u/Resident-Concert-387

Even Youtubers are getting slammed with UAPA now.

The following is an excerpt from the book 'Modern India' by Sumit Sarkar.

War time expansion of the Royal Indian Navy had brought in men from all parts of the country, weakening the old military tradition of recruitment from politically undeveloped ‘martial races’. Racial discrimination continued unabated in this last bastion of Empire, while service abroad brought contact with world developments and the I.N.A. trials and the post-war popular upsurge in India had a growing impact. On 18 February, ratings in the Signals training establishment went on hunger-strike against bad food and racist insults. Next day the strike spread to Castle and Fort Barracks on shore and 22 ships in Bombay harbour, and the tricolour, crescent, and hammer-and-sickle were raised jointly on the mastheads of the rebel fleet.

The ratings elected a Naval Central Strike Committee, headed by M.S. Khan, and formulated demands which combined issues of better food, equal pay for white and Indian sailors, etc., with the national political slogans of release of I.N.A. and other political prisoners and withdrawal of Indian troops from Indonesia. The men hesitated fatally, however, on the border-line of peaceful strike and determined mutiny, obeying orders to return to their respective ships or barracks on the after-noon of 20 February, only to find themselves surrounded by army guards. Next day fighting started at Castle Barracks when ratings tried to break out of their encirclement, with the ships providing artillery support, while Admiral Godfrey flew in bombers and threatened to destroy the navy. The same afternoon also saw remarkable scenes of fraternization, with crowds bringing food for ratings to the Gateway of India and shopkeepers inviting them to take whatever they needed.

The pattern of events in fact unconsciously echoed the course of the mutiny on the Black Sea Fleet during the first Russian Revolution of 1905: that too, had begun over inedible food, and fraternizing crowds had been shot down in a scene immortalized later on in the ‘Odessa steps’ sequence of Eisenstein’s film classic Battleship Potemkin. By 22 February, the strike had spread to naval bases all over the country as well as to some ships on sea, involving at its height 78 ships, 20 shore establish ments, and 20,000 ratings. At Karachi, the Hindu standards surrendered that morning only after a gun battle, while Hindu and Muslim students and workers demonstrated their support through violent clashes with the police and army.

At Bombay as well as elsewhere, two sharply different attitudes towards these dramatic developments became evident among Indian political groups by 22 February. The Bombay C.P.I. called for a general strike, which was

supported by Congress Socialist leaders like Aruna Asaf Ali and Achyut Patwardhan. Sardar Patel in sharp contrast advised people ‘to go about their normal business as usual’, and S.K. Patil and Chundrigar, heads of the provincial Congress and League units, even offered volunteers to help restore order. Despite Congress and League opposition, 300,000 downed tools in Bombay on 22 February, closing down almost all mills, and violent street fighting with crowds ‘erecting road blocks and covering them from nearby buildings’ continued for two days particularly in the proletarian districts of Parel and Delisle Road.

Two army battalions were needed to restore order in Bombay city, and the official casualty figures were 228 civilians killed and 1046 injured (plus 3 police deaths and 91 wounded).

Patel, helped for once by Jinnah, managed to persuade the ratings to surrender on 23 February giving an assurance that the national parties would prevent any victimization—a promise soon quietly forgotten, for, as Patel wrote to Andhra Congress leader Viswanathan on 1 March 1946, ‘discipline in the Army cannot be tampered with… We will want Army even in free India’.

Nehru accepted Aruna Asaf Ali’s invitation to come to Bombay, but quickly allowed himself to be ‘impressed by the necessity for curbing the wild outburst of violence’—though he did later on hail the R.I.N, strike for breaking down the ‘iron wall’ between army and people.

Gandhi was as unequivocally hostile as Patel. On 22 February he condemned the ratings for setting ‘a bad and unbecoming example for India’, advised them to peacefully resign their jobs if they had any grievances, and made the very interesting statement that ‘a combination between Hindus and Muslims and others for the purpose of violent action is unholy….’ Aruna Asaf Ali made the pertinent comment in reply that ‘It simply does not lie in the mouth of Congressmen who were themselves going to the legislatures to ask the ratings to give up their jobs.’ She also made a tragically accurate prophecy that it would be far easier to ‘unite the Hindus and Muslims at the barricade than on the constitutional front’.

The R.I.N. ratings of February 1946, in sharp contrast to the men of the Azad Hind Fauj, have never been given the status of national heroes—though their action involved much greater risk in some ways than joining the I.N.A. as alternative to an arduous life in Japanese POW camps. The last message of the Naval Central Strike Committee deserves to be remembered far betterthan it is: ‘Our strike has been a historic event in the life of our nation. For the first time the blood of men in the Services and in the streets flowed together in a common cause. We in the Services will never forget this. We know also that you, our brothers and sisters, will not forget. Long live our great people! Jai Hind!’.

The following is an excerpt from the book 'Modern India' by Sumit Sarkar.

War time expansion of the Royal Indian Navy had brought in men from all parts of the country, weakening the old military tradition of recruitment from politically undeveloped ‘martial races’. Racial discrimination continued unabated in this last bastion of Empire, while service abroad brought contact with world developments and the I.N.A. trials and the post-war popular upsurge in India had a growing impact. On 18 February, ratings in the Signals training establishment went on hunger-strike against bad food and racist insults. Next day the strike spread to Castle and Fort Barracks on shore and 22 ships in Bombay harbour, and the tricolour, crescent, and hammer-and-sickle were raised jointly on the mastheads of the rebel fleet.

The ratings elected a Naval Central Strike Committee, headed by M.S. Khan, and formulated demands which combined issues of better food, equal pay for white and Indian sailors, etc., with the national political slogans of release of I.N.A. and other political prisoners and withdrawal of Indian troops from Indonesia. The men hesitated fatally, however, on the border-line of peaceful strike and determined mutiny, obeying orders to return to their respective ships or barracks on the after-noon of 20 February, only to find themselves surrounded by army guards. Next day fighting started at Castle Barracks when ratings tried to break out of their encirclement, with the ships providing artillery support, while Admiral Godfrey flew in bombers and threatened to destroy the navy. The same afternoon also saw remarkable scenes of fraternization, with crowds bringing food for ratings to the Gateway of India and shopkeepers inviting them to take whatever they needed.

The pattern of events in fact unconsciously echoed the course of the mutiny on the Black Sea Fleet during the first Russian Revolution of 1905: that too, had begun over inedible food, and fraternizing crowds had been shot down in a scene immortalized later on in the ‘Odessa steps’ sequence of Eisenstein’s film classic Battleship Potemkin. By 22 February, the strike had spread to naval bases all over the country as well as to some ships on sea, involving at its height 78 ships, 20 shore establish ments, and 20,000 ratings. At Karachi, the Hindu standards surrendered that morning only after a gun battle, while Hindu and Muslim students and workers demonstrated their support through violent clashes with the police and army.

At Bombay as well as elsewhere, two sharply different attitudes towards these dramatic developments became evident among Indian political groups by 22 February. The Bombay C.P.I. called for a general strike, which was

supported by Congress Socialist leaders like Aruna Asaf Ali and Achyut Patwardhan. Sardar Patel in sharp contrast advised people ‘to go about their normal business as usual’, and S.K. Patil and Chundrigar, heads of the provincial Congress and League units, even offered volunteers to help restore order. Despite Congress and League opposition, 300,000 downed tools in Bombay on 22 February, closing down almost all mills, and violent street fighting with crowds ‘erecting road blocks and covering them from nearby buildings’ continued for two days particularly in the proletarian districts of Parel and Delisle Road.

Two army battalions were needed to restore order in Bombay city, and the official casualty figures were 228 civilians killed and 1046 injured (plus 3 police deaths and 91 wounded).

Patel, helped for once by Jinnah, managed to persuade the ratings to surrender on 23 February giving an assurance that the national parties would prevent any victimization—a promise soon quietly forgotten, for, as Patel wrote to Andhra Congress leader Viswanathan on 1 March 1946, ‘discipline in the Army cannot be tampered with… We will want Army even in free India’.

Nehru accepted Aruna Asaf Ali’s invitation to come to Bombay, but quickly allowed himself to be ‘impressed by the necessity for curbing the wild outburst of violence’—though he did later on hail the R.I.N, strike for breaking down the ‘iron wall’ between army and people.

Gandhi was as unequivocally hostile as Patel. On 22 February he condemned the ratings for setting ‘a bad and unbecoming example for India’, advised them to peacefully resign their jobs if they had any grievances, and made the very interesting statement that ‘a combination between Hindus and Muslims and others for the purpose of violent action is unholy….’ Aruna Asaf Ali made the pertinent comment in reply that ‘It simply does not lie in the mouth of Congressmen who were themselves going to the legislatures to ask the ratings to give up their jobs.’ She also made a tragically accurate prophecy that it would be far easier to ‘unite the Hindus and Muslims at the barricade than on the constitutional front’.

The R.I.N. ratings of February 1946, in sharp contrast to the men of the Azad Hind Fauj, have never been given the status of national heroes—though their action involved much greater risk in some ways than joining the I.N.A. as alternative to an arduous life in Japanese POW camps. The last message of the Naval Central Strike Committee deserves to be remembered far betterthan it is: ‘Our strike has been a historic event in the life of our nation. For the first time the blood of men in the Services and in the streets flowed together in a common cause. We in the Services will never forget this. We know also that you, our brothers and sisters, will not forget. Long live our great people! Jai Hind!’.

Many people in our country have a poor understanding of the socio-economic characteristics of India before 1991. Many believe, that our country was a 'socialist' country of some sort. Their shining evidence being, public enterprises, restrictions on private capital and the constitution's preamble.

One of their most prominent arguments is in regards to economic planning.

They say to communists, "if India wasn't a socialist country why did we have planning and restrictions on foreign capital?" Forgetting that import substitution was the favourite word of economists in Asia for a long time. That many non-communist developing countries used planning as a valuable tool of development, back when foreign capital wasn't as generous.

Economic planning in India was born during colonial rule in 1938 in India's prominent landlord party, the Indian national congress. It was created after much demand by.... Indian capitalists and and few left and right forces within congress.

But then, why would Capitalists extensively lobby for and formulate a system which restricted their own interests of the free market ?

Indian capitalists, now certain that the days of colonial rule and favorable contracts by the British would end, were interested in formulating a new economic programme. However India still was a feudal country at best, without no real basis or infrastructure for transitioning into capitalism. The Indian capitalist was too weak and speculative to bear the brunt of foreign competition. While developing heavy industries by themselves will be all too risky.

Turns out the free market isn't so worth fighting for if you would emerge as the 'loser' In the competition of that free market.

So programmes were devised to attempt a controlled "nationalisation" where the risky heavy industry would be left to the government while the profitable consumer industry would up for grabs by private forces, with a gradual 'withering away' of the public sector as development progressed.

New tarrifs and protections were brought to save Indian capital from foreign competition while any domestic completion would be made impossible by relative poverty and a complex system of licenses.

Notably this protection also meant the domestic market forces didn't need to make competitive products, instead they could just license foreign goods and continue producing them for long periods, appealing to their lazy and speculative natures. Afterall The Ambassador, the most prominent symbol of indian "socialism" was a licensed car built by the Birlas.

The above laziness was also the an important reason this model had failed to produce results. Almost all the countries which shielded their domestic capitalist class from foreign capital had forced them to copy and iterate, they were encouraged to built their presence in the relatively advanced western markets. Even the soviets were selling their Lada Samara's all the way in Britain.

Our country on the other hand had never had such ambitions with its artificially high rate of exchange.

The domestic capitalists were too incompetent and complacent to expand their influence.

Whatever was developed was a derivative of a foreign product, wasn't iterated upon due to the creation of (effectively) an oligarchy.

There was also a notable elitism in the conduct of education and healthcare, the prerequisites for industrialisation. AIIMS were too few, while IITs were elite, uppercaste circlejerks whose students were interested in fleeing away the first chance they had. Primary education was all too lacking.

Not surprising as the country didn't go through any serious social transformation. Casteism was alive and kicking, finding new ways to integrate with capitalism. Communal attitudes strengthened, and the position of women didn't improve considerably.

The concept of industrial development was bound to fail in the absence of social development and an 'industrious' Bourgeoisie.

​ Many people in our country have a poor understanding of the socio-economic characteristics of India before 1991. Many believe, that our country was a 'socialist' country of some sort. Their shining evidence being, public enterprises, restrictions on private capital and the constitution's preamble.

One of their most prominent arguments is in regards to economic planning.

They say to communists, "if India wasn't a socialist country why did we have planning and restrictions on foreign capital?" Forgetting that import substitution was the favourite word of economists in Asia for a long time. That many non-communist developing countries used planning as a valuable tool of development, back when foreign capital wasn't as generous.

Economic planning in India was born during colonial rule in 1938 in India's prominent landlord party, the Indian national congress. It was created after much demand by.... Indian capitalists and and few left and right forces within congress.

But then, why would Capitalists extensively lobby for and formulate a system which restricted their own interests of the free market ?

Indian capitalists, now certain that the days of colonial rule and favorable contracts by the British would end, were interested in formulating a new economic programme. However India still was a feudal country at best, without no real basis or infrastructure for transitioning into capitalism. The Indian capitalist was too weak and speculative to bear the brunt of foreign competition. While developing heavy industries by themselves will be all too risky.

Turns out the free market isn't so worth fighting for if you would emerge as the 'loser' In the competition of that free market.

So programmes were devised to attempt a controlled "nationalisation" where the risky heavy industry would be left to the government while the profitable consumer industry would up for grabs by private forces, with a gradual 'withering away' of the public sector as development progressed.

New tarrifs and protections were brought to save Indian capital from foreign competition while any domestic completion would be made impossible by relative poverty and a complex system of licenses.

Notably this protection also meant the domestic market forces didn't need to make competitive products, instead they could just license foreign goods and continue producing them for long periods, appealing to their lazy and speculative natures. Afterall The Ambassador, the most prominent symbol of indian "socialism" was a licensed car built by the Birlas.

The above laziness was also the an important reason this model had failed to produce results. Almost all the countries which shielded their domestic capitalist class from foreign capital had forced them to copy and iterate, they were encouraged to built their presence in the relatively advanced western markets. Even the soviets were selling their Lada Samara's all the way in Britain.

Our country on the other hand had never had such ambitions with its artificially high rate of exchange.

The domestic capitalists were too incompetent and complacent to expand their influence.

Whatever was developed was a derivative of a foreign product, wasn't iterated upon due to the creation of (effectively) an oligarchy.

There was also a notable elitism in the conduct of education and healthcare, the prerequisites for industrialisation. AIIMS were too few, while IITs were elite, uppercaste circlejerks whose students were interested in fleeing away the first chance they had. Primary education was all too lacking.

Not surprising as the country didn't go through any serious social transformation. Casteism was alive and kicking, finding new ways to integrate with capitalism. Communal attitudes strengthened, and the position of women didn't improve considerably.

The concept of Planned industrial development was bound to fail in the absence of social development and an 'industrious' Bourgeoisie.

In the last few days, much has been discussed about the CJP (Cockroach Janata party). We as Communists have been criticised that we are 'puranitical' for rejecting the movement, while others are on the fence on how they should view The CJP. Some are optimistic, some thinks it's the CIA, some others allege it's AAP.

To me, CJP is nothing more than an online page with some followers, there are people who think that CJP is 'revolutionary' just because it dares to criticise and because the younger people are associated with it.

On the front of critique, The CJP has only a single popular issue at best. The NEET paper leak and demanding resignation of The education minister.

But what's the use of it? One incompetent man would be replaced by another (If the government is feeling generous with an incompetent women perhaps to earn "naari shakti" points.) it will not change the fundamentally broken system of education.

On the front of association, The 'youth' is not class. Generations contrary to popular belief are not uniform. The interests of a 'youth' who bought the paper for lakhs is very different from the 'youth' who's preparation and coaching fees got wasted. Simply speaking there is no class or caste basis for CJP which means it will quickly turn into circlejerk for the urban upper caste youth.

Lastly, internet activism like CJP might achieve followers and might be convinient, but there could be no social progress without ground presence.

Still there is much to learn from this "bourgeois" movement.

For one the youth of our country are slowly realsing that their future is precarious and are developing consciousness. Sure its the urban youth but when your country's most privileged start to realise, it's an indication that things are not going well for capital.

There is also resistence to this Simple CJP movement as well. From those same 'middle class' and 'educated' who think the movement is too 'political' for their tastes.

One thing i want to make clear by the above line is that our country is in a very weird Position. While the failure and decay of the system is touching the privileged, they are to conscious about losing their privilege and too prejudiced to do anything aside from occasionally criticise the matters which affect them.

Any social movement which targets them is bound to fail.

On the other the marginalised sections of the population living in smaller towns and cities are probably angry with dissatisfaction too, but nobody has made any party are program which addresses their issues in a radical way.

Here is where there is the Most potential.

A mirror to the independence movement more than a century ago.

In the last few days, much has been discussed about the CJP (Cockroach Janata party). We as Communists have been criticised that we are 'puranitical' for rejecting the movement, while others are on the fence on how they should view The CJP. Some are optimistic, some thinks it's the CIA, some others allege it's AAP.

To me, CJP is nothing more than an online page with some followers, there are people who think that CJP is 'revolutionary' just because it dares to criticise and because the younger people are associated with it.

On the front of critique, The CJP has only a single popular issue at best. The NEET paper leak and demanding resignation of The education minister.

But what's the use of it? One incompetent man would be replaced by another (If the government is feeling generous with an incompetent women perhaps to earn "naari shakti" points.) it will not change the fundamentally broken system of education.

On the front of association, The 'youth' is not class. Generations contrary to popular belief are not uniform. The interests of a 'youth' who bought the paper for lakhs is very different from the 'youth' who's preparation and coaching fees got wasted. Simply speaking there is no class or caste basis for CJP which means it will quickly turn into circlejerk for the urban upper caste youth.

Lastly, internet activism like CJP might achieve followers and might be convinient, but there could be no social progress without ground presence.

Still there is much to learn from this "bourgeois" movement.

For one the youth of our country are slowly realsing that their future is precarious and are developing consciousness. Sure its the urban youth but when your country's most privileged start to realise, it's an indication that things are not going well for capital.

There is also resistence to this Simple CJP movement as well. From those same 'middle class' and 'educated' who think the movement is too 'political' for their tastes.

One thing i want to make clear by the above line is that our country is in a very weird Position. While the failure and decay of the system is touching the privileged, they are to conscious about losing their privilege and too prejudiced to do anything aside from occasionally criticise the matters which affect them.

Any social movement which targets them is bound to fail.

On the other, the marginalised sections of the population living in smaller towns and cities are probably angry with dissatisfaction too, but nobody has made any party are program which addresses their issues in a radical way.

Here is where there is the most potential.

A mirror to the independence movement more than a century ago.