Why I Try to Avoid the Compatibilist/incompatibilist Debate
I generally like debating ideas, but debating compatibilism verses incompatibilism, I find tedious. It might appear that this debate should be decided by looking at the empirical evidence and seeing which theory better comports with the evidence. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Compatibilism is a debate about the nature of determinism, and this is necessarily an ontological debate. I find all ontological debates tedious.
For example, the compatibilist argument that if you rewind time after you made a difficult decision, you would always make the identical choice. To them this proves there is never any leeway in our choosing. However, there is no, and can be no, experimental evidence for this. It is just a baseless claim that boils down to an ontological "yes it is," "no it's not" stalemate.
There appears to be no difference of the either view in explaining the objective observations of free will behavior. Anytime apparent indeterminism is observed, the compatibilist rightly claims that they do not need to subscribe to determinism.
Let's look at an example. Suppose we observe how rats navigate a maze that requires each rat to choose the correct way to turn at 4 "T" junctions in order to escape. We follow the statistics of which way the rat turns at each junction over the course of 10 trials. We do this for all 10 of the rats and compile the results. These types of experiments have been done many times over the years. The pattern invariably found is that initially the choice for each junction was a random 50%. The rats proved to the investigators (and probably to themselves) that either choice was possible at each of the 4 junctions. As the rats repeated the maze, the statistics changed. The choice that led out of the maze instead of a blind alley increased in frequency. By the 10th iteration, most subjects ran the maze making the correct choice at each of the 4 junctions. Random choices became purposeful choices as the maze was explored and knowledge of the subject increased. How should we think about this result?
The libertarian explanation is that rats have a genetic influence to escape a maze and will choose randomly if no information is available as a basis for choice. Choosing randomly we can all agree is not indicative of free will. However, their experience in running the maze gives them the information to make a rational, free will choice in later trials. Libertarians believe that at each junction the subject chooses according to its purpose, based upon the information it has. How do compatibilists view these results?
Some compatibilists might agree with the libertarian account. Some might say that the initial choices, though they appeared random, were actually manifestations of complex deterministic factors that just happen to appear as a 0.50 frequency. Some might think that choosing which way to go in a maze is totally unrelated to the type of free will needed for human moral responsibility. How do you explain these results?