u/Previous_Word_3517

After FPTP: Should electoral reform prioritize “centripetal democracy” or “consensus democracy” if we cannot fully achieve both?

I would like to make a poll here about the direction of electoral reform.

Many people who oppose FPTP / plurality voting probably agree that it has serious problems. It can create spoiler effects, strategic voting, minority winners, two-party domination, and incentives for candidates to mobilize only their core base instead of seeking broader acceptance from the electorate.

But when it comes to the question of what should replace FPTP, electoral reformers often have different institutional goals.

I want to simplify the discussion into two broad directions:

1. Centripetal democracy: encouraging candidates to seek broader acceptance

The core idea of centripetal democracy is this: Electoral systems should not merely reward the candidate who is best at mobilizing a loyal base. Instead, they should encourage candidates to seek second preferences, third preferences, or broader support in head-to-head comparisons.

This perspective is often associated with scholars such as Donald Horowitz and Benjamin Reilly. Their main concern is that, in divided societies, multiethnic societies, or highly polarized political environments, electoral systems can be designed to give candidates incentives to reach beyond their own camp and seek preference support from other groups. This is sometimes called vote-pooling.

This reform direction focuses more on who can become a broadly acceptable winner in a single office or single-member district.

Possible effects include:

  • Candidates may find it harder to win merely by using extreme rhetoric to mobilize a loyal base.
  • Politicians may need to seek second-preference support from voters outside their own camp.
  • The winner may be more broadly acceptable, rather than simply representing the largest core base.
  • Electoral competition may shift from “intensifying us-versus-them conflict” toward “expanding acceptability.”
  • Policy may become more stable, with fewer large-scale retaliatory reversals after alternation in power.

Examples of systems that may fit this direction include:

  • IRV / Alternative Vote
  • Condorcet methods, such as Minimax, Ranked Pairs, and Schulze
  • Two-round system
  • Approval Voting
  • Score Voting
  • STAR Voting

Condorcet methods are especially relevant here. They emphasize that if there is a candidate who would defeat every other candidate in head-to-head contests, that candidate should win. This is often seen as a way to identify a candidate who is acceptable to a majority against each alternative.

2. Consensus democracy: making legislatures more inclusive of plural viewpoints

Another reform direction is consensus democracy.

This concept is often associated with Arend Lijphart. He argues that democracy does not have to mean that the majority wins all political power. Democracy can also use proportional representation, coalition government, power-sharing, and multiparty negotiation to include more social groups in decision-making.

Consensus democracy is not necessarily focused on who wins a single office. Its main concern is whether the overall political system gives different groups representation and space for negotiation.

This reform direction focuses more on whether the legislature as a whole can include diverse political forces, rather than allowing one large party to dominate politics with a plurality-based seat advantage.

Possible effects include:

  • Legislative seats may correspond more closely to voters’ actual support.
  • Smaller and emerging parties may have more room to survive.
  • Winner-take-all domination by one large party or bloc may be reduced.
  • Coalition government, cross-party bargaining, and policy compromise may be encouraged.
  • The system may be better suited for handling conflicting interests and values in plural societies.

Examples of systems that may fit this direction include:

  • Party-list PR
  • STV
  • MMP
  • Open-list PR

Compared with centripetal democracy, consensus democracy does not necessarily aim to elect the “most centrist” single candidate. It places more emphasis on overall representation and power-sharing, allowing different political forces to exist proportionally in the legislature and then form governments or policies through negotiation.

3. The two approaches can partly be combined

In my view, centripetal democracy and consensus democracy are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

For example, a country could use IRV, Condorcet, or a two-round system for single offices or single-member districts, so that candidates must seek broader support. At the same time, another chamber or proportional tier could use STV, party-list PR, or MMP to ensure that diverse viewpoints are represented.

Australia is one example worth discussing. The Australian House of Representatives uses preferential voting / IRV, so single-member district competition is not simply FPTP. Meanwhile, the Australian Senate uses STV, which gives smaller parties and more diverse political forces greater opportunities for representation.

In other words, one institutional design can pursue several goals at once:

  • Broad acceptability in single offices or single-member districts;
  • Proportionality and plural representation in the legislature as a whole;
  • Negotiation and stability in government formation.

4. But for this poll, I will still provide only two options

Although the two approaches can be combined to some extent, in real-world politics many countries cannot freely redesign their entire political system.

In some countries, constitutional amendment is extremely difficult. Some countries cannot easily change presidentialism, parliamentarism, bicameralism, or the electoral system for a particular office. Some reformers can only work within the existing institutional framework and prioritize one reform direction first.

Therefore, in this poll, I am not listing “combine both” as a third main option. Instead, I want to ask a more basic question:

If you could only prioritize one reform direction, which one would you support more?

Poll options

  • Centripetal Democracy

I place more importance on encouraging candidates to seek broader acceptance. I tend to support systems such as IRV, Condorcet, two-round voting, Approval, or STAR as replacements for FPTP, especially for single offices or single-member districts.

  • Consensus Democracy

I place more importance on making legislatures more representative of diverse political forces. I tend to support systems such as PR, STV, MMP, or party-list PR as replacements for FPTP, with the goal of encouraging coalition government, cross-party negotiation, and power-sharing.

My question is:

After opposing FPTP, what should electoral reform prioritize?

Should it prioritize electing candidates who are more broadly acceptable? Or should it prioritize building legislatures and governments that can better include plural viewpoints?

View Poll

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u/Previous_Word_3517 — 1 day ago

英國相對多數制的危機:不是多黨化錯了,而是制度不適應多黨化

近期英國選舉顯示,英國的相對多數制正在出現結構性崩壞。過去這套制度之所以能維持穩定,並不是因為它本身特別公平,而是因為英國長期接近兩黨競爭。當大多數選票集中在保守黨與工黨之間時,相對多數制雖然會製造票席落差,但至少能把政治競爭壓縮成穩定的兩大陣營。

但現在的英國已經不是這種格局。2024 年大選中,工黨只拿到 33.7% 選票,卻取得 63.2% 下議院席次;英國改革黨拿到 14.3% 選票,卻只取得 0.8% 席次。這代表選票與席次之間出現嚴重落差,而不是單純的「勝者多拿一點」。

https://preview.redd.it/a1cd165f0f2h1.png?width=1140&format=png&auto=webp&s=508ebd1fd154a133e371fc919e7e0da199f4b9fa

更關鍵的是,英國改革黨的崛起嚴重瓜分了保守黨票源。YouGov 在 2024 年大選前的資料顯示,英國改革黨選民中有 68% 在 2019 年支持保守黨;即使英國改革黨不派候選人,也只有 36% 表示會改投保守黨,另有 26% 會乾脆不投票。這說明英國改革黨不是單純「借走」保守黨選票,而是把一部分原本屬於保守黨聯盟的選民重新組織成獨立政治力量。

這對相對多數制造成致命衝擊。相對多數制最害怕的不是多黨存在,而是同一政治陣營內部出現多個有競爭力的政黨。保守黨與英國改革黨分裂右派票源後,工黨可以用相對較低的全國得票率取得大量席次;但如果未來英國改革黨在更多選區領先,相對多數制也可能反過來把英國改革黨的相對多數放大成國會優勢。換句話說,這套制度不是穩定,而是把小幅票源變化放大成劇烈席次震盪。

2025 年地方選舉進一步證明英國已進入多黨競爭。英國改革黨在當年英格蘭地方選舉中贏得最多席次,共 677 席,占改選席次 41%;更重要的是,當年地方選舉勝選者平均得票率降到歷史低點 40.7%,還有 75 名候選人是在未達 30% 得票下當選。

https://preview.redd.it/zmj8s65w4f2h1.png?width=795&format=png&auto=webp&s=50277ae8d20f1eb6989aad7fcbf10e97ebce6c94

工黨內部也不是完全沒有檢討。工黨議員 Alex Sobel 在 2025 年下議院關於比例代表制的辯論中指出,2024 年工黨雖然取得歷史性多數,但這反而說明制度失敗,而不是制度成功;他也批評以三分之一左右選票形成「贏者全拿」的政治文化已難以接受。 Labour for a New Democracy 也指出,超過 100 名國會議員,其中多數是工黨議員,曾呼籲政府成立全國選制改革委員會。

因此,問題不是英國「不應該多黨化」,而是英國已經多黨化,卻仍使用一套假定兩黨競爭的制度。相對多數制在兩黨時代可以製造穩定政府;但在多黨時代,它更容易製造三種問題:少數得票取得壓倒性席次、第三勢力大量選票被低估、以及左右兩邊都被迫進行棄保與恐懼動員。

棄保與恐懼動員範例:

https://preview.redd.it/m8rcougm8f2h1.png?width=620&format=png&auto=webp&s=1f24c7223725e8df5dec57cc7f08957d10b5d18f

可能展望一:兩輪投票制或排序投票制

第一種改革方向保留了「一選區一代表」的單一選區制骨架,將相對多數制改成兩輪投票制、澳洲式排序投票制,或更偏孔多塞邏輯的排序投票制,而不是走向比例代表制。

這條路線的核心問題意識是:英國真正出問題的地方,不是「單一勝選制」本身,而是相對多數制允許候選人在多黨分裂下,只靠很低比例的選票勝出。當英國改革黨瓜分保守黨票源,綠黨與自由民主黨分散工黨及中間派票源時,相對多數制會把分票效果放大,讓某些候選人即使缺乏廣泛接受,也能靠相對領先當選。

兩輪投票制可以要求候選人在第二輪爭取過半支持;排序投票制則讓選民表達第二、第三偏好,降低棄保壓力,也迫使候選人不能只服務自己的基本盤。若排序投票制採用孔多塞邏輯,則更進一步強調候選人能否在一對一比較中擊敗其他主要對手,避免極端派靠分票漏洞勝出。

這種制度的優點,是它能同時保留地方代表、單一選區、政府形成效率;但候選人若想勝出,就必須爭取更廣泛的次級偏好,而不是只靠 25% 或 30% 的鐵票。

不過,它的限制也很明顯。兩輪制或排序投票制仍然是單一選區制,因此改善的是「當選者是否具有較廣接受度」,不一定能解決全國票席比例落差。若英國希望在保留強政府、單一選區與地方代表連結的同時,提高當選者的民意基礎,這會是較溫和、也較符合英國既有制度骨架的改革路線。

排序投票制的選票範例:

https://zh.wikipedia.org/zh-tw/%E6%8E%92%E5%BA%8F%E8%A4%87%E9%81%B8%E5%88%B6#/media/File:Preferential_ballot_zh.PNG

可能展望二:比例代表制

比例代表制的重點,是讓國會席次更接近各政黨的實際得票比例,減少「三分之一選票取得絕對多數」或「大量選票只換到極少席次」的結果。以 2024 年大選為例,英國改革黨得票高於自由民主黨,卻只拿到 5 席;自由民主黨則拿到 72 席。這不是因為某一方選民比較重要,而是因為相對多數制極度依賴票源地理分布。

比例代表制的優點是能降低票席轉換的扭曲,保守黨、工黨、英國改革黨、自由民主黨、綠黨、蘇格蘭民族黨、威爾士黨等力量,都可以依實際支持度取得較合理的國會存在感。

但它的代價也很明顯。比例代表制伴隨的國會碎片化會讓英國走向聯合政府,削弱傳統英式政治中「誰勝選、誰執政、誰負責」的清楚問責。小黨也可能因為成為組閣關鍵,而取得超過其席次比例的政策影響力。

因此,對於重視強政府、地方問責與清楚執政責任的人來說,比例代表制不是最理想的改革方向。

總結

英國相對多數制的危機,不是因為多黨政治本身錯了,而是因為制度仍停留在兩黨時代。當英國改革黨瓜分保守黨票源、綠黨與自由民主黨分散中間與左翼票源、蘇格蘭與威爾斯又有地方民族政黨時,相對多數制只會把分裂的票源轉換成更誇張的席次結果。

未來英國大致有兩條路:若要保留單一選區與穩定政府,可以採用兩輪投票制或排序投票制,讓當選者必須取得更廣泛接受;若要讓國會席次更接近各政黨實際得票比例,則應考慮比例代表制。

若完全不改革,英國政治很可能繼續出現一種矛盾局面:表面上仍是單一選區、單一勝者、單一多數政府;實際上卻是多黨碎裂、票源分裂、席次暴衝,以及越來越不穩定的政治正當性。

民眾評論:

「當工黨與保守黨不再能從相對多數制中穩定獲利時,過去被他們忽視的比例代表制便突然成為了他們討論的改革方向」

「我已經等不及看到下一階段:候選人在選區內只靠 20% 得票率當選,也能聲稱自己擁有民意正當性。」

reddit.com
u/Previous_Word_3517 — 1 day ago

My ranked runoff ballot design for 3- and 4-candidate runoffs

I am designing a possible ballot format for a ranked runoff election.

The basic idea is that a preliminary first round would narrow the field to either the top 3 or top 4 candidates. These candidates would then advance to a ranked runoff.

In the runoff, voters would not manually rank the candidates by writing numbers next to each name. Instead, the ballot would list every possible complete ranking, and each voter would choose one complete ranking.

For 3 candidates, there are 6 possible rankings.
For 4 candidates, there are 24 possible rankings.

For 3 candidates:

1.Vertical Full-Ranking Ballot 

https://preview.redd.it/m504hyaw5e2h1.png?width=575&format=png&auto=webp&s=8566841c2f340f25f5df39cd885daed08b9cd73b

2.Horizontal Full-Ranking Ballot

https://preview.redd.it/dc98c5ca6e2h1.png?width=671&format=png&auto=webp&s=58c36b697e098b8d08311b6dc5a6d93a2640c4be

3.Numerical Preference Matrix Ballot

https://preview.redd.it/hk3h1oud6e2h1.png?width=446&format=png&auto=webp&s=e1e08d4b5340ad944f7e8e6aa0663e1c78721d3d

Meaning of the numbers in the table:

1 = most preferred, 2 = second preferred, 3 = least preferred.

For 4 candidates:

https://preview.redd.it/gkd63lyz6e2h1.png?width=969&format=png&auto=webp&s=a164688a1b7e486c89febd47d1ce220e28a414ff

Meaning of the numbers:

1 = most preferred, 2 = second preferred, 3 = third preferred, 4 = least preferred.

Advantages over separate head-to-head matchup questions

Compared with asking voters to answer separate head-to-head matchup questions — 3 matchups for 3 candidates, or 6 matchups for 4 candidates — I think this design may have several advantages.

First, it may be faster to count and easier to audit, because each voter selects only one complete ranking. Election officials can simply tally how many voters chose each ranking, and then derive all pairwise results from those totals.

Second, each individual ballot is guaranteed to be internally consistent. A voter cannot accidentally create an intransitive preference cycle, such as Alice > Bob, Bob > Charlie, and Charlie > Alice, on the same ballot. Of course, a Condorcet cycle could still appear in the aggregate electorate, but it would not be caused by an individual voter filling out contradictory pairwise answers.

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u/Previous_Word_3517 — 1 day ago

李光耀和西班牙的佛朗哥,是否是蔣中正的上位替代?

政治人物的高下,不看自我神話,而看他留下了什麼:國家是否真正自主,政局是否長期穩定,社會是否有秩序,人民是否因其統治而變得更富足。 以這幾項硬指標比較,結論相當清楚:李光耀幾乎完勝,佛朗哥次之,蔣中正居末。

李光耀:幾乎沒有短板的建國者

李光耀的成功,從執政初期就已經定調。1959年新加坡取得自治後,他面對的是人口擁擠、失業、住房短缺與族群緊張並存的社會;他沒有先沉迷於宏大敘事,而是先把國家最需要的東西一件件做起來:整頓吏治、建立清廉政府、處理住房、穩住社會。 新加坡日後最值得稱道的,不只是富,而是富得乾淨。李光耀與其團隊很早就把反貪腐當成國家生存問題,建立一套對官員同樣嚴格的廉潔行政,使新加坡從一個曾有腐敗問題的殖民地社會,轉為以政府清廉聞名的國家。這種清廉不是裝飾,而是國家競爭力本身:官僚不腐,政策才能貫徹,投資者才敢長期下注,人民才會相信國家。

1960年代,他接著把「可治理」變成「可生存」。住房政策迅速擴張,國家用公共住宅把原本擁擠而破碎的城市人口重新安置;1965年新加坡被迫脫離馬來西亞後,他沒有讓這個沒有腹地、沒有資源、沒有戰略縱深的小國淪為大國附庸,而是立刻把國家路線轉為自立求生。工業化、吸引外資、發展港口與製造業、推動英語與雙語教育,全部服務於同一件事:讓新加坡靠自己活下去,而且活得比別人更好。1967年,他推動國民服役,把國防從口號變成全民責任;同年新加坡成為東協創始成員,開始替小國在區域內爭出外交空間。李光耀不是只會治理一座城市,而是真正把一座城市鍛造成一個國家。

到了1970、1980年代,李光耀沒有停在「國家活下來」這一步,而是繼續把新加坡往上推。公共住房、教育、國防、招商、城市治理、金融與高附加價值產業升級,逐步把新加坡從弱小港口,推成安全、穩定、繁榮的區域樞紐。到1990年他卸任時,新加坡已不是勉強存活的小邦,而是一個地位遠超體量、人民更團結、制度能延續運作的國家。從國家自主、官僚清廉、政治穩定到經濟發展,李光耀對另外兩人幾乎是全方位壓制

佛朗哥:撥亂反正,避戰圖存,終把西班牙帶回發展軌道

佛朗哥不如李光耀完美,但仍是遠比蔣中正成功的統治者。1930年代的西班牙,並不是一個已具備厚實中產階級、穩定政黨與成熟妥協文化的社會,卻被交給一套難以維持長期政策連續性的共和制度處理。第二共和國時期,地方主義、左右極化、勞工動亂、暴力政治與政府搖擺交織;其多數制選舉安排又進一步放大陣營對撞,使政策難以延續,政治不斷向兩端擺盪。佛朗哥在內戰中的歷史角色正是「撥亂反正」,將西班牙從一套已經失敗的共和制度中解救出來,將一個已經滑向崩裂的國家重新被壓回可治理的秩序。

1939年掌權後,佛朗哥接手的是內部仍然撕裂的國家。就在這種情況下,第二次世界大戰爆發。佛朗哥的高明,不在於選邊站得多快,而在於沒有把西班牙拿去替別人的戰爭殉葬。他一方面利用德國對西班牙的需要,向希特勒開出極高條件;另一方面又始終避免讓西班牙正式投入戰爭。之後他在軸心國與盟國之間維持周旋,既從德國方面獲取利益,又顧及西班牙對英美糧食與石油的依賴;當局勢逆轉後,還能及時重新強化中立姿態。這種在兩邊之間討價還價、把本國利益壓在意識形態之前的冷靜,正是國家政治最稀缺的能力。英國史家對他的戰時外交評語也相當直白:冷酷現實、時機拿捏精準,讓他的政權沒有隨軸心國一起覆滅。

佛朗哥早期並非沒有失誤。他在戰後推行自給自足,導致封閉、低效與經濟停滯,這是應當承認的敗筆;但與蔣中正不同,佛朗哥至少能在路線失敗後把國家轉回正軌。1953年,他與美國達成協議,換取資金與國際空間;1955年西班牙加入聯合國,外交孤立逐步解除;1959年,佛朗哥政府推行穩定計畫,放棄自給自足與過度保護,轉向市場經濟、對外貿易與外資。接下來的1960年至1974年,西班牙經濟平均年增長率達6.6%,進入「西班牙經濟奇蹟」時期,國家迅速工業化。這不是李光耀式的近乎全勝,但仍是先止亂、再保國、後發展的一條成功路線。

到了晚年,佛朗哥還替政權延續做了安排。1947年,他先把西班牙法制上重新定位為君主國;1969年,再正式指定胡安·卡洛斯為繼承人,避免了他死後國家立即墜入無人接班的權力真空。從國家秩序的角度看,能在自己退場前替國家留下一條可續的道路,本身也是統治成績。

蔣中正:腐敗失國,入台失序,對外最不自主

蔣中正與前兩人相比,最難看的地方,不是少了什麼漂亮口號,而是最核心的治理題目沒有做成。國民政府在大陸時期長期被貪腐、軍政失能與惡性通膨侵蝕。美國外交文件對此並不客氣,直接指出國民黨政府各級官員與軍官的普遍貪污舞弊,已經使政府失去人民信任;美國國務院後來總結中國革命時,也明言多年腐敗與管理失當已侵蝕國民政府的民心。最後大陸失守,不只是共產黨打得好,更是國民政府自己先把統治根基爛掉。

更糟的是,這套官僚腐敗並沒有在來台後立刻消失。接收台灣後,陳儀政府的貪污腐敗、壟斷與失政迅速累積民怨,最終孳生二二八事件;事件過後,留下長期的省籍對立。這對任何自稱重視國家整合的人而言,都是極嚴重的失敗。

蔣中正還有一項比李光耀與佛朗哥都更刺眼的缺點:他更依附外國,也更近於諂媚外國。 李光耀會借力,但不把國家命脈交出去;佛朗哥會交易,但始終把西班牙利益放在第一位。蔣中正則屢次把政權存亡押在美援上:1948年局勢惡化時,蔣夫人赴美急切爭取軍援;美國外交文件中也出現對蔣政權高度依賴美援的直接描述。到了台灣時期,國民政府的防衛、國際地位與政策空間都深受美國制約。與李光耀在夾縫中自立、佛朗哥在大戰中兩面爭利相比,蔣中正最像一個需要外國扶持才能維持的政權主人。

結論

若論功績,三人的排序應當寫成:李光耀第一,佛朗哥第二,蔣中正第三。

李光耀最強。他從清廉政治、公共住房、國防建設、族群整合,到工業化與國際化,幾乎把一個小國能做對的事全做對了;他留下的是一個真正獨立、富裕、穩定,而且能長久運轉的國家。
佛朗哥次之。他在西班牙失序時撥亂反正,在二戰中替國家兩邊議價、保全自身,雖然早期經濟路線走錯,最後仍能修正並把國家帶回發展軌道。
蔣中正則最差。他在大陸敗於腐敗,在台灣又讓官僚失政孳生省籍對立,對外還比另外兩人更依附、更失去自主。

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