kryuchkov had personally negotiated the release of colonel Rutskoy, who had been shot down over Afghanistan, from Pakistani captivity. This marked the first security agency to be placed in the hands of the Russian authorities, albeit a small one for the time being.

Chairman of USSR KGB Vladimir Kryuchkov

Attempt on Gorbachev’s Life

Alexander Shmonov was born in 1952 in Leningrad and grew up in a well-to-do family. After serving in the Soviet Army, he worked as a fitter at the Izhorsky Plant in Kolpino and lived in a dormitory.

In the second half of the 1980s, Shmonov joined the Social Democratic Party of Russia. He held radical political views. He held Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, responsible for the suppression of rallies in Tbilisi on April 9, 1989, and in Baku on January 20, 1990 (resulting in 21 and 131 deaths, respectively); for this reason, he intended to physically eliminate him, thereby ensuring democratic presidential elections. As early as March 1990, he had been posting leaflets calling for Gorbachev's assassination.

Alexander Shmonov

Shmonov purchased a scarce German double-barreled shotgun for 900 rubles, having first obtained the necessary permit from the police. Before departing, he sent an ultimatum to the Kremlin; however, upon realizing that no one intended to meet his demands, he proceeded with his preparations for the assassination attempt. On November 5, 1990, he traveled to Moscow. On the morning of November 7, he loaded his sawed-off shotgun with homemade ammunition of enhanced lethality, then applied makeup—affixing a false mustache and donning a wig—to alter his appearance. To bypass the metal detectors, Shmonov fashioned a diversionary placard mounted on a metal rod, bearing the inscription: "Stand Firm, State!" In his trouser pocket, he left a suicide note:

"In the event of my death, I hereby declare that I intended to attempt to assassinate the President of the USSR, M.S. Gorbachev."

At 11:09 a.m., moving amidst a column of demonstrators, Shmonov approached the Mausoleum, where the leadership of the USSR - headed by Gorbachev - was assembled. He managed to wedge himself between the marching columns, and his presence went unnoticed by the KGB agents on duty. When he was 47 meters from the Mausoleum, Shmonov whipped out a sawed-off shotgun, aimed at Gorbachev's head, and pulled the trigger.

https://preview.redd.it/yx4oeawv4qxg1.png?width=895&format=png&auto=webp&s=1a4ede9f3b8fdbd25988206d7debdd74bb09f40d

Hitting a target with a sawed-off shotgun from such a distance is extremely difficult—yet physically possible, and does not violate the laws of ballistics.

Vote here to determine whether Gorbachev survives.

"The good news is that Communists don't have a reliable majority. The bad news is that the democratic factions don't have any majority to elect you, Boris. We need a temporary compromise until we can hold a referendum on a nationwide election for the Russian president."

First Congress of People's Deputies was chaos. More than 80% of 1068 elected deputies were members of the CPSU, but that no longer means anything. Formally, Communists won the elections, but not a strong majority in parliament. Even a formally unified communist faction never emerged. CPSU has no control over the elected people's deputies. Communist Party of RSFSR is a battleground for different communist factions. Many people's deputies belong to multiple factions simultaneously, and it is impossible to predict their votes.

Democrats are no better off. Yeltsin has managed to better control "Democratic Russia", but it turned out to be not the only democratic group, and the voting patterns of individual deputies remain a mystery and a surprise. No one expected Patriots to be able to bring such a large faction to the Russian parliament, not even the Patriots themselves. However, the "Russian Unity" faction, led by Kim Yong-un, an ethnic Korean, is now a factor that could become a significant factor in the election of the Russian leadership.

Communists nominated Ivan Polozkov, the first secretary of the Krasnodar Krai regional committee and de facto governor of the region, as a candidate for Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. This position combines the status of head of parliament and the formal head of the RSFSR. Democrats nominated Boris Yeltsin, the leader of democrats in the Union parliament, who had also been elected as a people's deputy of the RSFSR. Seven votes were unsuccessful; neither Polozkov nor Yeltsin could secure the required number of votes. Polozkov's replacement with Alexander Vlasov, former Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR, also failed. Fractions took time to negotiate.

Gorbachev demands that the Supreme Soviet and its Communists elect a Russian leadership to avoid chaos and paralysis of power. During this time, stable parliamentary groups have finally formed, and new leaders with whom dialogue can be established have emerged.

Communist fractions: ~ 600 deputies

"Communists of Russia" is the most orthodox communist fraction, still loyal to Gorbachev and CPSU. Red conservatives support status quo, but fewer and fewer of its members understand what that means. It is led by Ivan Polozkov, an unsuccessful candidate for Supreme Soviet chairman.

"Food and Health" is a faction uniting the interests of collective kolkhoz chairmen and doctors, of whom there are unexpectedly many. The only thing holding them together is the desire to prevent Yeltsin from coming to power. Unlike the Communists of Russia, the agrarians and doctors are not dependent on Gorbachev and will not negotiate Yeltsin's election.

Workers' and Peasants' Union is an amorphous faction that formally represents the interests of workers. Its deputies are opposed to Yeltsin, but are far more willing to negotiate with the democrats. On their own terms, of course.

Democratic Platform in CPSU is a faction of internal reformists who remain party members but are dissatisfied with both Gorbachev and party orthodox. Within the Democratic Platform, there is a strong faction in favor of negotiations with the democrats.

"Left Center" consists of social democrats and moderate leftists who are trying to establish a centrist force and are willing to negotiate with both orthodox communists and radical democrats. It is "Left Center" deputies who best understand Gorbachev's concerns and want to prevent a paralysis of power.

Democratic fractions: ~ 400 deputies

"Democratic Russia" is the main faction of democrats. They are still united by their shared hostility to the communists and Yeltsin's charisma, but the failure to elect Boris Yeltsin as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet has already triggered internal conflicts.

"Radical Democrats" are the most radical part of the Democrats. Almost all of them are also members of "Democratic Russia," but this group is a force to be reckoned with.

"Group of non-party deputies" — most of them democrats. Probably no one really knows what to expect from this generally amorphous group. They support Yeltsin as a way to defeat the Union leadership and Communists, but it's difficult to imagine how the "Non-Party Deputies" would behave under different circumstances.

"Change - New Policy" is a group of young democrats who consider DR too radical. They are centrists on the democratic side, unwilling to support Polozkov or any other orthodox communist, but open to negotiations with reformist communists. This group most likely supported Yeltsin in the first votes, but one cannot say that it is loyal to Democrats.

Patriots: ~ 80 deputies

"Russian Unity" — they were able to get elected and form a united faction, rather than split. That's a miracle. There are almost no former party workers or officials among the patriots, so the faction is formally headed by Kim Yong-un, an ethnic Korean and also a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Patriot candidate Anatoly Salutsky received almost 100 votes in one of Chairman elections, but this is the faction's ceiling. The Patriots could become kingmakers, if they remain united.

Compromise candidates for the post of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR:

1. Sergey Baburin (Communists of Russia). Before being elected as a people's deputy, he was the dean of the law faculty at Omsk State University and a veteran of Afghan War. Baburin is young and has no ties to Gorbachev or old nomenklatura. In the 1980s, he advocated for the rehabilitation of victims of the repressions of the 1930s. A vocal opponent of Yeltsin, an opponent of Russian sovereignty, a nationalist, an Orthodox Christian, and a Red conservative, Baburin could become a compromise figure between Communists and Patriots.

New face of CP RSFSR?

2. Alexander Rutskoy (Democratic Platform in CPSU). An Air Force colonel and Afghan War veteran who flew 485 combat missions, Rutskoy is a member of the Democratic Platform in CPSU, but was elected with the support of patriots, NPF "Memory" and the Orthodox Church. Rutskoy is a soft opponent of the state sovereignty of the RSFSR, but he can find a compromise with reformist communists, nationalists, and moderate democrats. He lacks political experience, but Rutskoy is an inspiring figure. He is prepared for broad coalition negotiations, including a deal with Yeltsin, and could be an ideal compromise candidate. Despite his past, Rutskoy understands the need for urgent economic reform and a way out of the crisis.

Compromise candidate?

3. Gavriil Popov (Democratic Russia). Greek, economist by education, a staunch social democrat and a proponent of cautious reforms. He was one of the founders of the Interregional Deputy Group in the Supreme Soviet of USSR. Popov has already been elected Chairman of the Moscow Council, de facto mayor of Moscow. A supporter of Yeltsin, he is trying to find a compromise between him and Gorbachev. Popov is opposed to the nationalization of large-scale industry. Orthodox communists and patriots consider him an American spy. Popov could be a compromise between the democrats and the reformist communists, and would also suit Gorbachev as a compromise candidate.

All-Russian Mayor?

4. Nikolay Travkin (Democratic Russia/Democratic Party of Russia). While Popov is an armchair economist, Travkin is a practical and staunch liberal. A builder and agrarian by profession, he was the grassroots initiator of one of the first economic reforms, which allowed for freedom of contract between the client and the contractor, and the author of his own agrarian reform project. He is the leader of a group seeking to create a full-fledged party based on Democratic Russia and its regional allies. At the same time, Travkin is a statist and could attract the votes of patriots and even some communists.

Working man?

5. Dmitry Volkogonov (Left Center). Colonel General. Son of repressed father. A former political officer, dismissed from the army for anti-Stalinism. A researcher of the repressions who has become a staunch democrat. A Yeltsin supporter and his backup candidate. Volkogonov could become a compromise candidate between moderate communists, democrats, and some patriots, but only if the other candidates fail.

Redemed general?

Now the divided Supreme Council must elect a chairman and, along with him, determine the coalition that will govern Russia in the near future.

Vote here

Explanation: At the first congresses of people's deputies, there was no rule prohibiting a deputy from belonging to multiple factions. This meant that formal membership was utterly useless, and deputies were extremely unloyal, constantly changing their votes, switching factions, and simply skipping votes. The leaders of the deputy groups themselves didn't know exactly how many votes they controlled. At this stage, any diagrams were simply useless, but as a normal party system took shape, everything would come to them.